Korea’s green growth experience by Global Green Growth Institute
Korea’s Green Growth Experience: 
Process, Outcomes and Lessons Learned
ISBN 979-11-952673-5-4
Copyright © 2015
Global Green Growth Institute
19F Jeongdong Building, 21-15 Jeongdong-gil, Jung-gu, Seoul, 100-784, Korea
The Global Green Growth Institute does not make any warranty, either express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for 
the accuracy, completeness, or any third party’s use or the results of such use of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed 
of the information contained herein or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. The text of this publication may 
be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educational or nonprofit uses, provided that acknowledgement of the source is made. 
Resale or commercial use is prohibited without special permission. The  views and opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily 
state or reflect those of the Global Green Growth Institute. 
Cover Image © Freedom Man - Shutterstock, Inc. 
Korea’s Green Growth Experience: 
Process, Outcomes and Lessons Learned
Foreword I
Acknowledgment II
Abbreviations and Acronyms III
Executive Summary 1
CHAPTER 1: Introduction
1. Introduction 7
 1.1 Overview 7
 1.2 Low-Carbon Green Growth: The Korean Way 10
 1.3 Institutional Framework for Low-Carbon Green Growth 12
 1.4 Implementation Plans for Green Growth 14
References 20
CHAPTER 2: Low-Carbon Society
1. Introduction 23
 1.1 Overview 23
 1.2 Baseline Assessment 24
 1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth 31
2. Targets and Strategies 32
 2.1 Setting of Mid-term Emissions-Reduction Targets 33
 2.2 Setting of Emissions-Reduction Targets by Sector, Business Types, and Year 37
3. Policy Actions and Programs  40
 3.1 Establishment of the GIR and National GHG Inventory 42
 3.2 Korea Voluntary Emission Reduction (KVER) Scheme 44
 3.3 Target Management Scheme (TMS)  49
 3.4 Public Sector TMS 58
 3.5 Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) 62
4. Assessment 71
 4.1 Quantitative Assessment  71
 4.2 Qualitative Assessment 71
5. Takeaways and Recommendations 76
References 78
CHAPTER 3: Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
1. Introduction 83
 1.1 Overview 83
 1.2 Baseline Assessment 85
 1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth 89
2. Targets and Strategies 91
 2.1 The First National Energy Basic Plan (2008-2030) 92
 2.2 Energy Demand Management  93
 2.3 Energy Supply Management – Promotion of Clean Energy Use  96
 2.4 Target Setting 99
3. Policy Actions and Programs 100
 3.1 Policies and Programs on Renewable Energy 100
 3.1.1 Feed-in Tariff Policy  101
 3.1.2 Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 107
 3.1.3 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 112
 3.2 Policies and Programs on Energy Efficiency 100
Table of Contents
 
 3.2.1 Tax Credits for Investments in Energy-Saving Facilities  114
 3.2.2 Government Loans on Energy Use Rationalization Projects  116
 3.2.3 Government Support for Energy Diagnosis of SMEs  120
 3.2.4 Mandatory Public Procurement of Energy Efficient Goods  122
 3.3 Rationalization of Energy Prices 123
 3.4 Government Revenues for Financing Energy Sector Programs 128
4. Assessment 129
 4.1 Quantitative Assessment 130
 4.2 Qualitative Assessment 132
5. Takeaways and Recommendations 135
References 137
CHAPTER 4: Green Technology and Innovation
1. Introduction 141
 1.1 Overview 141
 1.2 Baseline Assessment  144
 1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth 148
2. Targets and Strategies 148
 2.1 Principles of Selection and Concentration 148
 2.2 National Strategy and Target Setting 150
 2.3 Green Technology Target Setting (Five-Year National Plan for Green Growth) 156
3.  Policy Actions and Programs 157
 3.1 R&D Investment Plans 157
 3.2 Institutional Framework 159
 3.3 R&D Programs and Fostering Green Talents 163
 3.3.1 Expansion of Basic Research and Promotion of Technological Convergence. 163
 3.3.2 Technologies for Greening of Strategic Industries  165
 3.3.3 Eco-friendly Technologies 166
 3.3.4 Establishment of Infrastructure for Green R&D  168
4. Assessment 174
 4.1 Quantitative Assessment 174
 4.2 Qualitative Assessment 179
 
5. Takeaways and Recommendations 181
References 183
CHAPTER 5: Green Lifestyles
1. Introduction 187
 1.1 Overview 187
 1.2 Baseline Assessment  188
 1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Grwoth 191
2. Targets and Strategies 194
 2.1 Local Green Growth Committees (LGGCs) and the Green Start Movement 195
 2.2 Government Plans and Strategies 197
 2.2.1 Plan on Expansion of Low-Carbon Green Life Practices (2009) 197
 2.2.2 Follow-up Plans from the Ministry of Environment  199
 2.3 Target Setting 199
3. Policy Actions and Programs 202
 3.1 Green Procurement and Consumption 202
 3.1.1 Mandatory Green Public Procurement  202
 3.1.2 Green Store Certification Program  204
 3.1.3 Voluntary Agreement for Green Procurement  207
 3.1.4 Carbon Labeling  208
 3.1.5 Carbon Points System  210
 3.2 Green Education and Environmental Awareness 212
 3.2.1 Green Leaders Program  213
 3.2.2 Green Campus Initiative  216
 3.2.3 “Cool-Mapsy” Campaign  218
 3.3 Waste Management 219
 3.3.1 Volume-based Waste Fee System  220
 3.3.2 Weight-based Food Waste Fee System  224
4. Assessment  228
 4.1 Quantitative Assessment  228
 4.2 Qualitative Assessment  236
5. Takeaways and Recommendations  237
References 239
CHAPTER 6: Green Industries
1. Introduction 243
 1.1 Overview 243
 1.2 Baseline Assessment 244
 1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth 250
2. Targets and Strategies 250
 2.1 Green Transformation of the Industrial Sector 250
 2.2 Development of Green Venture SMEs 256
 2.3 Building an Industrial Structure based on Resource Circulation 257
 2.4 Establishment of Green Industrial Complex and Clusters 259
 2.5 Target Setting 260
3. Policy Actions and Programs 261
 3.1 Green Certification and Financial Instruments 261
 3.1.1 Green Certification Scheme 261
 3.1.2 Financial Instruments in Support of Green Industries 263
 3.2 Regional Green Industrial Clusters 267
4. Assessment 269
 4.1 Quantitative Assessment 269
 4.2 Qualitative Assessment 274
5. Takeaways and Recommendations 276
References 278
CHAPTER 7: Green Homeland and Transportation 
1. Introduction 281
 1.1 Overview 281
 1.2 Baseline Assessment  282
 1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth 288
2. Targets and Strategies 291
 2.1 GHG Reduction Targets under the Green Homeland and Green Transport Agenda 291
 2.2 Strategies: Green Cities and Green Buildings 291
 2.3 Strategies: Green Transport 293
 2.4 Target Setting  296
3. Policy Actions and Programs 297
 3.1 Green Transportation 297
 3.1.1 Transportation Reform in Seoul and the Metropolitan Area 297
 3.1.2 Improvement of Vehicle-Emission and Fuel-Economy Standards 302
 3.1.3 Old Car Replacement Subsidy Program 304
 3.2 Green Cities 305
 3.2.1 Greening of Cities in the ROK – Case Studies of Incheon and Seoul 306
 3.2.2 Urban Farming 311
 3.3 Green Buildings 313
 3.3.1 Building Design Criteria for Energy Saving 313
 3.3.2 Energy-Efficiency Grade Certification Scheme 315
 3.3.3 Green Standard for Energy and Environmental Design (G-SEED) Program 318
4. Assessment  321
 4.1 Quantitative Assessment  321
 4.2 Qualitative Assessment 325
5. Takeaways and Recommendations 326
References 329
CHAPTER 8: Conclusion
1. Conclusion 334
 1.1 Key Milestones 334
 1.2 Key Limitations 337
 1.3 The New Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2014-2018) 340
 1.4 Takeaways and Recommendations 341
References 343
IMany countries look up to the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) phenomenal rise when it morphed from a besieged 
underdog to an economic powerhouse. Left in ruins after years of colonization and war, the government pursued 
export-oriented industrialization strategies that enabled economic growth at an unprecedented scale and speed. 
The admiration for the ROK’s rags-to-riches economic success stems largely from the fact that it is a nation devoid 
of natural resources, thus lacking the recourse to adopt resource-based approaches that have proven successful 
in many well-endowed countries. 
However, the limitations of the ROK’s manufacturing-driven and export-led growth have become more apparent 
in recent years. Despite having weathered the global oil shock in the 1970s and the emerging market debt crises 
in the 1980s, the nation’s economy was hit severely by fluctuations in global trade and commodity prices during 
the 1990s-2000s. Today, the country stands at the crossroads – it has to address the growing perils of natural 
resource scarcity, climate change, and global economic slowdown. 
The rapidly changing global landscape has pushed the ROK to position itself as a leading global force in promoting 
green growth as a new development paradigm. While various countries have also started to explore the merits 
of green growth in their policies and programs, the ROK raised the bar higher by embracing green growth as a 
national vision embedded in its governance system. Its confidence to explore this uncharted path deserves an in-
depth analysis and since no exhaustive documentation has been undertaken so far to evaluate the progress of the 
ROK’s green growth policy, this report – Korea’s Green Growth Experience – intends to fill this knowledge gap. 
The report highlights the processes, outcomes, and key takeaways in advancing green growth planning and 
implementation in the Korean context. Drawing on the expertise of a broad range of sector specialists and 
practitioners, the value-added knowledge from this report is expected to serve as the basis for more vigorous, 
long-term, and country-driven engagement on green growth. Specifically, it could inform policymakers, experts, 
advisers, scholars, and the broader development community of the emerging evidence for green growth and guide 
them in transforming the trade-offs into synergies in the form of bankable projects and win-win investments with 
tangible impacts on the ground. Given the solid global momentum to accelerate green growth, this is the opportune 
moment to look at the remarkable case of the ROK to cull out some useful lessons and relevant practices for other 
countries. 
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1Green growth offers opportunities to address the 
unprecedented development challenges of our age. It 
strives to provide innovative solutions that integrate 
economic growth, environmental sustainability, and 
social inclusiveness. As the global momentum for 
green growth accelerates, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) has boldly pursued this path to address fossil 
fuel dependency, economic slowdown, and climate 
change. By minimizing the tradeoffs and maximizing 
the synergies of greening the economy, the ROK 
adopted green growth as a national development 
strategy under the Lee Myung-bak administration.
Being the only country so far that has embraced 
green growth at a scale and speed never been 
demonstrated elsewhere, the ROK’s green growth 
experience thus deserves an in-depth analysis. 
Moreover, the fact that the ROK’s development 
path is relevant to both developed and developing 
countries, given its rags-to-riches economic 
success, makes it case worth examining. 
ROK’s Low-Carbon Green Growth Model 
The ROK’s green growth model is distinctively 
characterized by its high degree of bureaucratic 
centralization and strong top-down leadership 
that elevated green growth as a national priority. 
Although energy conservation and environmental 
sustainability have long been a part of the ROK’s 
development efforts, these issues were at the 
forefront of Lee Myung-bak administration’s 
national agenda. Its leadership placed green growth 
as a long-term vision, development paradigm, and a 
key policy goal carried out not as a slow evolutionary 
effort but as a swift and politically charged 
decision that was perceived to even match the 
economic miracle of the post-Korean War period. 
The path called “low carbon green growth” 
underscores the need to continue growing 
economically but under a scenario where 
greenhouse gas emissions are reduced at specific 
levels to mitigate climate change and also generate 
new growth engines such as green technology, 
green industries, and green jobs. Thus, this model 
advances the premise that emissions reduction 
need not hamper economic growth and can 
even unleash new growth nodes. As a matter of 
fact, the opportunities are immense especially 
for economies like the ROK with sophisticated 
levels of technology and industrial innovation.
In the ROK’s pursuit of low-carbon green growth, 
four unique milestones are noteworthy: 
(1) building the solid governance framework for 
green growth by establishing the Presidential 
Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) in 2009; 
(2) strengthening the legal enabling environment 
for green growth by enacting the Framework 
Act on Low Carbon Green Growth in 2010; 
(3) mobilizing various ministries to formulate 
comprehensive green growth plans at various 
levels – sectoral, national, and local – including 
the National Strategy for Green Growth (2009-
2050) and the Five-Year Plan (2009-2013); and 
(4) honoring Korea’s commitment in the global 
climate change agenda by setting an ambitious 
GHG reduction target of 30% by 2020, the 
highest recommended target for a non-
Annex 1 country of the Kyoto Protocol.
The confluence of these milestones created a 
strong enabling environment for green growth 
in the ROK as it lays out the institutional, legal, 
and programmatic platform for green growth. 
The Framework Act on Low Carbon Green 
Growth has succeeded in institutionalizing 
green growth as a domestic policy and 
provided a good template for other countries 
in formulating a comprehensive and proactive 
policy that integrates economic, environmental, 
and social objectives in one framework. 
The creation of the PCGG is a major organizational 
innovation given its independent capacity to 
mobilize inter-ministerial and multi-stakeholder 
efforts on green growth planning. Moreover, the 
ROK’s action-oriented and whole-of-government 
approach to green growth strategy is another good 
policy practice that could be replicated in other 
countries. Figure 1 encapsulates the core elements 
Executive Summary 
2of the ROK’s green growth policy, demonstrating 
how the convergence of these key factors helped 
create a strong foundation for green growth.
Progress by Themes
Low Carbon Society
In line with the ambitious target of reducing 
emissions by 30% from BAU levels by 2020 
(the highest target recommended by IPCC), the 
government has implemented a comprehensive 
mitigation strategy. It has succeeded in establishing 
a specialized center for GHG inventory (Greenhouse 
Gas Inventory and Research Center) and has also 
involved the public and private sector in a number 
of emissions reduction programs. These initiatives 
provided the strong ground for the launch of 
the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) in 
January 2015 despite the strong opposition from 
the industries over the policy’s implications on 
the ROK’s international competitiveness. The 
K-ETS will reinforce the ROK’s climate change 
mitigation policy by targeting the biggest emitters 
and thus could yield the most extensive impacts. 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy
Through the introduction of the First National 
Basic Energy Plan as the new overarching national 
Figure 1: Strong foundation of the ROK’s green growth policy
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3energy masterplan, the ROK’s green growth strategy 
for the energy sector targets both the supply 
and demand-side of the market. Its interventions 
of reducing energy demand, improving energy 
efficiency, and deploying renewable energy do not 
only seek to address the impacts of oil crisis but 
also to enhance the ROK’s environmental standing 
and strategically reform the economic structure 
based on new growth engines. The launch of the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) in 2013 
has placed stringent mandate on national power 
producers to meet targets for a proportion of their 
energy to come from renewables. Despite these 
efforts, greening the economy remains an enormous 
task for the ROK as there are no substantial 
improvements in energy intensity among its major 
industries especially the manufacturing sector.
Green Technology and Innovation
By adopting the formula of selection and 
concentration that has been an effective 
strategy for the ROK since its early stages of 
rapid economic growth, it has succeeded in 
narrowing the technological gap vis-à-vis its 
global counterparts and this could not have 
been possible without a significant boost in R&D 
investments for green innovation, specifically 
the promotion of convergence among existing 
and emerging technologies. Among the 27 key 
green technologies selected as priority areas for 
investment and commercialization, secondary 
cells and LED exhibited the best outcomes. 
Other technology items such as energy storage 
systems, renewable energy systems, and electric 
vehicles have made positive progress to become 
globally competitive while the progress in other 
technologies will require more time and resources 
to be globally competitive. The achievements in 
this area are critical as it will lay out the foundation 
for the generation of new growth engines.
Green Lifestyle
Greening people’s lifestyle requires society-wide 
behavioral change and the ROK has pursued 
incremental steps toward this endeavor by 
implementing a combination of binding and 
incentivizing policies targeting specific groups and 
sectors as well as by integrating both top-down 
and bottom-up approaches to communication. 
Public awareness and participation across all 
sectors have improved through the successful 
launch of the nationwide movement for low-
carbon green growth (the Green Start Movement) 
and the establishment of Local Green Growth 
Committees with the given roles of preparing 
and implementing green growth plans at the 
grassroots level. A wide range of government-led 
initiatives such as green procurement, carbon 
labeling, green education, and pay-as-you-throw 
waste management programs have entered a 
stage of maturity, serving a bottom-up momentum 
to pursue green life practices. To observe more 
proactive efforts from the public to shift to a 
greener lifestyle, longer term and tailor-made 
communication strategy is key to address this gap.
Green Homeland and Transportation
To transform the energy-intensive industrial 
structure of the cities, the Five-Year Plan has 
focused on three major entry points: urban 
planning, buildings, and transportation. Multiple 
pilot projects for greening of city operations and 
urban regeneration carried out by ministries and 
local governments have helped limit growth in 
urban energy consumption. Furthermore, the 
efficiency of the ROK’s public transportation system 
has improved significantly through the years by 
increasing its number of passengers and now serves 
as a good benchmark for other countries such as 
its quasi-public bus scheme and integrated subway 
system. Moreover, the adoption of strengthened 
building codes and increased participation in 
energy-efficiency building certifications have helped 
prevent further growth in GHG emissions from the 
building sector. The ROK’s experience in this area 
underscores the importance of addressing complex 
urban problems not as stand-alone issues but as a 
part of the larger integrated system covering a range 
of physical, economic, social, and behavioral factors. 
Green Industries
Aiming to create new growth engines to weather 
the energy and environmental crisis, the ROK 
intends to green the existing industries and also 
create new ones. Its overall plan to pursue the 
“green transformation” of the industrial sector 
focuses on green innovation of core industrial 
sectors, industrial restructuring for low-carbon 
development, and greening of the value chain. 
Given the ROK’s success in pressuring businesses 
to incorporate environmental considerations in 
4business operations, considerable progress has 
been achieved in greening its major industries such 
as steel, chemical, automobile, and electronics, 
which consume much energy and emit large 
amounts of GHG. To advance structural reform, 
the government has selected 17 industries with 
the highest potential to create new markets and 
bring positive spillover effects.  Greening the value 
chain, on the other hand, entails fostering of green 
SMEs, promotion of resource circulation in the 
industrial processes, and the establishment of green 
industrial complexes incubating high-tech industries 
and innovative public-private partnerships.
 
Way Forward
In testing the merits of green growth as a 
development paradigm, the ROK’s greatest 
contribution lies in its boldness and optimism 
to pursue green growth at a national scale with 
concrete targets and action plans. Its efforts are 
not futile given its achievements to date but its 
green growth model is not without limitations. Its 
degree of “greenness” remains debatable due to 
its alleged preference for market-driven growth 
that prioritizes the economy over the environment 
and social equity. The progress to date has been 
criticized for its vague substance and weak results 
due to the lack of appropriate metrics and indicators. 
Due to its highly top-down approach, bottom-
up communication has not been sufficient, thus 
failing to induce active stakeholder participation. 
Green growth as a policy approach remains 
embedded in the ROK’s development strategy with 
the release of the Second Five-Year Plan for Green 
Growth (2014-2018). While the First Five-Year 
Plan has succeeded in establishing the institutional 
foundation for green growth, the Second Five-Year 
Plan is expected to focus on achieving substantial 
outcomes specifically on establishing a low-
carbon socioeconomic infrastructure, achieving 
a creative economy through the convergence of 
green technology and ICT, and building a climate-
resilient environment. As the ROK strives to 
pursue green growth beyond its borders, it has 
to achieve results at home and in this regard, 
demonstrating the tangible benefits of green 
growth on the ground remains a critical test. 
Enabling Mandating Incentivizing
Economy-
wide
• Establishment of GHG 
Inventory and Research Center 
(CH-2)
• Government R&D Grants 
for Development of Green 
Technologies and Greening of 
Strategic Industries (CH-4)
• Government Grants for 
Fostering of Green Talents 
(CH-4)
• Target Management Scheme 
(TMS; CH-2)
• Public Sector TMS (CH-2)
• Korea Emissions Trading 
Scheme (K-ETS; CH-2)
• Korea Voluntary Emission 
Reduction (KVER; CH-2)
• Green Store Certification 
Program (CH-5)
• Voluntary Agreement for Green 
Procurement (CH-5)
• Carbon Labeling System (CH-5)
• Carbon Points System (CH-5)
Sector-wide
• Government Loans for Energy 
Use Rationalization Projects 
(CH-3)
• Government Supported Energy 
Service Company or ESCO 
Projects (CH-3)
• Government Grants for 
Voluntary Energy Diagnosis of 
SMEs (CH-3)
• Green Leaders Program (CH-5)
• Green Campus Initiative (CH-5)
• “Cool-Mapsy” Campaign (CH-5)
• Green Policy Loans, Guarantees, 
Funds and Insurance Programs 
(CH-6)
• Establishment of Green 
Industrial Clusters (CH-6)
• Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS; CH-3)
• Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS; 
CH-3)
• Mandatory Public Procurement 
of Energy Efficient Goods 
(CH-3)
• Mandatory Green Public 
Procurement (CH-5)
• Volume-based Waste Fee 
System (CH-5)
• Weight-based Food Waste Fee 
System (CH-5)
• Improvement of Vehicle-
Emission and Fuel-Economy 
Standards (CH-7)
• Building Design Criteria for 
Energy Saving (CH-7)
• Feed-in Tariff Policy for 
Renewable Energy (FIT; CH-3)
• Tax Credits for Investments in 
Energy-Saving Facilities (CH-3)
• Green Certification Schemes for 
Green Technologies, Products, 
Projects, and Businesses (CH-6)
• Integrated Fare System for 
Public Transportation in Cities 
(CH-7)
• Old Car Replacement Subsidy 
Programs (CH-7)
• Green Standard for Energy 
and Environmental Design of 
Buildings (G-SEED, CH-7)
• Building Energy-Efficiency 
Grade Certification Scheme 
(CH-7)
Table 1: Some of the ROK’s green growth policies and programs covered in this study
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Chapter 1: Introduction
71.1 Overview
As an emerging policy with the ambitious goal of 
addressing the long-standing stalemate between 
economic growth and environmental sustainability, 
green growth has come a long way from a mere 
buzzword to a new development paradigm. As it 
revives the sustainable development agenda with 
a more aggressive approach to address climate 
change, resource-use inefficiencies, and the global 
economic slowdown, the growing momentum for 
green growth has been noteworthy as proven by a 
myriad of related efforts worldwide.
In the global effort toward green growth, no country 
has blazed this new trail with such unparalleled 
passion as the Republic of Korea (ROK or Korea 
hereafter). The country perceives green growth 
as an opportunity to achieve greater levels of 
prosperity by changing the ways in which it pursued 
development in the past because the business-
as-usual ways have proven to be unsustainable. 
The ROK’s green growth experience – uniquely 
characterized by its swift and sustained action of 
transforming the tradeoffs into synergies between 
“growing” and “greening” – deserves paramount 
attention from both developing and developed 
nations for the following reasons:
• The ROK’s green growth policy is one of the 
most celebrated cases as it is the only country 
by far that adopted green growth as a new 
development strategy on an unprecedented 
scale, speed, and level of comprehensiveness. In 
short, there is an earnest motivation to pursue 
green growth in a systematic and grand manner.
• The ROK’s green growth experience offers 
valuable lessons for countries that seek to 
enshrine green growth as a national policy. As 
the nation was once a developing country that 
successfully achieved a developed status in the 
shortest time, its development lessons could 
be relevant for both developing and developed 
countries.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction 
Summary
The ROK pursued green growth in a holistic manner by forming a central governing body dedicated to green growth, 
mobilizing various line ministries, and involving stakeholders from different sectors of society to carry out the initiatives 
under a three-pronged strategy with ten policy directions. Driven by strong top-down leadership that envisages the 
enormous potential of green growth to create a new wave of economic dynamism without compromising environmental 
sustainability, the ROK provided sufficient mandate to the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) to 
undertake nationwide green growth planning and implementation. The PCGG then formulated comprehensive green 
growth plans – both medium- and long-term – that integrated economic, environmental, and social objectives into one 
framework. Furthermore, the ROK’s declaration of GHG reduction of 30 % by 2020 is the highest recommended target 
for a non-Annex-1 country of the Kyoto Protocol. Its enactment of the landmark legislation called the Framework Act 
on Low Carbon Green Growth is the only comprehensive blueprint so far for green growth policymaking at the national 
level. These milestones converged to forge the institutional, legal, and programmatic platform for green growth, thereby 
building up its solid foundation in the ROK. 
8• The ROK’s transition to a new administration 
under the leadership of President Park Geun-
Hye in 2013 is a good opportunity to examine 
the past outcomes of green growth initiatives 
and its continuity amid the power transition.
Since green growth is being sought as a solution 
that is yet to be proven, the next big step is to show 
how it really works. How does the ROK pursue its 
green growth policies and what are the outcomes, 
challenges, and key takeaways to date? While 
it is still premature to provide a comprehensive 
evaluation of the ROK’s green growth experience, 
this report intends to provide an objective 
documentation of what has been achieved hitherto 
as a way to enrich the existing literature and 
strengthen the empirical evidences on the feasibility 
and transformational nature of green growth. Since 
there is no one-size-fits-all green growth solution, 
the initiatives discussed herein are not necessarily 
intended to be adopted by other countries but the 
lessons and good practices will hopefully be useful 
for governments in drafting their own green growth 
policies and programs. 
Rise of Green Growth as a New Paradigm of 
Development
The rise of green growth as a development policy has 
been swift since the time when the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP) brought green growth to the 
discussion table at the Fifth Ministerial Conference 
on Environment and Development in Asia and 
the Pacific in 2005, putting forward an official 
declaration that adopts green growth as a strategy 
toward sustainable development. What explains 
the shift from being a sheer attractive slogan 
(Schmalensee, 2012) to a policy approach that even 
defies traditional growth models? 
Despite the traditionally perceived antithetical 
correlation of “green” and “growth,” two major 
factors were identified to have triggered the strong 
endorsement of green growth in the international 
community: 
(1) the global economic slowdown; and 
(2) the shortcoming of sustainable development to 
live up to society’s expectations. (Park, 2013):
• Global financial crisis. The prolonged global 
economic stagnation proved that the existing 
development strategies are no longer responsive 
to the evolving socioeconomic landscape. 
The World Bank (2012) even stressed that 
“our current growth patterns are not just 
unsustainable; they are also deeply inefficient,” 
thereby recommending countries to veer away 
from the grow-dirty-and-clean-up-later strategy. 
The Stern Review (2010) warned that “high-
carbon growth would kill itself” due to high 
carbon prices and hostile physical environments. 
As such, the challenging times pushed many 
governments to look for new sources of 
opportunities and green growth is heralded 
as a win-win solution with its assurance that 
environmental sustainability does not need to be 
compromised in favor of economic growth. 
• Shortcomings of sustainable development. The 
grand promise of sustainable development to 
effectively juggle its three equally important 
pillars – economic, environmental, and social – 
remains elusive. The global economic situation 
might have improved significantly in the 
past two decades but it took place at a huge 
environmental cost and worsened the great 
divide between the haves and the have-nots. 
Sustainable development needs to be further 
tested with time, but to this date, it failed to 
satisfactorily deliver what it had promised. As a 
policy option, green growth is expected to offer 
a better deal by reconciling the conflicting goals 
and harmonizing the imperatives of economic 
growth and environmental sustainability. 
• Thus, green growth is considered as the 
international community’s best hope for the 
25-year stalemate over the integration of 
the economic and environmental pillars of 
sustainable development (Samans, 2013).
The merits of green growth become even more 
salient when juxtaposed with “brown growth” (see 
Table 1). The stark difference is that brown growth 
– one that promotes the “grow first, clean up later” 
strategy –  is too GDP-centric while green growth – 
which urges countries to “grow and clean up at the 
same time” – is more quality-oriented, as it attempts 
to tackle the deeply entrenched friction between 
the economic, environmental, and social dimensions. 
The economic success of today’s industrialized 
9countries could be fairly attributed to brown growth 
but today’s developing economies cannot simply 
continue to follow suit to catch up with the rich 
countries. As aptly put by The Economist (2012): 
“Rich countries prospered without worrying much 
about the environment. Poor and middle-income 
countries do not have that luxury.”
Being a relatively new subject in academic and 
policy discourse, it is no wonder why green growth 
is vaguely defined, especially in reference to 
sustainable development. Despite the growing 
literature, a universally accepted definition is 
still lacking (Jacobs, 2013) and much ambiguity 
surrounds this concept, specifically about its 
actual niche in the overall sustainability agenda. 
It is conceived as a sister concept of the low-
carbon economy, a policy agenda, a means toward 
sustainability, a subset of sustainable development, 
and to a greater extent, a new development 
paradigm that is transformational in nature and a 
viable alternative to old growth models. 
Several international organizations such as the 
Global Green Growth Institute, World Bank, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Asian Development Bank, and the 
United Nations have provided a working definition 
of green growth and the common denominator is not 
just the emphasis on the link between the economy 
and environment but also on social inclusiveness. 
If green growth also touches upon these three 
interlocking components (economic, environmental, 
and social), then how can it be differentiated from 
sustainable development? 
The OECD (2011) emphasized the coherent 
relationship between the two, highlighting the fact 
that green growth is a subset of – instead of an 
alternative to – sustainable development. Green 
growth fits well into the conceptual framework of 
sustainable development but its narrower scope or 
focus on the environment-economy nexus (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2013) – thereby providing more details 
on environmental and resource productivity – 
makes green growth easier to operationalize, hence 
paving the way for measurable progress. Likewise, 
green growth represents a “reinforced emphasis” 
on sustainable development because of its cross-
sectoral approach to development strengthened by 
enhanced upstream planning and diagnostics (AfDB, 
2013).
Amid the absence of a universally accepted 
operational definition, it is worth noting nevertheless 
that the differences in the meaning of green growth 
mainly stem from the areas of emphasis (Scott et al., 
2013). However, the various definitions are based 
on similar foundational goals that revolve around 
resource efficiency, environmental protection, 
economic growth, climate resilience, and social 
inclusiveness. Thus, although different stakeholders 
might not agree on a standard definition of green 
growth, there has been a broad consensus in the 
academic and policy sphere as to what green growth 
entails (Bowen, 2012), and this is expected to 
Brown Growth Green Growth
Quantitative (GDP-focused/economy-centric) Qualitative (holistic - economy, environment, society)
Resource-intensive (more input = more output) Resource-efficient (less input = more output)
Production factor-intensive (labor, capital, natural asset) Innovation-based technology, (value-added knowledge)
Energy dependency (fossil fuel-driven) Energy self-sufficiency (renewables)
Climate-vulnerable (high risk, low adaptive capacity) Climate-resilient (high risk, high adaptive capacity)
Unsustainable growth Sustainable development
Table 1: Comparison between brown growth and green growth
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improve further given the ongoing experimentation 
worldwide that seeks to amass sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that green growth actually works.  
1.2 Low-Carbon Green Growth: The Korean Way
The ROK’s rags-to-riches economic success is 
considered as one of the greatest development 
miracles of our era. After the Korean War, the 
country was almost as poor as Sudan with per 
capita income of a measly US$86, but it pulled off an 
exponential rise, growing by 750 times in absolute 
terms and by 300 times in per capita income (Lee, 
2008). By joining the official club of foreign aid 
donors (Development Assistance Committee of 
OECD) in 2010, the ROK is the first and only country 
so far to transform itself from an aid recipient to an 
aid donor, and this was achieved within only half a 
century. 
The growth was indeed swift but as a consequence, 
the nation has been locked into a quintessential 
growth trajectory that is highly dependent on 
imported fossil fuels given its lack of natural energy 
resources. Thus, its greenhouse gas emissions almost 
doubled from 1990 to 2005 (largely from its huge 
manufacturing sector), which is the highest among 
OECD countries (Jones and Yoo, 2011). The pace 
of economic activities has reached a level where 
it begins to threaten future growth prospects and 
social welfare. After decades of steady growth, the 
ROK is confronted with three major challenges or 
the so-called “triple crunch” – economic slowdown, 
climate change, and energy-import dependency. 
Particularly, it has to break away from lackluster 
growth by exploring new growth engines. It also 
has to address its heavy dependence on imported 
fossil fuel that costs approximately US$100 billion 
annually (even rising to US$140 billion during the 
oil price shock in 2008), an amount greater than its 
income from some its major export items. Moreover, 
the nation has not been spared from the harmful 
impacts of climate change given its temperature and 
sea-level rises that are both higher than the world 
average (GGGI, 2011). 
In view of these challenges, President Lee Myung-
Bak presented the concept of “low-carbon green 
growth” as the nation’s new development paradigm 
in a speech he delivered in August 2008 marking the 
60th founding anniversary of the ROK. Recognizing 
that the nation has only come halfway in graduating 
into the league of high-income countries, he 
boldly proposed that an active pursuit of the new 
paradigm would provide new engines of economic 
growth and jobs needed in continuing the nation’s 
developmental success. “Low-carbon” highlights 
how the ROK envisioned transforming the nation’s 
carbon-intensive economy into a low-carbon 
economy to be at the heart of realizing green growth. 
Indeed, “low-carbon” has been a dominant figure of 
the ROK’s green growth goals, strategies, and action 
plans.
The ROK’s Green Growth Milestones
Amid the looming uncertainties, green growth has 
gained significant resonance in the ROK as the 
country recognizes the need to shift toward a more 
sustainable growth path. Its green growth policy 
has been driven by a high degree of bureaucratic 
centralization and strong top-down leadership that 
links long-term development objectives with the 
greening of its economic activities. Korea’s green 
growth trajectory is unlike the experience of most 
developed countries, which followed an evolutionary 
process. Korea’s exceptional case of elevating green 
growth as a national vision stemmed from proactive 
leadership that set ambitious targets for a given 
period (Lee and Ahn, 2015). 
It also embodies the spirit of “race to the swift” 
that has defined the nation’s approach to rapid 
industrialization since the 1960s (Kim and Thurbon, 
2015). In the ROK’s journey toward low-carbon 
green growth, four milestones stand out. 
Although similar initiatives have taken place 
in the past (for example, the establishment of 
the Presidential Commission on Sustainable 
Development in 2000 under the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration), the unique convergence of the 
celebrated milestones described below are strong 
enough for meaningful policies to be actually 
implemented.
1. Establishment of an executing organization 
for green growth: Prior to the introduction of 
green growth as a national vision, there was no 
powerful apparatus for green growth from an 
institutional perspective. 
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 Thus, the Presidential Committee on Green 
Growth (PCGG1 ) was formed in 2009 as an inter-
ministerial body that develops, implements, and 
coordinates the green growth efforts of various 
ministries and agencies. 
2. Formulation of national comprehensive plans on 
green growth: The two major plans – the National 
Strategy for Green Growth (2009-2050) and the 
Five-Year Plan (2009-2013) – ensure that green 
growth activities are pursued in a systematic 
and organized manner with budget support. 
The long-term plan aims to achieve three main 
objectives elaborated by ten policy directions 
based on a consensus among the stakeholders 
from the public, private, and civil society sectors. 
The medium-term plan, on the other hand, 
includes hundreds of projects with a total budget 
of approximately US$100 billion. The volume of 
this plan constitutes 2% of its GDP, which is twice 
higher than the UN recommendation for green 
investments (UNEP, 2009) and also comparable 
with the annual military budget for services of 
most governments.
3. Declaration of national GHG emission-reduction 
targets: In November 2009, the government 
declared its ambitious reduction target – to 
reduce emissions by 30% below a business-
as-usual level by 2020. This is the highest 
recommended target for a non-Annex 1 country 
under the Kyoto Protocol. The realization of this 
target is critical as it provides a solid direction for 
the ROK to truly build a low-carbon society. This 
commitment is being honored by the passage of 
legislation on a national GHG emissions trading 
scheme, a target management scheme, the 
creation of the national GHG inventory report 
system, and other relevant reforms.
4. Enactment of the Framework Act on Low Carbon 
Green Growth. This landmark legislation was 
passed to support the declaration of low-carbon 
green growth in 2008 as a new development 
strategy. Providing the legal framework 
for pursuing low-carbon green growth as a 
national agenda, the key aspect of the law is the 
institutionalization of green growth at the national 
level, which provides a good governance structure 
and coordination mechanism for the involved 
1 | The PCGG used to be under the Office of the President during the Lee administration and during the succeeding administration, President Park continued 
embracing green growth through the establishment of the Prime Ministerial Green Growth Committee (GGC) in October 2013 to continue the mandate of 
the PCGG under the Office of the Prime Minister and in compliance with the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth (which requires the creation of a 
new committee after the term of the PCGG ended in February 2013). GGC also maintains its status of sitting upon the apex of a vast network of government 
agencies involved in green growth planning and implementation. According to Seung-Hoon Lee (former head of the GGC), the main difference between the 
PCGG and the GGC is that the former PCGG focused on “platform building” while the GGC pays attention on implementing and extending the current work 
programs (Kim and Thurbon, 2015).
Figure 1: Milestones of the ROK’s green growth policy
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Jan. 2009
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government agencies. It also supersedes other 
related laws such as the Energy Framework Act, 
Climate Change Act, Sustainable Development 
Act, Framework Act on Urban Development, and 
others.     
1.3 Institutional Framework for Low-Carbon Green 
Growth
The Presidential Committee on 
Green Growth (PCGG)
As a policymaking body, the PCGG provides the 
overall direction of green growth activities at the 
national level by monitoring the implementation 
of the National Strategy for Green Growth and the 
Five-Year Plan. The PCGG was the outcome of the 
merger of three bodies: the Presidential Committee 
for Sustainable Development, the Presidential Energy 
Committee, and the Special Task Force for Climate 
Change (Kim and Thurbon, 2015). Based on the 
Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth, the 
PCGG is mandated to perform the following roles: 
(1) deliberate on the government’s major policies 
and plans related to green growth and matters 
concerning the performance of such policies and 
plans; 
(2) coordinate with appropriate central 
administrative agencies and local governments; 
(3) discuss various subjects relevant to pursuing 
green growth; and 
(4) participate in the global green growth dialogue 
and international negotiations. 
Under the co-chairman system, the Prime Minister 
represents ex officio members, who are ministers from 
relevant government bodies and heads of national 
research institutes. 
On the other hand, the chairman from the private 
sector could come from one of the “commissioned 
members,” who are experts from research institutes, 
universities, and nongovernmental organizations. 
From 2013 onwards, there are four subcommittees 
under the PCGG: 
(1) Green Growth Strategy
(2) Climate Change Countermeasure 
(3) Energy
(4) Green Technology and Industry 
The subcommittees of the PCGG have been 
reorganized over time, starting with three 
subcommittees in the first phase (2009) and 
reorganized into four subcommittees in the second 
phase (2010) and third phase (2011). The Secretariat 
was also established to undertake administrative 
duties and support the work of the PCGG. 
 The Secretariat is composed of three teams: 
(1) Policy Planning and Coordination
(2) Climate Change Policy
(3) Green Technology and Industry
Each team is composed of experts from various 
relevant public institutions, research institutes, and 
businesses.
Since its foundation in January 2009 up to October 
2012, the PCGG has conducted a total of 21 
regular meetings and 11 policy implementation 
review meetings. During the regular meetings, 
all relevant ministries responsible for the ten 
policy directions reported on each agenda’s 
strategy and action plan to the PCGG. 
The implementation review meetings, on the other 
hand, focused on the results of policy enforcement 
along with countermeasures for the identified gaps 
in order to constantly monitor performance. In 
the process of promoting green growth, it is worth 
noting that PCGG’s role is not limited to policy 
implementation and supervision but also includes 
preliminary gathering of feedback through the 
conduct of implementation review meetings. 
This is in contrast to the nation’s unilateral, 
top-down approach to policymaking in the 
past. This approach has also enabled the PCGG 
to strengthen public-private partnership 
through multi-stakeholder engagement.
While PCGG is considered as one of the most 
significant institutional innovations on green 
growth, given its independent capacity to mobilize 
inter-ministerial and multi-stakeholder efforts on 
green growth planning, its major limitation is the 
lack of authority over the national budget since the 
budgeting process falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance. 
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As such, while the PCGG can exercise sufficient 
authority on drafting medium- and long-term 
green growth plans, its capability to be completely 
in control of implementation is limited, especially 
in terms of advancing radical proposals. This 
was evident when PCGG’s proposal to phase out 
subsidies on electricity was opposed by several 
ministries that might be severely affected (Kim and 
Thurbon, 2015).
Institutional Collaboration and Stakeholder 
Consultation
To ensure nationwide enforcement of green growth, 
local governments are encouraged to organize 
the Local Green Growth Committees (LGGCs), 
which have a similar organizational structure to 
the PCGG. The establishment of LGGCs in various 
cities and provinces facilitates the review of green 
growth policies and plans at the local level, thereby 
promoting a strong sense of local ownership and 
autonomy (Kim, 2013). It also complemented the 
top-down approach to green growth planning and 
implementation.
Given the critical role of the private sector in 
ensuring the success of green growth initiatives, 
the government included not only public officials 
but also private sector representatives as 
organizing members of the PCGG. Moreover, five 
public-private consultative groups called Green 
Growth Consultative Groups were launched: 
Industry, Finance, Science and Technology, 
Green Lifestyle, and Green IT. These groups are 
composed of members from local governments, 
research institutes, industry, finance, civil society 
organizations, and general citizens (Kim, 2013). The 
PCGG receives useful feedback from this group 
to make green growth policies more feasible and 
practical to implement. To maximize the role of the 
consultative groups as an effective communication 
channel, each group holds quarterly meetings on 
the main agenda that will be discussed in the regular 
meetings of PCGG. If needed, the groups can co-
host conferences with PCGG where members can 
interact with each other to share experiences and 
ideas. Conference materials and publications are also 
delivered through e-mail as frequently as possible 
to facilitate information sharing and stakeholder 
networking. 
Aside from PCGG, relevant ministries also play 
crucial roles in advancing the ROK’s low-carbon 
green growth policy. For instance, the Ministry of 
Environment leads the implementation of the target 
management scheme (TMS) and the emissions 
trading scheme (ETS). The Ministry of Knowledge 
and Economy, on the other hand, leads in the areas 
related to energy efficiency, new and renewable 
energy, smart grid, and green technology such as 
Figure 2: Organizational structure of the PCGG
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public institutions under these ministries, specifically 
the Korea Environmental Industry and Technology 
Institute (KEITI), Korea Environment Corporation, 
Korea Energy Management Corporation (KEMCO), 
Green Business Association, and the Korea 
Technology Finance Corporation also serve as a 
bridge between the central and local governments, 
and work with PCGG and the Green Growth 
Consultative Groups to ensure the successful 
enforcement of green growth policies.
In terms of governance structure in implementing 
the green growth programs and projects, the 
implementing bodies are classified into two: central 
administrative body and local administrative 
body. The former is composed of PCGG, relevant 
ministries, and public institutions, which assume 
the role of a control tower by supervising the 
implementation of policies and managing the Green 
Growth Consultative Groups. On the other hand, 
the local administrative body – referring to the 
LGGCs and Green Growth Consultative Groups – is 
in charge of promoting green growth at the local 
community level and gathering feedback from 
businesses and local residents.
1.4 Implementation Plans for Green Growth
National Vision, Strategies, and Policy Directions
The ROK’s comprehensive approach to green growth 
policy is reflected in its long-term and medium-term 
plans, which are anchored in low-carbon green 
growth as a national vision with three strategies and 
ten policy directions. 
The three major strategies are: 
(1) mitigation of climate change and enhancement of 
energy security
(2) creation of new growth engines; and 
(3) improvement in the quality of life and 
enhancement of the ROK’s international 
standing. 
These strategies are further elaborated by ten policy 
directions and each policy direction is composed of 
several programs and projects on green growth. 
The green growth plans of the ROK can be largely 
categorized into comprehensive plans and sectoral 
plans. Comprehensive plans are those that cross-cut 
Figure 3: The ROK’s green growth strategy and policy directions
Green Growth National Strategy and Vision
Aiming to Become World's 7th Largest Green Economic Power by 2020, and 5th Largest by 2050
energy self-sufﬁciency
Mitigation of climate change 
and enhancement of energy security
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2) Reduction of the use of fossil fuels and the enhancement of 
3) Enhancement of the capacity to adapt to climate change
Creation of new Growth Engines
4) Development of green technology for the creation of new growth engines
5) Greening of traditionally-supported industries and nurturing of green industries
6) Advancement of industrial structure
7) Laying the foundation for the green economy
Improvement in the quality of life
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  8) Creation of green homeland and transportation
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10) Becoming a role model for the international community as a green growth leader
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 Source: Office for Government Policy Coordination, 2010
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tasks of central and local governments, as well as 
ministries. The National Strategy for Green Growth 
and the Five-Year Plan are the overarching plans, 
which provide directions for other central- and 
regional-level comprehensive plans formulated for 
green growth. 
The ministries are mandated to include mainstream 
green growth in their relevant plans (i.e., sectoral 
plans), which are categorized into key plans, related 
plans, and associated plans, respectively.
• Key plans refer to those that are considered 
to have uppermost relevance to the national 
green growth strategy, such as the National 
Energy Basic Plan, Comprehensive Basic Plan to 
Respond to Climate Change, and Basic Plan for 
Sustainable Development. These plans usually 
have long planning horizons (20 years) and are to 
be deliberated by the PCGG before approval by 
the Cabinet. 
• Relevant plans, on the other hand, are plans that 
are formulated under the nation’s legislative 
framework and have indirect relevance to the 
nation’s green growth agenda; they include the 
Comprehensive National Territorial Plan and the 
National Science and Technology Basic Plan. 
• Associated plans are administrative plans 
formulated under ministerial initiatives, such as 
the New and Renewable Energy Development 
Plan under the Ministry of Knowledge Economy 
(currently the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and 
Energy, MOTIE). 
Medium- and Long-Term Green Growth Plans
Some of the salient features of the National Strategy 
for Green Growth are the setting of basic policy 
directions for green growth, putting in place specific 
measures to meet the objectives, and designating 
the appropriate institutions. It also envisages green 
growth as a close collaboration between the public 
and the private sectors as well as the civil society. 
The timeline set under the ROK’s green growth plan, 
especially the long-term plan that spans more than 
four decades, is also critical to ensure the continuity 
of green growth. The long-term period of the nation’s 
green growth strategy confers a great sense of 
responsibility and accountability on any political 
leader in power to honor the commitments within 
the timeline. The ROK has set a long-term vision of 
being one of the world’s seven “green” economic 
powers by 2020 and this was well-articulated 
in the international community in the hope that 
green growth would also be the main agenda of the 
Figure 4: Framework of implementation plans for green growth
Source: Kim and Choi, 2013
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succeeding governments (PCGG 2009c; see also 
PCGG, 2009d).
The Five-Year Plan, on the other hand, supported 
the implementation of the National Strategy for 
Green Growth through its investments, projects, 
and policy reforms in the areas of climate change, 
energy, transportation, and green technologies. 
While the plan emphasized the creation of new 
industries that are environmentally friendly, it 
also focused on the overall greening of existing 
industries. Thus, it highlighted the reduction of GHG 
emissions especially in the manufacturing sector 
while boosting productivity at the same time. It is 
worth noting that both plans were created through 
the active collaboration of the PCGG, the Prime 
Minister’s office, relevant ministries and institutions, 
universities, and technical experts. 
In order to avoid overlapping with other plans 
and strategies, the plan was reevaluated and 
adjusted to become the national plan that is both 
comprehensive and concise (PCGG, 2009b). As such, 
the announcement of the Five-Year Plan was backed 
up by follow-up policies of relevant ministries and 
local governments. The continuity of the plan in the 
succeeding years was also guaranteed by the Park 
Geun-Hye administration as it prepared the Second 
Five-Year Plan for the 2014-2018 period.
Budget Allocation for the Five-Year Plan for Green 
Growth
Prior to the announcement of the Five-Year Plan for 
Green Growth, the government launched the Green 
New Deal, which aimed to create green jobs and 
investments to overcome the global economic crisis. 
Aiming to generate 960,000 green jobs by investing 
50 trillion KRW (roughly US$ 43 billion) over 
four years, the government, in collaboration with 
businesses, invested boldly in green technologies 
such as new and renewable energy, electric cars, 
rechargeable batteries, and light-emitting diodes 
(LEDs).
The Green New Deal was eventually integrated into 
the Five-Year Plan. During the initial establishment 
of the plan, the government estimated that a total 
of 107.4 trillion KRW (approximately US$ 100 
billion) would be spent to support green growth from 
2009 to 2013. In 2009, the first year of the project, 
approximately 17.5 trillion KRW was spent, and it 
was noted that an average annual increase of 10.2% 
in investment was required to meet the necessary 
budget. Such amount was equivalent to 2% of the 
ROK’s annual GDP and was reflected in the National 
Fiscal Management Plan (2009-2013). This seemingly 
astounding amount, however, did include budget 
allocated to highly related areas such as economic, 
energy, industry, and environmental policies. Indeed, 
delineating budgets that are entirely specific to green 
growth is impractical, given how related actions 
span over a variety of economic, environmental, 
and social issues. The impact of the National Fiscal 
Management Plan (2009-2013) deserves recognition 
as it marked the period where green growth policies 
were prioritized in annual fiscal plans and where 
ample support was provided to push forward the 
nation’s low-carbon green growth agenda.
Legal Framework for Green Growth
To establish a solid legal foundation for the 
ROK’s green growth initiatives, the government 
submitted a draft bill – Framework Act on Low 
Carbon Green Growth – to the National Assembly 
in February 2009.  Both the ruling and opposition 
parties unanimously passed the bill after forming 
the Special Committee on Climate Change and 
conducting in-depth discussions in public hearings. 
In January 2010, President Lee Myung-bak signed 
and promulgated this landmark legislation with 
the attendance of interested parties from relevant 
ministries, industries, and the general public. This 
Act, which includes seven chapters and 64 articles, is 
a fundamental law stipulating major policy directions 
on building a low-carbon green growth strategy as 
well as the necessary institutional framework and 
policy enforcement methods (Office for Government 
Policy Coordination, 2010). 
The enactment of the law had three major objectives: 
(1) to implement measures to effectively address 
climate change and energy issues and promote 
sustainable development; 
(2) to build the implementation system for green 
growth, such as the establishment of the PCGG; 
and 
(3) to devise a variety of institutional systems to 
promote low-carbon green growth in the region 
(Office for Government Policy Coordination, 
2010). 
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The general provisions of the Act cover the basic 
purpose and definitions of terms, basic principles 
of low-carbon green growth, and responsibilities 
of different stakeholders. It also stipulates the 
implementation plans for green growth at the 
national and local government levels, and guidelines 
on the composition, operation, and functions of 
relevant authorities such as PCGG. It also includes 
provisions on the green economy and green industry, 
development and commercialization of green 
technology, and the creation of green jobs (Office for 
Government Policy Coordination, 2010). It should be 
noted that the Act is supported by an enforcement 
decree promulgated in April 2010, which provides 
detailed guidelines necessary for implementation of 
the Act. The enforcement decree serves as the last 
piece for the establishment of the nation’s legal basis 
for pursuing green growth actions.
The Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth 
takes precedence over many of the (existing) related 
laws, such as the Sustainable Development Act, and 
the Energy Use Rationalization Act, which illustrates 
how the government was fully committed to make 
sure that the new paradigm of growth is legally 
enforceable.  Of course, there are other relevant 
legislations that have been enacted to support 
the government’s program-level actions for green 
growth. For example, the Act on the Allocation and 
Trading of GHG Emission Permits (2012), and its 
Enforcement Decree (2014) were enacted prior to 
the launch of the Emissions Trading Scheme in 2015. 
Some others include the Sustainable Transportation 
Logistics Development Act (2009), the Smart Grid 
Construction and Utilization Promotion Act (2011), 
the Green Building Development Support Act 
(2012), and the Act on Promotion of Purchase of 
Green Products (2013).
1.5 Scope and Method of Analysis
This report is intended to initiate an objective 
approach to sharing the ROK’s green growth 
experience, given the country’s outstanding ambition 
to actualize green growth on an unprecedented scale 
and at a speed never seen elsewhere. 
In this light, this report seeks to achieve the following 
four-fold objectives: 
(1) to describe the background (the “why”) and steps 
taken for the setting of targets, strategies, and 
action plans under the National Five-Year Plan 
for Green Growth; 
(2) to provide details (the “who and how”) on some 
of the follow-up actions taken at the program or 
project levels; 
(3) to conduct an objective assessment (both 
quantitative and qualitative) of the outcomes to 
date; and 
(4) to provide key recommendations and major 
takeaways for other countries. 
The structure of each chapter follows a uniform 
outline, covering key topics such as baseline analysis 
of relevant problems, challenges, and opportunities. 
It then explores the setting of targets, strategies, 
as well as implementation of policy actions, which 
are selected based on the level of relevance, 
Table 2: Investment Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013)
Source: GGGI, 2011
Components Total 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mitigation of climate change and enhancement of energy security
57.5 8.5 15.5 16 9.8 7.7
(51.9) (7.7) (14.0) (14.4) (8.8) (6.9)
Creation of New Growth Engines
29.0 4.8 5.2 5.8 6.4 6.8
(26.2) (4.3) (4.7) (5.2) (5.8) (6.1)
Improvement in the Quality of Life and Enhancement of the ROK’s 
International Standing
27.2 5.2 4.8 5.2 5.7 6.3
(24.5) (4.7) (4.3) (4.7) (5.1) (5.7)
Unit: KRW trillion (white row) and US$ billion (gray row)_ 
* Note: Exchange Rate (US$ 1 = 1,108.5 KRW) of November 3, 2011
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resource allocation, and degree of impact. Based 
on this documentation, quantitative and qualitative 
assessments of the outcomes to date are presented; 
the quantitative evaluation is based on the analysis 
of available secondary statistics from various 
sources, the results of which complement the 
merits of the qualitative evaluation. Finally, each 
chapter concludes with a set of recommendations 
and key takeaways that could be useful for other 
governments in identifying the entry points and 
benchmark cases for their own green growth 
policies. While the timeframe of the assessment 
follows the implementation period (2009-2013) of 
the Five-Year Plan, it is worth noting that some of 
the discussed initiatives have been implemented 
beforehand since the ROK has been successfully 
carrying out programs and projects in the past that 
are directly in line with the concept of green growth. 
The target audience of this report includes 
government officials at different levels who have 
the authority to carry out green growth planning 
and implementation in their respective countries. 
This group refers to not just the politicians but also 
the whole range of people in the civil service such 
as the technical bureaucrats, planners, legislators, 
local leaders, and decision makers. The analysis 
also caters to researchers and technical experts 
who are interested in delving deeper into the latest 
developments of the ROK’s green growth initiatives. 
Other important stakeholders in the policymaking 
process such as the private sector, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the civil society groups whose 
organizational values are aligned with the principal 
tenets of green growth could also benefit in many 
ways from the findings of this study. This report is 
very timely given the increasing demand especially 
from developing countries to learn about the ROK’s 
green growth experience. It also comes at a very 
opportune time with the release of the new National 
Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2014-2018) in 
2014, which marked the ROK government’s renewed 
enthusiasm for continuing to promote low-carbon 
green growth in the coming years. 
The report is structured in chapters that correspond 
to the areas prioritized in the Five-Year Plan except 
for four areas of the ten agenda items, namely: 
(a) increasing the climate change adaptation 
capacity; 
(b) enhancing the industrial structure; 
(c) laying the foundation for a green economy; and
(d) becoming a role model for the international 
community as a green growth leader. 
While the report tries to be as comprehensive 
as possible, the exclusion of these areas is done 
deliberately due to specific reasons. The agenda 
item pertaining to climate change adaptation largely 
involves the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project, 
which has been mired in controversy over its alleged 
detrimental impact on the natural ecosystem, as well 
as other pertinent issues. 
Another hotly debated issue is the ROK’s nuclear 
energy program, which forms part of the nation’s 
green growth policy despite the big question of 
whether or not nuclear energy can be considered 
a “green” alternative to fossil fuels. This report 
intends to exercise objectivity in its analysis as 
much as possible, and since evaluating the progress 
and outcomes of the programs that are linked 
to controversies would inevitably entail value 
judgments, thereby jeopardizing neutrality, the areas 
related to the four-river restoration project as well 
as nuclear energy have been omitted. 
Moreover, as the target audience of this report 
is the developing countries, it is best to limit the 
scope of the study to the most relevant areas. In 
the context of Korea’s 10 policy directions, three 
areas (enhancing the industrial structure, laying 
the foundation for a green economy, and becoming  
a role model for the international community as 
a green growth leader) are deemed less relevant 
for developing countries given the differences in 
the industrial base and development assistance 
landscape between Korea and the developing 
countries.  
It should also be noted that the report is a 
compilation of essays written by different authors 
both within and outside GGGI, with expertise in 
different green growth-related areas such as energy, 
transport, waste management, green technology, 
emissions reduction, green industries, green lifestyle, 
and other related fields. Regular discussions were 
conducted with and among the writers to gain a 
common understanding of the proposed content. 
The individual chapters also went through a rigorous 
peer review conducted by GGGI’s internal staff; the 
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feedback solicited from the reviewers was used as 
inputs to the revisions. The report acknowledges 
its limitations in not covering the whole gamut of 
relevant green growth initiatives, due to time and 
resource constraints. It also recognizes the analytical 
uncertainties that readers should be critical about. 
Given the long-term timeframe for green growth 
initiatives to actually bear fruit, the discussion 
focuses on mid-term success and early lessons that 
could be instrumental in achieving the long-term 
green growth objectives.
 
To disseminate the content of this report, outreach 
activities will be conducted on an ad hoc basis 
through GGGI’s capacity development programs. In 
the process of imparting the cases and lessons from 
this report, ample prudence will be exercised to make 
it clear that the purpose of undertaking this initiative 
is not to impose the ROK’s green growth policies 
on other countries, but rather to provide them with 
tested ideas and experiences learned on the ground 
as good starting points for designing their own green 
growth activities. Therefore, the critical question at 
the end of the day for countries with the vision to 
embrace a sustained shift toward green growth will 
always be: how relevant is this policy to my country, 
and what could be the windows of opportunity for 
innovation based on the local context? 
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1.1 Overview
As the 47th country to join the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1993, the Republic of Korea (ROK) 
was designated as a Non-Annex I country under the 
Kyoto Protocol, thus being excused from sharing the 
mandatory obligation of reducing GHG emissions.
Although classified as a developing country with less 
historical responsibility based on the principle of 
“Common but Differentiated Responsibilities,” the 
ROK is one of the top producers of GHG among the 
OECD countries. The government has emphasized 
that the country has a short 30-year history of 
economic development and is still in the process of 
growing, and thus has different conditions to follow 
on emissions reduction compared to the highly 
developed economies. 
However, the mounting international pressure on 
developing countries to also shoulder the global 
responsibility of reducing GHG emissions has 
reshaped the ROK’s climate change diplomacy 
toward a more proactive engagement.
 
The climate change diplomacy of the ROK is 
commonly divided into four phases: Observation 
Phase (1972-1988); Passive Response Phase (1989-
1996); Proactive Response Phase (1997-2007); and 
Active Intervention Phase (2007-present). Similar 
to most developing countries, the government 
started off with passive and defensive diplomacy, as 
it was concerned that efforts to reduce GHG might 
affect the country’s international competitiveness. 
Likewise, the industrial sector responded very 
sensitively to the government’s efforts on climate 
negotiations. 
CHAPTER 2 
LOW-CARBON SOCIETY
1. Introduction 
Summary
Despite being classified as a developing country with less responsibility to reduce emissions under international climate 
negotiations, the ROK is in fact one of the top emitters among the OECD countries. Thus, the government set an ambitious 
target of reducing emissions by 30% from BAU levels by 2020 based on scientific assessments and multi-stakeholder 
consultation. To honor this commitment, the government laid out a comprehensive institutional and legal framework to 
facilitate the implementation of mitigation strategies. An array of initiatives has been successful such as the establishment 
of the Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Research Center and the introduction of several emissions reduction programs 
targeting the public and private sectors. These initiatives provided the testing ground for the ROK’s boldest mitigation 
action to date – the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) − which still pushed through despite strong opposition from 
affected industries, and is expected to play a critical role in engaging heavy emitters to explore cost-effective mitigation 
measures and invest in low-carbon technologies. Currently, the ROK has not yet achieved substantial results in decoupling 
economic growth and GHG emissions. However, the government hopes to achieve more promising outcomes as it exerts 
more aggressive, even if unpopular, efforts to succeed in this goal. 
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For example, the industrial leaders have continuously 
sought to rationalize their inactions to reduce GHG 
emissions, pointing out how the U.S. withdrew from 
the Kyoto Protocol and how developed countries 
have tried to protect their own national interests 
during the negotiation process. 
Given the immensity of the challenges posed by 
climate change, it is clearly evident that this global 
problem cannot be resolved without the full support 
of all leading GHG emitters. Thus, the ROK also 
felt the need to improve its national awareness of 
global warming. The ROK could have used its history 
of short and rapid industrialization with relatively 
lower “historical emissions per capita” as an excuse 
to spare itself from taking more responsibilities on 
emissions reduction. However, the country also faces 
tremendous pressure to exert more efforts and its 
status as a developing country (and thereby is not 
subject to mandatory emissions reduction) under the 
global climate change negotiations has been widely 
criticized. 
When considering the size of the economy and the 
amount of GHG emissions, the “leading developing 
countries” − including the ROK, China, Mexico, and 
South Africa − have faced tremendous international 
pressure to take more responsibility. Heeding the 
call for global climate actions, former President Lee 
Myung-bak, who took office when discussions on the 
post-Kyoto Protocol started, announced low-carbon 
green growth as the country’s new development 
strategy, thereby taking a more proactive stance on 
climate diplomacy. 
1.2 Baseline Assessment
The ROK’s economic development and GHG 
emissions have shown similar rates of growth. 
During the 15-year period of 1990-2005, the 
nation’s economy achieved an annual GDP growth 
rate of 5.6%. The GHG emissions in the same period 
increased by an average of 4.7% per year, and as a 
result, the amount of emissions in 2005 increased by 
99% compared to emissions in 1990. It is also worth 
noting that such level of increase in the given period 
was the highest among OECD countries and this is 
attributed to the ROK’s economic structure, which 
is highly energy-intensive and dependent on fossil 
fuels.  
Figure 1: Annex I and Non-Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol
Source: Kim, 2010
ANNEX I NON-ANNEX I
EU
Germany
U.K.
Italy
France
Spain
Poland OPEC
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
IranNon-Parties to Kyoto
U.S., Australia, Turkey
Russia
Ukraine EITs
China
India
Brazil
South Africa
Pakistan
Argentina
OECD
Japan
Canada
S. Korea
Mexico
* Note: EIT stands for Economies in Transition while OPEC means Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
* Note: EIT stands for Economies in Transition while OPEC means Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
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Root Causes of Challenges
The energy sector is the leading emitter of GHG 
in the ROK, accounting for 84.3% of the total 
emissions. Moreover, 11% of the emissions come 
from the industrial processes (e.g., semiconductor 
production), 2.5% from agriculture, and 2.2% from 
waste disposal. The GHG emissions in the energy 
sector, which comes primarily from fuel combustion, 
showed a 4.8% average annual increase and its share 
of the country’s gross emissions grew slightly from 
83% in 1990 to 84.3% in 2005. 
The most notable increase in emissions during the 
1990-2005 period took place in the industrial sector. 
As the primary source of national revenue, this 
sector represents manufacturers of various products 
such as semiconductors, display panels, steel, ships, 
and automobiles. The GHG emissions grew by an 
average of 9.3% a year, which corresponds to the 
continued increase in the amount of exported 
goods. The total emissions by the industrial sector 
increased by over 60%, boosting its share of the 
country’s gross emissions from 6.7% in 1990 to 11% 
in 2005. In contrast, the share of total emissions by 
the agricultural sector decreased from 4.4% in 1990 
to 2.5% in 2005 due to the reduction in farmland 
area, enhanced productivity of farming practices 
(e.g., use of nitrogen fertilizers), and decrease in 
the total number of livestock. Similar trends were 
also observed in the waste sector as its share in the 
nation’s gross emissions decreased from 5.6% to 
2.2% from 1990 to 2005, due to the introduction of 
recycling and waste incineration, as well as reduced 
amounts of waste in the landfills.
1990 1995 2000 2004 2005
Annual 
Growth (%)
Gross Emissions (million 
tCO
2
)
297.5 451.8 528.5 587.3 591.1 4.7
GDP (billion KRW) 320,696 467,099 578,665 693,996 723,127 5.6
Emissions per capita 
(ton/person)
6.94 10.02 11.24 12.21 12.24 3.9
Emissions/GDP 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.82 -0.8
Table 2: GHG emissions in the ROK (1990-2005)
Source: Yoo, 2008
Index Period Value World Ranking
Amount of emission per capita (tons) 2005 9.3 28
Historical amount of emissions per capita (tons) 1900-2000 146.5 64
Gross emissions (million tons) 2005 448.9 10
Historical total amount of emissions (million tons) 1900-2000 7,041.7 23
Table 1: ROK’s GHG emissions responsibility index
Source: Oh, 2009
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Relevant Problems
Since the ROK imports 97% of its energy and has 
established an industrial structure that is energy-
intensive and heavily reliant on fossil fuels, the 
country is extremely vulnerable to global oil price 
fluctuations. As such, binding agreements on curbing 
GHG emissions to be imposed in the future would 
lead to opposition from the energy and industrial 
sectors, as GHG reduction measures would have 
detrimental impacts on the national economy. 
Generally, the level of a nation’s energy consumption 
– which is the primary source of GHG emissions – 
increases proportionally with the national income, 
but the energy consumption per unit GDP tends to 
decrease as the economy advances. This trend also 
holds true for the ROK as its rate of increase in the 
CO
2
 emissions per capita has remained relatively 
constant since 1990 and amounted to 10.9 tons in 
2009. On the other hand, the energy use per unit 
GDP, which increased with national income until 
the mid-1990s, began to show marginal signs of 
stagnation from the year 2000 despite the continued 
increase in per capita income. This is a result of the 
growing efforts to improve energy efficiency and the 
increasing share of the less energy-intensive tertiary 
service industry. However, the underlying challenge 
for the ROK is how to curb its energy consumption 
per unit GDP, which is markedly higher than the 
developed countries. 
Note that the decreasing trajectory of energy 
consumption per unit GDP (shown in Table 4) was 
followed by another steep increase in the late 
1990s, raising questions on whether the country had 
actually come close to a breaking point. After having 
achieved remarkable economic growth through 
export-led industrialization, the ROK experienced 
a foreign exchange crisis in 1998, which took a toll 
on the economy and led to a major transformation 
of the country’s economic structure. From this 
transformation, the tertiary sector grew steadily to 
take up the greatest share of the country’s GDP, yet 
its growth rate was surpassed by the manufacturing 
sector. This suggests that the economic development 
Table 3: GHG emissions of leading emission countries  
 Source: IEA, 2007
2005 Ranking
1990 2005 Changes during 
1990-2005 (%)Emissions Percentage (%) Emissions Percentage (%)
World 21,024 100.0 27,136 100.0 29.0
Annex-I Countries 13,913 65.5 14,183 53.3 1.9
OECD Countries 11,092 53.3 12,910 49.4 16.4
1 U.S. 4,851 23.3 5,817 21.4 19.9
2 China 2,211 11.0 5,060 18.6 128.9
3 Russia 2,189 9.8 1,544 5.7 -29.5
4 Japan 1,058 5.1 1,214 4.5 14.8
5 India 588 2.8 1,147 4.2 95.5
6 Germany 968 4.6 813 3.0 -15.9
7 Canada 429 2.1 549 2.0 27.9
8 U.K. 558 2.7 530 2.0 -5.0
9 Italy 398 1.9 454 1.7 14.0
10 ROK 227 1.7 449 1.7 97.6
Unit: million CO
2
 tons
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of the ROK after the 1998 crisis was once again 
led by the energy-intensive manufacturing sector 
as most primary industries transitioned into the 
secondary manufacturing industry rather than into 
the tertiary service sector. This trend is unlike the 
case of developed countries that have constantly 
invested in environmentally friendly and energy-
saving technologies as a means to nurture innovative 
industries with greater future value. The ROK’s 
strengthened reliance on labor- and resource-
intensive manufacturing industries could be 
problematic if the future climate negotiations were 
to put limits on the country’s GHG emissions as this 
might trigger an economic slump or even lead to a 
much bigger economic crisis.
Another aspect of the climate negotiations that 
is important for the ROK is its potential impact 
on the international export market. Increasing 
numbers of climate change and environmental 
treaties have enforced strengthened regulations, 
whereby countries or businesses that fail to comply 
with the new standards have to deal with trade or 
tariff barriers. For example, the EU announced in 
2009 the increase of GHG emissions standards 
for motor vehicles to 130 g/km as of 2012, and 95 
g/km as of 2020. As penalties will be imposed on 
manufacturers that fail to meet the new standards, 
this policy will have a direct impact on the ROK, 
being the world’s fifth largest automobile producer. 
Apparently, the outcomes of climate change 
negotiations are developing into specific regulations 
that set out new trade standards in the international 
market. Naturally, countries that are a step ahead 
in technology innovation would frame climate 
negotiations in such a way as to minimize the costs 
of reducing emissions and maximize the economic 
benefits of trading climate-related goods and 
services. 
The future of the green energy market, which is 
expected to grow rapidly in the coming decades, 
will be greatly shaped by climate negotiations. 
Developed countries – especially those that have 
played a proactive role in climate deals – have been 
the early movers and dominated the market share 
for green products and services. Meanwhile, the 
so-called “second movers” – those with technological 
gaps to fill to become globally competitive – have 
struggled to benefit from the explosive growth of the 
green market. In other words, the reinforcement of 
environmental regulations acts as a barrier to these 
second movers while it offers opportunities to the 
early movers with advanced technologies. The ROK’s 
sustained status as a Non-Annex I country under 
international climate negotiations has hindered the 
country’s drive to stimulate its industries in building 
a competitive technological edge for entering new 
global markets for green goods and services. Upon 
enforcement of emissions reduction in the future, 
the ROK will have to deal with two major challenges: 
(1) GHG emission reduction obligations to be 
imposed will be commensurate with those of 
developed countries as the ROK is likely to be 
recognized as an “advanced developing economy,” 
and 
(2) the manufacturing sector will lose its 
international competitiveness in the course of 
competing with the frontrunners of low carbon 
technologies. 
Foreseeing these circumstances, the ROK 
government acknowledged the need to shift to a 
low-carbon growth path. 
Aside from the issue of imposing global emission 
caps, the extreme impact of climate change on the 
Korean Peninsula is another triggering factor for 
the shift toward a low-carbon society. The average 
rise in temperature in six major cities (Seoul, Busan, 
Daegu, Incheon, Gwangju, and Daejeon) has been 
1.50°C over the past century, which is far above 
the global average of 0.74°C. Rising seawater levels 
reveal similar trends – as of 2012, seawater levels 
in the Jeju region rose by 5.97 mm per year for the 
past 33 years, which is approximately three times 
the global average (1.8 mm/year) according to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
The average annual rainfall (1996-2005) in the ROK 
increased by approximately 10% from the average 
of the past 30-year period (1971-2000), with rain 
being more concentrated in the summer season. 
The total amount of damage caused by weather-
related disasters, such as typhoons and flash floods, 
amounted to 17.7 trillion KRW in the period of 
1996-2005.
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Energy Intensity % change 
(2000-2008)1960 1970 1973 1980 1990 2000 2007 2008
ROK     0.279 0.336 0.328 0.369 0.315 0.314 2.0
France 0.227 0.256 0.256 0.223 0.206 0.191 0.175 0.176 1.0
Germany 0.238 0.328 0.322 0.291 0.228 0.178 0.160 0.160 1.3
Japan 0.121 0.142 0.144 0.123 0.106 0.111 0.099 0.095 1.9
U.K. 0.290 0.282 0.265 0.226 0.180 0.152 0.120 0.117 3.2
U.S. 0.399 0.417 0.402 0.352 0.271 0.234 0.204 0.198 2.0
OECD     0.306 0.274 0.224 0.203 0.183 0.179 1.6
Table 4: Energy intensity of selected countries
Source: KEEI, 2009
Figure 2: Share of developed countries in the world’s green energy market
Source: MKE, 2008
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Research on Public Awareness of Climate Change (June 2008)
A public survey was conducted by the Ministry of Environment (1,040 participants, 95% confidence- level, ±3.04% 
margin of error) to ascertain the level of public awareness on climate change. The results of the survey revealed that: 
• Most of the respondents (88.1%) were aware of climate change and global warming caused by increasing use 
of fossil fuels. The majority (95%) considered the level of impacts as “severe.”
• More than half of the general public (56.8%) considered that the central government should play a leading 
role in reducing the national GHG emissions, whereas their awareness of the individual and corporate 
responsibilities was relatively low.
• If the ROK were to cap its GHG emissions, the public believed that it should be imposed at a level that is 
either “close to that of developed countries (39.6%)” or “slightly higher than that of the developing countries 
(36.4%).”
• More than ninety percent (91.8%) of the respondents “supported” the government’s strategies and actions 
to foster climate technologies and green industries as the nation’s new growth engine.
Which entity plays the biggest role in 
preventing global warming?
Response (%)
Central Government 56.8
Individuals 13.8
Corporations 11.3
Local Governments 10.3
Civil Society 5.8
Academic Institutions 1.0
No response 1.1
Source: MoE, 2014f
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Policy Options
After Lee Myung-bak was inaugurated as president 
in February 2008, the new administration decided to 
adopt a strategy that: 
(1) mandates the government’s proactive 
participation in international talks on climate 
change; 
(2) ensures that the ROK’s contributions toward the 
global climate agenda are commensurate with 
the nation’s economic power and influence in the 
international arena; and 
(3) enforces national actions of emissions reduction 
to the fullest extent that is deemed bearable in all 
sectors of the economy. 
Accordingly, the government made plans considering 
the timeframe stipulated in the Bali Road Map, 
specifically targeting: 
(1) the establishment of the nation’s overarching 
strategy on climate change response and 
participation in climate negotiations by year 
2008; 
(2) presentation of the ROK’s strengthened 
commitment through global climate negotiations 
in 2009, while at the same time carrying out 
diplomatic activities that help identify and 
maximize the nation’s interests; and 
(3) devise measures to prepare the nation for the 
post-2012 climate change regime. 
In July 2008, President Lee announced that the ROK 
would establish a mid-term GHG reduction target 
by the end of the year, which became a major turning 
point signaling how the nation is to follow the new 
paradigm of low-carbon growth.
The “Transition into a Low-Carbon Society” is one of 
the 10 major policy agenda items under the nation’s 
Five-Year Plan for Green Growth. This falls under the 
overarching national strategy of “improving climate 
change responses and energy self-governance.” 
Relevant policies and implementation programs 
prioritize the needs for monitoring GHG emissions, 
establishing a comprehensive GHG emissions 
management system, improving public awareness on 
climate change, and realizing emission reduction in 
all sectors of the economy.
Figure 3: Government plans under the timeframe of the Bali Road Map
2008
• Inauguration of a new presidential administration 
• Preparation of an overarching  national strategy for climate change
2009
• Announcement of strengthened national commitments toward global climate 
agenda  
• Intensiﬁcation of diplomatic activities to identify and maximize national interst
2010-2012
• Establishment of policies and infrastructure necessary for the preparation for 
the post-2012 climate change regime   
2013
• Post-2012 climate change regime
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1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth
The ROK recognized actions to realize the “transition 
into a low-carbon society” as opportunities for 
simultaneously resolving multiple challenges: 
minimizing the nation’s impacts from future climate 
negotiations, enhancing people’s quality of life, 
and exploring new drivers of economic growth. 
This set of agenda evolved from the government’s 
understanding of the need to advance into a less 
energy-intensive and more environmentally friendly 
stage of economic development. As a response, 
the government took proactive actions such as 
participating in global climate negotiations, setting 
GHG reduction targets, and continuously monitoring 
the outcomes from mitigation actions.
The nation’s Comprehensive Basic Plan to 
Correspond to Climate Change, which was 
released in September 2008, identifies the first 
priority objective of responding to climate change 
as “fostering climate-friendly industries as a new 
growth driver.” Climate-friendly industries include 
activities related to energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, and resource recovery, which all contribute 
to responding to the climate challenges and boosting 
the country’s export performance. The ROK’s 
low-carbon green growth paradigm perceives the 
transition into low-carbon society as an opportunity 
to innovate and add much value to the nation’s 
industrial technology. Such pioneering efforts will 
hopefully empower the ROK to play a bridging role 
between the developed and developing nations 
amidst the post-2012 development regime.
Figure 4: SWOT analysis conducted for the “low-carbon society” agenda
Source: PCGG, 2009a
 
Strengths Weaknesses
Opportunities Threats
• 
Strategic 
Directions
Disclosure of GHG emission 
information & establishment of 
a national GHG emissions 
management system
Establishment of a mid/long-term 
national emission reduction targets and 
implementation of sector 
speciﬁc actions
Expansion of carbon sink capacities
Engagement in North Korea’s 
afforestation activities to help build 
trust toward developing a green 
Korean peninsula
• Increased public awareness 
of climate change
• Well-organized public-
private ties that offer 
favorable conditions for 
implementing climate 
actions
• Highly qualified human 
resources and IT 
infrastructure
• Increasing mumber of 
collective country actions 
on climate change
• Increasing volume of global 
market for low-carbon 
goods and services
• Opportunities to gain 
recognition in the 
international climate 
change arena as an 
“advanced developing 
economy”
• Lack of basic infrastructure 
and emissions statistics 
needed in building a low 
carbon society
• Highly energy-intensive 
industrial structure
• Lack of international 
competitiveness in low-
carbon technology markets
• Mounting international 
pressure to cap GHG 
emission
• Decreased competitiveness 
of energy intensive 
industries from emissions 
reduction actions
• Outward flow of 
manufacturing business 
and increasing reliance on 
technology import
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2. Targets and Strategies
The setting of a nation’s GHG reduction targets 
is a critical process as it determines the levels of 
mitigation actions and necessary investments to 
follow.  The reduction targets have a significant 
impact on the national economy and the society at 
large since the government’s existing regulatory and 
incentive measures need to be realigned toward the 
achievement of these targets. 
The ROK pledged to the international community 
that the nation would set a GHG reduction target 
at the G-8 Summit in July 2008. In the following 
year, the government fulfilled this commitment, 
announcing that the nation would reduce its GHG 
emissions by 30% from business-as-usual (BAU) 
levels by the year 2020. It should be noted that this 
target is the most ambitious, based on the levels 
recommended by the IPCC for developing countries. 
In response to the nation’s mixed reactions toward 
the reduction targets, President Lee pointed out 
that “meeting these targets will place a burden 
on the national economy in the short term, but 
relevant measures are necessary for the nation’s 
greater interest in the long term.” He added that the 
“ROK’s voluntary setting of reduction targets will 
encourage the international community to take more 
responsible actions against global climate challenges 
(Blue House, 2009).”
Although the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth 
did not specifically quantify the nation’s reduction 
targets, it provided a detailed outline on how 
the government plans to set and manage them. 
Fundamentally, the stages in the development of the 
ROK’s mid-term reduction targets were: 
(1) assessment of the nation’s GHG reduction 
potential in various sectors; 
Table 5: Specific tasks and actions under the low-carbon agenda
Tasks Actions
1. Disclosure of GHG 
     emissions data
a. Disclose and manage GHG emissions data
b. Establish a national GHG emissions inventory and management system
c. Nurture and develop MRV service industries and establish a global GHG emissions research center
2. Reduction of 
     carbon emissions
a. Set national GHG emission reduction targets
b. Establish sector-specific GHG reduction strategies 
c. Enable GHG reductions based on market principles
3. Carbon sink and uptake
a. Realize a low-carbon and resource-circulating society
b. Expand carbon sink/sources in forests
c. Foster ocean-based carbon sink and expand environmentally friendly agricultural practices
4. Greening of the 
      Korean Peninsula
a. Support forest restoration activities in North Korea
b. Establish an ecological and environmental belt across the Korean Peninsula and boost cooperation 
with North Korea in the energy sector
c. Prepare a joint strategy for climate change adaptation and mitigation with North Korea
Source: PCGG, 2009a
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(2) development of GHG reduction strategies 
based on cost estimation of different mitigation 
measures; 
(3) development of the nation’s GHG reduction 
scenarios, which was followed by public hearing 
and consultation; and 
(4) proclamation of the nation’s GHG reduction 
targets (PCGG, 2009a).
2.1 Setting of Mid-term Emissions-Reduction 
Targets
In the process of setting the national GHG reduction 
targets, the government conducted numerous 
assessments, held discussions with relevant experts, 
and went through public consultations as a means 
to build a strong social consensus and support. 
Immediately after the president declared that the 
nation would announce its mid-term GHG reduction 
targets in July 2008, the government created an 
ad hoc team of researchers (from relevant national 
research institutions) to come up with projections on 
the ROK’s future GHG emissions. This team worked 
for a period of 10 months to draft the projections, 
which were then reviewed by an external committee. 
The external committee comprising a total of seven 
members (economists, energy and environment 
specialists) validated and supplemented the team’s 
projections and identified various mitigation 
measures to help support three different national 
GHG emissions reduction scenarios in August 2009 
(PCGG, 2009d).
Several different methods can be used in setting the 
GHG reduction targets, including the: (1) base-year  
approach  (often  adopted  by  developed  countries); 
(2)  BAU  approach  (often  adopted  by developing  
countries);,  and  (3)  intensity-unit-based  approach  
that  takes  into  consideration  the emissions  per 
unit  production  (PCGG,  2009b).  In  devising the 
national targets, some  recommended that the 
government should adopt the intensity-unit-based 
approach as it is deemed most favorable to the 
nation’’s circumstances. However, the government 
eventually selected the BAU approach, which is 
fundamentally based on top-down assessments of 
a countrynation’’s growth factors. After a series 
of  closed-door  assessments,  validations,  and  
discussions,  the  government finally  announced  
three scenarios to the public, which were to cut 
emissions either by 21% (Scenario- 1), or by 27% 
(Scenario-2),or by 30% (Scenario-3) from BAU levels 
by 2020. 
Figure 5: Emissions-reduction scenarios 
Source: PCGG, 2009b
BAU 
Scenarios
Scenario1 Scenario2          Scenario3
   298         594        813  642    590      569
         1990      2005      2020
Unit: million tons
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In devising the national targets, some recommended 
that the government should adopt the intensity-unit-
based approach as it is deemed most favorable to the 
nation’s circumstances. However, the government 
eventually selected the BAU approach, which is 
fundamentally based on top-down assessments of 
a country’s growth factors. After a series of closed-
door assessments, validations, and discussions, the 
government finally announced three scenarios to 
the public, which were to cut emissions either by 
21% (Scenario 1), or by 27% (Scenario 2), or by 30% 
(Scenario-3) from BAU levels by 2020. 
Following the announcement of the BAU scenarios, 
the government began to assess public opinion, 
holding a total of 44 symposia and public hearings 
nationwide over a period of two months (August 
– September 2009). Throughout this process, the 
industrial sector expressed strong concern over 
the possible weakening of the ROK’s industrial 
competitiveness, and insisted that the target 
should be set at 21% (Scenario 1) or lower levels. 
Industrial leaders emphasized that the government 
should consider the practicality of the proposed 
mitigation measures, relevant costs, and capacities 
of the industrial sector in planning and carrying out 
mitigation actions.
The industrial sector also stressed the fact that the 
ROK is still far behind in terms of developing and 
commercializing the mitigation technologies. Most 
importantly, several mitigation measures proposed 
by the government, such as the utilization of bio-
fuels and green cars, were perceived not to result in 
the level of GHG emissions reduction. In addition, 
the estimated cost of abatement proposed by the 
government (50,000 KRW per tCO
2
) was considered 
excessive in light of the nation’s GDP level and 
economic growth rates. The ROK’s industrial 
structure, composed primarily of energy-intensive 
businesses – steel, petrochemicals, and cement 
manufacturing – was also recognized as a major 
obstacle in meeting the ambitious reduction target.
On the other hand, the civil society claimed that the 
nation’s GHG reduction target should be set at levels 
higher than Scenario 3 (30%), given the status of the 
ROK as the world’s ninth largest GHG emitter and 
as a member of the OECD. Some groups based their 
suggestions on what is called the “Responsibility-
Capacity Indicator,” an index representing the level 
of the nation’s responsibilities for the changing 
climate based on multiple factors such as income 
levels, the accumulated amount of GHG emissions, 
and population. The ROK ranked high (32nd) on 
the global list, stressing the need for the setting of 
ambitious mitigation targets.  
The surveys conducted to collect public responses 
indicated a range of differing opinions. In a poll 
conducted by the PCGG immediately after the 
announcement of the three scenarios, the general 
public was supportive of Scenario 1, while experts 
in the fields related to climate change were leaning 
toward Scenario 2. However, in a survey conducted in 
October 2009 after the ROK successfully hosted the 
G-20 Summit, the general public changed its stance 
as the majority shifted to support Scenario 3. 
This result was in conflict with a survey conducted 
over a similar period by the Korea Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and the Federation of 
Korean Industries, where the respondents from the 
industrial sector once again confirmed their support 
toward Scenario 1. Given such conflicting views 
among different groups, the National Assembly’s 
Special Committee on Climate Change held a forum 
on two separate occasions in an effort to mediate the 
Table 6: Public support toward different reduction scenarios
Scenario Target Selection Criteria
Supporting groups based 
on public hearing
1
21%
(171 million tons reduction from BAU)
Cost effectiveness Industrial sector
2
27%
(223 million tons reduction from BAU)
Reduction target to meet international 
levels
Academia/research institutions
3
30%
(244 million tons reduction from BAU)
Highest reduction target recommended for 
developing countries
Environmental and civil groups
Source: Special Committee on Climate Change, 2009
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dispute. The discussions in the two fora eventually 
provided the momentum and consensus necessary 
for the government to push forward with the most 
ambitious reduction target (Scenario 3).
Methodology for Target Setting on GHG Reduction
In order to set the national GHG reduction targets, 
the government analyzed the GHG emission 
projections, reduction potential, and their 
macroeconomic impacts. The analysis followed a 
four-stage process. In the first stage, GHG emissions 
were projected based on the forecasts of multiple 
economic variables, such as oil prices, growth rate, 
industrial structure, and investment plans of the 
industrial sector. 
The data on oil prices came from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (IEA), which expected 
that the price of oil would stand at US$98/bbl in 
2008, US$84/bbl in 2010, US$70/bbl in 2020 and 
US$82/bbl in 2030. In terms of population, Statistics 
Korea (KOSTAT) forecasted that the nation’s 
population would increase from 48.6 million in 2008 
to 48.9 million in 2010 and to 49.3 million in 2020 
and fall to 48.6 million in 2030. The annual economic 
growth rate was projected to reach 4.2% in 2008 
and 4.75% in 2010 before falling to 2.24% in 2030 
(PCGG, 2009c). 
In the following stage, the GHG reduction potentials 
were analyzed using the MARKAL Model developed 
by the IEA. In the third stage, the macro-economic 
Table 8: Examples of economic variables reflected in the GHG emission target setting
2008 2010 2020 2030
Oil price (US$/bbl) 98 84 70 82
Population (million) 48.6 48.9 49.3 48.6
Economic growth rate (%) 4.2 4.75 3.66 2.24
Source: PCGG, 2009c
Table 7: Milestones in the setting of national GHG reduction targets
Date Milestone Description
Jul. 2008
Government announced a plan 
to set the national mid-term 
GHG reduction targets 
The ROK announced its mid-term GHG reduction targets in 2008 during the 
G-8 Extended Summit 
Aug. 2008
Declaration of low-carbon green 
growth as national vision
President Lee proclaimed low-carbon green growth as the new national vision 
in his speech at the 60th anniversary of the founding of the ROK
Sep. 2008 – Jun. 2009
Analysis on emission projections 
and reduction potential
Conducted by an ad hoc research team composed of members of national 
research institutions
Jul. 2009
Establishment of a 
review committee
Establishment of a review committee consisting of seven experts from 
the environment, energy, and economy sectors to verify the reliability of 
projections and reduction potentials
Aug. 2009
Announcement of GHG reduction 
targets based on three scenarios
GHG emission-reduction targets of 21% (Scenario 1), 27% (Scenario 2), and 
30% (Scenario 3)
Aug. 2009 Expert-opinion surveys
A survey conducted among 400 selected experts from the academia, research 
institutions industry, and civil society groups
Aug. – Sep. 2009 Public surveys A public survey conducted on 1,000 citizens 
Aug. – Sep. 2009 Symposia and public hearings 44 symposia and public hearings held nationwide
36
impacts of GHG reduction efforts on GDP and level 
of consumption were analyzed using the Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE). Successfully, GHG 
reduction scenarios were developed in the fourth 
stage, taking into consideration different mitigation 
measures that can be realized (PCGG, 2009c). 
Emissions Reduction Strategy
As mentioned above, the MARKAL model finds the 
least expensive combination of emission-control 
technologies to meet a given GHG reduction target. 
The ROK’s three different GHG reduction scenarios 
thus draw upon different combinations of emission-
control technologies. For example, Scenario 3 (30%  
BAU 2020) draws upon applying emission-reduction 
measures such as deployment of green cars (electric 
and fuel cell vehicles), expansion of the use of 
energy-efficient appliances, and implementation of 
strong demand-management policies, in addition 
to those selected for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. 
Detailed reduction measures for different scenarios 
are presented in Table 9.
Figure 6: Economic variables reflected in the GHG emission target setting 
Projectons on Economic Variables
(e.g., GDP, Growth Rates)
Determination of Emission
Reduction Potentials
Projections on GHG Emission
(BAU)
BAU levels of future emissions 
under the given 
economic circumstances
Projected impacts on the macro 
economic variables for different 
reduction scenarios
Amount of achievable reduction
under affordable costs
Expected Macroeconomic
Impacts from Mitigation Actions
Announcement of National
Emission Reduction Targets
Source: PCGG, 2009c
MARKAL Model  
• MARKAL was developed in a cooperative 
multinational project over a period of almost two 
decades by the Energy Technology Systems Analysis 
Programme (ETSAP) of the IEA.
• The basic components in a MARKAL model are 
specific types of energy or emission-control 
technology. Each type is represented quantitatively 
by a set of performance and cost characteristics. 
A menu of both existing and future technologies is 
inputted to the model. Both the supply and demand 
sides are integrated, so that one side responds 
automatically to changes in the other. The model 
selects the best combination of technologies that 
minimizes total energy system cost.
• Some of the useful applications of MARKAL include 
identification of least-cost energy systems and cost-
effective responses to restrictions on emissions.
Source: IEA-ETSAP, 2014
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2.2 Setting of Emissions-Reduction Targets by 
Sector, Business Types, and Year
In 2011, the strategies related to GHG reduction 
targets took a more concrete shape. After holding 
another series of public hearings and coordination 
meetings followed by consultative meetings within 
the PCGG, a plan outlining GHG emission-reduction 
targets by sectors, business types, and financial years 
was prepared and approved by the Cabinet in July 
2011 (Joint Work of Relevant Ministries, 2011a). 
The plan estimated that the nation’s emission levels 
will begin to fall after reaching their peak in 2014, 
realizing a decoupling of economic growth and 
GHG emissions in 2015, which is a result of low-
carbon investments and the deployment of green 
technologies. 
The GHG reduction targets by sector and business 
types released in 2011 are presented in Tables 10 
and 11. The targets by sector are: 18.2% for industry, 
34.3% for transportation, 26.9% for buildings, 
15.2% for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, 12.3% 
for waste management, and 26.7 % for energy 
conversion. The GHG reduction targets by business 
type were partially modified, reflecting stakeholders’ 
opinions suggested at the industry leader gatherings, 
NGO-initiated workshops, and public hearings. 
Table 9: Examples of economic variables reflected in the GHG emission target setting
Scenario Target Emission-Reduction Measures
1
21%
(171 million tons reduction from BAU)
• Green buildings and residential houses 
• Deployment of energy high-efficient manufacturing equipment and facilities
• Low-carbon transport systems 
• Expansion of renewable and nuclear energy generation
• Introduction of smart-grids
2
27%
(223 million tons reduction from BAU)
• Measures for removal of fluorinated gases (F-gases) with high global warming 
potentials (GWP)
• Increase of bio-fuel supply 
• Introduction of carbon capture storage (CCS) technologies
3
30%
(244 million tons reduction from BAU)
• Deployment of green cars (electric and fuel cell vehicles) 
• Increase in the use of energy-efficient appliances 
• Strengthening of existing energy demand management policies
Source: PCGG, 2009d
Figure 7: GHG Reduction Trajectory
Source: Joint Work of Relevant Ministries, 2011b
BAU
Reduction
Targets
850,000
850,000
850,000
850,000
850,000
850,000
850,000
850,000
2010    2011    2012    2013    2014    2015    2016    2017    2018    2019    2020
Unit: thousand tons
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Table 10: Reduction targets by sector and business types (2020 BAU)
Source: Joint Work of Relevant ministries, 2011b
Sector Sub-category
Baseline
(2007)
BAU
(2020)
Reduction Target
Amount of 
targeted
reduction
Emissions after 
reduction
Reduction rate 
(%)
Industry
Refinery 12.8 17.1 1.28 15.83 (7.5)
Mining 1.0 0.68 0.027 0.655 (3.9)
Steel 86.0 121.35 7.88 113.47 (6.5)
Cement 42.2 41.48 3.53 37.95 (8.5)
Petrochemicals 50.7 63.47 4.77 58.7 (7.5)
Paper and wood 8.7 7.73 0.55 7.18 (7.1)
Textile/Leather 11.9 9.81 0.61 9.2 (6.3)
Glass/Ceramics 4.5 5.50 0.22 5.28 (4.0)
Non-ferrous metal 5.4 5.02 0.21 4.81 (4.1)
Machinery 10.2 13.10 0.99 12.11 (7.6)
Electrical
/Electronics
Energy 9.7 12.09 0.96 11.14 (7.9)
Non-energy 18.0 29.25 24.55 4.70 (83.9)
Electronic display device 6.3 71.65 28.32 43.33 (39.5)
Semiconductor 8.4 14.53 4.03 10.5 (27.7)
Vehicle
Energy 6.7 8.72 0.68 8.04 (7.8)
Non-energy 2.9 3.62 3.25 0.36 (90.0)
Shipbuilding 1.8 3.79 0.25 3.54 (6.7)
Other manufacturing 17.6 16.91 0.29 16.62 (1.7)
Food and drinks 6.8 6.16 0.31 5.86 (5.0)
Construction 2.5 3.22 0.23 2.99 (7.1)
Sub-total 314.1 455.18 82.937 372.265 (18.2)
Transport
Passenger transport /
Private vehicle
87.7 107.25 36.82 70.43 (34.3)
Building
Domestic 70.5 87.44 23.62 63.82 (27.0)
Commercial 67.6 91.52 24.44 67.08 (26.7)
Sub-total 138.1 178.96 48.06 130.9 (26.9)
Public Public and others 16.2 18.85 4.70 14.15 (25.0)
Agriculture, 
forestry, 
and fishery
Agriculture, forestry, 
and fishery 30.0 29.10 1.52 27.59 (5.2)
Waste Waste 17.1 13.83 1.71 12.13 (12.3)
Total 610 813 243.9 569.1 (30.0)
Unit: million CO
2 
eq
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Source: Joint Work of Relevant ministries, 2011b
Table 11: Reduction targets by year
Category Sub-category 2012 2013 2015 2020
Conversion Power generation, city gas, and district heating 1.5 3.0 6.1 26.7
Industry
Refinery 0.4 0.6 2.8 7.5
Mining 0.4 0.4 0.6 3.9
Steel 0.1 0.2 2.1 6.5
Cement 0.3 0.5 3.0 8.5
Petrochemicals 0.4 0.6 2.8 7.5
Paper and wood 0.4 0.5 2.4 7.1
Textile/Leather 0.4 0.6 1.1 6.3
Glass/Ceramics 0.4 0.5 0.7 4.0
Non-ferrous metal 0.4 0.5 0.7 4.1
Machinery 0.45 0.7 1.2 7.6
Electrical/Electronics 0.2 2.2 32.3 61.7
Electronic display device 2.4 3.4 26.3 39.5
Semiconductor 1.0 1.8 17.3 27.7
Vehicle 0.3 1.1 15.2 31.9
Shipbuilding 0.5 0.6 1.3 6.7
Manufacturing 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.7
Food and drink 0.5 0.6 0.9 5.0
Construction 0.2 0.5 3.2 7.1
Transport Passenger transport / private vehicle 2.0 4.2 9.6 34.3
Building
Domestic 1.8 5.0 8.9 27.0
Commercial 1.9 4.4 8.8 26.7
Public and others Public and others 5.2 8.6 15.7 25.0
Agriculture, forest 
and fishery Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 0.0 0.1 1.7 5.2
Waste Waste 1.3 2.0 9.0 12.3
Total 1.6 3.3 10.0 30.0
Unit: %
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For example, the short-term reduction rates set 
for the cement industry were lowered considering 
challenges involved in introducing mitigation 
measures in the short term (Joint Work of Relevant 
Ministries, 2011b). The accumulation of mitigation 
targets by sector and business types presents the 
nation’s total cumulative reduction target by year, 
set at 1.6% in 2012, 3.3% in 2013, 10.0% in 2015, 
and 30% in 2020. As shown in Figure 7, the ROK 
aims to realize decoupling of economic growth and 
GHG emissions by 2015. It should be noted that the 
2020 target is in line with what was announced in 
2009. 
The setting of emissions-reduction targets by 
sector and business types was an ambitious attempt 
by the government, considering how domestic 
industries were to strongly oppose the government’s 
regulatory barriers. In the process, the industrial 
sector continuously raised issues on the importance 
of disclosure of the government’s decision-making 
process, delivery of accurate information, and public 
consultations. Most importantly, the continued lack 
of sound communication between the government 
and business entities resulted in frustration and loss 
of trust among the industrial leaders. According to 
a survey conducted by the Korea Small Business 
Institute at the end of 2010, many SME respondents 
mentioned that they suffered from inadequate 
information, leading them to obtain information 
from personal networks rather than from the 
government authorities. 
Such shortfall underlines the insufficient effort of 
the government to eagerly engage the public in 
setting the emissions-reduction targets. According 
to a survey on businesses conducted by the Ministry 
of Environment following the announcement of 
the reduction targets in 2012, majority of business 
leaders show low acceptability of the reduction 
targets, with suggestions that targets should be reset 
by the forthcoming administration. 
As described above, the setting of GHG reduction 
targets is a sensitive issue to the government, 
industry, and the nation as a whole. If the target is 
set too high, it sparks opposition from the industrial 
sector as the targets would weaken the ROK’s 
international competitiveness. However, if the target 
is set too low, it fails to provide strong market signals 
and justifications for mitigation actions, and damages 
the government credibility in the international 
community. The ROK’s experience has demonstrated 
that the most critical element of national target 
setting is enabling coordination among stakeholders 
through clear disclosure of information and regular 
consultation to reach an agreement among different 
parties, and enhancing public acceptability of the 
agreed targets. 
Legal Framework
The Korean government laid out a comprehensive 
legal framework to support the setting of 
the national emissions-reduction targets and 
implementation of mitigation strategies. Most 
importantly, the Framework Act on Low-Carbon 
Green Growth provided clear government directions 
under the Chapter titled “Realization of Low-Carbon 
Society.” Article 38 (Basic Principles for Coping with 
Climate Change) states that the government shall: 
(1) establish the state’s medium- and long-term 
targets for reduction of GHG; 
(2) promote the reduction of GHG efficiently and 
systematically by introducing cost-effective and 
reasonable regulatory systems based on market 
mechanism; and 
(3) utilize high technologies and convergence 
technologies to reduce GHG. 
Article 42 specifically details the government’s 
obligation to establish medium- and long-term 
targets as well as the goals for each particular phase 
of follow-up actions. The reduction targets are to 
be established for each sector that shall prepare the 
necessary measures for accomplishing the agreed 
targets. The Framework Act articulates the needs 
for emission reporting (Article 44), establishment 
of an integrated information management system 
for GHGs (Article 45), and introduction of a Cap and 
Trade System (Article 46). 
3. Policy Actions and Programs 
Years before the ROK announced low-carbon 
green growth as its national vision, the government 
initiated a number of major policies and programs 
that provide incentives for voluntary mitigation 
actions. Among others, the Voluntary Agreement 
(VA) scheme and the Korea Voluntary Emission 
Reduction Program (KVER) played critical 
roles during this transitional period before the 
government started to enforce stricter regulations.
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It is important to note that the voluntary 
mitigation efforts from the industrial sector helped 
improve public perception on the necessity and 
justification for the government’s development and 
implementation of regulatory measures. 
These initial efforts also helped lay the foundation 
for the necessary legal and institutional 
infrastructure required to meet the national 
reduction targets. In other words, the necessary 
foundation for the measurement, reporting, and 
verification (MRV), and the institutional framework 
that supported the implementation of the VA 
scheme and KVER enabled the government to 
introduce pre-emptive regulatory instruments such 
as the Target Management Scheme (TMS) and the 
Emission Trading System (ETS).
The VA scheme was initiated in 1998 when the 
ROK had limited understanding of and experience 
on how to effectively regulate GHG emissions. The 
purpose of the VA scheme was to facilitate energy-
saving and GHG-reduction efforts in the industrial 
sector. Targeting energy-intensive enterprises with 
annual energy consumption greater than 5,000 
TOE, the government signed agreements inviting 
businesses to voluntarily establish plans, implement 
actions, and report the outcomes of energy and/
or GHG emission-reduction actions. What initially 
started with just 15 companies, including POSCO (a 
major steel manufacturer), developed into an active 
program supported by 1,300 companies by 2009. 
However, while the VA scheme helped in raising the 
awareness of business leaders on the necessity for 
the nation’s collective mitigation actions, outcomes 
were limited as it was a compulsory scheme. 
The VA scheme eventually lost momentum when 
most of the companies involved were allowed to 
participate in the TMS when it was first introduced 
in 2011.
The KVER was launched in 2005 and led by the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy, now known 
as the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy 
(MOTIE). As one of the nation’s earliest programs 
aimed at emissions reduction, the procedures and 
requirements of the KVER were very similar to 
the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) initiative. Under this carbon offset program, 
the government certifies and provides incentives 
for emissions reduction achieved through energy-
efficiency improvements and development of 
renewable energy. Carbon offset is a mechanism 
whereby a country, company, or individual invests 
in another party to reduce GHG emissions, in order 
to compensate for or to offset an emission made 
elsewhere. The mechanism allows actions to capture 
the low-hanging fruits of emissions savings – the 
easiest and cheapest “quick wins” – to balance 
out their own carbon footprints. Although KVER 
lost momentum in 2011 when the nation’s major 
emitters were mandated to take part in the TMS, the 
program is expected to continue to serve as a carbon 
offset mechanism under the ETS, which came into 
force in 2015. 
The ROK reached a turning point in its GHG 
reduction policies and actions in 2008 after 
President Lee declared low-carbon green growth as 
the new paradigm for national development. 
Figure 8: Relationship between different GHG reduction schemes and carbon offset programs
Source: GGGI, 2014
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In order to fulfill the national GHG emission targets, 
the government created the TMS, which requires 
companies emitting more than 15,000 TOE annually 
to set individual reduction targets in consultation 
with the government. Following these efforts, the 
government launched the ETS as a strengthened 
regulatory measure superseding the TMS in 2015.
3.1 Establishment of the GIR and National GHG 
Inventory
The MRV system emphasizes the importance of how 
mitigation actions should be taken in such a manner 
that they can be clearly measured, reported, and 
verified. The 2007 Bali Action Plan highlighted the 
importance of MRV system in order for each country 
to deliver concrete national actions on managing 
their respective national GHG reduction targets. As 
MRV is an effective tool to secure the transparency 
and consistency of information on national 
mitigation actions, establishing an MRV system is 
an essential and basic element of GHG reduction 
efforts. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I parties 
(developed countries) are required to report 
annually on inventories of GHG emissions and 
descriptions of key mitigation actions to the 
UNFCCC in a specified format. The guidelines 
for Annex I countries lead to consistency in what 
countries report, when they report it, and how 
they make such reports. In contrast, reporting 
requirements are less stringent for non-Annex 
I parties (developing countries) and allow for 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs). 
There is thus an urgent need for developing 
countries to establish an accurate and consistent 
MRV system that can be used worldwide in order to 
ensure efficient mitigation actions and international 
support for GHG reductions. It is also necessary 
for them to draw up an inventory of GHG that is 
universally recognized to engage in the international 
carbon market. The ROK is not an Annex I party to 
the Kyoto Protocol but the country established the 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Research Center 
(GIR) in June 2010 to lead the preparation of GHG 
reduction measures. 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Research Center 
(GIR)
After announcing the vision of low-carbon green 
growth in August 2008, there was much discussion 
about setting up a research institute for GHG 
reduction. As such, the GIR was established in 
June 2010 as an affiliated research institute of 
the Ministry of Environment (MoE) based on the 
Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth 
(PCGG, 2010). At the Cabinet meeting held on 
November 17, 2009, it was thus decided to set up 
an “independent and permanent research institute” 
as a follow-up measure to ensure accomplishment 
of the national GHG reduction target. In April 2010, 
the ROK government enacted the Framework Act 
on Low Carbon, Green Growth and its Enforcement 
Decree. The principle and system of GHG inventory 
management and setting up of the GIR is specified 
in this law, and the establishment of a clear and 
effective National Greenhouse Gas Information 
Management System was realized (PCGG, 2010). 
Table 12: Vision, goals, and functions of GIR
Category Description
Vision Serve as a think tank on global GHG mitigation
Goals
(Information Hub) – Manage GHG emission information efficiently 
(Accelerating Green Growth) – Respond to climate change through GHG mitigation 
(Global Networking and Outreach) – Develop a global collaboration system for GHG reduction
Six Functions
Operate a world-class national GHG management system 
Support the implementation of TMS and ETS
Support the national and sectorial GHG reduction target setting 
Conduct research on domestic and overseas GHG reduction efforts 
Expand international cooperation for climate change response 
Prepare for linking up with international carbon markets
Source: GIR, 2014b
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Under the Act, the MoE and the PCGG formed a 
team to lay the groundwork for the establishment of 
the GIR, which started to operate on June 15, 2010. 
As a leading research institute on GHG inventory 
and mitigation, it aims to control and manage GHG 
emissions at the levels set for developed countries.
With the vision of serving as a think tank on global 
GHG mitigation, the GIR set three main goals: 
comprehensive and efficient management of 
GHG information; acceleration of green growth 
by supporting the attainment of GHG reduction 
targets; and development of a global collaboration 
system for GHG reduction. It consists of three 
teams with distinct duties and responsibilities: the 
Planning and Management Team; the GHG Inventory 
Management Team; and the GHG Mitigation 
Research Team. Meanwhile, the MoE organized 
and now operates a consultative group to ensure 
efficient performance of the GIR, consisting of high-
level government officials from relevant government 
agencies.
Since the performance of the GIR depends on its 
expertise and autonomy as a research institute 
supporting the accomplishment of national 
GHG reduction targets, the organization initially 
started with a minimum number of administrative 
officials (three), and focused on recruiting high-
quality researchers (Enforcement Decree for 
the Framework Act on Low-Carbon Green 
Growth Article 36.3). Eleven researchers and ten 
professionals dispatched from relevant agencies 
secured the necessary expertise and independence 
of the GIR. Since its foundation, it has conducted 
diverse activities including the setting of the 
national GHG reduction targets, managing the 
targets by updating reduction potential, supporting 
GHG reduction, and drafting a roadmap. Also, it 
has been responsible for the management of TMS 
implementation; national GHG inventory update, 
refinement, and revision; setting up of an ETS 
registry; and initiation of international cooperation 
projects.    
National GHG Inventory System
The GIR’s main mission is to compile and maintain 
a transparent and reliable national inventory on 
GHG concentration. In this regard, the institute has 
implemented measures to improve the quality of 
inventory data and the GHG Management System 
(GIR, 2014c). In line with promoting transparency 
in government, anyone can now access GIR’s online 
inventory data and look for participant entities of 
TMS (including entities subject to the ETS). The GIR’s 
data collection provides a wide range of data – macro 
data such as national GHG emissions and emissions 
per capita, and smaller-scale data such as GHG 
emissions per company or facility. 
The institute is also in charge of reviewing GHG 
emissions data prepared by the heads of the relevant 
ministries and providing the National GHG Statistics 
Management Committee with the data for its 
review. The National GHG Statistics Management 
Committee led by the Vice Minister of Environment 
coordinates, deliberates, and decides on GHG 
inventory collected by the GIR. The preparation of 
the national GHG inventory is conducted in three 
stages: 
(1) measurement and reporting; 
(2) verification; and 
(3) deliberation and decision-making (GIR, 2014c). 
In accordance with Article 36 of the Enforcement 
Decree of the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green 
Growth, the GIR should provide guidelines for the 
MRV of the national GHG inventory (MRV5) to 
controlling ministries of each of the five sectors. 
In return, the ministries of each sector are to 
submit a final report of GHG inventory to GIR. 
The national GHG inventory covers the six main 
GHGs under the Kyoto Protocol, namely: Carbon 
dioxide (CO
2
), Methane (CH
4
), Nitrous oxide (N
2
O), 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF
6
).
The National Inventory Report (NIR) prepared 
by the GIR is a national GHG emissions statistics 
report following the IPCC Guidelines for National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories. The NIR covers 
quantitative data on GHG emissions and emission 
sources, including GHG emissions generated by the 
five sectors specified above. In the NIR, the base year 
is the first year when a country began calculating 
and analyzing its GHG inventory, and 1990 is the 
base year for most countries. Likewise, the ROK’s 
NIR presents time series data on GHG emissions and 
GHG sinks for all years from the base year (1990) 
to the most recent year. For instance, the 2012 NIR 
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provides the statistical trends of ten years from 
1990 to 2010 and the 2013 NIR covers 11 years, 
from 1990 to 2011.
3.2 Korea Voluntary Emission Reduction 
 (KVER) Scheme
The Korea Voluntary Emission Reduction (KVER) 
Scheme, launched in 2005, is the nation’s first 
major GHG reduction program. Under this scheme, 
business enterprises are required to voluntarily 
reduce GHG emissions by taking measures such 
as introducing energy-efficient equipment and 
enhancing manufacturing processes (GIR, 2014a). 
Upon assessment and verification of these 
attempts, companies receive certification for 
their GHG reductions. During the early years of 
implementation, the KVER scheme targeted all 
business enterprises operating in the ROK (Phase 
1), but this was narrowed down to SMEs in 2011 
(Phase 2) when the TMS was introduced. Even 
Figure 9: Institutional coordination for the national GHG inventory system
Source: GIR, 2014d
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Figure 11: National GHG inventory preparation process 
Source: GIR, 2014c
Stage 1
•   Calculation of emissions 
       by sector, conducted by   
       relevant government 
       ministries
•   Reporting of sectoral 
      emissions statistics to 
      relevant line ministries 
      for review
•   Submission of sectoral 
      emissions statistics to GIR
•   Working-level meetings 
       between GIR and relevant 
       ministries and institutions 
       on the results of validation
•   Finalization of emissions 
       statistics through 
       clearance by the national 
       GHG emissions 
       management council
•   Validation of sectoral 
      emissions statistics by 
      GIR
Stage 2 Stage 3
Figure 10: MRV Procedures
1. Boundary Setting
•   Setting of the boundaries   
      of an GHG emitting facility   
      based on relevant 
      registration documents
•   Categorization of emission    
       sources by type of 
       business activities 
       and facilities
•   Determination of the 
       emission calculation
       methodology for different
       sources of emission
•   Submission of emissions 
      reports and validation    
      reports to the relevant 
      ministries
•   Identiﬁcation of individuals      
      in charge of data collection,  
      monitoring, and emissions 
      calculation
•   Setting of emission data        
      collection plans and 
      monitoring method, 
      following the given 
     standards and regulations
•   Measurement and 
      calculation of emissions
•   Preparation of detailed     
       emission reports
•   Validation of emissions  
       reports by 3rd party 
•   Preparation of validation 
      reports by the 3rd party
2. Source Categorization 3. Monitoring Method
6. Assessment 5. Methodology Setting
7. 3rd Party Validation 8. Reporting
4. Institutional Setup
Source: MoE, 2014f
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though the TMS took over quite a large proportion of 
target participants of KVER, the latter maintains to 
cover SMEs, which are not obligated to reduce GHG 
emissions under the TMS.
KVER Phase 1
The KVER scheme’s concept and activities are similar 
to the well-known CDM projects. Generally, six steps 
are required to obtain GHG reduction credits: 
(1) project planning; 
(2) validation; 
(3) approval; 
(4) project implementation; 
(5) verification of GHG reductions by a third party; 
and finally 
(6) certification of GHG emissions reduction and 
issuance of Korea Certified Emission Reduction 
(KCER). 
The project developer prepares and submits the 
Project Design Document (PDD), in the initial stages 
of project conceptualization, to an accreditation 
institute for review. The verification institute is 
a third party qualified to assess GHG reduction 
potential, review implementation plans, and verify 
the actual reductions achieved. Once it drafts 
the validation report based on the findings from 
PDD, the Korea Energy Management Corporation 
(KEMCO) forwards all relevant documents for a 
final review to the accreditation committee before 
officially registering the project for implementation. 
After the project moves into the implementation 
phase, the GHG reduction activities and their 
outcomes are self-monitored by the project 
developer as stipulated in the PDD. As a matter of 
course, the verifying institute conducts the final 
verification process and drafts verification reports 
that specify the amount of reduction eligible for 
being recognized as reduction credits. Finally, the 
verification report is reviewed by the accreditation 
committee and KCERs are issued accordingly.
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy 
(MOTIE) is the government institution in charge of 
issuing registration certificates for GHG emission-
reduction projects. As described above, KEMCO is 
the supporting agency under MOTIE that registers 
projects, manages the outcomes of KVER projects, 
operates the accreditation committee, and provides 
all required assistance in project planning and 
implementation. The GHG verifying institute is a 
third party composed of relevant exports and is 
given the role to evaluate PDDs as well as monitor 
and verify the performance of GHG reduction 
Figure 12: Implementation process of the KVER scheme 
Source: Han, 2010
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activities. KCERs are issued annually over the first 
five years of project implementation (starting from 
the year of PDD registration).
To encourage active participation of the industry, 
the ROK government has offered different incentive 
schemes, the most significant of which was the profit 
gained by participating companies in selling the 
KCERs. Since 2007, the government has periodically 
purchased KCERs at prices ranging between US$4 
to US$6 per ton of CO
2
 equivalent. The government 
decides on the unit prices of KCERs, based on the 
fluctuating prices of the European Union Allowance 
(EUA). Such government incentives encourage 
companies to actively engage in mitigation activities. 
The SMEs that are comparably less capable (both 
in financial and technical terms) of taking part in 
KVER were provided with additional government 
incentives. For example, in the project-planning 
phase, the government provided grants of up 
to US$2,000 to 4,500 per project as a means of 
supporting the costs necessary in developing PDDs. 
During the implementation phase, SMEs were 
also eligible to receive government grants (up to 
US$3,000 per year) to cover the costs needed in self-
verifying the amount of GHG reductions.
Outcome of Phase 1
Table 13 below shows the number of projects and 
government purchases made over the Phase 1 
period. The number of projects continued to increase 
until 2007 but drastically decreased in 2008 due 
to two major reasons: the depletion of potentially 
viable projects; and the capping of government 
budget for the purchase of KCERs. As of early 
2010, there were 255 projects registered and 
heat recovery and utilization projects were found 
to dominate the total share of investments. Such 
efforts accounted for 86% of the total number of 
projects, while others such as electricity-efficiency 
enhancements and use of renewable energy cover 
the remaining share. 
Table 13: Projects and government purchases under the KVER scheme
Source: KEMCO, 2013
Year
Application for 
registration
Registered projects Verified Projects Government projects
No. of 
Projects
Expected 
KCERs
No. of 
Projects
Expected 
KCERs
No. of 
verification
Verified 
KCERs
No. of 
Purchases
Purchased 
KCERs
2005 26
2006 68 7,079,666 41 1,043,474
2007 171 8,767,476 60 983,750 38 941,307 37 940,602
2008 64 7,696,514 86 1,226,124 88 1,926,752 82 1,576,968
2009 70 7,467,908 65 1,260,822 161 2,720,353 141 2,229,080
2010 53 5,582,356 43 444,733 176 2,961,528 87 1,742,808
Total 452 43,524,716 295 4,958,905 463 8,549,940 347 6,489,458
Unit: tCO
2
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KVER Phase 2
After the launch of the TMS, the coverage of 
KVER was limited to SMEs and there was a slight 
modification of the operating guidelines. The 
Phase-2 KVER offered SMEs full support for 
administrative costs and guaranteed government’s 
purchase of KCERs in order to encourage their 
voluntary GHG reduction activities. Among the 
SMEs, those that have operated new facilities for 
less than a year and whose facilities have GHG 
reduction potential exceeding 100 tCO
2
 per year 
can apply for KVER projects. Once selected, project 
developers receive government grants necessary for 
the preparation of the PDD and certification of GHG 
emissions reduction. An entity that owns multiple 
facilities is allowed to apply for project registration 
separately. 
One of the exemplary cases of GHG reduction 
projects by SMEs under the KVER scheme is a fuel 
switching project of Sampo Food Co., a Korean 
food distributor operating dozens of canneries. The 
company had a cannery in Chungju manufacturing 
canned products (e.g., vegetables, fruits, seafood) for 
both domestic and overseas markets. Before KVER, 
the Chungju cannery of Sampo Food Co. used oil 
burners to produce steam used in manufacturing. 
However, it succeeded in reducing GHG emissions by 
switching to LPG. 
The second case is a waste heat utilization project 
of Cheongna Energy and Insun ENT (Environmental 
New Technology). Before KVER, Cheongna Energy 
produced hot water for a district heating system 
using LNG while Insun ENT, a construction waste 
disposable service provider located in nearby 
Cheongna Energy, released steam into the air. The 
released steam from Insun ENT was a by-product 
generated from waste boilers. However, the two 
companies succeeded in GHG reduction by agreeing 
to work together for KVER by utilizing Insun’s steam 
as a fuel to produce hot water for Cheongna, instead 
of using LNG to heat up the water. By reducing 
Cheongna’s consumption of LNG, both companies 
were successful in reducing GHG emissions.
Outcomes of Phase 2
As of September 2013, a total of 422 projects were 
registered for GHG reductions. The total GHG 
emissions amounting to 14,620,000 tCO
2
 have 
been certified since 2007, and the government 
paid approximately 38 billion KRW to purchase 
7,560,000 tCO
2
. Statistics show that there was 
active registration between 2007 and 2009, but the 
number of registration and the amount of certified 
GHG reductions significantly decreased between 
2011 and 2012. As described earlier, this was the 
result of limiting the KVER scheme’s target to SMEs 
after the introduction of the TMS. To reverse this 
downward trend, KEMCO is taking measures to 
promote the participation of SMEs in GHG reduction 
projects. 
Table 14: GHG reduction case of Sampo Food Co.: Switching from oil to LPG   
Category
Energy 
Consumption
Emission Reduction
Outcome
Before KVER 222,000 L /year 
(Diesel)
644 tCO
2
/yr
119 tCO
2
/yr
After KVER
181,732 Nm3/year
(LPG) 525 tCO
2
/yr
Investment Effect
Amount of 
investment
Energy cost 
savings
Government 
Support
Investment cost recovery 
period
4 million (KRW) 56 million (KRW) 7 million (KRW) 0.1 (year)
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For instance, a new program known as the “Support 
Program for Infrastructure Development to Promote 
Participation in GHG Reduction Projects” offers a 
package of supporting programs including: holding 
workshops to improve the understanding of climate 
change responses and KVER; offering educational 
and training programs; building GHG inventory 
to track GHG emissions and support new GHG 
reduction projects; and assisting in PDD preparation.
3.3 Target Management Scheme (TMS)1
The Industrial Greenhouse Gas and Energy Target 
Management Scheme (TMS) specifically aims to 
reduce GHG emissions and energy use by the 
industrial sector. Under the TMS, approximately 600 
large-scale business facilities, which are responsible 
for more than 60% of the ROK’s total emissions, are 
subject to setting GHG reduction and energy-saving 
Table 15: GHG reduction case of Cheongna Energy and Insun ENT: Utilization of waste heat
Category Consumption Emissions Reduction
Outcome
Before KVER 222,000 L/year 
(Diesel)
8,723 tCO
2
/yr
8,696 tCO
2
/yr
After KVER 9,860 L/year
(LNG)
26 tCO
2
/yr
Investment Effect
Amount of 
investment
Energy cost 
savings
Government 
Support
Investment cost recovery 
period
2.2 billion (KRW) 3 billion (KRW) 0.1 billion (KRW) 0.7 (year)
Figure 13: Number of certifications and volume of reduced GHG emissions
Source: KEMCO, 2013
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targets. Compared to the Voluntary Agreement 
(VA), which emphasizes voluntary participation of 
companies in setting and achieving GHG reduction 
targets, TMS involves stronger and more stable 
policy enforcement.
The preparations for the official launch of TMS 
began in March 20102 . As a supervisory agency, the 
Ministry of Environment (MoE) led the preparatory 
work by creating a task force in April 2010, 
which developed the specific guidelines for TMS 
operations, monitoring, reporting, and verification 
(MRV) procedures, and criteria for the designation 
of participating entities. The benchmarking studies 
were conducted to ensure that the guidelines 
reflect the leading practices of similar standards 
and programs around the world (e.g., Rule for the 
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases/US 
EPA), National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting 
Act of Australia, EU-ETS Monitoring and Reporting 
Guidelines, and Japanese Voluntary Emissions 
Trading Scheme/JVETS). Once the draft guidelines 
were prepared, the task force held focus group 
meetings, briefing sessions, and public hearings to 
gather feedback to make final adjustments before 
the official launch in March 2011.
Implementation 
The TMS is implemented according to the following 
process: 
(1) designation of participating entities (i.e. 
controlled entities); 
(2) negotiations between ministries and controlled 
entities for setting GHG reduction and energy 
saving targets; 
(3) preparation and submission of implementation 
plans; 
(4) implementation of mitigation measures; 
(5) preparation and submission of completion 
reports, GHG emissions, and energy use 
accounts; and 
(6) evaluation of outcomes by relevant ministries. 
(1) Designation of Controlled Entities
In the early years of operation, the controlled 
entities under the TMS were companies and facilities 
showing average emissions and energy use for 
the previous three years of above 125,000 tCO
2
 
eq. (GHG emissions) and 500J (energy use) for 
companies, or 25,000 tCO
2
 eq. (GHG emissions) and 
100J (energy use) for facilities. These criteria were 
made more stringent in 2012 and 2014 as shown in 
Table 18. As of 2014, the total number of controlled 
entities registered was 466, the majority of which 
belong to the petrochemical industry while the rest 
are from the power generation and manufacturing 
industries such as semiconductors, electronics, and 
cement.
(2) Setting of Targets 
The emissions reduction and energy-saving targets 
are set on an annual basis (i.e., in terms of target 
allowances) and follows the “grandfathering 
method,” which involves the setting of target 
allowances based on emissions in the baseline 
year.3 As shown in Figure 16, the Greenhouse Gas 
Table 16: GHG reduction case of Cheongna Energy and Insun ENT: Utilization of waste heat
Category VA TMS
Target setting Self-setting by participating companies
By mutual consent of government and companies 
(controlled entities) through consultation
Implementation Voluntary Compulsory
Verification Self-verification Third party verification
Source: MOTIE, 2009
2 | The government began to pilot test the TMS on selected companies from 2009. 
3 | The TMS was planned to replace the “grandfathering method” with “benchmarking method” in 2013. The benchmarking method involves setting 
       of targets by using “benchmark intensity levels” for industrial processes or products (for example, the total GHG emissions for per unit of production). 
       However, the plan was postponed due to concerns over the integrity of the set benchmark intensity levels. 
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Inventory and Research Center (GIR) initially makes 
top-down BAU projections of the total emissions 
from controlled entities under the TMS. 
The pre-determined emission reduction rates for 
each sector (the values of which need to be met 
to stay on track toward achieving its reduction 
targets) are multiplied to their BAU emissions, 
which provide an estimate of the total amount of 
allowances to be made available for the controlled 
entities in the compliance year. Opposing to such 
top-town projections and target setting, the 
ministries responsible for different industrial sectors 
open negotiations individually with each of their 
controlled entity to agree on their BAU emissions 
(bottom-up approach; negotiations are based on 
the projected growth in business, and plans on 
facility expansion; refer to Table 19. The emission 
allowances of each entity are equivalent to the 
agreed BAU emissions multiplied by the reduction 
coefficient, which means that commensurate 
responsibility is shared among the entities under 
same industrial sector. 
Table 17: Preparation process for TMS
Period Description
April 19, 2010 Creation of the TMS Task Force
April 30, 2010 Development of guidelines for TMS operation
May 2010 Focus group meetings with selected CEOs from the power generation and manufacturing industries
July 2010 Program briefing sessions for candidate controlled entities
November 18, 2010 Public hearing on TMS guidelines
Figure 14: TMS implementation process
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(3) Preparation of Implementation Plans, 
Completion Reports, and Emission Accounts
The controlled entities submit the Implementation 
Plans – outlining how the established targets are to 
be met – for approval by their relevant ministries. 
Upon carrying out mitigation activities, their 
outcomes are presented in the form of Completion 
Reports and Emission Accounts, which are verified 
by third party organizations (verification institutions) 
prior to submission to the heads of ministries. As of 
2013, there are 25 verification institutions selected 
by the government that have been providing 
emissions verification services for the entities.
(4) Recognition of Early Actions
The TMS acknowledges the past emissions 
reductions achieved by the controlled entities, that 
is,  those from measures that have been completed 
before the entities entered the TMS program are 
accepted to be part of their emissions account for 
the compliance year. However, only the reductions 
that have been fully verified and acknowledged 
by government-run programs such as KVER are 
recognized. The maximum amount of emissions 
reductions from early actions accepted for a given 
compliance year are not to exceed 10% of the annual 
allowance for each entity. The government has 
also placed a cap on the total volume of acceptable 
emissions reductions from early actions for a given 
compliance year, which is 1% of the total allowance 
for controlled entities.
(5) Measurement, Reporting, and Verification 
(MRV)
The procedures for MRV under the TMS are quite 
rigid, comparable to those of Japan (Standards on 
Reporting of CO
2
 Equivalent GHG Emissions) and 
the U.S. (GHG Mandatory Reporting Program - 
Monitoring and Reporting Regulation/MRR). Most 
importantly, MRV procedure mandates third party 
verification to all emissions reduction achieved, 
which should strictly follow the guiding principles 
laid down by the government. The MRV process in 
essence can be divided into eight phases as shown in 
Figure 14.
Table 18: Criteria for designating the entities subject to TMS 
Year
Company Standard Facility Standard
GHG emission Energy consumption GHG emission Energy consumption
2010~ 125,000 tCO
2
 eq or higher 500 TJ or higher 25,000 tCO
2 
eq or higher 100 TJ or higher
2012~ 87,500 tCO
2
 eq or higher 350 TJ or higher 20,000 tCO
2 
eq or higher 90 TJ or higher
2014~ 50,000 tCO
2
 eq or higher 200 TJ or higher 15,000 tCO
2
 eq or higher 80 TJ or higher
Source: MoE, 2014c
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Figure 16: Target setting system for GHG reduction 
Source: MoE, 2012f
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Figure 15: The number of controlled entities of TMS as of 2014
Source: MoE, 2014d
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Table 21: Details of MRV procedures
Phase Description
Phase 1: Boundary Setting - Setting of boundaries for controlled entities
Phase 2: Determination of Emissions Source - Review of facility list and past energy consumption data
Phase 3: Selection of Monitoring Method - Selection and verification of monitoring method in comparison to the government’s 
   set guidelines
Phase 4: Establishment of Monitoring Framework - Establishing framework (e.g., instrumentation and division of labor) for period 
   monitoring of emissions
Phase 5: Assessment of Emissions by Facilities - Calculation of emissions for each facility based on collected data 
Phase 6: Preparation of Emission Accounts - Preparation of Emission Accounts based on the assessments of Phase 5
Phase 7: Emissions Verification - Third party verification of Emission Accounts
Phase 8: Submission of Emission Account - Submission of Emission Accounts to relevant ministry 
Source: MoE, 2014f
Table 20: Items to be included in the reports of the covered entities
Implementation Plans Completion Reports and Emission Accounts
• GHG emission status by facilities
• Information on the specific locations and methodologies for 
GHG emissions monitoring 
• Detailed targets and plans for mitigation actions by year
• Plans for new facility installations and expansion of existing 
facilities
• Plans for quality assurance and control
• Plans for reflecting remedial measures suggested by the 
relevant ministry from the previous year 
• Data on actual GHG emissions and energy use
• Comparison between targets and actual results 
• Details on technology applications and investments made to 
reduce emissions
• Outcomes of quality assurance/control activities 
• Implementation reports reflecting remedial measures
Source: MoE, 2014c
Table 19: Calculation of emission allowance for controlled entities (bottom-up)
Emission Allowance = [Baseline Emissions x (100% + Expected Growth Rate in Business Activities) + Expected Emissions from 
New Facility Installation or Facility Expansion] x Reduction Coefficient
Baseline Emissions: Emissions of companies or facilities for the baseline year
Estimated Growth Rate in Business Activities (%): Estimated growth in emissions from the baseline year, based on projections of the rate of facility 
operations and volume of production
Emissions from a New Facility Installation or Facility Expansion: Amount of additional emissions expected from new facility installations or facility 
expansions that arise from the baseline year
Reduction Coefficient: Factor used to adjust the gap between emission allowance and the total projected emissions of controlled entities for a 
given industrial sector (i.e., equivalent to government-set allowances for each sector divided by the total amount of agreed BAU emissions from 
their controlled entities).
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Institutional Framework, Incentives, and Penalties
The MoE supervises the process for TMS 
implementation outlined above, while the 
responsible line ministries manage the actions on 
the ground. The MoE is in charge of preparing and 
disseminating the key operational guidelines, as 
well as approving the list of participating entities.
The MOTIE, MOLIR, MAFRA, and MoE are the 
supervising ministries responsible for negotiating 
reduction targets with the controlled entities as 
well as reviewing their implementation plans, 
completion reports, and emissions accounts upon 
submission. As an information hub for the national 
GHG emissions, the GIR supports the process of 
verifying the emissions accounts prepared by MoE 
and supervising ministries. 
The TMS is a regulatory scheme that does not 
require budgetary support. However, the ROK 
government provides participating companies with 
institutional and financial incentives to ensure the 
efficient operation of the scheme. For example, the 
government rolled out a new financial program that 
offers low-interest loans for controlled entities 
that invest in energy-efficient facilities. In addition, 
government programs that grant financial incentives 
for consulting services related to meeting the target 
allowances (e.g., conducting on-site diagnosis to 
recommend potential mitigation measures) have also 
been initiated. 
In terms of regulatory actions, the government 
penalizes the entities failing to meet the 
requirements, such as non-submission of completion 
reports or third party verifications, fabricating 
emission accounts, and failing to meet given target 
allowances. The amount of fines for negligence 
differs by types and number of relevant cases. 
Nevertheless, the government ensures that the 
Table 22: Violations for failing to meet target allowances
Violation Amount of fine (KRW)
When an entity fails to meet the target allowance and implements 
corrective actions:
(a) First violation 3 million
(b) Second violation 6 million
(c) Third or more violations 10 million
Figure 17: Institutional framework for TMS implementation
Source: GIR, 2014e
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controlled entities are given a chance to take 
corrective actions before the imposition of fines. It is 
important to note that the amounts of fines imposed 
are not in any way related to the actual amounts of 
GHG emissions exceeded.
Outcomes and Takeaways
The results on actual emissions reduction achieved 
by the controlled entities of TMS have shown 
promising results. In 2012, as many as 434 entities 
contributed to 21.3 million tons eq. CO
2
 reduction, 
which is approximately 3.8% of their total emissions; 
more than 90% of the total number of participating 
entities have achieved their targets. It is important 
to note that such outcomes are 2.7 times higher 
than the government’s initially set targets for 
the year, which stood at 8 million tons eq. CO
2
. 
Most of the emissions reductions came from the 
petrochemical (32.4%), steel (26.9%), and cement 
(18.2%) industries, which hold a large number of 
the controlled entities. The MoE reported that 
the emissions reduction achieved in 2012 was 
equivalent to 53.7% of the nation’s estimated net 
carbon sink from forest reserves, or GHG emissions 
from operating ten 900 MW capacity thermal power 
stations providing district heating to 160,000 homes. 
The TMS is gaining recognition for slowing the 
growth of GHG emissions in the industrial sector 
in the ROK. Although the scheme initially raised 
concerns that the controlled entities would need a 
significant amount of time to prepare for changing 
their operations, the outcomes achieved show 
that companies can take on the challenge in a 
cost-effective way. It is worth noting that public 
hearings held before the enforcement of TMS 
have conveyed strong signals to the industrial 
leaders that the government is fully committed in 
taking all necessary measures to enforce TMS. The 
government’s provision of financial incentives in 
the form of grants and technical assistance (from 
energy service companies) to assist SMEs regarding 
emissions inventory and diagnosis was an important 
success factor. In addition, the contribution of third 
party verification institutions and the effective 
coordination between the MoE and the line 
ministries were critical in overcoming the obstacles 
to TMS implementation.
As of 2014, there were no recorded penalties 
imposed on controlled entities that failed to meet 
their requirements. The low levels of fines and the 
government’s reluctance to impose penalties reflect 
the government’s objective of making the policy less 
threatening to companies. Instead, the government 
tries to offer them opportunities to build solid 
technical and infrastructural capacity to undertake 
MRV, which is a prerequisite for the successful 
transition to the ETS. A 2013 survey for controlled 
entities of TMS confirmed that the scheme was 
successful in achieving this objective (Yoon and Won, 
2013). Many responded that the TMS provided 
an exceptional opportunity to prepare for the 
ETS, especially in building corporate capacities in 
preparing for third party verifications and creating 
emissions accounts.
Inevitably, the effectiveness of TMS remains 
controversial as many of the controlled entities 
have shifted to take part in the newly introduced 
ETS in 2015. Still, the scheme has the potential to 
serve as an effective tool to manage GHG emissions 
targets for the energy producers and business 
entities that are excluded from ETS. As depicted by 
the Phase 2 outcomes of the KVER, the government 
must make systematic changes for the scheme 
to remain effective. As the TMS is no longer a 
stepping stone for making a transition to the ETS, 
stricter application of penalty rules is paramount 
in fulfilling its role as a regulatory tool. The 
government thus needs to assure the industry and 
the citizens that TMS is not a redundant regulation, 
but rather a scheme to complement the successful 
implementation of ETS. 
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Table 23: Examples of projects implemented by controlled entities in 2012
Company A Company B Company C
Sector Petrochemical Cement Oil Refinery
Mitigation measure
Facility retrofit (replacement 
of pre-heaters to energy 
efficient model)
Heat recovery from existing 
facilities
Switching of fuel (from 
bunker C fuel oil to LNG)
Investment cost (KRW) 1.4 billion 84.0 billion 20.3 billion 
Emissions reduction (tons CO
2
 eq.) 16,000 65,000 205,000 
Projected savings in energy expenditures (KRW) 2 billion 10 billion 10 billion 
Figure 18: Evaluation of achieved GHG reductions (2012)
Source: MoE, 2014f
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3.4 Public Sector TMS
The public sector TMS shares the same objectives 
with the TMS described in the previous section, 
but is focused on regulating the GHG emissions 
and energy consumption of public institutions, 
including central administrative agencies, local 
governments, state-owned enterprises, and national 
and public universities. The ROK government 
recognized that placing the public sector at the 
forefront of mitigation actions is critical to set the 
bar high on GHG emission reduction for industries 
and individual households. In addition, the scheme 
facilitates government leadership and sharing of 
responsibilities in transitioning to a low-carbon 
society. In this light, the government set an ambitious 
target of reducing GHG emissions of public sector 
operations by 20% (relative to the average emissions 
in 2007-2009) by 2015. 
Implementation
The implementation process for public sector 
TMS can be divided into the planning stage and 
implementation stage. In the planning stage, each 
participating institution prepares and submits an 
annual implementation plan for its registration at 
the GIR and evaluation of the MoE. The participating 
institutions set their own annual targets for each 
compliance year (2011-2015), but their proposals 
must ascertain the 20% reduction target by 2015. 
Flexibility is allowed as it is recognized that different 
institutions face different challenges, such as the 
number of corresponding facilities, mitigation 
potentials, and budgetary constraints.
Upon evaluating the feasibility of the proposed 
actions provided in the annual implementation plan 
and conducting consultations with the Ministry of 
Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) and the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE), the 
Figure 19: Implementation process for the public sector TMS
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MoE may request the participating institutions to 
improve or supplement their plans, and the relevant 
institutions should submit their revised plans 
accordingly.   
In the implementation stage, the entities take 
actions to achieve their GHG reduction targets and 
submit annual completion reports that verify their 
outcomes. During this process, they are mandated 
to keep the account books that provide data on 
energy consumption on a monthly basis. The data 
can be found in the National GHG Emission Total 
Information System (NGMS), which is developed 
and operated by GIR and periodically uploaded 
online. The annual completion reports are evaluated 
by MoE, with support from MOPAS and MOTIE. 
Consequently, evaluation reports are prepared by 
MoE for submission to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
which then issues an order, if deemed necessary, to 
each participating institution.
Setting of Targets and GHG Emission Calculations
It is important to recognize that unlike the TMS – 
which mandates setting of reduction targets for 
both GHG emissions and energy consumption 
– the public sector TMS only mandates setting of 
reduction targets for GHG emissions. In addition, the 
public sector TMS sets targets on an absolute basis 
based on baseline emissions (average from 2007-
2009), not BAU projections. Considering how the 
baseline emissions fail to take into account the likely 
increases in emissions in the future, the public sector 
TMS is often conceived as a stronger regulatory 
measure compared to the TMS. 
However, in order to maintain the integrity and 
fairness of the target setting process, the following 
clauses have been applied:
• The participating institutions that have 
experienced annual fluctuations in GHG 
emissions greater than 2% during the baseline 
years (2007-2009) from expansion or closure of 
facilities are to use the average value computed 
for the years after such actions have taken place 
as the baseline emission.
• The participating institutions that have taken 
early actions leading to verified reductions in 
GHG emissions during the baseline years (2007-
2009) are to use the average value computed 
for the years before the early actions have taken 
place as the baseline emission. 
• The participating institutions that foresee a 
significant increase or reduction in emissions 
from expansion or closure of its facilities in the 
future are entitled to incorporate their impacts 
to the baseline emission. 
The calculation of GHG emissions is an extensive 
process that involves preparing a list of relevant 
facilities and equipment, identifying their activities 
in relation to energy consumption, providing data on 
actual amount of energy consumed per activity in the 
given period, and translating energy consumption 
data into GHG emission data. Moreover, the 
emissions can be categorized into either direct 
or indirect emissions. Direct emission represents 
emissions from combustion of fuel for activities such 
as direct heating and running of motor vehicles. 
Indirect emission, on the other hand, is associated 
with the consumption of electricity or heat. 
Table 24: Scope of emission activities
Emission Category Emission activity
Direct Emissions
Emissions from stationary combustion 
sources 
Solid fuel combustion 
Gaseous fuel combustion 
Liquid fuel combustion
Emissions from mobile combustion 
sources (e.g., motor vehicles)
Mobile combustion
Indirect emissions
Emissions from electricity and heat 
(steam) consumption
Consumption of externally provided electricity  
Consumption of externally provided heat steam
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Translating energy consumption into GHG emissions 
thus involves the use of different equations, as given 
in the examples below. The participating agencies 
rely on the NGMS that performs the automatic 
calculations.
• The GHG emissions generated from the 
combustion of solid fuel such as anthracite coal 
are calculated by multiplying the amount of coal 
consumption, specific heat value of coal, the 
given emission coefficient of the consumption 
activity, and the global warming potential. The 
same method applies for the combustion of 
gaseous and liquid fuels.
• The GHG emissions generated from electricity 
consumption are calculated by multiplying the 
Indirect Emission Coefficient (IEF) to the amount 
of electricity use as provided by the regional 
utility company. Note that the consumption of 
electricity generated from New and Renewable 
Energy (NRE) facility owned by the participating 
institutions and electricity used for recharging 
electric vehicles are exempted from emissions 
calculations.
The public sector TMS mandates the participation 
of approximately 770 public institutions, including 
central administrative agencies, local governments, 
public organizations, state-owned enterprises, 
national hospitals, and public universities, along with 
their affiliates such as local government offices and 
regional offices. The target facilities for emissions 
reduction in participating institutions include the 
following:   
• Building facilities or installations including 
streetlights and electronic display boards
• Facilities that are being used on a lease or rent 
basis, as well as facilities that are owned but 
have been entrusted to the private sector for 
operation
• However, special groups of facilities that are 
essential to national defense (e.g.,military 
facilities), public order (e.g., police vehicles), 
public safety (e.g., emergency vehicles, fire 
trucks), public education (e.g., elementary 
schools), and social welfare (e.g., homeless 
shelters) are excluded from the target setting. 
In addition, in order to improve the efficiency of 
implementation, small buildings (with floor area 
less than 100 m2) and buildings on a short-term 
lease (less than one year) are also excluded.
Incentives and Penalties
The MoE once pledged to provide additional 
budgets for the effective implementation of the 
scheme, but such support has failed to materialize. 
Nonetheless, it has provided small-scale incentives 
and grants to participating institutions with 
proven outstanding achievements. In 2012, for 
example, the top-five participating institutions 
were rewarded with electric vehicles. Several other 
participating institutions that have exceeded their 
targets received small financial rewards. On the 
other hand, there are no regulatory standards for 
imposing fines on participating institutions that 
have failed to meet their targets. However, the TMS 
has been incorporated in the central government’s 
performance evaluation system for public 
institutions since 2012, where both the quality of 
targets and level of achievement are evaluated.
Table 25: Examples of facilities eligible for target setting for a city government
Government Office Buildings Waste Recycling Facilities Branch Office 
(in another city)
Water Treatment Plant (WTP)
Public Parks and Restrooms
Public Museums and District 
Community Centers
Gasoline Vehicles WTP-owned diesel cars
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Outcomes and Takeaways
Due to the strong participatory efforts of public 
institutions, the MoE has reported that the public 
sector TMS has helped reduce approximately 
400,000 tons CO
2
 eq. of GHG emissions in 2012, 
based on an evaluation of 703 institutions that 
submitted their reports. The figure equates to 
8.1% of the baseline emissions, which stood at 
4.9 million tons CO
2
 eq. This exceeded the MoE’s 
target of 8% for 2012 and also higher than what was 
achieved in 2011 (5.7%). In terms of achievements 
by types of participating institutions, the regional 
public corporations achieved the highest average 
reduction rates (12.2%) followed by state-owned 
enterprises (10.1%), central administrative agencies 
(7.7%), local governments (7.2%), and national and 
public universities (5.3%). All types of participating 
institutions have managed to increase their average 
emissions reductions from the previous year. 
An analysis of the GHG reduction method adopted 
by public institutions demonstrates that the most 
salient one was related to behavioral improvement 
(62.7%) - compliance with designated cooling 
and heating temperature and less frequent use 
of elevators − followed by facility improvement 
(6.9%), replacement of fleet vehicles with LNG cars 
(0.8%), and others (29.6%). It was also found out that 
most public institutions preferred to cut emissions 
through behavioral adjustments than facility 
improvement, as it entails less cost. However, these 
would not suffice to achieve the target of public 
TMS to reduce 20% of GHG emissions by 2015, thus 
urging more active efforts from stakeholders. 
The public sector TMS has achieved positive results 
despite the lack of additional budget and incentives. 
Providing financial support to help participating 
institutions undertake more diversified GHG 
reduction activities remains a critical challenge. The 
absence of punitive regulations for non-compliance 
is another concern. If top performers are rewarded 
for their efforts, slackers should likewise receive 
disciplinary measures to enforce fairness in the 
pursuit of reduced GHG emissions.
Figure 20: Annual GHG reduction rate (%) of pubic institutions
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3.5 Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS)
Korea embarked on a new journey to establish 
a domestic market for emissions trading by 
launching the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme 
(K-ETS) in January 2015.  The legal basis for the 
implementation of K-ETS was provided through the 
enforcement of the Framework Act on Low Carbon, 
Green Growth in April 2010, which states that 
“the government may operate a system for trading 
emissions of greenhouse gases by utilizing market 
functions in order to accomplish the State’s target 
reduction of greenhouse gases.” Subsequently, the 
Act on Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Allowances (ETS Act) was passed with 
a near unanimous vote by the National Assembly 
in May 2012. It is important to recognize that this 
event marked a salient point in the nation’s emission 
reduction policy; K-ETS fully secured a legal basis 
when it was passed as a law in 2012 (effective 2015) 
before the inauguration of the new president in 
2013. 
The ETS is a policy instrument that was first 
introduced by the European Union (EU) to tackle 
GHG emissions. It is basically a “cap and trade” 
system, whereby the emissions of all emitters 
participating in the scheme (i.e., controlled entities) 
are capped, but within specified limits; controlled 
entities are allowed to buy and sell allowances as 
much as they require through designated trading 
markets. The allowances are the trading currency of 
the market; controlled entities must seek to secure 
sufficient allowances to meet their actual amounts 
of emissions produced during given compliance 
periods. Creating an adequate scarcity of allowances 
in the market to ensure a meaningful carbon price is 
critical, as they send out price signals for investments 
in emission reduction activities.  
The K-ETS is the second biggest carbon market after 
the EU’s ETS. In an attempt to gain a firm foothold 
on the international stage as a green growth leader, 
the ROK adopted the scheme to prepare for future 
climate treaties and strengthen its negotiating 
power. Given that the existing TMS was part of the 
preparations for the introduction of K-ETS, it is fair 
to note that the ROK has finally entered a stage of 
full-fledged mitigation actions based on market-
driven mechanisms. As shown in Table 26, ETS 
enjoys several advantages over top-down regulatory 
instruments such as TMS. Although the success of 
the newly launched K-ETS needs to be tested against 
time, this section seeks to provide information on 
the key components and design of the scheme, 
which is undoubtedly one of the most meaningful 
accomplishments under the nation’s low-carbon 
green growth agenda.
Figure 21: GHG reductions achieved by the public sector 
Source: MoE, 2014e
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Table 26: Comparison of TMS and ETS
Description TMS ETS
Allocates emissions reduction targets (or 
allowances) based on the nation’s GHG 
reduction tagets
Yes Yes
Involves annual verification and reporting of 
emissions
Yes Yes
Allows trading of allowances between 
participating entities
Yes Yes
Allows carry-over or borrowing of emissions 
allowances
No Yes
Recognizes offsets No Yes
Government penalties imposed are 
commensurate to the amount of emissions 
unmet by allowances
No Yes
Incentives provided to a surplus of 
allowances
No Yes
Figure 22: Concept of the ETS
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The basic principles and guidelines for the operation 
of the scheme are outlined by the ETS Act and its 
enforcement decree (issued in November 2011). 
The following documents provide the directions for 
successful planning for the implementation of K-ETS:
• The emissions allowances are to be allocated 
on a five-year (compliance years) basis – the 
so-called implementation periods. However, 
the first and second implementation periods 
shall involve three compliance years, in order to 
ensure that complementary measures are taken 
in a timely manner during the early years of 
K-ETS operation. 
• The Basic Plan provides mid- to long-term (10 
years) objectives and directions of K-ETS for 
each implementation period; the plan is to be 
established no later than one year prior to the 
commencement of each implementation period.
• The National Emissions Allowance Allocation 
Plan (Allocation Plan) provides information on 
the total amount of allocations that will be made 
available by sector and business types for the 
given implementation period, which are aligned 
with the nation’s emission reduction targets. 
• The plan also provides guidelines for K-ETS 
operation, which have been made flexible 
under the ETS Act and its enforcement decree. 
The Allocation Plan is prepared at least six 
months prior to the commencement of each 
commitment period.
• The six detailed guidelines serve as an additional 
guidance on allocation and trading of allowances, 
along with verifying the performance of 
controlled entities. 
The Basic Plan for the first implementation phase 
(2015-2017) was released in January 2014. The 
document put forward the need for the government 
to take a phased approach in achieving the designed 
objectives of the K-ETS during the first 10 years of 
operation. 
For the first implementation period, efforts are 
to focus on stabilizing the newborn market. 
Flexibility will be allowed for controlled entities, and 
allocations of allowances to all controlled entities 
shall be made free of charge. Gratis or free allocation 
is a practice whereby the government allocates 
emissions allowances to participant entities of ETS 
for free. Auctioning allocation is a method whereby 
the government holds an auction to sell emissions 
allowances to entities in need. Obviously, the 
controlled entities face significant financial burdens 
under the auctioning of allocations that strictly 
follows the polluter-pays principle.
The second implementation phase (2018-2020) of 
K-ETS is to focus on enhancing the performance of 
controlled entities on emissions reduction, as the 
period’s last compliance year marks the nation’s 
mid-term emission reduction targets (30% from 
BAU by 2020). The government will seek to widen 
the criteria for the selection of controlled entities, 
and allocate about 3% of emission allowances 
through the auctioning process. During the third 
implementation phase (2021-2025), the government 
will further expand the share of allowances allocated 
through the auctioning process to derive more active 
engagement and investments in mitigation activities. 
In addition, appropriate measures shall be made to 
ensure that K-ETS helps the controlled entities to be 
prepared for the post-2020 climate agreements. 
Institutional Framework for K-ETS 
The K-ETS is supervised and coordinated by the 
Ministry of Environment (MoE), which is responsible 
for preparing the National Emissions Allowance 
Allocation Plan. This plan is reviewed by the 
Allocation Committee composed of coordinating 
line ministries (e.g., MOTIE, MOLIT, and MAFRA). 
In addition, MoE is responsible for the designation 
and notification of controlled entities, reporting 
and certification of emission accounts of controlled 
entities, operation of the offset scheme, and 
imposition of penalties. The Greenhouse Gas 
Inventory and Research Center Korea (GIR) 
and Korea Environment Corporation (KECO) 
support MoE at the working level. As an affiliated 
organization of MoE, the GIR manages all data and 
information related to national GHG emissions, sets 
“benchmark emission intensity levels” of industrial 
processes, and conducts assessments and evaluation 
studies that provide directions for effective 
operation of the scheme. On the other hand, KECO 
provides supervision services (e.g., reviewing, 
monitoring, evaluating) to ensure appropriate 
allowance allocation, trading, MRV, and reporting of 
performances by controlled entities.
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The  Ministry  of  Strategy  and  Finance  (MOSF)  
is  responsible  for  preparing  the  Basic  Plans  and 
supervising the operation of the allocation trading 
platform (i.e., Korea Climate Exchange), which 
was established under the Korea Exchange (KRX), 
which is the sole securities exchange operation of 
the nation  under the  authority  of MOSF. Unlike  
the TMS,  where coordinating  ministries  (MOTIE, 
MOLIT and MAFRA) having the authority over 
controlled entities actively engage to supervise their 
activities, the MOSF  is  the  sole  organization  in  
charge  of  all  such  responsibilities.  However,  the  
coordinating ministries  of  the  TMS  are  invited  
to  take  part in the  Allocation  Committee  and  the  
Certification Committee, which are consultative 
groups that approve the Allocation Plan and 
emission accounts of controlled entities.
Key Components of ETS Operation 
(1) Selection of Controlled Entities
The controlled entities under the ETS policy are 
businesses with average annual emissions greater 
than 125,000 CO
2 
eq. and facilities with average 
annual emissions greater than 25,000 CO2 eq. The 
average emissions for the first three years, out of 
the past four years from the starting year of the 
given implementation period, are considered as 
the average annual emissions of businesses and 
facilities. For example, the average annual emissions 
for 2011-2013 provided the basis for the selection 
of 526 businesses (including businesses that own 
facilities eligible as controlled entities) for the first 
implementation period (2015-2017). It should be 
noted that these controlled entities are responsible 
for approximately 66% of the nation’s total 
emissions. 
(2) Allocation of Emissions Allowances and MRV
The allocation of emissions allowances under 
K-ETS takes place through a process similar to the 
TMS. The National Emissions Allowance Allocation 
Plan lays out the total allowances to be allocated 
to controlled entities by sector for the given 
implementation period, based on the nation’s BAU 
projections and annual reduction targets (30% 
from BAU by 2020). For example, approximately 
1.69 billion KAUs4  are to be made available for 
Figure 23: Structure of the legal framework and implementation plans for ETS
Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth
Six Detailed Guidelines
- Guidelines on allowance allocation, adjustments, and revocation
- Guidelines on recognition of early actions
- Guidelines on recognition of offsets
- Guidelines on reporting and certiﬁcation of emission allowances
- Guidelines on veriﬁcation of emission allowances
- Guidelines for Certiﬁcation Committee, allowance trading, and supervision
Act on Allocation and Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowances (ETS Act)
Enforcement Decree of the ETS Act
Implementation Period
Basic Plan National Emissions Allowance Allocation Plan
Source: MOSF, 2014
4 | Considering how K-ETS is likely to be linked to the existing (EU-ETS) and newborn international carbon markets, the emissions trading unit was named    
      the Korean Allowance Unit (KAU). One KAU is equivalent to 1 ton of CO
2
 eq.  
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allocation during the first implementation period, 
5.2% of which are contingency KAUs for controlled 
entities that may justify additional allowances during 
the implementation period. Annual allowances are 
allocated into 23 types of businesses. 
The sum of bottom-up “micro-allocation” of 
allowances for each controlled entity in a given 
sector must ideally be within the total amount of 
allowances for the sector provided by the top-down 
“macro-allocation” process (described previously). 
The K-ETS fundamentally adopts the grandfathering 
method (identical to the TMS) in making micro-
allocations for the first implementation period, 
which determines emissions allowances of 
controlled entities based on their past emissions 
performances. However, benchmarking method 
applies for the controlled entities in the cement, 
aviation, and oil refinery industries, which are the 
areas where “benchmark emission intensity levels” 
have been made readily available. This decision to 
apply the method on a selective basis was envisioned 
as the first step toward expanding the application of 
a benchmarking method in the future. Compared to 
the benchmark method, the grandfathering method 
is often scrutinized for how it disproportionately 
favors entities with high emissions records in the 
past.
Based on calculations using the aforementioned 
methods, the controlled entities submit their 
application for allocation four months before the 
beginning of the implementation period. In addition 
to their three-year average baseline emission, the 
application provides justification on the factors (e.g., 
facility expansion) that affect their BAU projections, 
which form the basis for the allowance amount 
applied. 
GIR
(emission permits registry / 
offset registry)
Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance (MOSF)
Presidential Commit-
tee on Green Growth 
(Deliberation)
Allocation Committee
· Chairperson: Minister of Strategy and Finance
· Membership: Vice minister of coordinating ministries
Working Group
· Head: President of GIR
· Membership: Experts designated by the 
  coordinating ministries
Establishment of the 
Allocation Plan
Establishment of the 
Basic Plan
Deliberation Committee
Certification Committee
Ministry of
Environment (MoE)
Designate Eligible Entities
Set & Notify Allocation of 
Emission Allowances
Report and Certify GHG 
emissions
Surrender/Carryover 
Emission Allowances
Operate the Offset Scheme
Impose Penalty & 
Conduct Survey
Korea Exchange 
(Korea Climate Exchange)
MoE
Figure 24: Institutional Framework for ETS
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Upon review by the Working Group (composed of 
experts from academia, research institutes, and 
private sector who are appointed by coordinating 
ministries), the allocation plan is approved by the 
Deliberation Committee headed by the Vice Minister 
of MoE and composed of high-ranking officials of 
the relevant coordinating ministries. As mentioned 
previously, the allocated allowances are granted free 
of charge for the first implementation period. 
(3) Trading of Emissions Allowances
The fundamental difference between the ETS and 
TMS is the “tradability” of emission allowances. 
Unlike the TMS, the controlled entities of K-ETS 
can either generate profits or losses by selling or 
buying emissions allowances under the trade market. 
Trading takes place on the KAU trading platform 
called the “Korea Climate Exchange,” where all 
controlled entities are automatically given trading 
accounts. As the sole securities exchange operator 
of the nation, the Korea Exchange (KRX) competed 
with the Korea Power Exchange (KPX) to host the 
Korea Climate Exchange. 
The KRX was selected on the grounds that it has 
well-established operations systems to support 
large-scale trading activities, and is better positioned 
to promote the newborn market. All trade events 
that take place in KRX are to be validated by trade 
agreements and reported to competent government 
authorities on an electronic basis. 
(4) MRV and Surrendering of Allowances
The stages involved in MRV under K-ETS are 
identical to those under the TMS. Unlike the TMS 
where controlled entities are annually evaluated 
(after the MRV process) on whether they have met 
their reduction targets on the basis of emissions and 
energy consumption accounts, controlled entities 
annually submit the “Application for Surrendering of 
Allowances” under K-ETS. It provides information on 
the controlled entity’s total emissions for the given 
compliance year, along with registration number 
of their allowance accounts. Upon review and 
confirmation that the application is in order, the MoE 
transfers (or surrenders) the KAUs equivalent to the 
controlled entity’s recorded emissions out of the 
allowance account. Should the controlled entity fail 
to retain a sufficient amount of KAUs in its account 
for surrendering, the government imposes a penalty 
commensurate to the purchase for unmet KAUs, 
at three times the average market price recorded 
for the compliance year. However, the penalty 
imposed for 1 KAU shall not exceed 100,000 KRW 
(approximately US$ 90). 
Table 28: Total available KAUs for the first implementation period
Sector Types of Business
Allowance 
(million KAUs)
Energy Conversion (1) Power Generation/Energy 735.8
Industry (17)
Mining, Food and Beverages, Textiles, Lumber, Paper, Oil Refining, Petrochemical, 
Glass/Ceramic, Cement, Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metal, Machinery, 
Semiconductor, Display, Electrical/Electronics, Automobile, Shipbuilding
808.7
Building (2) Building, Communication 20.9
Transportation (1) Aviation 3.8
Public Waste (2) Water Service, Waste 28.5
Contingency 88.8
Total 1,686.5
Source: MoE, 2014b
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Design Requirements and Considerations
(1) Borrowing and Carryover of Emission 
Allowances
If a controlled entity falls short of emission 
allowances, it has the option to borrow from the 
following compliance years, but only within 10% of 
the total KAUs to be surrendered in the compliance 
year. While allowances can be borrowed from any 
of the following compliance years, they cannot be 
borrowed from a different implementation period. 
On the other hand, a controlled entity that holds 
surplus emission allowances can carry over the 
surplus to the following compliance year of the same 
implementation period, or to the first compliance 
year of the following implementation period. 
Although there is no limit to the amount of carry 
over, allowances can only be carried over on a yearly 
basis. 
(2) Recognition of Early Actions and Offsets 
Much like the TMS, K-ETS recognizes emissions 
reductions that have taken place by controlled 
entities from early actions (before joining the 
K-ETS) by means of providing additional emission 
allowances. However, the amount of additional 
allowances is not to exceed 3% of the total 
allowances given for the implementation period 
(this applies only for the first implementation 
period). In addition, only reductions that have been 
acknowledged by government-run programs (i.e. 
KVER and TMS) are eligible for recognition. Note 
that the only the portion of emissions reduction that 
exceeded the given targets, and those that have not 
been accounted for under the TMS are eligible to be 
recognized as early actions.
The K-ETS also recognizes carbon offsets as eligible 
assets for compliance with the given emissions 
caps of controlled entities. Carbon offsets refer to 
emissions reductions made in order to compensate 
for, or to offset, an emission made elsewhere (outside 
the boundaries of the facilities of controlled entities). 
In the first implementation period, only up to 10% of 
the total emissions allowances to be surrendered in a 
given compliance year can be recognized; in addition, 
not more than half of these recognized carbon 
offsets shall be from overseas activities. 
(3) Market Stability Reserve (Contingency 
Allowances)
In order to control possible unusual hike in allowance 
prices, the government has stocked up stability 
reserve of allowances (contingencies) to be supplied 
to the market. The government may provide up to 
25% of its reserve allowances, when one or more of 
the following conditions is triggered by the market: 
• Market price of emission allowance exceeds, for 
six consecutive months, three times the average 
market price of the preceding two years.
• Trading volume substantially increases in a short 
period due to a rapid increase in demand.
• Average trade volume of the latest one month 
is more than twice of the same month of the 
immediately preceding two years, and the 
average trading price of the latest one month 
is more than twice of the same month of the 
preceding two years.
• Market stabilization measures are needed to 
maintain order in emission trading markets or to 
protect public interest. 
• Average price of emission allowances for the 
latest five months is less than 60% of the average 
price of the preceding two years. 
(4) Government Support for Industrial Entities
The ROK government is coming up with measures to 
support the industrial entities to ease their burden 
of participating in the K-ETS. Most importantly, the 
government has decided that allowance allocations 
for all sectors and business types shall be made 
free of charge in the first implementation period 
(2015-2017). In addition, only 3% of total allowance 
allocations are planned to be made subject to auction 
in the second implementation period (2018-2020); 
steel and semiconductor industries with high trade 
dependence and mitigation costs are to be exempted 
from auction. The government is also discussing the 
possibility for controlled entities to own emissions 
reduction certificates (acquired through external 
programs such as the CDM) to be converted into 
KAUs eligible for trading in K-ETS.
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Takeaways 
Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, 
the ROK has implemented a range of policies for 
climate change response and GHG reduction. Among 
these policies, the ETS had to overcome intense 
opposition from the industrial sector even before its 
implementation. The main arguments surrounding 
ETS are anchored in the necessity to pursue the 
policy to enforce the ROK’s position in global climate 
negotiations as well as the readiness of both the 
government and controlled entities to successfully 
operate the scheme.
(1) Justification for the Launch of ETS and its 
Effectiveness
The chasm between the government and 
participating entities regarding the enforcement of 
the ETS has continued throughout the process of 
drafting the ETS Act and even after its promulgation. 
The government argues that the introduction of 
the scheme is an unavoidable choice in preparation 
for the post-Kyoto Protocol regime. It also insists 
that early adoption of the ETS is the best option to 
meet a possible mandatory reduction in the future 
given the limitations of existing policies in achieving 
GHG reduction targets. The industrial sector in 
general, however, is at odds with the government, 
saying that the ROK’s early actions will increase 
the international community’s expectation toward 
the nation in 2020. Most importantly, the industrial 
leaders claim that there is no reason to initiate the 
system at a time when the ROK’s competitors like 
Japan and the U.S. have postponed the nationwide 
implementation of the ETS or are not even 
considering adopting the policy. It reckons that 
early enforcement of the ETS would instead weaken 
the international competitiveness of domestic 
industries. 
The disparate views on ETS could hamper its 
successful implementation in 2015. Although the 
effectiveness of the scheme is yet to be tested, the 
bottom line is that K-ETS has significant potential to 
bring about positive changes, as supported by the 
government:
• Reducing Costs. One of the key justifications for 
the ETS is the low compliance costs on emissions 
reduction; gains from emissions trading are 
substantial as they help cut down the costs of 
reducing emissions. The IPCC has reported 
that a majority of studies highlighted that full 
emissions trading would halve the compliance 
costs (IPCC, 2001). Through the Climate Change 
2010 Synthesis Report, the IPCC further 
validated that the EU has successfully reduced 
the marginal abatement cost from US$ 20-655 
to US$ 14-135 per ton CO
2
 eq. by introducing 
the EU-ETS. Similar reports have also been 
made in the ROK as the PCGG reported 
that assessments conducted by the Korea 
Environment Institute (2010), the Samsung 
Economic Research Institute (2009), and the 
Korea Energy Economics Institute (2011) have 
shown that K-ETS will reduce the compliance 
costs by 44%, 60%, and 68%, respectively, in 
comparison to the TMS (PCGG, 2011). 
• Promoting Technology Innovation. An 
underlying objective of the ETS is to drive 
innovation in new low-carbon technologies by 
setting a price on carbon, which incentivizes 
low-carbon investments and reduces return of 
investment on carbon-intensive products and 
processes. Although it is unclear as to how far 
the EU-ETS has been successful in achieving this 
objective, emissions trading has undoubtedly 
had positive impacts on increasing the market 
volume and spreading of low-carbon goods and 
services, which eventually stimulates innovation. 
• Fostering Green Industries. In addition 
to driving emissions reductions, the ROK 
government uses the ETS as a critical tool to 
accelerate the reaping of commercial benefits 
and creation of new jobs from green industries. 
The experience of the EU-ETS has shown that 
the scheme has supported European firm’s 
dominance of the global export of renewable 
energy products, thus maintaining Europe’s 
supremacy in the production of renewable 
energy. 
(2) Readiness for Enforcement
Strong government leadership and commitment 
enabled the successful launch of the ETS in the ROK. 
In terms of laying the legal foundation for this policy, 
the government’s efforts toward setting the national 
emissions reduction target and the enactment of 
the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth 
played critical roles. Building the institutional 
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capacity and infrastructure for a credible and 
consistent MRV system was made possible through 
the accumulation of experiences from the KVER and 
TMS. 
However, it is important to recognize that K-ETS 
went through a lengthy and painful process of 
consultations before the launch in January 2015. The 
following is a summary of some key decisions drawn 
in various points of disputes:
• During the process of finalizing the K-ETS bill 
in 2011, the government postponed its launch 
from January 2013 to January 2015. However, 
further delays did not take place despite the 
continued pleas of the industrial leaders insisting 
that the scheme should only be launched when 
the post-2020 climate agreements are already 
in place. 
• Industrial leaders have continuously questioned 
the credibility of the BAU emissions projections 
made by the government, which determines the 
top-down allocation of emission allowances. 
They argue that the government’s projection 
has been too conservative, which has led to 
underestimation of the nation’s emissions for 
2020, so a decreased amount of allowances 
are to be made available in K-ETS. Despite the 
controversy, the government has continued to 
stick to the initial BAU projections. In September 
2014, however, the government did agree that 
necessary revisions should be made in the 
future.
• The government’s guidelines on the provision 
of free allowances provoked a heated debate 
among industrial leaders. The draft ETS 
Act (November 2010) indicated that the 
government may allocate a maximum of 10% 
through the auctioning process for the first 
implementation period, while all allocations 
are to be made through the auctioning process 
for the third implementation period. However, 
the government eventually agreed to relax this 
initial proposal and additionally promised free 
allowance allocations to business sectors of high 
trade-dependencies that are most vulnerable 
to the impacts of emissions capping. The ETS 
Act has also eased other regulations compared 
to its original draft, such as the criteria on the 
selection of participating entities, carry-over of 
allowances, and imposition of fines. 
• Identical to the TMS, the K-ETS caps indirect 
emissions, in addition to direct emissions that 
arise within the boundaries of facilities of 
controlled entities. In other words, indirect 
emissions related to the use of electricity 
and steam are subject to capping. Industrial 
leaders have objected to this function of K-ETS 
saying it is a double standard; emissions are 
regulated twice, through capping emissions of 
industries that generate electricity and heat, and 
capping emissions of industries that use them 
upon purchase. Despite these concerns, the 
government insisted on the need for regulating 
indirect emissions as it helps improve efficiency 
in energy consumption.
• In response to the request for reducing the 
burden of the controlled entities during the first 
implementation phase, the government decided 
to provide additional allowances (10%) from 
the amount stipulated by the Allocation Plan. 
In addition, the government decided to control 
the market price of allowances, specifically to 
be maintained under 10,000 KRW per KAU 
(approximately US$9) by providing additional 
allowances should the average market price of 
the past three months exceeds this value. Such 
decisions made in September 2014 were the 
countermeasures against the requests from the 
industrial sector to further postpone the launch 
of K-ETS.
Launching K-ETS was a bold move taken by the 
ROK government, considering how the nations in 
direct competition (e.g., Japan and Taiwan) have 
decided not to push through immediately due to 
competitiveness concerns. Experiences from the EU-
ETS also indicate reservations on the effectiveness 
of carbon trading as an effective policy tool. 
The event has successfully built the momentum 
for establishing market-based solutions around 
the international climate agreement set to be 
agreed at the end of the year. However, the ROK 
government has taken steps to come to terms 
with the industrial opposition. Most importantly, 
the government’s decision to provide additional 
allowances for the first implementation period 
has enabled controlled entities to maintain their 
emissions levels of 2013-2014, raising questions on 
the need for making a complicated programmatic 
shift. In addition, government arrangements on 
capping the market prices of KAUs have restricted 
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K-ETS from developing into a full blown market-
based mechanism. Such developments illustrate how 
the ROK has struggled to deal with the issue of cost 
containment while not compromising the ambitions 
of the scheme. 
Securing agreement with the industrial leaders 
remains a critical challenge for K-ETS. The 
government should thus continuously seek to earn 
public support by ensuring fairness and transparency 
in emissions allowance allocations. In addition 
to securing the stability of the newborn market 
in the short term, the government must adhere 
to its original commitment of ensuring that the 
carbon price of K-ETS has an impact on investment 
decisions. Given how the nation has a relatively 
small domestic market, linking K-ETS to other 
carbon markets will be an important factor in this 
process. Linking K-ETS with other cap-and-trade 
schemes will not only help stabilize the market and 
provide additional opportunities to reduce costs for 
cutting of emissions but will also ensure that K-ETS 
promotes a “level playing field” of global regulation, 
which is a prerequisite for the ROK’s mitigation 
actions to gain a firm foothold on the international 
stage.
4. Assessment
4.1 Quantitative Assessment 
The ROK’s total GHG emissions, which stood at 
503.1 million tCO
2
 in 2000, have continued to 
increase each year (excluding 2009), reaching 688.3 
million tCO
2
 in 2012. This trend cast doubts on the 
effectiveness of the ROK’s strategies and regulatory 
programs for GHG reduction. However, some 
positive implications should not be overlooked. 
First, the figures for gross national emissions and 
emissions per capita have displayed clearer signs 
that national emissions are reaching a tipping point, 
despite the continued increase in national GDP. 
From the perspective of economic productivity, it is 
important to note that GHG emissions per unit of 
GDP once again peaked in 2011. The comparison 
of the nation’s GDP growth rates and the changes 
in GHG emission levels of entities that have 
participated in the TMS also provide some positive 
signs for the future emissions from industrial 
activities. 
As shown in Figure 25, the growth rate of GHG 
emissions from entities regulated by TMS was 
found to be lower than the nation’s GDP growth 
rate for the first time in 2012. The government’s 
strengthened management of emissions through the 
implementation of TMS has made small but steady 
progress.
Nevertheless, the government’s plan to peak gross 
emissions by 2014 is most likely unachievable 
if the ROK’s economy is to be on track for a 
sustained recovery. Note that the actual total GHG 
emissions in 2011 exceeded the government’s 
targeted emissions levels for the year 2014 set at 
approximately 691 million tons of CO
2
 equivalent. 
Most importantly, emissions from the energy 
sector − which accounted for 87.2% of gross 
national emissions as of 2012 − has continued to 
grow, outpacing the GDP growth rate. The trends 
in gross emissions after the 2008 global economic 
crisis indicate how future emissions may follow 
the trajectory observed in 1998-2008, the decade 
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The 
recovery of the economy, which was fundamentally 
based on increased revenues of highly energy-
intensive industries, has once again jeopardized the 
nation’s emissions performance, raising questions on 
whether the ROK is getting any closer to decoupling 
economic growth and GHG emissions.
In summary, the nation’s emission statistics indicate 
that the ROK has not yet achieved satisfying results 
in terms of sharpening its mitigation policies and 
practices. Although there are several positive 
signs, the underlying challenge for the ROK is 
still in the levels of energy consumption per unit 
GDP, which remain markedly higher than those of 
developed countries, as illustrated in Table 30. Even 
by taking into fair consideration the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the nation’s total GDP, the 
ROK is still lagging behind compared to the global 
leaders such as France and Germany.
4.2 Qualitative Assessment
The ROK’s efforts to set stringent national emission 
targets (30% below BAU in 2020) was most 
appropriate, given the nation’s growing level of GHG 
emissions and economic standing in the international 
community. Although there were shortfalls in the 
process of convening the major emitters to reach 
consensus on reduction targets, full credit should 
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be given to the government’s follow-up actions in 
allocating reduction targets by sector, business type 
and years, as well as securing public budget to help 
meet these targets. Without doubt, the proactive 
drive from the central government encouraged 
regional governments and industrial leaders to 
identify opportunities in reducing and managing 
their GHG emissions. The government’s regulatory 
emissions reduction programs (TMS and ETS) also 
played a critical role in convincing heavy emitters to 
explore the cost effectiveness of available mitigation 
measures, develop emissions management 
strategies, and invest in low-carbon technologies. 
As of 2011, the ROK was the world’s seventh largest 
GHG emitter, with emissions reaching approximately 
610 million tCO
2
. As described in the previous 
section, the ROK will need more time to decouple 
economic growth and GHG emissions, especially 
if its economy will continue to grow at its current 
pace and maintain its industrial structure. However, 
the ROK’s mid-term GHG reduction targets should 
not simply be criticized as being too ambitious, 
just because the nation is unlikely to have peaked 
emissions as planned in 2014. In fact, the targets 
were set based on solid analysis of mitigation 
potentials in major economic sectors, using an 
internationally acknowledged model (MARKAL). 
The reasons for sustained growth in GHG emissions 
should be sought by assessing the effectiveness of 
the government’s mitigation strategies, especially 
on whether the mitigation measures – as planned 
Table 29: Changes in GHG emissions between 1990 and 2011
Indicator 1990 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gross GHG emissions (excludes LULUCF, in million tons CO
2
-eq.) 295.7 511.3 604.1 609.2 667.8 697.7
Net GHG emissions (includes LULUCF, in million tons CO
2
-eq.) 269.5 470.2 565.4 565.6 624.0 654.7
Emissions per capita (in ton CO
2
-eq./person) 6.9 10.9 12.3 12.4 13.5 14.0
Population (in thousand persons) 42,869 47,008 48,949 49,182 49,410 49,779
GHG emissions per unit GDP (in ton CO
2
-eq./billion KRW) 801.3 737.1 617.4 620.5 639.8 644.8
GDP (in trillion KRW) 369.0 697.6 978.5 981.6 1,043.7 1,082.1
Source: GIR, 2014c
Source: MoE, 2014a
Figure 25: Annual growth rates of national GDP and GHG emissions from controlled entities of TMS
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in the target-setting process (e.g., deployment of 
green cars, increase in the use of energy-efficient 
appliances, introduction of CCS technologies) 
– actually took place in full scale and generated 
tangible results. As argued by the industrial leaders 
during the setting of the nation’s reduction targets, 
it is critical that the selection of mitigation measures 
validating reduction targets are supported by 
substantial evidence, regarding technical and cost 
feasibility, as well as the capacities of the private 
sector to mobilize actions on the ground. 
Setting of the GHG reduction target: 
BAU vs Baseline 
During the COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, when 
President Lee announced that the ROK would 
reduce its GHG emissions by 30% relative to the 
BAU scenario by 2020, the baseline emissions (for 2020 
BAU) were projected to be 776 million tCO
2
 .5  However, 
this projection was revisited multiple times following 
the president’s announcement. The government plan 
released in August 2009 estimated the baseline 
emissions to be 813 million tCO
2
, and the Cabinet 
Meeting held in September 2009 approved this value 
Table 30: Energy intensity of selected countries as of 2012
Energy Intensity
Manufacturing Share 
(% of GDP)
2005 2010 2011 2012 2012
ROK 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.55 31
France 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.15 11
Germany 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.25 22
Japan 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.26 18
U.K. 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.19 10
U.S. 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.36 13
OECD 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.31 -
Non Annex-I Parties 1.16 1.09 1.09 1.08 -
Source: IEA, 2014
Source: GIR, 2014c
Figure 26: Changes in the ROK’s national GHG emissions by sector during 1990-2012
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as the basis for the nation’s mid-term reduction 
target. In 2013, GIR suggested 763 million tCO
2
 as 
the baseline emission and the Second Basic National 
Energy Plan released in January 2014 projected 
the baseline at 804 million tCO
2
. Witnessing such 
discrepancies in projections by different institutions, 
the government initiated a formal working group 
in May 2013 to validate the emission projections. 
As a result, the government decided to support the 
initial estimate of 776 million tCO
2
 as the baseline 
for 2020, and reflected this value in the National 
Emissions Reduction Roadmap released in January 
2014. Although the details of the validation and 
decision-making process were not disclosed to 
the public, this roadmap briefly states that “776 
million tCO
2
 was selected through the validation 
process as the proposed value similar to the initial 
estimate given in 2009.” The government also noted 
that adhering to the initial estimate is important 
to uphold national integrity in the international 
community.
The BAU emissions projection is generally made 
from a comprehensive assessment of multiple 
factors including economic growth rate, oil prices, 
population growth rate, industrial structure, and 
energy demand projections. As it is an assessment 
based on data that are currently available, 
uncertainties can lead to a significant overestimation 
or underestimation of BAU projections. For this 
reason, it is inevitable that different government 
institutions indicate different figures; the data 
utilized as well as assumptions made must have 
varied considerably by institutions. Thus, the 
government initiated a formal working group 
to validate the emission projections, which was 
successful in clarifying the nation’s targets. However, 
the fundamental problem remains unresolved: 
the credibility of BAU projections and its possible 
implications. In order to avoid such circumstances, 
target setting can be based ideally on past emissions 
data (e.g., national emissions in year 2005) rather 
than future projections. Germany and Japan are 
good examples of countries where this has taken 
place; the nation’s emission-reduction targets are 
provided in percentages of past emission levels (year 
1990).
Selection of mitigation measures
The regulatory measures for emissions reduction in 
the ROK may need more time to have a substantial 
impact and achieve decoupling. Although the 
government set aggressive targets, there are 
limitations inherent in any regulatory measures; 
substantive gains are difficult to achieve within a 
short timeframe. However, what remains critical 
is whether the government’s selection of GHG 
reduction measures (as well as their projected 
impacts) was appropriate, especially as they 
provided the basis for setting the national reduction 
targets. Recent trends in emission growth for 
different sectors indicate otherwise, as there were 
significant gaps in government considerations made 
on different reduction measures.  
In the setting of the mid-term GHG reduction 
targets, the government proposed different sets of 
reduction measures to support different scenarios. 
For example, Scenario 1 (21% reduction from BAU) 
was supported by transportation system reforms 
and the expansion of renewable energy use. The 
more aggressive Scenario 2 (27% reduction from 
BAU) and Scenario 3 (30% reduction from BAU) 
included additional measures, such as introducing 
CCS technologies and deployment of green cars. 
Unfortunately, the ROK failed to make enough 
progress in developing and commercializing 
green technologies to realize emissions reduction 
as planned from the selected measures. A good 
example is the deployment of green cars, a market 
that accounted for only 30% of the total domestic 
car sales (40 trillion KRW) in 2012. High market 
prices, limited travel range, long battery charging 
time, and scarcity of publicly available charging 
stations were some of the limiting factors for the 
deployment of green cars. The recent development 
of more advanced electric vehicles (e.g., hybrid 
electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) 
has deterred consumers from making immediate 
purchases of what is currently available in the 
market (MOTIE and KIETE, 2013). The government’s 
unattractive incentive scheme has also delayed 
the commercialization of environmentally friendly 
technologies by the automakers. This experience 
demonstrates the importance of underlying 
assessments on which national reduction targets are 
5 | The 2020 BAU of 776 million tCO
2 
was based on the unofficial data provided by the Presidential Committee on Green Growth.
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to be based. Assessments must provide clear and 
convincing evidence for technological readiness and 
market-growth opportunities.
Carbon-reduction programs
Despite its status as a non-Annex I party to the 
Kyoto Protocol, the ROK has taken proactive 
actions to reduce GHG emissions. The government’s 
determination to implement plans through programs 
such as the KVER and TMS has led to positive 
achievements, although there is still room for 
improvement. It is without doubt that ROK’s efforts 
under the agenda of “establishing a low -carbon 
society” have provided momentum for the nation’s 
industries to reduce their energy consumption 
and invest in low-carbon technologies. With the 
implementation of the K-ETS in 2015, the ROK is 
expected to enhance its readiness to cope with the 
Durban Platform and better position itself in global 
climate negotiations. 
The Korea Voluntary Emission Reduction (KVER) 
program, which was launched in 2005, is now 
targeting SMEs that are excluded from the obligatory 
participation in TMS. Credit should be given to the 
government’s decision to extend and modify the 
program to help meet the demand of the SMEs. 
However, KVER alone is limited in actively engaging 
SMEs, as the scheme does not provide immediate 
finances but rewards the outcomes of successful 
investments. Given the long recovery period and 
high front-end capital costs, the availability of 
budget is a significant barrier to SMEs, despite the 
decreasing technical risks in emission-reduction 
measures and government promises for a fair profit 
margin. Therefore, the current KVER scheme should 
seek to introduce incentives based on a forward 
contract and advance payment method, whereby 
SMEs can secure front-end capital guaranteed by the 
proceeds of future KVER offerings. 
The TMS was designed in a way to ensure that 
leading emitters are made accountable for their 
share of emissions reduction. The scheme is a 
regulatory measure that requires controlled entities 
to achieve pre-agreed reduction targets and imposes 
penalties for failure. One may view this program 
as being retrogressive, especially given the ROK’s 
strategy toward deregulation and endorsement of 
market mechanisms. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy 
that TMS has successfully raised the awareness of 
private sector entities on the need for emissions 
reduction. Most importantly, the program has made 
significant contributions to GHG mitigation. Thanks 
to the strong commitment of the controlled entities, 
the emissions reduced in 2012 were 2.7 times larger 
than what was initially targeted. An important 
element of TMS that deserves to be emphasized is 
the process of target setting, which opens the way 
for negotiations between the government and the 
controlled entity. It was collaborative governance, 
not top-down decision making, which helped TMS 
take root in the ROK. 
Another aspect of TMS is that it was initially 
designed to serve the purpose of preparing the 
private sector for the forthcoming ETS. It was 
on such account that the government permitted 
flexibility in TMS implementation. For example, the 
setting of reduction targets and penalties imposed 
upon failure were not as stringent as one would 
normally expect from an average government law 
or regulation. Recognizing such gaps, the TMS 
must be revised to serve a different purpose in the 
future, preferably to create synergies with the ETS. 
One proposal would be to redesign the TMS into a 
program that solely regulates energy consumption 
Table 31: 2020 BAU estimates
Presidential Committee on Green 
Growth
GIR
Second Basic 
Energy Plan
GHG Reduction 
Roadmap
Release Date  Early 2009 Aug. 2009 2013 Jan. 2014 Jan. 2014
2020 BAU
(million tCO
2
)
776 813 763 804 776
Source: Kim, 2014
76
of energy-intensive industries (moving away from 
control of GHG emissions). 
The ETS is a market-based incentive scheme 
aimed to save emissions at the lowest cost point. 
Although the ETS is viewed by many in the ROK as an 
additional step toward acceleration of technological 
innovation and fostering of climate-friendly 
industries, its outcomes are still in question. Despite 
high expectations from the government and NGOs, 
events that took place during the preparation stage 
revealed that the ROK would need a significant 
amount of time before the new system makes steady 
headway. The persistent opposition by industrial 
leaders, bureaucratic conflicts over which ministry 
will run the scheme, and varying opinions among 
the members of the National Assembly eventually 
delayed the preparatory work and decision-making 
processes. As a result, the National Emissions 
Allowance Allocation Plan – a document with critical 
implications for both the efficiency and impacts 
of the ETS – was released only several months 
ahead of the launch, triggering yet another round 
of debates over the feasibility and effectiveness of 
the ETS operation. Despite the sufficient time for 
the government to gain acceptance from the private 
sector entities (as ETS was mandated by law in 2012 
to be launched by 2015), government actions still 
leave much room for improvement. As learned from 
the experiences of the EU-ETS, it is imperative that 
the principles of allocation of emissions are clearly 
communicated with participating entities right from 
the start. 
Investment in green technology 
Technological innovation is key to successful 
emissions reduction. TMS and ETS may provide solid 
platforms on which to build actions and investments, 
but without a technological enabler, emission cuts 
simply become a costly practice to businesses. 
Even though the ROK invested 108.7 trillion KRW 
in financing green growth actions under the Five-
Year Plan, its outcomes in terms of commercializing 
emission-reduction technologies have been limited. 
Failure to make available technological options may 
have been the primary bottleneck – particularly 
to SMEs with low technological capabilities – to 
realizing emission-reduction targets in the ROK. 
The government’s future policies should recognize 
that technologies offer the potential to dramatically 
reduce the costs of emissions reduction and seek 
ways to accelerate the implementation of innovative 
solutions.
5. Takeaways and 
Recommendations
Climate change poses a fundamental threat to 
economic development and poverty alleviation, 
especially in developing countries with limited 
capacities and financial resources to respond 
effectively. Recognizing that climate change is 
a global problem with international causes and 
transboundary effects, developing countries are 
being actively supported by developed country 
partners and international organizations to establish 
low-carbon green growth strategies. Based on 
the ROK’s experiences, several recommendations 
can be derived to help policymakers, planners and 
practitioners in setting effective emission-reduction 
targets and implementing actions to realize a low-
carbon society. 
With regard to establishing a systematic foundation 
to support mitigation actions, the importance of 
collecting and managing emissions data to compile 
a comprehensive national emissions inventory, 
and creating an organizational framework, the 
importance of linking up different sectors to support 
this process cannot be over-emphasized. In the 
ROK, the Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research 
Center (GIR) was established in 2010 to specifically 
fulfill this role. The GIR compiles emissions data 
that is dispersed amongst multiple numbers of 
stakeholders and government organizations, serving 
as a centralized information hub. Timely disclosure 
and accumulation of emission statistics helps the 
government track the nation’s potentials, capacity, 
and performance on lowering of emission levels. 
It also enables policymakers to derive optimum 
strategies for designing national mitigation 
programs. 
Given the circumstances of developing countries 
in entering a stage of rapid economic growth, there 
are limitations in adopting the policies and programs 
of the developed economies with expectations of 
duplicating their success. Developing countries 
should take a step-by-step approach whereby 
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government efforts place a greater emphasis on 
strengthening the mitigation capacities of different 
entities rather than trying to carve out emissions in 
the short term. In the build-up of the ROK’s carbon 
trading market that was launched in January 2015, 
the government conducted numerous assessments 
based on experiences accumulated from operating 
several different mitigation programs. As described 
in the previous section, the ROK government 
engaged with the industrial sector to voluntarily 
reduce their GHG emissions even before preparation 
of the National Strategy for Green Growth. In 
addition, the Target Management Scheme (TMS) 
helped ensure private sector acceptance of 
strengthened regulatory actions.
Throughout this process, the energy-intensive 
industries of the private sector invested in low 
carbon technologies, gradually gaining knowledge, 
experience, and confidence needed in taking 
additional steps to help meet the nation’s reduction 
targets. Likewise, developing countries should 
avoid immediate adoption of stringent regulatory 
measures and continuously seek to design and 
strengthen mitigation programs that can be well 
accepted under the circumstances of a country’s 
capacities and available resources. 
Needless to say, the fundamental solution 
to achieving emission reduction is to reduce 
the demand and supply of fossil fuels through 
technology diffusion. There are simple and low-
cost actions that can lead to immediate emission 
reduction, but sizeable and long-lasting mitigation 
is most likely to be achieved through technological 
innovation. Green technologies enable businesses 
to decrease their dependence on fossil fuels, but 
it is equally important to understand that they can 
also contribute to enhancing the competitiveness 
of existing economic activities by reducing costs, 
optimizing production processes, and improving 
product quality. Developing countries should seek to 
exploit such opportunities to resolve the dilemma of 
development and mitigation. Given the technology 
gaps that exist between developed and developing 
countries, technology diffusion is one area in which 
international aid is needed to provide better support.
National mitigation strategies should be established 
in a balanced manner so as to prevent creating blind 
spots. For example, the KVER scheme of the ROK 
was revised to target SMEs, after the heavy emitters 
migrated from the KVER scheme to take part in the 
newly introduced TMS in 2010. Given the capability 
gaps of SMEs in comparison with large companies, 
the framework and implementing regulations of 
the KVER scheme were redesigned in a way that 
minimizes the financial obstacles in actively engaging 
in mitigation actions. Such efforts have enabled 
collective actions from private companies of all sizes, 
ensuring that there are no such blind spots in the 
given roles of the different actors. 
The sustainable forest reserves and land use in many 
developing countries (especially in Southeast Asia) 
determines in essence the economic sustainability of 
low-income households as well as the environmental 
sustainability of the nation as a whole. Although the 
ROK’s policies on forest conservation in the 1970s 
did not recognize forests as carbon store or carbon 
sink, the strengthening of forest management 
practices and community-based rehabilitation 
actions, which started during the stages of rapid 
industrial development, helped the nation sustain 
a solid foundation for pursuing economic growth. 
Endeavors to expand the forestry resources have 
been carried out not only for the sake of protecting 
the environment, but also to contribute to improving 
the income of households in the agricultural 
sector (Kang et al., 2014). Carbon benefits that 
forest reserves have to offer underscore the need 
for developing countries to actively engage in 
conservation, sustainable management of forests, 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. 
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1.1 Overview
Alongside its economic growth, the ROK has seen 
a dramatic increase in energy consumption.  The 
total primary energy consumption, which stood at 
45.7 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE) in 1981, 
increased six-fold to 278.7 million TOE in 2012. 
Energy consumption per capita also jumped to 5.57 
TOE in 2012, up from 1.18 TOE in 1981, exceeding 
that of Japan and many European countries with 
national incomes two or three times higher than the 
ROK’s.1  
From the late-1980s to the early-2000s, the ROK’s 
energy consumption kept pace with economic 
growth, as illustrated in Figure 1. Such rapid growth 
of energy consumption is typical for a developing 
country in transition to an advanced economy. 
The growth in energy demand often outpaces the 
growth in production during the initial stages of 
industrialization; energy elasticity decreases only 
when an economy reaches a stage of increasing 
share of tertiary industries and emergence of 
technology-intensive industries. It is also typical to 
observe a continued increase in end-user energy 
consumption until a certain level of income is 
achieved. Along with the rise of income, energy 
demand tends to make a qualitative shift toward 
advanced or more efficient energy sources. 
During the period of rapid economic growth, 
the industries promoted by the government − 
particularly the heavy and chemical industries 
(steel, cement, and petrochemicals), as well as the 
automobile and ship building – led to the steep 
increase in energy consumption in the ROK. 
CHAPTER 3 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY
1. Introduction 
1 | The energy consumption per capita of major economies in 2011 (in TOE) includes the following: France - 3.81, Germany - 3.88, Japan - 3.61, Canada - 7.30, 
U.S. - 7.02, and OECD average - 4.28. 
Summary
Given the ROK’s heavy dependence on oil imports, the energy security challenge would suffice as the major factor why a 
green growth transition on a national scale is necessary. But green energy solutions – reducing energy demand, improving 
energy efficiency, and deploying renewable energy – aim not only to deal with vulnerability to oil price shocks but also to 
improve environmental performance and shift to a leaner, cleaner economic structure built on new growth engines. From 
2009-2013, considerable progress was achieved in prioritizing demand-side management (promoting the rational and 
effective consumption of energy resources), which challenged the traditional principle that stable energy supply is the 
panacea for energy security. The targets for energy intensity and NRE deployment provided a strong signal for boosting 
investment and technological innovation. Despite the positive progress, the ROK’s efforts toward greening the economy 
still have a long way to go as its flagship industries remain highly energy-intensive and delayed reforms in energy pricing 
hamper energy intensity improvements. The ROK’s experience demonstrates how government’s regulatory efforts can 
be kunuted without the support of robust energy-pricing policies. 
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Source: KEEI, 2013b
Figure 2: Energy demand by sector
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However, it is important to recognize that this 
trend remains prevalent today to a considerable 
degree; as shown in Figure 2, the growth of energy 
consumption is driven strongly by the industrial and 
transportation sectors. As of 2012, the industrial 
sector accounted for 61.7% of the nation’s total 
energy consumption, followed by the transportation 
sector (17.8%) and residential-commercial sectors 
(18.2%).  As a result of the continued expansion 
of the heavy and chemical industries, industrial 
energy consumption has increased 3.5 times since 
1990, reaching 128.3 million TOE in 2012. Energy 
consumption in the transportation sector has risen 
2.6 times to 37.1 million TOE during the same period 
due to the increasing number of vehicles. Meanwhile, 
the residential-commercial sectors showed relatively 
moderate growth, which was accompanied by the 
shift from traditional fossil fuels such as coal and 
firewood to highly efficient forms of energy such as 
gas and electricity.
1.2 Baseline Assessment
Root Causes of Challenges
Korea’s energy challenge is rooted in the country’s 
limited natural resources. Specifically, its indigenous 
energy resources including anthracite coal, 
hydropower, and renewable energy have low 
economic feasibility. As such, the ROK has to rely 
heavily on energy imports to meet the constantly 
growing energy demand. As of 2012, domestic 
energy production from indigenous sources was 
11.1 million TOE, accounting for only 4% of the total 
primary energy supply. 
• The nation’s coal resources consist of low-
quality anthracite, which is only adequate 
for household heating and small boilers. The 
ROK has also limited reserves of coal and its 
production dropped annually to 1.03 million 
TOE by 2012 in response to the government’s 
promotion of the Coal Industry Rationalization 
Policy.2  
• The ROK has a long history of hydropower 
development. Many of the large hydropower 
stations that operate today were built during the 
1970s to 1990s, when the government engaged 
in a flurry of dam construction to secure water 
supply and meet the increasing demand caused 
by rapid economic growth. However, the nation’s 
highly restricted land area and the growing 
concerns over the environmental impacts of 
hydropower expansion have hampered the 
deployment of hydropower energy since the 
late 1990s. Currently, hydropower makes up for 
only 8% of the ROK’s total power-generation 
capacity. 
• Renewable energy has gained the attention of 
the government as it was identified as a solution 
to the fossil fuel dependency and energy 
insecurity. While the initial potential to harness 
solar, hydropower, geothermal and bioenergy in 
the ROK appears promising, it is restricted by 
the difficult geographical conditions (i.e., 70% 
of total land area comprises hills and mountains 
divided by steep river valleys), extreme seasonal 
variations, and high population density. While 
the volume of renewable energy use has grown 
to 8.04 million TOE, increasing more than ten-
fold over the past 20 years, this figure is still 
minuscule compared to other countries like 
Japan (18.9 million TOE), Germany (32.8 million 
TOE), and France (19.8 million TOE). 
It is obvious that the increasing energy imports to 
meet the domestic energy demand places a heavy 
burden on the economy and weakens national 
competitiveness, especially when the balance of 
payments is hampered by high global energy prices. 
In the 2000s, the ROK spent over 20% of the total 
national revenues on importing energy. In 2012, for 
example, the nation’s spending on energy imports 
reached US$184.8 billion, making the ROKas the  
world’s fifth largest oil importer and third largest 
importer of coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) after 
China and Japan.
2 | Public preference for energy-efficient sources brought about the serious weakening of competitiveness of the coal industry by the end of the 1980s. The 
declining profitability due to the reduced demand for coal aggravated its level of production. In response to this, the government implemented the Coal 
Industry Rationalization Policy in 1989 with the aim of reforming and improving the structure of the coal industry. As a result, the number of coal mines was 
reduced from 332 in 1989 to just 5 in 2010 and coal production dramatically decreased from 24.3 million tons in 1988 to 2 million tons in 2012. 
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The ROK is one of the top global exporters of 
petroleum products, with three of the ten largest 
crude oil refineries in the world. It is interesting 
to see how a nation that relies almost entirely on 
imports to meet its energy needs has fostered 
an industry that adds value to fossil fuels. The 
government strategically supported the oil refinery 
industry as a priority sector for development 
under the First Five-Year Economic Development 
Plan (1962). As a result, the total export revenues 
generated by the refinery industries increased 
substantially over the years and covered more than 
9% of the nation’s total exports by 2011. 
Although it is true that the ROK’s oil refinery 
industry has a role to play in tackling the nation’s 
energy crisis – since oil refineries are critical to 
stabilize the supply of petroleum products –
they have had a limited impact in terms of resolving 
the nation’s fundamental challenge of resource 
scarcity as their primary activities do not span across 
“upstream sectors” of overseas oil exploration and 
production, but simply focus on the downstream 
sectors of processing and purifying crude oil.
The ROK has had limited engagements and success 
in the development and acquisition of overseas 
energy reserves as a means of improving the nation’s 
energy self-sufficiency.
Relevant Problems
Given the inherent constraints regarding energy 
resources, the nation’s energy plans have undergone 
significant changes over the past 40 years. During 
the early stages of economic development and 
amid the global oil crisis in the 1970s-1980s, the 
government’s priority agenda was stable and cost-
effective supply of energy imports to fuel economic 
development. In this context, the diversification of 
energy sources was strategically undertaken by the 
government. 
The nation was to move away from being fully 
dependent on petroleum-based fossil fuel imports 
from the Middle East and introduced natural gas 
and coal as new sources of energy by opening 
channels via Southeast Asia and North America. 
Such diversification of energy supply sources was 
intended to minimize the risks involved in single 
Figure 3: Indigenous energy production by fuel type
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energy source dependency, enabling the economy 
to become much more flexible in responding to the 
fluctuations in the global energy market and other 
related contingencies. 
Despite the government’s efforts, petroleum-based 
fuels remained a major energy source even in 
the 1990s due to the promotion of the heavy and 
chemical industries. It was only when electricity 
consumption started to grow exponentially in the 
late 1990s that the share of petroleum-based fuels 
in the total primary energy consumption began to 
fall substantially (to less than 50% in the 2000s and 
even 38% in 2012). The share of LNG, which was 
introduced in the late 1980s, increased to 18% in 
2012 following a significant annual growth of 20% 
in the 1990s. As for bituminous coal, the cement 
industry began to use it as a major energy source 
in the early 1980s, followed by other industries 
including paper, chemicals, textiles, and food. 
Although the government’s heavy interventions for 
diversification of energy sources helped improve 
the nation’s energy security, it is also true that such 
positive outcomes continuously reinforced the 
excessive exploitation of energy resources. The 
government’s strong intervention in the process 
also led to the weakening of the energy industry’s 
competitiveness and reduced market functions.
Consequently, structural reforms to increase the 
efficiency of energy industries formed part of the 
government’s key energy policies in the late 1990s. 
Such efforts were in line with the government’s 
strategic directions toward removing deep-rooted 
inefficiencies in the economic structure. To this end, 
the government amended the Petroleum Business 
Act in 1995, which eased or abolished regulations on 
market entry, energy pricing, facility development, 
and import/export in an effort to fully liberalize the 
energy industry. The restructuring of public utility 
companies was also undertaken; for example, the 
Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) was split 
into six subsidiary companies with further plans for 
privatization. Prior to the reform, KEPCO enjoyed 
a monopoly over power generation, transmission, 
distribution, and sales. Newly established in 2001, 
the Korea Power Exchange (KPX) seeks to operate 
a competitive electric power market by purchasing 
electricity from individual power producers to meet 
the nation’s electricity demand at the lowest cost.
However, much of the ROK’s energy problems 
today are rooted in the failure of the government 
to fully establish the principles of free competition 
in the energy utility market during this period. The 
government’s actions to bring about a full-scale 
reform ceased in the early 2000s, when it was 
concluded that a competitive market runs the risk of 
undermining the importance of meeting the nation’s 
energy demand, especially as the nation has no 
neighboring country from which to import electricity. 
The decision underlines government’s concern 
over possibilities on monopolization of the energy 
industry by a selected number of private companies 
over which they would have no direct control. 
As a result, natural gas and electricity businesses 
are still firmly in the hands of public enterprises, 
Table 1: Energy mix in the ROK
Source: KEEI, 2013b
1981 1990 2000 2005 2010 2012
Coal 15.2 (33.3) 24.4 (26.2) 42.9 (22.2) 54.8 (24.0) 77.1 (29.2) 81.0 (29.1)
Petroleum 26.6 (58.1) 50.2 (53.8) 100.3 (52.0) 101.5 (44.4) 104.3 (39.5) 106.2 (38.1)
LNG (0.0) 3.0 (3.2) 18.9 (9.8) 30.4 (13.3) 43.0 (16.3) 50.2 (18.0)
Hydro 0.7 (1.5) 1.6 (1.7) 1.4 (.7) 1.3 (.6) 1.4 (.5) 1.6 (.6)
Nuclear 0.7 (1.6) 13.2 (14.2) 27.2 (14.1) 36.7 (16.1) 31.9 (12.1) 31.7 (11.4)
Renewables 2.5 (5.5) 0.8 (.9) 2.1 (1.1) 4.0 (1.7) 6.1 (2.3) 8.0 (2.9)
Total 45.7 (100) 93.2 (100) 192.9 (100) 228.6 (100) 263.8 (100) 278.7 (100)
  Unit: million TOE, share in %
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate the share in total energy supply 
88
namely the Korea Gas Corporation and subsidiary 
companies of KEPCO. Individual power producers 
were responsible for only 12% of the total electricity 
generation capacity of the ROK in 2007. Under 
the government advocacy for more and cheaper 
energy as the route to sustained economic growth, 
public energy utilities have been suffering from 
snowballing debts while struggling to remedy the 
nation’s economy-crippling power shortages. The 
government continues to maintain until today a 
strong will to keep energy prices low and avoid 
situations of insufficient energy supply that are 
likely to impede economic growth. In short, the 
government’s reluctance to run the risks of full-
fledged market reform has not been accompanied by 
an alternative solution to overcome the nation’s low 
energy self-sufficiency, high dependence on fossil 
fuels, and low efficiency of energy systems.
Moreover, the ROK’s relatively small land area is 
reaching its physical limits for constructing new 
power plants and transmission facilities. The nation 
also struggled to contain air pollution and smog 
generated by fossil fuel combustion. Particulate 
pollution has become a chronic phenomenon during 
the winter season in the main cities. For example, 
high-PM10 episodes, defined as days in which 
the 24-hour mean PM10 concentration exceeds 
100 μg/m3, occurred 254 times during the period 
2001–2008 in Seoul. The concentration of nitrogen 
dioxide, which comes principally from emissions 
by automobile exhausts and industrial boilers, was 
found to reach 0.034-0.038 ppm in Seoul during the 
2008-2010 period, which is 50% higher than the 
average in major cities in OECD countries. 
Energy Classification in the ROK
Energy sources can be classified into two groups: 
(1) fossil fuels:  such as  coal, natural gas, and petroleum 
(2) non-fossil fuels: such as wind and solar. 
However, energy sources can also be divided into 
renewables and non-renewables: renewable  resources 
regenerate as fast as they are consumed and are 
continuously available such as wind and solar while 
non-renewable resources are those that can be depleted 
such as fossil fuels and nuclear energy. 
The ROK adopted the concept of “New and Renewable 
Energy (NRE),” which includes a total of eight renewable 
energy sources and three “new energy sources.” Energy 
classification/specification is important as it determines 
the technologies acceptable within the government’s 
climate change policies and programs. For example, unlike 
the ROK’s classification and specifications on renewable 
energy sources, the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
does not recognize energy generated from combustion 
of non-renewable municipal waste (non-biodegradable 
part of municipal waste) as renewable energy. 
The specific energy classifications of the ROK are shown 
below: 
• Renewable Energy: solar heat, photovoltaic power, 
biomass, wind, small-hydro, geothermal, marine, and 
waste
• New Energy: fuel cell, coal liquefaction and 
gasification, and hydrogen energy
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Policy Options 
The concept of environmental sustainability has 
not been well integrated into the government’s 
energy policies since the national strategy was 
primarily structured around improving the nation’s 
energy security. Nuclear power was sought as the 
only viable option to address the energy shortage. 
Thus, it is recognized by the government as an 
affordable, clean, and environmentally sustainable 
form of energy. Despite the highly debatable 
environmental implications of nuclear energy, its 
cost competitiveness (i.e., direct costs in comparison 
with fossil fuels) and contribution toward energy 
independence have made its deployment an 
attractive policy for the government. After being 
introduced in 1978, a total of 23 reactors now 
provide approximately one-third of the nation’s 
electricity. 
The exponential rise in global oil prices in the early 
2000s compelled the ROK to take a step back and 
adopt a wider perspective on the issue of energy 
security. The explosive growth of energy demand 
in emerging nations such as China and India poses 
a new risk to the ROK’s energy security. The rising 
global competition over natural resources has 
heightened the nation’s uncertainty on fueling 
its economic growth under the existing energy-
intensive industrial structure. In addition, the 
possible enforcement of the nation’s contributions 
to the global treaty on GHG emissions reduction was 
another issue to consider in addressing the energy 
crisis. 
Under the evolving circumstances, the government 
observed rapid changes in the energy market, especially 
in terms of technology. For example, mass production 
and market competition were driving renewable 
energy systems to be increasingly competitive against 
conventional energy generation. Non-traditional 
energy transformation technologies were breaking 
the notion that high efficiency in energy generation 
can only be achieved by large-scale systems. The 
entry of highly efficient small-scale facilities that 
can avoid the environmental impacts of large-scale 
deployment was expected to change the existing 
patterns of energy production and consumption. 
The technologies that allow a systematic 
communication between energy suppliers and 
consumers enable energy demand to better adapt to 
the supply during low-cost energy periods. 
Acknowledging the fact that it is impossible for 
the nation to immediately cut down its use of fossil 
fuels, the government presented a practical and 
coherent proposal under the Five-Year National 
Plan for Green Growth in 2009, which was once 
again anchored on resolving the nation’s energy 
insecurity. However, unlike its past interventions, 
the government was to focus on reducing 
GHG emissions through effective demand-side 
management and deployment of NRE systems. 
The technological innovation needed to deliver such 
outcomes was expected to unleash new engines 
of economic growth. For example, the industries 
engaged in manufacturing of components for 
renewable energy facilities and IT-based energy 
monitoring and control systems could lead the 
nation’s export-driven economy.
1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth
As one of the most resource-deprived countries, the 
energy security issue has long been at the center of 
the ROK’s economic development plan. In an era of 
global market integration where countries share the 
implicit motive to gain greater possession of natural 
resources, the growing competition over fossil fuels 
became an imminent threat to the very existence of 
the nation. It is fair to say that the energy security 
challenge in the ROK is enough to be singled out 
from many other reasons as to why nationwide 
engagement for a green growth transition was 
necessary. 
However, it is important to recognize that the 
proposed green energy solutions – reducing energy 
demand and deploying NRE systems – are aimed 
not only at providing a desirable buffer against 
rising energy prices and improving the nation’s 
environmental performance, but also at transitioning 
to a leaner, cleaner economy built on new engines 
of growth. The improvements in energy efficiency 
would enhance the cost-competitiveness of the 
products manufactured in the ROK, and fostering 
NRE industries would help create new technology-
intensive items for export. 
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Source: PCGG, 2009b
Figure 4: SWOT analysis for greening the ROK’s energy sector
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“Reducing the use of fossil fuels and enhancing 
energy self-reliance” is one of the ten agenda items 
presented in the Five-Year Plan. It is composed of 
four action plans: 
(1) establishment of a society that consumes less and 
enhances energy efficiency; 
(2) deployment of clean energy systems; 
(3) expansion of nuclear energy generation capacity; 
and
2. Targets and Strategies
The ROK’s endeavor to make a robust shift toward 
enhancing energy efficiency and employing clean 
energy sources was anchored in the First National 
Energy Basic Plan (2008-2030) released in August 
2008, which was later incorporated into the Five-
Year Plan for Green Growth. Subsequently, the 
strategic directions under this plan were reflected 
in the various associated plans within the existing 
energy policy framework. 
(4) engagement in the development of energy 
sources overseas. This chapter focuses on 
how the ROK government delivered plans and 
established programs under the first two action 
items as well as the evaluation of the outcomes 
to date.
This chapter focuses on how the ROK government 
delivered plans and established programs under the 
first two action items as well as the evaluation of the 
outcomes to date.
The action plans for the demand-side management 
were embodied in the Fourth Basic Plan for the 
Rationalization of Energy Use (2008-2012) while 
the action plans for the supply-side reforms were 
laid out in the Third Basic Plan for the Deployment 
of Renewable Energy (2009-2030) and the Fourth 
Basic Plan for Electricity Supply (2008-2022). 
Tasks Actions
1.Promotion of less energy consumption and high energy efficiency
a. Ensure technological innovation in energy efficiency 
b. Promote innovation in energy demand management by sector 
c. Manage the energy demand by source and supplier
d. Introduce and distribute highly energy-efficient appliances 
2. Expansion of clean energy supply a. Facilitate the industrialization of new and renewable energy b. Introduce market mechanisms
3. Building of capacity to supply nuclear energy 
a. Enhance the reliability of nuclear energy  
b. Increase the share of nuclear energy 
c. Become a leading exporter of nuclear technology 
4. Strengthening of capacity to develop overseas resources
a. Overhaul the overseas resource development system 
b. Ensure strategic promotion of overseas resources  
c. Rebuild and expand infrastructures for resource development 
d. Develop unconventional energy sources and natural resources
Table 2: Action plans for the ROK’s energy sector
Source: PCGG, 2009b
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2.1 The First National Energy Basic Plan 
 (2008-2030)
The First National Energy Basic Plan is the ROK’s 
first comprehensive plan that lays out the nation’s 
long-term principles, strategic directions, and overall 
goals in the energy sector. Fundamentally, the plan 
was designed to ensure that all energy plans under 
the existing policy framework are well aligned and 
interconnected. 
 
However, the underlying intention of the government 
of putting in place a new overarching plan in 2008 
was to ensure that the nation’s future energy plans 
coherently respond to the challenges stemming 
from climate change and global resource scarcity. 
Accordingly, the plan naturally served as a blueprint 
for achieving low-carbon green growth in the energy 
sector. Under the three pillars of energy security, 
energy efficiency, and environmental sustainability, 
the plan set out four agenda items, each with 
quantitative targets. 
Figure 5: Structure of energy planning in the ROK
Basic plan for 
rationalization 
of energy use
Basic plan 
for overseas 
resource 
development 
Plan for 
underwater 
mineral 
resources
Basic plan 
for NRE 
development & 
deployment
Plan for 
oil 
Stockpiling
Plan for 
power supply 
and demand
Plan for 
natural gas 
long-term 
supply
Long-term 
plan for coal 
industry
National  Energy Basic  Plan
SupplyDemand
Plan for technology development of 
national energy resources
Strategy for climate change 
(Master plan for reducing greenhouse gas)
The ROK’s energy policies take the form of various plans formulated and implemented by the government. The 
overriding plan is the National Energy Basic Plan, with a 20-year timeframe, which encompasses all energy-related 
sectors and aims to present the basic principles, strategic directions, and overall goals. Its associate plans with 
shorter timeframes (5-20 years) are divided into the energy supply-side and the energy demand-side, respectively. 
The supply-side plan specifically covers the development of particular energy sources including renewables, 
while the demand-side plan seeks to promote the rational and effective consumption of energy resources while 
minimizing the related environmental impacts to help improve public welfare and sustain economic growth.
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The rationale behind the plan is the belief that the 
ROK needs to break away from focusing on the 
energy supply side and should rather pay more 
attention on the demand-side management to 
achieve a sustainable and optimal energy mix. The 
specific strategies of the four-point plan are the 
following:
• Low Energy Consuming Society. In order to 
better respond to the fluctuating oil prices and 
increasing climate change risks, the ROK is to 
implement stringent policies that regulate energy 
consumption and improve energy efficiency, which 
can ultimately reduce energy demand by 7.6% and 
12.4% compared to BAU projections by 2020 and 
2030, respectively. Based on this goal, the energy 
intensity (TOE per million KRW) is expected to 
improve from 0.341 in 2006 to 0.185 in 2030.
• Energy Independence. As a means of improving 
energy security, the nation is to actively engage 
in overseas energy development to expand its 
resource base and maximize the use of indigenous 
renewable energy sources. In addition, the nation 
will seek to promote clean use of non-petroleum 
products such as LNG, coal, and nuclear power 
to achieve an optimal energy mix. The targeted 
reduction in petroleum dependency for energy 
is from 43.4% (2007) to 33% (2030), and the 
targeted increase in the share of renewable energy 
in meeting the nation’s total energy consumption is 
from 2.4% (2007) to 11% (2030).
• Green Energy Industry as a New Engine of 
Economic Growth. The ROK also aims to 
support R&D activities to foster technologies 
and industries relevant to energy efficiency 
and renewable energy systems. Specifically, the 
government will double its budget for R&D in 
green technologies, which will not only accelerate 
the commercialization of green technology but 
also generate new jobs in the sectors relevant 
to green growth. The targeted level of domestic 
technologies in the green energy sector in 
comparison to the global leaders (which stood at 
approximately 60% as of 2007) is 100% by the year 
2030. Achieving these targets will successively 
help enhance the ROK’s share of global renewable 
energy markets.
• Energy Welfare.  In order achieve social 
integration and social inclusion, the government 
will put in place various policy measures (e.g., 
expanding the supply of low-cost energy to 
impoverished communities, adjusting the energy 
pricing structure, etc.) to ensure that all citizens 
can meet their basic energy needs regardless of 
income. The government seeks to reduce the share 
of households with energy spending that exceeds 
10% of their total income from 7.8% in 2007 to 0% 
by 2030.
2.2 Energy Demand Management 
In the wake of the oil crisis in the late 1970s, the ROK 
government enacted the Energy Use Rationalization 
Act and established the Korea Energy Management 
Corporation (KEMCO) as a leading implementer 
of its energy conservation policies. Since the early 
1990s, the government has been formulating the 
Basic Plan for Rationalization of Energy Use every 
five years, making efforts to systematize its energy 
conservation policies. In addition to the fourth Basic 
Plan for the Rationalization of Energy Use (2008-
2012) that was released soon after the government 
proclaimed low-carbon green growth as the new 
national vision in 2008, the government formulated 
an additional plan called Demand Management 
Measures to Cope with High Oil Prices to ensure 
that the paradigm shift (from stable supply to 
demand management) leads to rapid results on the 
ground.
The Fourth Basic Plan for Rationalization of Energy 
Use (2008-2012)
The plan was jointly formulated by relevant 
ministries as a five-year action plan for the demand-
side management. The most prominent feature of 
this plan is the doubling of the energy consumption 
reduction target compared to the past average 
target as well as its sufficient budget allocation of 
18.3 trillion KRW. Such target is necessary to stay 
on track toward reducing the energy intensity to the 
level of advanced countries (0.185 TOE per million 
KRW) by 2030, as committed by the National Energy 
Basic Plan (2008). Specifically, energy intensity was 
expected to be reduced by 11.3% by in 2012 (0.297 
TOE per million KRW) compared to the 2007 levels. 
The total amount of savings from the reduced energy 
consumption (34.2 million TOE) was estimated to 
reach approximately 9.5 trillion KRW. 
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It should be noted that in addition to the direct 
measures for immediately cutting down energy 
consumption, technological improvement, market 
creation, and institutional arrangements that 
generate enabling conditions for energy providers 
and consumers to deliver energy efficiency were 
identified as areas of critical importance. While the 
government was to exercise stringent control over 
large firms and public institutions with sufficient 
resources and capabilities, voluntary participation 
was applied to smaller business entities, households, 
and individuals. In addition, the government sought 
to strengthen the price signals in order to achieve 
energy-demand reductions. 
To this end, the plan set out four detailed 
implementation strategies as summarized below: 
• Development and Deployment of Energy-
Efficiency Technologies. The government 
planned to invest 1.2 trillion KRW in technology 
development for the seven core sectors over the 
five-year period – building an energy management 
system, energy IT systems, energy storage 
systems, green vehicles, LEDs, energy intensive 
systems, and energy-efficient appliances. These 
technologies would play an important role in 
curbing energy consumption. Moreover, the 
energy-intensive systems include equipment with 
high potential to enhance energy efficiency such 
as boilers, electric motors, and air conditioning 
systems. The details on how the government 
funding for these technologies was channeled to 
R&D activities of public, private, and academic 
entities are provided in Chapter 4 (Green 
Technology and Innovation). 
• Creation of Energy Efficiency Markets and 
Promotion of Market Transition. In an effort 
to fundamentally change the consumption 
patterns of end-users, the government sought to 
create and stimulate markets for the production 
and distribution of products with high energy 
efficiency. To this end, various regulatory and 
Table 3: Sample action plans in the Fourth Basic Plan for the Rationalization of Energy Use
Sector Measures
Industry
• Tax levies on energy-efficiency investments
• Free energy diagnosis for SMEs by government institutions
• Launch of cooperative platforms where large enterprises help SMEs adopt  energy-efficient technologies
• Negotiation of agreement schemes between the government and large energy-consuming companies (or 
facilities) to set and meet energy saving targets (i.e., Target Management Scheme discussed in Chapter 2)
Transportation
• Strengthening of vehicle emission standards 
• Tax exemptions on the purchase of hybrid cars
• Expansion of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) infrastructure
• Expansion of bicycle roads
Buildings
• Strengthening of energy regulations and standards for buildings
• Expansion of district cooling and heating infrastructure
• Subsidies for investments in energy-neutral homes
• Expansion of energy certification schemes for buildings
Public Sector
• Requiring all public buildings to meet the highest energy- efficiency level
• Mandating all public institutions to increase their procurement of energy-efficient goods
• Launch of energy-saving programs such as weekly car-free days, eco-driving campaigns, and limiting 
elevator and escalator use in commercial buildings
Source: MKE, 2008c
95
incentive schemes were implemented to enable 
a sustained market transition. Some of the major 
schemes proposed include the following: 
– Phase out all energy inefficient incandescent 
light bulbs from the market by 2013
– Require home appliance manufacturers to 
ensure that the average energy efficiency of all 
their models (instead of regulating each product) 
sold in the market meet a predetermined level 
– Mandate public institutions to preferentially 
procure products with low standby power 
consumption or with high energy efficiency 
labels
– Expand the list of products subject to energy 
efficiency labeling scheme
– Order the placing of warning labels on products 
that fail to meet a minimum standby power 
consumption standard
– Provide subsidies for promote investments on 
switching to energy efficient equipment
• Energy Demand Management. The need for 
eliminating energy inefficiencies across all sectors 
of the economy was at the heart of the Fourth 
Basic Plan for the Rationalization of Energy Use. 
To attain this end, identifying opportunities, 
assessing their potentials for energy savings, and 
evaluating the economic feasibility of the required 
investments were critical steps in delivering 
tangible results. In addition to strengthening the 
regulatory measures, the government proposed a 
diverse set of incentive measures to bring together 
participation from a wide variety of sectors and 
stakeholders with varying needs and capacities.
• Establishment of Energy-Conserving Society.  
Recognizing how the energy consumption pattern 
is strongly associated with the energy pricing 
structure, the government put forward reform 
measures to further rationalize energy pricing 
and incentivize energy conservation practices. In 
addition, the government promoted participatory 
schemes at the grassroots level to help energy-
saving practices to take root in the public sphere 
(kindly refer to Chapter 5 for further details). The 
specific measures are enumerated below:
– The electricity prices are to phase out cross 
subsidization3  and be gradually increased to 
better reflect the actual unit cost of power 
generation. 
– As a means of reducing consumption for heating 
during the winter season, a differential tariff 
that charges prices according to seasons and 
end-use is to be introduced to natural gas 
pricing. 
– The unit cost for district heating is to be 
capped by region in order to improve fairness 
and stimulate competition for enhancing 
productivity among energy suppliers. 
Demand Management Measures to Cope with High 
Oil Prices (2009)
Alarmed by the threat of soaring oil prices, 
the government announced an additional plan 
to complement the Fourth Basic Plan for the 
Rationalization of Energy Use. This plan called 
Demand Management Measures to Cope with High 
Oil Prices was released in June 2009 in preparation 
for the possible skyrocketing of oil prices (note that 
the global oil prices actually exceeded US $100 per 
barrel in 2011 and through most of 2012, although 
the price escalations did not reach the levels of 
the 2005-2007 crisis). The plan was perceived 
as a tipping point where both the public and 
private sector decisively committed themselves to 
conserving energy and sharing the burden.
While the plan was deemed as a reinforced version 
of the Fourth Basic Plan, it laid out the additional 
items of interventions that succeeded in reassuring 
the private and public sector of the government’s 
commitment to managing the country’s energy 
demand. The core elements of the plan include the 
following:
• Strengthening of the Government’s Institutional 
Framework. Recognizing how the past energy 
policies on the supply-side management have 
created institutional gaps in terms of regulating 
and monitoring energy consumption, the 
government required all relevant ministries 
to form an energy conservation division. The 
ministries are required to undertake full-scale 
measures to reduce energy consumption by 
setting targets and managing performance within 
3 | Cross subsidization is a mechanism that subsidizes the loss of less profitable sectors with the gains incurred in high profitable sectors. In the ROK, different 
rates are charged depending on the types of end-use sectors: residential, general, educational, and industrial. The profit from the sales of residential and 
general electricity is used to cover the loss from industrial and agricultural electricity sales.   
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their authority. As a cross-ministerial body, the 
establishment of the Energy Efficiency Bureau 
was proposed under the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy (with an ad hoc organization with a 
three-year term) to oversee the performance 
of the ministries. In addition, the annual energy 
supply and demand plan was to be reported to 
the state council, and the energy imports and 
consumption were to be reported on a quarterly 
basis.
• Vehicle Emissions Control. Realizing how the 
nation’s emission standards and the technological 
competitiveness (in terms of emissions 
reduction and fuel efficiency) of domestic car 
manufacturers are lagging far behind those set 
by the global leaders, the government proposed 
the strengthening of the vehicle fuel standards to 
exceed the level of advanced countries by 2015. 
The government planned to provide 150 billion 
KRW for five years as seed investment for the 
R&D activities needed to meet the target, which 
will help attract an annual investment worth 
550-720 billion KRW from the domestic car (and 
component) manufacturers.
• Regulatory and Incentive Mechanisms.  
The government further proposed a set of 
strengthened regulatory and incentive measures 
across all sectors of the economy. These 
measures included an escalated consumption 
tax on low energy efficient products, mandating 
energy-intensive businesses and buildings to 
appoint energy management officers, legislative 
amendment to encourage public institutions to 
procure products of highest energy efficiency, 
and providing corporate tax cuts of 50% for SMEs 
producing certified energy efficient goods.
2.3 Energy Supply Management – Promotion of 
Clean Energy Use 
Recognizing New and Renewable Energy (NRE) 
as the most important alternative to fossil fuels 
and the need for its comprehensive development 
and exploitation in the future, the ROK enacted 
a law to promote the development of NRE 
technologies as early as 1987. Anticipating how the 
commercialization of technologies was supported 
by the market under the international climate treaty 
during the mid-1990s, the government laid the 
foundation for deploying NRE into the domestic 
energy market by formulating the Basic Plan for NRE 
Technology Development and Deployment, which 
served as a mid- to long-term action plan since the 
year 2001. Specifically, the plan includes setting 
targets for the level of domestic technology and for 
the share of energy generated from NRE, as well as 
strategies to achieve these targets, assessing the 
outlook and projections of their impacts, and making 
proposals on state subsidy programs.
Despite the government’s aggressive focus on 
boosting the NRE sector, the ROK’s share of NRE in 
the total energy generation continued to remain low 
at 2.37% as of 2007. In addition to the challenges 
of high front-end cost and low financial viability, 
the ROK’s geographical and climate conditions 
are unsuitable for exploiting renewable energy. 
Most of the nation’s land is covered by hills and 
mountains cut by steep river valleys that experience 
high seasonal climate variations. For example, the 
capacity factor for wind power generation in the 
ROK is approximately 25%, which is  significantly  
lower  than  the  average  for  most  of  Western  
Europe  and  the  U.S.  (the Northwest regions, in 
particular) given their capacity factor of about 
50%. Under such conditions, the ROK  has  seen  
disproportionate  deployment  of  renewable  energy  
sources.  Waste  and  hydropower made up for 77% 
and 14% of the total NRE supply respectively as of 
2007, while natural renewables such as solar PV and 
wind accounted for less than 3%.
Low levels of technological sophistication and 
industrial infrastructure have been identified 
as critical barriers for deploying renewable 
energy. Although the government has prioritized 
investments in R&D activities based on the principles 
of selection and concentration – promoting 
development in three key areas namely solar PV, 
wind energy, and fuel cells – the level of technology 
has not caught up with the global leaders due 
to weak commitment and shortages of human 
resources with expertise in NRE. Specifically, public 
R&D investment in renewables only reached 63% 
of what was projected for the 2004-2006 period 
by the Second Basic Plan for NRE Technology 
Development and Deployment. Having failed to keep 
pace with the speed of product commercialization 
and industrialization in the global market, the ROK’s 
deployment of renewable energy has relied heavily 
on imported facilities and technologies. 
97
The Third Basic Plan for NRE Technology 
Development and Deployment (2009-2030)
In response to the nation’s vision on low-carbon 
green growth, the government promptly revised the 
Second Basic Plan for NRE Technology Development 
and Deployment, which was set in 2002 with a 
time horizon of 2003-2012. An early amendment 
was deemed appropriate given how the nation was 
found to be off-track regarding meeting the target 
set by the Second Basic Plan (NRE share of 3.0% by 
2006 and 5% by 2011) and the need for ensuring 
consistency of the plan with the First National 
Energy Basic Plan (2008-2030) released in 2008. In 
this light, the government directed public research 
institutions (Korea Energy Economics Institute and 
Korea Institute of Energy Research) to undertake a 
policy research over a period of 18 months, before 
the draft Third Basic Plan was ready to be disclosed 
in a series of public consultations. The Third Basic 
Plan was released in December 2008 and sought 
to shift the strategic policy focus of the NRE sector 
from “immediate boost in the volume deployment” 
to “promoting technology development,” from “the 
use of public subsidies” to “promoting market-
driven investments,” and from NRE deployment 
through “large-scale systems” to “community-based 
or household-based, small-scale systems better 
customized to the local conditions.”
Aligning its planning horizon to that of the First 
National Energy Basic Plan, the Third Basic Plan 
set an NRE deployment target of 11% by 2030, 
which was based on a comprehensive assessment of 
the ROK’s potential NRE sources, supply capacity, 
technological levels, economic feasibility, and 
investment volume. Note that this target represents 
the share of NRE in the nation’s total primary energy 
supply, and is substantially higher than the BAU 
estimates indicating a 5.7% share of NRE by 2030. 
The third Basic Plan predicted that the achievement 
of such a target would result in NRE generation of 
39,517 GWh in 2030, accounting for 7.7% of the 
nation’s total electricity generation. It is important 
to recognize that the Basic Plan also emphasized the 
need for breaking away from over-reliance on waste 
and hydropower sources and focusing on expanding 
the use of natural renewables including wind, ocean, 
and geothermal energy. Although solar thermal 
and PV are also expected to grow annually at 15-
20%, their share of the total energy supply will be 
restricted as the deployment is based on the off-grid 
needs of households and small communities. 
Based on the targets shown in Table 4, a total of 
111.4 trillion KRW was estimated to be required 
from the public or private sources of finance 
until 2030, comprising 100 trillion KRW for NRE 
deployment, and 11.4 trillion KRW for R&D 
activities. The required annual budget envelope is 
likely to peak in 2020, which is the projected time 
when NRE technologies in the market can reach 
the stage of financial feasibility for deployment. 
Regarding the government’s expenditures, the 
Third Basic Plan proposed that the government 
should bear approximately 35% of the total budget, 
equivalent to 39.2 trillion KRW (32 trillion KRW 
for NRE deployment and 7.2 trillion KRW for R&D 
activities). The government costs for extending 
subsidies for installation, low interest loans, and 
operating feed-in tariff schemes are 69%, 15%, and 
16%, respectively, of the total budget needed for 
NRE deployment (32 trillion KRW).
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As a means of achieving the deployment targets, 
the Third Basic Plan proposed to undertake three 
priority strategies, which are: 
(1) facilitating NRE technology innovation and 
industrialization;
(2) boosting NRE deployment through a diverse 
set of promotional programs and introducing 
market-based mechanisms; and 
(3) strengthening the basic infrastructure for NRE 
deployment.
• NRE Technology Innovation and Industrialization. 
As mentioned previously, the Third Basic 
Plan sought a paradigm shift from “boosting 
deployment” to “promoting technological 
development,” based on the lessons learned from 
past experience (specifically the Second Basic 
Plan), which proved that without specific targets 
for achieving technological breakthrough, NRE 
deployment targets become unrealistic and 
unattainable. Accordingly, technical roadmaps and 
product roadmaps for each of the NRE sources 
were formulated, indicating specific plans for 
meeting the short-term (until 2010), mid-term 
(until 2020), and long-term (until 2030) targets for 
technology innovation and industrialization.4
The government was to support R&D activities 
not only by providing the necessary budget, but 
building the demonstration sites or test-bed 
complexes that open opportunities for industries 
to pilot test their technologies. In addition, the 
government placed an emphasis on establishing 
a Korean technology certification standard for 
the NRE products – which is compatible to the 
leading global standards – in order to ensure its 
competitiveness in the global market.
• Introduction of Market-based Mechanisms. 
The Third Basic Plan stressed the need for NRE 
deployment to be led by the private sector based 
Table 4: Target outlook for the deployment of NRE
Source: MKE, 2008d
2008 2010 2015 2020 2030
Annual 
Growth
Solar Thermal 33 (0.5%) 40 (0.5%) 63 (0.5%) 342 (2.0%) 1,882 (5.7%) 20.2%
Solar PV 59 (0.9%) 138 (1.8%) 313 (2.7%) 552 (3.2%) 1,364 (4.1%) 15.3%
Wind 106 (1.7%) 220 (2.9%) 1,084 (9.2%) 2,035 (11.6%) 4,155(12.6%) 18.1%
Bio 518 (8.1%) 987 (13.0%) 2,210 (18.8%) 4,211 (24.0%) 10,357 (31.4%) 14.6%
Hydro 946 (14.9%) 972 (12.8%) 1,071 (9.1%) 1,165 (6.6%) 1,447 (4.4%) 1.9%
Geothermal 9 (0.1%) 43 (0.6%) 280 (2.4%) 544 (3.1%) 1,261 (3.8%) 25.5%
Ocean 0 (0.0%) 70 (0.9%) 393 (3.3%) 907 (5.2%) 1,540 (4.7%) 49.6%
Waste 4,688 (73.7%) 5,097 (67.4%) 6,316 (53.8%) 7,764 (44.3%) 11,021 (33.4%) 4.0%
TOTAL 6,360 7,566 11,731 17,520 33,027 7.8%
Share of nation’s 
total primary 
energy supply
2.58% 2.98% 4.33% 6.08% 11.0%
Unit: thousand TOE
4 | Note that these road maps served as a basis for policy actions and programs under the “Green Technology Agenda” described in Chapter 3 of this report. 
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on market principles, thus proposing to completely 
phase out the government’s Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) 
scheme and the introduce the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS). In addition, the government aimed 
to strengthen the regulatory mandate of public 
sector organizations to invest in NRE systems, and 
make available NRE certification schemes (e.g., 
green building certification) that provide credits on 
voluntary initiatives for NRE deployment. 
However, government subsidies targeting NRE 
deployment at the household and community level 
such as the One Million Green Homes Project 
continued to be available. Some critical aspects 
in the process of delivering these action plans 
include:
– Ensuring that NRE deployment better meets 
end-user requirements and secures financial 
feasibility for investment by upholding 
competition among different NRE sources;
– Enhancing the role of local governments by 
supporting the launch of local initiatives for NRE 
deployment, which are periodically monitored 
and evaluated by the central government; 
– Strengthening the monitoring of NRE systems 
in operation (those that have been installed 
through government subsidies); and 
– Intensifying the mutual support between 
the NRE technology development and NRE 
deployment agenda; for example, government 
support for NRE deployment programs is to be 
scaled up and made timely and responsive to the 
evolving levels of technology commercialization. 
• Strengthening of Basic Infrastructure. Several 
administrative, legislative, and institutional 
arrangements were proposed by the Third 
Basic Plan as a means of strengthening the basic 
infrastructure needed for the deployment of 
NRE. Most importantly, the Renewable Energy 
Fund was to be launched with the support of 
government seed money to attract private finance 
for investments in NRE deployment. In addition, 
the government proposed to hold periodic 
consultations with the leaders of NRE industry 
to better respond to market needs, identify 
and improve regulatory barriers, and create 
an enabling condition for NRE investment. As 
solutions to help NRE industries build their scale 
and become more competitive, the government 
was to engage in public campaigns promoting 
NRE as affordable sources of energy and support 
academic curriculums of universities that are 
relevant to fostering of NRE experts. 
2.4 Target Setting
As addressed above, the ROK government unveiled 
a robust set of strategies and policy measures 
for improving the nation’s energy efficiency and 
utilization of clean energy, ensuring that this process 
provides opportunities for fostering new growth 
engines. As addressed above, the ROK government 
Short-term
(until 2010)
Mid-term
(until 2020)
Long-term
(until 2030)
Target A - 
Unit cost of generation
300 KRW/kWh 150 KRW/kWh 90 KRW/kWh
Target B - 
Unit cost of system purchase
6,000 KRW/Watt 3,000 KRW/Watt 1,500 KRW/Watt
Scope of Activities
R&D on improving the efficiency 
of crystalline silicon PV module 
manufacturing process, and 
developing the technology for 
manufacturing a-Si PV modules
RD&D to support technology 
integration, commercialization, 
establishment of supply chains, 
and systematizing PV module 
manufacturing lines
Commercialization led by the private 
sector, through low-cost production 
arrangements and productization of 
systems with varying capacities and 
features
Table 5: Example of technical roadmap (for solar PV) under the Third Basic Plan for NRE Technology Development and Deployment
Source: MKE, 2008d
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unveiled a robust set of strategies and policy 
measures for improving the nation’s energy efficiency 
and utilization of clean energy, ensuring that this 
process provides opportunities for fostering new 
growth engines.
The Energy Efficiency Bureau, established under 
the MKE in July 2009, played a leading role in 
providing directions and monitoring progress for 
government interventions on the energy demand-
side management. When the MKE was reorganized 
into MOTIE in 2013, this bureau was renamed as the 
Bureau of Energy Demand Management Policy and 
its operation (initially three years) was extended to 
July 16, 2015. On the other hand, the Korea Energy 
Management Corporation (KEMCO) was at the 
forefront of executing policy measures, including 
programs for energy management diagnosis, the 
Energy Service Company (ESCO), and energy saving 
campaigns. Meanwhile, its affiliate, the New and 
Renewable Energy Center (NREC), carried out 
measures to promote NRE deployment, such as a 
certification scheme for NRE systems, an FIT scheme, 
NRE mandatory use for public buildings, and NRE 
deployment support program. 
Following the First National Energy Basic Plan (2008-
2030), the primary targets of the energy sector given 
by the Five-Year National Plan for Green Growth 
were focused on enhancing the energy intensity 
levels and share of NRE. Achieving these targets was 
of paramount importance not only for transitioning 
to a leaner economy powered by new growth 
engines, but also for the setting and implementing 
the nation’s GHG emissions targets. It is fair to point 
out that the energy sector targets and strategies 
released in 2008 set the tone and pace of the ROK’s 
succeeding policies and actions formulated under the 
low-carbon green growth initiative.
3. Policy Actions and Programs
3.1 Policies and Programs on Renewable Energy
Driven by increasing environmental awareness 
and soaring oil prices, the ROK has shown great 
interest in policies and investments related to new 
and renewable energy (NRE). Against this backdrop, 
various programs are being carried out to utilize 
NRE to achieve energy self-sufficiency, reduce GHG 
emissions, and adapt to climate change. 
The ROK initially implemented the feed-in tariff (FIT) 
scheme, an incentive program to promote voluntary 
participation in NRE distribution in early 2000, a 
time marked by the rapid commercialization of NRE. 
However, after ten years of implementation, the 
government transitioned from FIT to the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS) policy, which regulates the 
proportion of NRE within the total power supply. 
Moreover, the ROK also proposed to implement the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) policy, effective in 
2015, which requires oil refineries to blend biofuel 
in their products. Various policies to incentivize 
voluntary distribution of NRE in the non-industrial 
sectors are also being carried out at the local 
level (refer to Chapter 7 on Green Homeland and 
Transportation). Such diverse policy measures 
represent the ROK’s efforts to address the financial 
gaps in the NRE industry to help create an enabling 
environment for energy self-sufficiency. While NRE is 
still deemed to be less economically viable with huge 
gaps in technology development, its future growth 
prospects are immense. Thus, boosting investment, 
R&D, and other enabling policies is critical to tap this 
potential. 
Annual Targets
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Energy intensity (TOE/million KRW) 0.317 0.313 0.307 0.297 0.290
NRE share
(% of nation’s total primary energy supply) 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.54 3.78
ROK’s share of global renewable 
energy market (%) 2.8 3.6 4.3 5.0 5.4
Table 6: Energy targets under the Five-Year Plan
Source: PCGG, 2009b
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3.1.1 Feed-in Tariff Policy
The FIT scheme is a policy mechanism in which the 
government compensates power producers (PPs) 
for the price difference between the market price 
and production cost when the transaction price is 
lower than the standard price (the price set by the 
government). 
Under this policy, the government mandates system 
operators (SOs) to purchase all locally generated 
renewable electricity from local PPs at specific rates 
(fixed prices) and sell it to users. In the process, the 
government will subsidize PPs with FIT for 15 to 20 
years. The standard purchase price for renewable 
electricity is strategically lowered in phases, taking 
into consideration the enhanced economic feasibility 
or profitability of investments from the advancement 
of NRE technology. The ROK introduced the FIT 
scheme in 2002 to expand the NRE deployment and 
foster related domestic industries (manufacturing) 
and service sectors (engineering).
 
The main challenge for effective operation is to 
ensure that the sum of the market price of electricity 
and the FIT subsidy is maintained close to the actual 
cost of renewable energy generation. The level of FIT 
subsidy is automatically determined by the standard 
tariff set by the government, to which proper pricing 
is critical for the market to function. This means 
that excessively low standard prices may discourage 
investors and extremely high prices may fuel a 
sudden surge in NRE development, which might 
distort resource allocation and entail social costs. 
While the scheme is thus effective in mitigating 
investment uncertainties, its system of standard 
pricing is complicated due to the highly volatile 
market.
The FIT scheme has gained support in many 
developed countries such as Germany, Britain, the 
U.S. and Japan to strategically support domestic 
NRE industries in line with fulfilling mandatory 
GHG emissions reduction. Success stories have 
shown that the FIT can stimulate NRE deployment 
by easing investment uncertainties, engaging 
small and medium-sized PPs to generate local 
jobs, and promoting a diverse set of NRE sources 
by administering standard prices reflecting the 
technological and feasibility gaps of various energy 
sources. However, the scheme has also been 
criticized due to the difficulty in setting the proper 
standard prices, projection uncertainties on the 
necessary operational budget and its impacts, 
sensitivity of PPs to standard price fluctuations, 
and the long-term budgetary burden of FIT with 
significant risk for the government.
Implementation 
Figure 6 shows the procedure for subsidizing the 
electricity generation of NRE power plants under 
the FIT scheme. An important step prior to the 
commercial operation of the power plants is that 
PPs must obtain approval through site investigation 
and document review for determining the FIT 
eligibility from the Korea Energy Management 
Corporation (KEMCO). KEMCO’s evaluation 
provides the basis for setting the applicable 
standard price, which is reflected into the Power 
Purchase Agreement (PPA) between the PPs 
and the Korea Electric Power Corporation 
(KEPCO) or the Korea Power Exchange (KPX). 
The PPA stipulates the legal requirements of 
preferential purchase of electricity generated 
from NRE. The traded amount of electricity 
based on the PPA is the basis for PPs to receive 
FIT subsidies. To maintain the explicitness and 
transparency of subsidy payments, PPs must put 
in place certified metering systems that monitor 
the amount of electricity generated by different 
energy sources or facilities as applicable. PPs 
must also provide detailed data regarding the 
production, consumption, and supply of electricity 
on a daily basis in a register (or using an automatic 
recorder) for record-keeping purposes.
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The FIT payment to PPs is set by multiplying the 
price difference between the standard price of 
NREs and the system marginal price (SMP)5  to 
the volume of electricity traded. The trade volume 
pertains to the power supplied to the market by 
PPs, but excludes consumption from the operation 
of the power plant. In general, the standard price 
agreed on the PPA is applied for 15 years from 
the first commissioning but the period can be 
extended to 20 years for photovoltaic power plant 
(effective since October 2008). The standard 
price and application period can be adjusted 
considering changes in oil prices, technological 
progress, commercialization, and power transaction 
results. This means that PPs that received the 
FIT subsidy before the price adjustment would 
fall under the standard price applicable when 
they first joined the scheme, and that the original 
price is effective for 15 years. Operators of NRE 
power plants can continue to sell their electricity 
to the government at the SMP even after the 
guaranteed period under the PPA has expired. 
The standard price by NRE sources applicable 
to all PPAs is calculated based on the following 
criteria, and is revised as needed by the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE):
• General costs related to NRE power plant 
construction, operations and maintenance 
(O&M), return on invested capital, and the level 
of taxes and public utility charges
5 | The System Marginal Price (SMP) is the transaction price of electricity set by KEPCO, ROK’s single largest electricity power utility.  
Figure 6: Operational procedure for the FIT scheme
Approval for Power Plant Project
(MKE, Local Government) Approval for the use of Transmission Lines
(KEPCO)
Registration to Power Exchange Market
(Korea Power Exchange)
Site Investigation to Determine FIT Eligibility
(KEMCO)
Signing of Power Purchase Agreement
(KEPCO)
Pre-meetings for FIT Approval
(Korea Power Exchange)
Commissioning of Plant Facilities
(Korea Electrical Safety Cooperation)
Approval for Site Development
(Local Government)
Approval of Project Plans
(Local Government)
Reports on Project Implementation
(MKE, Local Government)
Completion of Plant Construction
(MKE, Local Government)
Notiﬁcation of Plant Operation
(MKE, Local Government)
Commercial Operation of Plant
(Plant Operator)
Payment of FIT Tariff
(Korea Power Exchange, KEPCO)
Project 
Approval
Power 
Purchase
Construction 
&
Commissioning
Source: KEMCO, 2014
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• Capacity factor of power generation, lifespan of 
the plant, accident modification factor (AMF), 
and energy consumption rate of the plants  
• Levels of NRE technology commercialization and 
conditions for market deployment
• Costs paid by PPs in using transmission and 
distribution systems 
• Degree of commercialization and deployment of 
NRE technologies 
• Actual supply prices for electricity generated by 
NRE in the power market
One of the most important elements of operating the 
FIT scheme is the “quota” on electricity purchases 
imposed on each energy source. The government 
sets a cap on the preferential purchases of electricity 
generated by different NRE sources to maximize 
the limited budget allocated for the scheme. For 
example, FIT subsidies in the ROK only apply to 
the installations of solar PV, windfarms, and fuel 
cell facilities that are approved before reaching 
the cumulative capacity ceilings of 500 MW, 1,000 
MW, and 50 MW, respectively. The government 
has sought to gradually increase the quota while 
lowering the standard price, considering how 
boosting the volume of the domestic market helps 
reduce the front-end costs for installation. 
The standard prices levied by NRE sources is 
presented in Table 6 and 7.
As a means of ensuring fairness and addressing 
disparities between different sources of energy and 
the circumstances for their development, standard 
prices are made dependent on several factors 
including installed capacity, location of installation, 
and conditions of power generation. Note how PPs 
that generate electricity from hydro, waste, and 
bioenergy are given the option to set fixed or varying 
prices. They also have one chance to switch options 
over the entire duration of PPA. In addition, annual 
depreciation of the notified standard price applies 
to electricity generated from solar (4%), wind (2%), 
and fuel cell (3%) to ensure that standard prices 
continuously reflect the enhanced profitability 
of investments from technological advancement; 
however, annual depreciation does not apply to 
prices agreed in existing PPAs. 
The MOTIE is the supervisory body for the FIT 
scheme while KEMCO (and its affiliate, the New and 
Renewable Energy Center, or NREC) is in charge of 
implementation on the ground. It should be noted 
that MOTIE administers the Electrical Industry 
Foundation Fund, which is the government’s source 
of FIT subsidies. The fund is raised by levying and 
collecting charges from public electricity bills as a 
means of securing the financial resources to support 
and sustain the nation’s energy industry. 
Table 7: Standard price for solar PV generation (as of 2010)
Source: KEMCO, 2014
Location
Guarantee
Period
(years)
Installed Capacity
Less than 
30 kW
30 kW -
200 kW  
200 kW -
1 MW
1 MW - 
3 MW  
More than 
3 MW
General
15 566.95 541.42 510.77 485.23 408.62
20 514.34 491.17 463.37 440.20 370.70
Building
15 606.64 579.32 546.52 - -
20 550.34 525.55 495.81 - -
Unit=KRW/kWh
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The Proceeds of the fund also target various public 
needs, such as investments for rural electrification 
and R&D for improving energy technologies and 
services. The Korea Electrical Safety Corporation 
(KESCO), which is the designated public agency for 
conducting pre-service inspection on NRE facility 
installations, is an important enabler of the scheme’s 
success since it upholds compliance to safety 
standards and technical requirements in NRE plants. 
The local government offices – having the authority 
over project approval and NRE plant construction 
and commissioning – play key roles, particularly by 
attending to the concerns of local communities on 
developing proposals.
Outcomes and Takeaways
Since the initiation of FIT in 2002, there have 
been 2,128 power plants with a total accumulated 
installed capacity of 1,054 MW that benefited 
from the subsidy.  Without doubt, the scheme was 
successful in boosting NRE deployment despite 
public skepticism. FIT subsidies enabled the 
exploitation of natural renewable energy sources 
such as wind and solar, which continue to grapple 
with relatively low profitability. The completion and 
operation of large-scale windfarms of Gangwon (98 
MW capacity) and Yeongdeok (39.6 MW capacity) 
from 2005 to 2006 marked the new era of clean 
energy in the ROK. In 2008, solar PV installation 
achieved an outstanding growth of 257 MW in 
installed capacity. In 2011, the total accumulated 
subsidy offered to PPs amounted to 1.1 trillion 
KRW and the total cumulative volume of electricity 
subsidized under the FIT scheme was 10,112 GWh. 
Although there was no new participation in the 
scheme when it was repealed in 2012, the annual 
subsidy payment is expected to remain above 300 
billion KRW in the coming years as existing PPAs are 
effective for 15-20 years.
Source: KEMCO, 2014
Table 8: Standard price for non-PV generation (as of 2011)
Source Capacity Additional Requirements
Standard Price
Note
Fixed Variable
Wind 10 kW or more - 107.29 - Depreciation rate: 2%
Small Hydro 5 MW or less
Hydro
Over 1 MW 86.04 SMP+15
Below 1 MW 94.64 SMP+20
Multipurpose
Over 1 MW 66.18 SMP+5
Below 1 MW 72.80 SMP+10
Waste Incineration   20 MW or less - SMP+5
Share of fossil 
fuels for power 
generation must 
be maintained 
under 30%
Waste (Refuse-derived fuel) 50 MW or less - SMP+15
Bio Energy
LFG 50 MW or less
Over 20 MW 68.07 SMP+ 5
Below 20 MW 74.99 SMP+10
Biogas 50 MW or less
Over 150 kW 72.73 SMP+20
Below 150 kW 85.71 SMP+25
Biomass 50 MW or less Ligneous biomass 68.99 SMP+15
Ocean Energy Tidal 50 MW or more
Maximum tidal 
range is over 8.5m
Installation on 
embankment 62.81 -
No embankment 76.63 -
 Maximum tidal 
range is below 8.5m 
Installation on 
embankment 75.59 -
No embankment 90.50 -
Fuel Cells 200 kW or more
Based on biogas 227.49 -
Depreciation rate: 
3%Based on other fuels 274.06 -
Unit=KRW/kWh
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From a value-for-money perspective, the ROK’s 
experience has provided solid evidence that 
subsidizing operational costs can be as effective as 
subsidizing front-end investment costs. In 2010, the 
National Assembly Budget Office released a report 
comparing the cost effectiveness of government 
subsidy programs for NRE deployment (refer to 
Table 9), many of which are aimed at subsidizing 
facility installations through grants or low interest 
loans, comprising approximately 60% of budgetary 
expenditure.  
Unit: kw
Category 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Amount of Electricity 
Generation (GWh) 159.9 269.8 309.9 390.2 489.9 854.8 1,185.4 1.503.0 2,427.9 2,520.7 10,111.5
Subsidy Payment
(billion KRW) 3.4 5.6 5.0 7.6 10.0 26.6 119.5 262.7 331.8 368.9 1,141.0
Number of 
Power Plants 28 8 5 23 57 142 753 291 386 435 2,128
Installed Capacity
(MW) 50.7 18.6 47.1 107.6 20.0 102.2 276.9 229.6 102.0 99.6 1,054.4
Table 9: Annual outcomes of the FIT scheme 
Source: KEMCO, 2012
Figure 7: Accumulated capacities of power generation under FIT scheme
Source: KEMCO, 2012
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The volume of energy generation per unit capacity 
of facility in operation was found to be substantially 
high for those subsidized by the FIT scheme. Such 
results imply how the FIT scheme enables PPs to 
exert consistent efforts regarding the maintenance 
and management of facilities to maximize their 
profits, as the volume of electricity generation is 
linked to the revenue flow. In contrast, the PPs that 
benefit from the subsidies on NRE installations are 
more likely to overlook the operational efficiency 
of its facilities since it is already up and running.
Recognizing how the underlying core purpose of 
boosting NRE deployment in the ROK through the 
FIT scheme was to promote domestic industries and 
services – especially the manufacturing sector – it is 
important to understand how the scheme has helped 
achieved this objective. 
During the early stages of the ROK’s NRE industry, 
the FIT scheme has played a critical role in realizing 
exponential growth in revenues and jobs. The 
government saw great potential for NRE goods 
to become the nation’s next competitive export 
item. However, the total export revenue has fallen 
recently due to the lack of significant progress in 
combating climate change on a global scale. Wind 
turbines of different capacities (750kW, 1.5MW, 
2MW) reached the commercialization stage and 
mass production by domestic firms, while vertical 
integration in manufacturing solar PV systems is 
achieved domestically.
Type Government program
Average installation capacity 
per facility (kW)
Efficiency 
(kWh/kW)
Efficiency compared 
with designed capacity
Installation subsidy
Green Homes Program 2.85 875 64%
General Deployment Program 25 1,037 76%
Regional deployment Program 72 1,161 85%
Operational cost subsidy FIT Scheme 322 1,372 101%
Table 10: Operational efficiency of solar PV facilities: FIT scheme vs. installation subsidies
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, 2010
Figure 8: Growth of domestic NRE sector during 2004-2013
Source: KNREC, 2014b
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However, the application of the FIT scheme in the 
ROK has its own limitations. The NRE products 
have failed to overcome the cost competitiveness of 
leading exporters, especially China. In comparison 
to providing direct forms of incentives to NRE 
industries – such as provisioning tax levies and 
subsidizing utility costs as done by the Chinese 
government – the FIT scheme’s benefits toward NRE 
industries arise indirectly from stimulating market 
demand. It should be noted that a large portion of 
the beneficiaries under the FIT scheme are facility 
constructors and PPs and it is natural that their 
preference for utilizing cheap and reliable items in 
the market has led to reliance on imported goods. 
According to the Korea Small Business Institute, 
46.6% of solar PV facility components in domestic 
installations are imports as of 2010. In many aspects, 
the ROK’s NRE industries (especially the small 
ones) have limited capacity for keeping pace with 
technological innovation and the mass production 
required to meet the domestic demand (Kim, 2010).
In 2008, the government decided to lower the 
standard price and maintain the FIT scheme until 
the end of 2011. The following year, the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS), which requires PPs to 
allocate a certain percentage of their energy mix for 
renewable sources, replaced the FIT scheme. 
However, the government’s commitment to abandon 
FIT stirred controversy as the scheme had played a 
vital role in the promotion of NRE, thus substantially 
enhancing public awareness. The public also viewed 
this transition as contrary to the global trend since 
FIT was rapidly gaining momentum in several 
countries. 
The growing financial burden of providing FIT 
subsidies was the major reason for its termination. 
In 2008, for example, the total amount of subsidy 
payment rose 4.5 times from the previous year. 
In addition, the design of the FIT scheme led to a 
surging number of solar PV installations, which 
had comparably low returns in terms of power 
generation. The average amount of electricity 
generated per one million KRW of subsidy (over 
the entire period of FIT implementation) was 1.92 
MWh for solar PV, which is substantially lower 
than the average of 8.86 MWh for all subsidized 
NRE sources (refer to Table 10). In response, the 
government undertook measures in 2009 (the 
year after the subsidized number of solar PV 
installations marked an explosive growth) by capping 
the annual capacities of solar PV installation and 
excluding solar PV projects from being subsidized 
by eight state-owned energy companies. This 
government intervention demonstrates the 
difficulty in sustaining the efficiency of the scheme, 
which is largely affected by the evolving rates of 
return driven by technological progress. Note 
that many of the regulatory requirements related 
to the application of standard prices described in 
Table 8 and 9 (e.g., depreciation rate, location of 
installation, and conditions of power generation) 
are countermeasures to the original standard 
price guideline. Furthermore, another factor 
for discontinuing the FIT policy was to promote 
competition among PPs. As the RPS scheme is 
associated with trading of Renewable Energy 
Certificates (RECs), it was expected to drive 
competition among the PPs to enhance the cost 
effectiveness of NRE investments. In addition, 
RPS would better induce competition among 
NRE sources as it places no quota restriction on 
development. 
3.1.2 Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
The RPS is a market-oriented policy that stipulates 
the amount of renewable energy to be supplied in 
the market, along with the timeframe for meeting 
these standards. RPS has been adopted by several 
developed countries, including the U.S., Britain, 
Sweden, and Canada. Under the ROK’s RPS, the PPs 
are obligated to generate NRE and given the option 
of fulfilling this by either directly engaging in NRE 
installations or purchasing RECs. Energy retailers 
have no obligations under the RPS as this market is 
monopolized by the public sector in the ROK. 
In phasing out the FIT scheme that has been the 
centerpiece of the nation’s drive toward generating 
green energy, the ROK government highlighted 
three objectives for adopting the RPS:
(1) expand the nation’s supply of NRE; 
(2) ease the government’s financial burden arising 
from implementation of NRE; and 
(3) support the development of domestic NRE 
industries. 
While the FIT scheme and RPS share the same 
objectives, there is a clear difference in their 
operating mechanisms and pricing methods. The 
FIT serves as a price adjustment mechanism on 
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how the amount of NRE generated in the market is 
largely dependent on the standard prices set by the 
government. In contrast, the RPS serves as a demand 
adjustment mechanism where market price for NRE 
becomes largely dependent on the government’s 
mandate for the required amount of NRE generation. 
In comparison with the FIT scheme, which is an 
incentive program, RPS is a regulatory policy that 
offers the advantage of inducing price competition 
among NRE producers, reducing the government’s 
financial burden, and easing the difficulties in making 
NRE supply forecasts, which is critical to achieving 
the long-term target (11% by 2030). However, the 
policy runs the risk of supporting the deployment 
of a limited number of NRE sources that offer the 
highest returns. 
To facilitate a smooth transition, the ROK 
government pilot-tested the RPS by signing 
Renewable Portfolio Agreements (PRA) with six 
state-owned PPs, effective from 2009 to 2011. 
However, preparations for adopting the policy 
started as early as 2007 when the government 
commissioned the Korea Electrotechnology 
Research Institute (KERI) to draft the enforcement 
regulations and review the required legislative 
provisions. A series of workshops with industrial 
leaders, expert meetings, and public hearings was 
held during 2007-2009, before the RPS Taskforce 
Team was created under MKE with the mission 
to carry out a full-scale launch by 2012. After 
submission to the National Assembly in late 2008, 
the revised version of the Act on the Promotion of 
the Development, Use, and Diffusion of NRE – which 
phased out the FIT scheme and launched the RPS – 
was approved in March 2010.
Implementation 
Covering both public and private PPs with a capacity 
of greater than 500 MW (targeted PPs), there are 
a total of 17 PPs subject to RPS as of 2015, with a 
portfolio that includes all types of NRE under the 
government classification. The target of 10% of the 
total power generation by 2022 will be achieved 
through annual increase of targets, starting from 2% 
Source
Weighted 
Value
Types of Energy and Criteria
Types of Installation Criteria
Solar PV
1.2
Installations on general plot of land
Below 100 kW
1.0 Above 100 kW
0.7 Above 3,000 kW
1.5
Installations on existing facilities (e.g., buildings)
Below 3,000 kW
1.0 Above 3,000 kW
1.5 Floating installations
Other NRE
0.25 Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), using by-product gas
0.5 Waste or landfill gas incineration
1.0 Hydro power, on-shore wind, bio energy, RDF, waste gasification, and tidal power (installation on an embankment)
1.5 Ligneous biomass and offshore wind power (less than 5 km of distance relay)
2.0 Fuel cell, tidal power
2.0
Offshore wind (greater than 5 km of distance relay), geothermal energy, 
tidal power (without embankment)
Fixed weighted value
1.0-2.5 Variable weighted value
5.5
Energy storage system (ESS) facility (integrated with wind power facility)
Effective year 2015 
5.0 Effective year 2016
4.5 Effective year 2017
Table 11: Weighted value of REC for various NRE sources
Source: MOTIE, 2015b
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in 2012 and increasing by 0.5% each year up to 2016, 
followed by a one % annual increase thereafter to 
meet the total target. It should be noted that this 
figure is actually more ambitious than the nation’s 
overall target of reaching 11% by 2030. Under the 
overall annual targets, the amount of mandatory 
NRE supply for each targeted PP is calculated based 
on their reference amount of past power generation 
(also net of power from NRE). 
Anticipating that solar PV will disproportionally 
suffer under RPS as it comparably lacks the financial 
feasibility, the RPS includes carve-out provisions 
specifically for solar PV systems to be effective until 
2015. This requires targeted PPs to supply a certain 
amount of energy generated from solar PV, which is 
to increase from 276 GWh in 2012 to 1,971 GWh 
in 2015. In meeting these requirements, targeted 
PPs are required to purchase at least 50% of energy 
(generated from solar PVs) by PPs that are not 
subject to the RPS (third party PPs). This rule had to 
be introduced considering how a complete phase-
out of the FIT scheme would undermine small-scale 
investments in solar PV installations. 
The unique feature that separates RPS from the 
FIT scheme is in terms of trading RECs, which are 
transaction units of certified power generation 
and supply from NRE. The RECs are granted to 
energy supplied by NRE facilities that have started 
commercial operation after January 2012. Targeted 
PPs are allowed to purchase RECs in the market to 
meet their requirements. In other words, third-party 
PPs are given the opportunity to sell their RECs to 
the targeted PPs, which will lead to profits aside 
from the selling of electricity to KEPCO or KPX. 
Figure 9: Overview of RPS implementation
Source: MOTIE, 2015b
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Note that a weighted value is multiplied to the actual 
amount of NRE supplied (MWh) in the calculation 
and granting of RECs. 
Such measure aims to promote a balanced 
technological development and deployment of 
all NRE sources by controlling the number of 
RECs made available in the market. In principle, 
the weighted value is reviewed every three years 
and is calculated by taking multiple factors into 
account, including environmental impacts, levels 
of technological development, projected effects on 
promoting the NRE industry, unit cost of production, 
and the impacts on GHG reduction. As shown in 
Table 11, the weighted value may vary according 
to each renewable source and condition of facility 
installation.
The RPS implementation starts from determining 
the required amount of NRE-generation for 
targeted PPs, a procedure that is carried out by 
the certification authority (NREC). The calculated 
figures are reported to and approved by the 
responsible government ministry (MOTIE), before 
notifying PPs by January of the implementation 
year. RECs are issued monthly and PPs must apply 
for issuance at least 90 days before the end of the 
month in which the corresponding supply of NRE 
took place (RECs are effective for trading for three 
years from the date of issuance). Upon meeting its 
annual obligations by either directly issuing RECs 
(from making direct investments in NRE facility 
installation) and/or purchasing RECs from the 
market, targeted PPs are to report their annual 
performances to the government. Targeted PPs 
“retire” after submitting their RECs for compliance 
purposes and KNRE removes them from accounts of 
targeted PPs in the online RPS management system.
Failure to meet annual targets will entail a penalty, 
which is principally set based on the unmet amount 
of NRE and average market price of RECs for the 
implementation year. However, targeted PPs are 
permitted to borrow up to 20% (exceptionally 30% 
until 2014) of the required total amount of NRE to 
be generated for a given year from their renewable 
portfolios of the following years (three years 
maximum). As mentioned above, PPs not subject to 
mandatory NRE supply under the RPS can pursue 
NRE installations and receive RECs for trading. 
However, only the targeted PPs are eligible for REC 
purchases. Figure 9 provides an overview of the 
procedures for RPS.
The government (MOTIE), certification 
authority (KNRE), and PPs are all involved in the 
implementation of the RPS policy. MOTIE designated 
KNRE as the certification authority tasked to:
(1) calculate and report the annual amount of 
mandatory supply for each of the targeted PPs;
(2) manage certification issuance;
(3) operate the REC trade market;
(4) report the average transaction price; and
(5) verify the performances of targeted PPs.
Note how KNRE is also in charge of certifying 
the eligible facility to be used for demonstrating 
compliance with the RPS requirement (both for 
targeted and non-targeted PPs as shown in Figure 
9); the institution conducts on-site inspection to see 
whether the facility conforms to technical and safety 
standards. Certified facilities are automatically 
registered through the online RPS management 
system, which is the platform for issuance, trading, 
and tracking all RECs.
The price of the RECs for trading is not pre-
determined, but rather derived by the interaction of 
supply and demand in the market, which is divided 
into the over-the-counter market and the spot 
market. The over-the-counter market, which is open 
year round, is where a single seller and a single buyer 
bilaterally agree to make long-term REC transactions 
based on signing of contracts. The contract is 
reported to KNRE for actual transfer of RECs. 
However, transactions are made through auction 
or tendering in the spot market that opens once a 
month (both for RECs for solar PV and non-solar PV). 
While the choice of over-the-counter or spot market 
depends on the discretion of the PPs, the parties 
involved in the contract market must ensure that 
they comply with the contract period agreed with 
the counterpart. Breaching the terms may inflict loss 
or disadvantage on the counterpart.
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Outcomes and Takeaways
Since the inception of the RPS policy in 2012 through 
the first half of 2014 (January-September 2014), 
there have been a total of 6,873 new NRE plant 
installations. In terms of the generation capacity, 
this is equivalent to 842 MW for 2012, 901 MW 
for 2013 and 1,423 MW for the first half of 2014 
(total of 3,166 MW). Approximately 38% of the 
total generation capacity came from 6,730 solar PV 
installations. It is important to recognize how such 
outcomes far exceed those for the FIT scheme, which 
amounted to approximately 1,000 MW in generation 
capacity over the 11-year implementation period.
Despite the positive growth, the volume of new NRE 
facility installations was found to be insufficient 
as the targeted PPs continued to underperform 
in meeting their annual targets. In 2012, of the 
NRE supply obligations distributed among the 
targeted PPs, 35.3% were not met; 26.3% were 
granted extension while the remaining 9% were 
subject to non-compliance. In other words, out 
of approximately 6.4 million RECs imposed on 
13 controlled PPs, only 4.2 million RECs retired 
in 2012. Accordingly, the penalty levied for non-
compliance amounted to 25.4 billion KRW. Although 
the percentage of unmet NRE supply obligations 
decreased slightly to 32.8% in the following year, the 
volume of unmet RECs increased significantly as the 
annual target was raised from 2.0% to 2.5% of the 
total power generation. 
Consequently, the penalty levied on seven targeted 
PPs with non-complied REC allocations reached 
49.8 billion KRW in 2013; a significant portion of this 
increase is attributed to the increase in the average 
market price of RECs compared to 2012. It should 
be noted that penalties imposed have been largely 
targeted at state-owned PPs that are responsible for 
a large proportion of the total NRE obligation under 
the RPS. 
The worsening financial stability of state-owned 
PPs participating in RPS is being recognized as 
a public concern; they have chronically suffered 
from the government’s long-standing commitment 
to maintaining low energy prices. Details on the 
performance of targeted PPs indicate extremely 
high levels of compliance (nearly 100%) with 
solar PV requirements (carve-out provision). This 
outcome relates to how the solar PV offers the 
advantage of high flexibility in application (e.g., 
design and size), requires a shorter amount of 
time for site development and construction, and 
involves a less complicated process of acquiring 
permits. In contrast, obstacles in exploiting non-solar 
PV sources (which often have greater single site 
generation capacities) are seen as a major barrier 
causing sluggish performance. Many critics noticed 
the difficulty of initiating investments in non-solar 
PV energy facilities as they are more likely to trigger 
regulatory requirements dispersed among multiple 
ministries (e.g., Korea Forest Service on forest land-
use, Ministry of National Defense on developing 
NRE Source
FIT (2001-2011) RPA (2010-2012) RPS (2012-)
Number of 
installations
Generation 
capacity (MW)
Number of 
installations
Generation 
capacity (MW)
Number of 
installations
Generation 
capacity (MW)
Solar 2,009 498.2 559 62.2 5,232 947.7
Wind 15 320.3 3 33.0 18 196.0
Hydro 64 90.2 9 22.9 40 639.2
Fuel Cell 20 50.5 2 5.2 17 113.4
Bio 19 93.0 - - 49 1,022.7
Waste 1 2.2 2 418.5 14 316.5
Total 2,128 1054.4 575 541.8 5,370 3,235.4
Table 12: Outcomes of FIT scheme, RPA, and the RPS by NRE source (as of June 2014)
Source: KNREC, 2014b
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areas nearby military facilities). For example, dozens 
of windfarm projects in the ROK have been stuck in 
the early phase of licensing. The targeted PPs have 
emphasized that there are not enough RECs on the 
market for them to meet their obligations. 
The energy generated from bioenergy and fuel cells 
has seen the most profound increase under the 
RPS. A staggering 1022 MW and 113 MW increase 
in generation capacity for bioenergy and fuel cells 
respectively was achieved over the 2.5 years of RPS 
implementation, which is higher than the 93 MW and 
50.5 MW increase during 11 years of FIT scheme 
implementation. The RPS has indeed helped increase 
the nation’s competitiveness in fuel cell technology. 
For example, POSCO Energy has invested huge sums 
in R&D and secured manufacturing capabilities for 
molten carbonate fuel cells. Taking advantage of 
the high-weighted value for fuel cells under the RPS 
(see Table 11), the firm recently completed building 
the world’s largest fuel cell plant (59 MW system). 
However, increases in bioenergy generation capacity 
– which was primarily derived from biomass co-firing 
power plant installations – created unanticipated 
side effects of increasing biomass imports. Most 
notably, wood pellets that can be purchased at 
relatively low prices opened a convenient and 
cost-effective way of issuing RECs. In response, the 
government sought to impose a quota on the amount 
of RECs that can be secured through the use of wood 
pellets.
The integrity of the REC market is another area of 
concern. The market price of RECs has been volatile 
over the three years of implementation due to the 
government’s market interventions. When the spot 
market opened in 2012, the prices of solar PV and 
non-solar PV RECs were approximately 229,000 
KRW and 42,000 KRW, respectively. However, the 
price has been halved for solar PV RECs, while it 
doubled for non-solar PV RECs as of January 2015. 
Prices have fluctuated severely between this period, 
peaking at the end of 2013 (when targeted PPs 
were approaching annual compliance evaluations) 
but hitting near record lows toward the end of 
2014. This trend has been largely affected by the 
government’s supply of cheap RECs (government-
owned RECs6 ) that sought to mitigate the financial 
burden of targeted PPs in the short term. The 
provision of RECs below market prices has hindered 
the signaling function of the market and raised 
uncertainties over the government’s commitment to 
the RPS.
The RPS is thus progressing sluggishly given the 
multiple issues that are yet to be resolved. Due to 
opposition from the targeted PPs, the government 
took a step back in 2014, announcing that the 
initial target of meeting 10% of power generation 
from NRE sources by 2022 is to be moved to 2024. 
Despite the concession, the launch of the ETS in 
2015 has cast doubts on the responsiveness of the 
ROK’s energy industry to the mounting challenges. 
The RPS is an example of how the nation’s ambition 
of greening its energy supply has continuously 
neglected to induce burden sharing across the value 
chain, especially among the end- users who enjoy the 
benefit of low energy prices. If the government is to 
adhere to such strategic direction, demonstrating 
strong commitments to minimizing uncertainties 
and boosting investor confidence are critical for the 
successful deployment of NRE.
3.1.3 Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)
High dependence on foreign energy sources 
of the transportation sector and the desire to 
promote domestic industries have raised interest in 
renewable biofuels as an alternative to petroleum. 
In this regard, RFS represents the most significant 
government intervention to guarantee a market 
for biofuels in the ROK. The policy requires 
transportation fuel to contain a minimum volume of 
biodiesel. Transport fuel providers (domestic refiners 
and importers) are mandated to ensure that the 
minimum blending standards are fully met in market 
sales and consumption.
Developed countries such as the U.S., Britain, and 
Germany have implemented the RFS policy to 
actively respond to climate change, address energy 
security issues, and foster green industries. In the 
ROK where biofuels were first introduced to the 
domestic markets in 2002, the RFS was adopted 
specifically for diesel fuels (based on official 
public notice) in 2012 after going through a phase 
of voluntary agreements for blending with fuel 
providers for the 2007-2012 period. 
6 | RECs secured by the government through issuance of RECs from NRE supply that arise from the government’s FIT subsidies.
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While the blending ratios of biodiesel experienced 
0.5% annual increases during the first four years of 
the voluntary period (starting from 0.5% in 2007), 
it has been fixed at 2% since 2010. The legislation 
for the formal operation of RFS was passed in 
2013 to strengthen the regulatory functions and 
administrative authority while ordinance and 
regulations are expected to be enforced starting July 
2015 after a two-year grace period. 
Implementation
Two key issues were highly contested in preparation 
for the RFS enforcement: 
(1) selection of transportation fuels subject to 
mandatory blending; and 
(2) determination of the blending ratios. 
The government looked into the possibility of 
adopting the RFS for gasoline (to be blended with 
bio-ethanol) and LNG fuels (with bio-methane). 
Plans to increase the existing blending ratio set for 
biodiesel – which had been fixed at 2% until the 
launch of the RFS in 2015 – was also a critical issue, 
as the government was under extreme pressure 
from two opposing sectors – the fuel providers 
and biodiesel manufacturers. Consequently, the 
government held multiple closed-door consultations 
with relevant stakeholders including automobile 
manufacturers, refinery companies, and bioenergy 
providers. 
After careful consideration, the government decided 
that the mandated ratio for blending biodiesel is 
to start at 2.5% in 2015, and be maintained for the 
first two years of RFS implementation. The blending 
ratio is to increase to 3% and be maintained for 
the four consecutive years (2017-2020). However, 
covering the transportation fuels other than diesel 
was postponed, without specific timeframes on 
enforcement. 
The MOTIE is in charge of RFS operation. Specifically, 
it supervises the detailed procedural guidelines 
for implementing the RFS. The process involves 
the government notifying fuel providers of their 
obligations, carrying out of obligations by fuel 
providers, conducting annual verification of 
performances by the RFS implementing agency 
(to be determined), and imposing penalties upon 
non-compliance. Fuel providers that fail to meet 
the mandatory blend ratio face penalties, which 
are determined based on the average transaction 
prices of diesel fuel during the implementation 
year. Sanctions on business operations can also 
be imposed if procedures or targets are period 
breached.
Takeaways and Recommendations 
The entities under RFS in the ROK are the four 
domestic refineries, along with fuel importers 
with relatively low market shares. According to 
the Korea Petroleum Association, 93% of the total 
annual volume of diesel fuel produced by four 
domestic refineries (19.5 trillion liters) is sold to the 
transportation sector, and approximately 0.4 trillion 
liters of biofuel has been purchased to meet the 2% 
blending standard as of 2013. The escalated blending 
ratio of 2.5% starting July 2015 is thus expected to 
increase the nation’s annual biodiesel consumption 
by approximately 0.1 trillion liters.
As mentioned previously, there have been severe 
conflicts throughout the preparation for RFS launch. 
Oil refinery industries subject to RFS have insisted 
on maintaining the blending ratio at 2%, while the 
biodiesel production industries requested a 3% 
increase. Ultimately, the government enforced a 
more lenient regulation than originally planned due 
to concerns that putting excessive pressure on oil 
refineries may lead to imposing an excessive burden 
on the general public. Gaining public support for the 
policy is especially important in countries like the 
ROK, since an immediate expansion of biofuel use 
entails an increase of imports. Such imports may 
be a cheap alternative, but it has significant cost 
implications with regard to investments needed 
for securing facilities for proper storage, shipment, 
and logistics that are likely to be reflected in the 
consumer prices of diesel.
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The proponents of RFS emphasize that expanding 
the use of biofuels provide benefits in terms of 
reduced dependence on foreign sources of energy, 
reduced GHG emissions, and increased profits from 
agricultural and industrial activities. In addition, 
RFS has the potential for enhancing the nation’s 
energy security, increasing investments in related 
industries, and improving the environmental quality. 7 
However, the critics of RFS in the ROK have raised 
concerns over the issue of biofuel production. For 
example, mandating the use of bioethanol – in which 
the ROK has a weak production base – is most 
likely to increase cheap imports from countries like 
Brazil. Such measure defeats the benefits of the 
RFS, specifically in achieving energy security, and 
protecting local agriculture and related industries. 
It should be noted that approximately 60% of 
biomass used for production of biodiesel in 2013 
was imported. Regulating fuel providers to meet 
their targets with biodiesels made from domestically 
sourced biomass is an option being advocated by 
many critics. 
The unintended consequences of biofuel use are also 
jeopardizing the integrity of the RFS. A worldwide 
expansion of biofuel consumption has indicated 
likely adverse impacts on other areas of policy 
importance, such as agricultural commodity markets 
and land-use patterns. Consequently, countries 
such as the U.S. and Germany that are currently 
enforcing the RFS have introduced sustainability 
standards to address these issues. Biofuels produced 
using biomass collected from key biodiversity areas 
are not accounted for in blend ratios. In contrast, 
the ROK government has yet to pass legislation on 
sustainability standards to counter the unintended 
consequences of RFS operation.
Although not without its challenges, RFS has 
potentials for contributing to the ROK’s emission 
reduction and environmental sustainability. A 
good example is how the government’s promotion 
of biodiesel use that started in 2007 has helped 
increase the collection and recycling rates of used 
cooling oil nationwide. 
However, strengthening the government’s 
fundamental rationale toward expansion of biofuel 
use is necessary for RFS to gain the required 
support of stakeholders with differing interests. 
The government’s policy-measures for fostering 
domestic industries across the biofuel value chain 
are also a decisive success factor.
3.2 Policies and Programs on Energy Efficiency
In tackling the energy crisis, the ROK’s past 
strategies have focused on exploring alternative 
energy sources and reviving nuclear energy. 
However, efficient use of the available finite 
energy is equally important. Since energy saved 
is as good as new energy generated, conserved 
energy is increasingly being viewed as the fifth 
fuel. Harnessing technologies to manage, store, 
and conserve energy can address the spate of 
energy challenges such as the supply-demand 
imbalances and mounting GHG emissions. To 
promote energy efficiency, the government has 
been implementing various policy incentives 
for the industrial sector, being the major energy 
consumer. In particular, incentives are targeted at 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – having 
weaker energy management infrastructure than 
large conglomerates – to instill their voluntary 
participation in energy-saving activities. On the 
other hand, the government has set more stringent 
energy efficiency standards for large enterprises 
and the public sector to set optimal examples for the 
private sector and individual households.
3.2.1 Tax Credits for Investments in Energy-Saving 
Facilities
The policy offers tax deductions to local individuals 
and companies that invest in energy-saving facilities 
to encourage the private sector to pursue energy 
efficiency. Facilities subject to tax deduction are 
legally acknowledged and provided in the year when 
the investment is concluded. If the investment period 
covers two years or more, the tax deductions are 
based on the amount of investment made during 
each taxable year. The policy was first implemented 
in 2000 and has been offering tax benefits for 
investments made since 2001.
7 | Biofuels emit substantially lower volumes of direct GHG than fossil fuels when produced, harvested, and processed under the right circumstances   (Renew-
able Fuel Standard: Overview and Issues, Congressional Research Service, October 2010).
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Implementation
Tax deductions are applicable only for investments 
pertaining to newly purchased assets or items 
with proven energy conservation benefits. The 
deduction amount is calculated based on fixed rates 
of the total sum of investment. The fixed amount 
is deducted from either the income tax (limited to 
income tax of business income) or corporate tax 
during the taxable year. However, the deduction 
amount is capped at 30% of the corporate tax 
for the given year (with a waiver for SMEs).
The Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) 
provides the official classification of energy-saving 
facilities. Water-saving facilities such as faucets 
or toilets, as well as facilities categorized as for 
manufacturing of NRE (acknowledged by relevant 
laws) are also included. Investments on energy-
saving facilities that have not been classified by the 
MOSF may also receive benefits upon submission 
of application (with proof of at least 10% energy 
consumption) and approval by KEMCO. Tax 
deductions undergo a simple process of reporting and 
approval and recipients submit the details of their 
investments to the relevant tax offices annually.
Since the implementation of the policy, the rate used to 
calculate the deductible amount has been readjusted 
several times. The policy started with a rate of 10% 
in 2001, and this figure was maintained between 
7-10% during the early years of implementation. 
As one of the key measures to deal with the 
soaring oil prices in 2008, the ROK government 
attempted to strengthen the tax incentives for 
energy-saving activities by increasing the rate 
from 10 to 20% of the total sum of investment.
However, as concerns were raised regarding how 
the provision of incentives have concentrated 
on a limited number of companies, the rate was 
readjusted to 10% in 2011; as a compensation 
scheme, the government abolished the capping of 
annual deduction amounts. In 2014, the government 
made further revisions by diversifying the rates by 
the size of firms. Differential rates of 3%, 5%, and 
10%, now apply for large, medium, and small-sized 
enterprises, respectively. The policy is planned to be 
effective only until the end of 2016.
Outcomes and Takeaways
The majority of tax deductions were part of 
corporate taxes. As shown in Table 14, the average 
total amount deducted has reached 200 billion 
KRW per annum since 2009. Obviously, benefits 
have largely been directed to large enterprises 
with significantly higher and sustained volumes 
of investment. For example, 95.5-97.7% of the 
total tax deductions were awarded to large firms 
that comprised 58.2-72.9% of the total number 
of beneficiary firms during 2008-2011. In 2011, 
SMEs with a 41.8% share of the total number of 
beneficiary firms accounted for only 2.9% of the total 
tax deduction provided. Moreover, the top 1% of the 
beneficiary firms (based on annual revenues) were 
subject to 97.4% of the total amount of tax deduced. 
After the differential rates have been introduced 
(large, medium, and small-sized companies), the 
government expects a sharp reduction in total tax 
deductions. The MOSF reported that the annual 
total deduction from investments in energy-saving 
facilities for 2015 is expected to drop to 34.5 billion 
KRW.
Table 13: Scope of energy-saving facilities
Classification Example facilities and systems
Energy-saving facilities
• Energy-saving systems of industrial facilities and buildings, power 
demand control systems, energy efficient equipment and materials, 
and electronic goods that reduce standby power
• NRE generation facilities
Water-saving facilities, water-saving equipment, wastewater reuse 
system8
• Water-saving faucets and toilets
Facilities that manufacture intermediary or finishedcomponents of NRE 
installations (limited to solar PV, wind, and small-scale hydro)
• Solar PV component (e.g.,PV modules and inverters) manufacturing 
facilities
8 | Wastewater re-use systems refer to facilities that prevent the disposal of wastewater into public sewage. Instead, it enables the re-use of wastewater for 
other purposes.
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The ROK has been offering tax breaks to encourage 
private sector spending to align with government 
strategies through a multiple number of tax credit 
schemes. For example, tax credits (similar to those for 
energy-saving facilities) also apply for investments 
in environmental protection, targeting a wide 
range of facilities that fall under the categories of 
environmental sustainability, clean manufacturing, 
and GHG reduction. Although the private sector has 
identified such incentive schemes as a decisive factor 
to scaling of investments, government efforts in 
building and maintaining a clear rationale to provide 
tax credits is especially important. Setting the 
effective period and deduction rates must be aligned 
to meet these needs. The ROK’s schemes tend to 
have relatively low deduction rates targeting a wide 
range of investments to be effective over a long 
timeframe (over 10 years). In countries such as the   
U. S., tax deduction rates often reach 10-50% but 
with capped ceilings (it should be noted however that 
the U. S. has significantly higher rates of corporate 
tax and imposes an alternative minimum tax). 
3.2.2 Government Loans on Energy Use 
Rationalization Projects
The ROK government began to initiate energy 
conservation policies using financial instruments 
after the second global oil crisis in the late 1970s. 
It created the Energy Use Rationalization Fund in 
1980 to provide low-interest loans for both energy 
producers and consumers to boost investments on 
energy efficiency and conservation. The proceeds 
of the loan have been diversified over the years of 
operation to support the nation’s evolving investment 
needs. Today, the loans cover three primary projects: 
ESCO, TMS, and installation of energy equipment. 
TMS projects refer to relevant investments carried 
out by entities subject to TMS to meet their GHG 
emissions reduction and/or energy-saving targets. 
Projects for installation of energy equipment include 
investments in energy-saving facilities, high energy-
efficiency product manufacturing systems, and 
energy demand management systems.9 
Implementation
The details on the types of loan recipient and lending 
conditions are summarized in Table 15. The loan 
is limited to the costs of purchasing and installing 
(includes engineering and pilot testing) new energy 
equipment with proven energy-saving benefits 
(and/or GHG emission reduction benefits). It does 
not cover the purchase of land, construction of 
buildings, and value added tax (VAT). The detailed 
description of eligible items (e.g., boilers, waste heat 
recovery systems, lighting equipment, and energy 
storage systems) are provided in the policy guidance 
document.
It should be noted that loans are provided only 
to SMEs, non-profit organizations, and public 
institutions. However, large companies may also 
receive support in the form of interest subsidies, 
in which the government compensates only for the 
difference between the market interest rate and low 
interest loans offered by the program. 
In other words, the energy users shall receive loans 
from commercial banks that offer interest rates 
higher than those of the low-interest loan program, 
and subsequently receive the government subsidy 
for the amount of incremental cost incurred from the 
difference between the two interest rates. Through 
such measures, the government can take advantage 
of lessening the financial burden while making good 
use of commercial loan programs. A total of 18 
commercial banks have opted to provide loans on 
Table 14: Annual tax deductions for investments in energy-saving facilities 
Amount 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Rates (%) 10 7 7 10 10 10 20 20 20 10 10 10
Total Deduction 15.9 46.5 23.0 23.2 28.3 67.6 130.0 257.7 257.6 382.7 281.4 226.1
From Income Tax 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3
From Corporate Tax 15.9 46.5 22.9 23.1 28.2 67.5 129.8 257.5 257.3 382.5 281.3 225.8
Unit: billion KRW
9 | Energy-demand management systems refer to hardware solutions such as thermal storage cooling systems for improving the energy supply-demand 
balance.
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projects recommended by the government to receive 
interest subsidies.
The low-interest loan program offers funds at fixed 
interest rates and/or variable interest rates, which 
follow the average yield on three-year treasury (e.g., 
2% as of 2012 3Q), and has a repayment period of 
5-7 years (after a three-year grace period). Up to 
100% of the project’s total costs are to be covered by 
the loan, while the minimum amount of the loan is set 
at 20 million KRW. 
However, the loan implementing agency (KEMCO) 
is authorized to exercise control over the maximum 
loan amounts per project to ensure that the limited 
annual budget for the program provides benefits 
to an appropriate number of energy users. Energy 
users who wish to avail themselves of the loan 
should submit the application form to KEMCO 
for evaluation. External experts are invited to 
evaluate the applications in the form of quantitative 
scores, where a grade of 70 points or higher leads 
to the issuance of loan agreements (KEMCO), or 
recommendation letters for initiating loan contracts 
with a commercial bank. However, loan applications 
of less than 50 million KRW are exempted from 
quantitative evaluation and instead undergo a 
simple qualification assessment. Upon signing of loan 
contracts, KEMCO verifies whether investments 
have actually taken place as planned. It performs site 
inspection and performance evaluation annually for 
completed projects.
Loan Purpose Recipient Type Maximum Loan Amount per Recipient Loan Conditions
1. ESCO Projects
ESCO implementation 
entities having contracts 
with energy users 
(investments on facility 
retrofit)
30 trillion KRW
Grace Period : 3 years
Repayment Period: 7 years
2. TMS Projects
Entities subject to TMS 
(investments to meet energy 
consumption and GHG 
emission targets under TMS)
15 trillion KRW
Grace Period : 3 years
Repayment Period: 5 years
3. Installation of Energy 
Equipment
- Energy saving facilities
- High energy-efficiency product 
   manufacturing systems
- Energy demand management 
   systems 
All entities with plans to 
make relevant investments
15 trillion KRW
1 trillion KRW
5 trillion KRW
Table 15: Proceeds of low interest loans for energy use rationalization projects (as of 2014) 
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Outcomes and Takeaways
As the administrative authority for the Energy Use 
Rationalization Fund, MOTIE allocates the annual 
budget for government’s low interest loans. In 2012, 
the total annual budget for the low interest loans 
and interest subsidies amounted to 530 billion KRW 
and 70 billion KRW, respectively. As shown in Table 
16, the size and the number of beneficiaries of the 
Energy Use Rationalization Fund have increased 
significantly compared to the fund’s initial operation. 
It should be noted how projects relevant to the 
Voluntary Agreement (VA) scheme and mass energy 
generation have also received loans prior to 2010. 
The details of loan proceeds in 2011 indicate that:
• Lighting fixtures, heat recovery systems, 
equipment for optimizing manufacturing 
processes, power generators, boilers, and 
air heating/cooling systems were the most 
commonly invested items under ESCO projects.
• Equipment for optimizing manufacturing 
processes and recovering waste heat, furnaces, 
and power generators were the most commonly 
invested items under TMS projects.
• Waste heat recovery systems, energy demand 
monitoring and control systems, compressors, 
boilers, infrared radiation dryers, high-frequency 
induction heating devices, heat recovery 
exchangers, and energy-saving heating devices 
are the most commonly invested items under the 
projects for installation of energy equipment.
There were 830 loans provided to SMEs in 2011, 
which was about six times the number of loans 
granted to large companies, amounting to 352.3 
billion KRW or 60% of the total budget. Large-
scale loans greater than 4 billion KRW (35 projects 
totaling 259.2 billion KRW) and 1 billion KRW (96 
projects totaling 189.8 billion KRW) comprised only 
13% of the total number of loans, but accounted for 
76% of the total amount of loans granted. Small-scale 
loans worth less than 100 million KRW constitute 
48% of the total number of projects and comprise 
only about 4% of the total amount of loans granted.
 
Years
Budget 
(billion 
KRW)
Amount 
of Loan 
Granted
(billion 
KRW)
Rate of 
withdrawal
(%)
Amount of Loan Granted (billion KRW)
ESCO
TMS 
(and VA)
Energy 
Equipment 
Energy Demand 
Management 
Systems
Mass Energy 
Generation
‘80-’99 - 2,951 - 113 - 1,431 - 1,407
2000 446 399 89.4 86 39 113 - 161
2001 396 387 97.6 75 29 109 - 173
2002 526 503 95.5 140 68 139 7 150
2003 478 477 99.9 100 77 127 11 162
2004 480 474 98.7 83 66 130 8 187
2005 670 690 102.9 183 131 178 15 183
2006 655 645 98.4 133 114 183 20 196
2007 640 617 96.4 136 95 224 33 130
2008 683 679 99.5 112 117 312 39 100
2009 583 581 99.7 132 141 246 12 50
2010 512 512 100.0 131 139 243 - -
2011 602 590 98.1 285 169 136 - -
Total - 9,504 - 1,708 1,182 3,571 145 2,898
Table 16: Amount of loans granted for energy use rationalization projects
Source: KEMCO, 2013
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ESCO Projects in the ROK
Under the Energy Service Company (ESCO) project, ESCOs pursue investments to enhance the energy efficiency of users 
and recoup the investments from savings accrued in energy bills. The financing scheme, which originated in the U. S. in 
the late 1970s, was introduced in the ROK in 1992. In order to stimulate the ESCO market, the government has been 
providing tax credits and low interest loans for ESCO projects. 
Investment agreements between the energy user and ESCO are based on assessments of energy saving potentials and 
projections on related costs and benefits. In the ROK, these agreements take the form of three different types of legal 
contracts: shared savings; guaranteed savings; and new shared savings. Once the contract is signed, ESCO carries out the 
necessary installation work and provides post-installation services including staff training on energy conservation. The 
savings in energy costs upon facility installation are shared in accordance with the terms of the contract. The contract 
between the energy user and ESCO is terminated once the investment costs are recouped observing the terms of the 
contract. The energy user is rightfully entitled to any benefits that arise from energy savings after the termination of 
the contract. 
The ROK’s experience revealed that ESCO projects provide a win-win solution among stakeholders with different 
interests. ESCOs gain investment profits and avail themselves of incentives from the government, and energy users 
avoid shouldering the burden of huge upfront investment costs and technical risks in generating energy savings through 
the support of ESCOs. Meanwhile, the government benefits by increasing opportunities for energy-saving industries, 
creating new jobs, and helping achieve the national GHG emissions target. Over the years, the scope of ESCO projects in 
the ROK has been extended from simple component replacements to complex system retrofits that exploit technological 
advances (e.g., waste heat recovery). The size of a single investment has also increased – from an average cost of 500 
million KRW during the initial phase to the present value worth 0.9-1.3 billion KRW. Accordingly, the government has 
strived to meet the growing demand for low interest loans by increasing the annual budget allocated from 5 billion KRW 
in 1998 to 130 billion KRW in 2010.
Category Shared Savings Guaranteed Savings New Shared Savings 
Principles
• ESCO raises the project 
fund with its own capital or 
through a loan from a third 
party (financial institution)
• Energy cost savings realized 
by the energy user is shared 
with ESCO to redeem the 
investment costs
• Energy user raises the 
project fund and ESCO 
guarantees the minimum 
energy cost savings 
• ESCO compensates for the 
loss to the energy user, if 
the actual amount of energy 
cost savings fails to reach the 
agreed minimum amount
• ESCO raises the project 
fund with its own capital or 
through a loan from a third 
party (financial institution)
• ESCO guarantees the 
minimum energy cost savings
• Energy cost savings realized 
by the energy user are shared 
with ESCO to redeem the 
investment costs
Characteristics
• Energy user has no financial 
implication arising from front-
end costs 
• The most prevalent type of 
contract in the ROK
• ESCOs with greater scope 
to sharpen their technical 
services to energy users, as 
they shoulder no burden of 
fund raising
• Implemented in the ROK 
since 2004
• Seeks to exploit the 
advantages of “Shared 
Savings” and “Guaranteed 
Savings” contract
Table 17: Types of ESCO project contracts (between energy user and ESCO)
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The Energy Use Rationalization Fund is the 
government’s flagship mechanism to encourage the 
private sector to invest in energy-saving facilities. 
By mobilizing low-interest loans worth 500-600 
billion KRW annually, to support a wide range of 
activities, the fund has helped ease the financial 
burden of the private sector in driving energy 
conservation and achieving substantial savings in 
energy costs. Particularly, the proceeds of the fund 
have continuously evolved to meet the changing 
market demand and the government’s regulatory 
standards. For example, in response to the launch 
of the TMS in 2012, the fund allocated a separate 
budget for supporting investment projects of 
entities subject to TMS; the annual budget was 
later escalated from 10 billion KRW to 15 billion 
KRW to meet the increasing demand. Furthermore, 
the fund’s guidelines have been revised in 2012 to 
enhance industrial responses to the increasing risks 
in energy supply. It now allows large companies and 
non-profit organizations to receive the support for 
installing energy demand management systems that 
was previously confined to SMEs. Also, the list of 
items eligible for purchase from the loan proceeds 
has been updated to keep up with the market trends 
and technological advancement.
Nonetheless, the policy has yet to address several 
challenges. Relative to the substantial budget spent 
for this initiative, the outcomes of energy efficiency 
improvement have been criticized from a value-for-
money perspective. Since 2009, KEMCO has been 
carrying out post-evaluations, but only on a limited 
number of completed projects. In addition, some 
of these post-evaluations were confined to merely 
checking whether or not the facilities have been 
properly installed. The root cause of the problem lies 
in the shortage of human resources to manage over 
1,000 projects per year. With the absence of a long-
term follow-up mechanism, the outcome is limited 
to the number of new installations and its genuine 
intention to achieve progress on energy efficiency 
through the replacement of industrial facilities may 
be overlooked. In addition, stringent management 
of the fund proceeds across all stages of operation 
(approval to post-evaluation) is critical in ensuring 
the effectiveness of the program. KEMCO’s past 
experiences have revealed that some beneficiaries 
have disguised themselves to receive loans on 
projects with no energy-saving benefits. 
3.2.3 Government Support for 
 Energy Diagnosis of SMEs
Energy diagnosis is a process carried out by expert 
groups (energy consultant) to assess the industrial 
facilities’ energy consumption patterns, identify 
measures for enhancing energy efficiency, and 
recommend investments to optimize energy use. 
In the ROK, facilities of private sector entities with 
annual energy consumption of over 2,000 TOE 
should undergo energy diagnosis every five years. 
Acknowledging how SMEs generally have limited 
capacity in dedicating adequate resources to 
engage in energy efficiency investments, the 
government has been providing financial support 
to better achieve the desired outcomes of energy 
diagnosis. SMEs owning facilities with total annual 
energy consumption of less than 10,000 TOE 
(sum of all facilities owned) are eligible to receive 
partial support from the government in meeting 
their obligations. In addition, the government also 
supports SMEs with no obligations (annual energy 
consumption of less than 2,000 TOE) to voluntarily 
carry out the energy diagnosis. Underscoring the 
need for interventions in small-scale facilities with 
frequent high energy losses due to unnecessary 
energy consumption, the government launched 
support for 10,000 businesses to carry out 
voluntary energy diagnoses over a five-year period 
(2010-2014). The scheme also helped improve 
the competitiveness of SMEs and their level of 
preparedness for policies on GHG emissions.
Implementation (Voluntary Diagnoses of SMEs)
The SMEs that wish to avail themselves of the 
energy diagnoses can directly apply via  the website 
of KEMCO – the agency in charge of overall 
management, supervision, and provision of funding 
support under MOTIE – or directly through the 
energy consultant. The contract signed between 
the SME and the energy consultant is reported 
to KEMCO prior to the delivery of services. Upon 
completion of energy diagnosis and KEMCO’s 
verification of the actual amount of labor input spent, 
the diagnosis report is submitted and reviewed by 
KEMCO. 
121
In addition to the site visit, KEMCO conducts a 
satisfaction survey on the recipient SME to evaluate 
the performance of the energy consultant. Finally, 
KEMCO disburses the fees claimed by the SME.
The MOTIE announces the standard cost for energy 
diagnosis of SMEs annually based on projections 
of the direct costs and labor costs (two persons 
engaged in two days of site investigation and two 
days of report writing). Of the total fee per business 
facility worth approximately 4 million KRW as 
of 2012, the government carries 70-90% of the 
standard cost, while the remaining amount subject to 
VAT is covered by the participating SME. Funding is 
available on a first-come, first-served basis according 
to the submission dates of diagnosis reports. 
KEMCO notifies SMEs of the total budget allocated 
each year, in addition to sharing a contact list of 
certified energy consultants and standard form 
of contract to be used between SMEs and the 
energy consultants. It should be noted that the 
government’s support for SMEs with annual energy 
consumption between 2,000-10,000 TOE also 
follows similar procedures and requirements.
Outcomes and Takeaways 
Although the detailed outcomes of policy 
implementation have not been made available, 
the amount of energy saving and emissions 
reduction potentials derived from both mandatory 
and voluntary energy diagnosis serve as a good 
reference. 
Category Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Facilities with annual 
energy consumption 
greater than 2,000 TOE 
(mandatory diagnosis)
Number of Facilities 383 420 559 545 469 546 2,922
Potentials for Energy 
Saving (TOE/year) 429,013 549,333 710,412 479,840 438,800 440,622 3,048,020
Potentials for Energy 
Saving Identified as 
Percentage of Total Energy 
Consumption (%)
4.6 8.0 6.4 5.9 4.7 3.5 5.3
Potentials for Emissions 
Reduction (tCO
2
/year) 1,086,377 1,463,397 1,754,496 1,184,438 1,080,153 1,004,434 7,573,295
Facilities of SMEs 
with annual energy 
consumption between 
2,000-1,000 TOE
(Mandatory diagnosis)
Government Support
(% of diagnosis cost) 70 70 90 90 90 70 -
Total Government Budget 
Spent (million KRW) 2,093 1,489 2,660 2,277 2,299 2,259 13,077
Number of Facilities 145 111 152 128 144 166 846
Potentials for Energy 
Saving (TOE/year) 44,579 30,953 39,256 33,504 37,513 40,426 226,231
Potentials for Emissions 
Reduction (tCO
2
/year) 99,672 78,714 88,164 81,841 79,384 89,597 517,372
Facilities of SMEs 
with annual energy 
consumption less than 
2,000 TOE 
(voluntary diagnosis)
Government Support
(% of diagnosis cost) - - - 90 90 - -
Total Government Budget 
Spent (million KRW) - - - 6,660 1,496 - 8,156
Number of Facilities - - - 2,000 430 - 2,430
Potentials for Energy 
Saving (TOE/year) - - - 57,265 32,484 - 89,749
Potentials for Emissions 
Reduction (tCO
2
/year) - - - 124,770 73,291 - 198,063
Table 18: Outcomes of energy diagnosis in the ROK (2007-2012)
Source: KEMCO, 2013
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The government’s support for obligatory energy 
diagnosis of SMEs during 2007-2012 helped identify 
the average energy saving and GHG reduction 
potentials of approximately 267 TOE/year/facilities 
and 611 tCO
2
/year/facilities, respectively. SMEs 
of smaller energy consumption that have been 
supported to conduct voluntary energy diagnosis 
(2010-2011) have identified relatively smaller 
potentials of approximately 37 TOE/year/facilities 
and 82 tCO
2
/year/facilities. Such potentials are 
derived from various hardware or operational 
interventions (e.g., facility retrofit, optimization of 
facility operations, and establishment of energy 
consumption monitoring system and database 
compilation), as well as management interventions 
(e.g., participatory employee programs that help 
instill the mindset to conserve energy). 
Moreover, some success stories showcasing 
local governments’ active participation has 
been noteworthy. For instance, the province of 
Jeonraanam-do has signed an agreement with 
KEMCO in 2010 to support a portion of energy 
diagnosis costs to be borne by SMEs under the 
voluntary scheme. Based on the diagnosis reports 
supported by Jeonranam-do, the identified 
potentials of energy saving averaged 10.3% per 
annum and valued at 1.084 billion KRW per year 
or 21.7 million KRW per diagnosed facility. The 
example illustrates how the diagnoses provide a 
platform for SMEs and central or local governments 
to collaborate in addressing the energy crisis and 
reinforcing business competitiveness. 
Despite the success, the government failed to meet 
the target of engaging 10,000 businesses to carry 
out voluntary energy diagnosis over a five-year 
period (2010-2014). The government support for 
voluntary energy diagnosis ended in 2013 due to 
the lack of participation of SMEs. In addition to 
the low level of awareness and appreciation of the 
importance of energy efficiency, SMEs consider the 
10-30% levy on the diagnosis fee as burdensome. As 
for the energy consultants, engaging in facilities with 
high energy use was much more profitable as they 
generally have higher contract values. 
Although the government’s underlying intention in 
engaging SMEs in energy diagnosis is to reduce the 
blind spots in the energy efficiency movement, the 
lack of follow-up mechanisms on realizing energy-
saving potentials was an obstacle in winning the 
buy-in of SMEs. Thus, voluntary energy diagnosis 
should seek to extend support toward actual 
implementation by diversifying and scaling up of 
incentives to respond to the unique needs of SMEs.
3.2.4 Mandatory Public Procurement of Energy 
Efficient Goods
Electronic appliances and equipment account for a 
large portion of the energy consumed by households, 
businesses, and industrial sectors. With growing 
public interest and government’s tightening of 
regulatory standards, the introduction of energy 
efficiency grades and certifications have made it 
easier for consumers to make environmentally 
friendly choices. However, it is true that energy 
efficient goods in the market are generally more 
expensive, often prompting consumers to buy 
cheaper and less efficient products. Such behavior 
can lead to reduced demand for energy efficient 
goods, thereby increasing their prices. 
To enable the public sector to lead the energy 
conservation efforts, the policy on “Mandatory 
Public Procurement of Energy Efficient Goods” 
requires all government institutions to prioritize the 
purchase of energy efficient goods. Specifically, the 
agencies should identify and select goods with “high 
energy efficiency certifications” or “highest energy 
efficiency grades” upon purchase of new electronic 
appliances.
• The high energy efficiency certification program 
is a voluntary certification scheme of the ROK 
for industrial and construction equipment with 
energy saving features, meeting the minimum 
energy efficiency performance standards. A total 
of 45 items are eligible for certification, which 
include electric pumps, inverters, ventilation 
systems, and gas boilers. 
• A total of 22 electronic appliances are eligible 
to acquire energy efficiency grades in the ROK, 
such as home appliances (e.g., refrigerators, 
washing machines) and lighting systems 
(e.g.,incandescent light bulbs, fluorescent 
light bulbs, lamp stabilizers). These appliances 
must meet the minimum energy performance 
standard to be sold in the domestic market and 
are stamped with energy efficiency grades of 1 
(most efficient) to 5 (least efficient). In addition 
to the grades, the labels also provide information 
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on the product’s average electricity consumption 
(in kWh/month and KRW/year) and CO
2 
emissions (in g/hr).
Implementation and Takeaways
The policy applies to all public institutions, 
including not only central and local governments 
but also special local administrative agencies 
and government-funded institutes. The subject 
institutions must purchase products with high 
energy efficiency certifications or products rated 
as grade 1 under the labeling standards. However, 
if there are no such products available in the 
market, institutions are allowed to select the next 
best product. Exemption also applies to small-
scale purchases, recognizing the importance of 
streamlining procurement processes. There were 
additional requirements for purchasing lighting 
fixtures, as at least 30% of all new street lamps and 
public building’s lighting systems were required to 
use LED products by 2013 (60% by 2015 and 100% 
by 2017), while 40% of all lighting systems in public 
buildings were required to adopt LED products 
by 2014 (60% by 2015 and 100% by 2020). Such 
figures have been put in place after the government 
released the National Roadmap on LED Deployment 
(2011), aiming for LEDs to cover 60% of all of the 
nation’s lighting systems by 2020.
It is important to understand that the mandate for 
procurement of energy efficient goods is only one of 
a long list of mandates given under the Regulations 
on Energy Use Rationalization of Public Institutions. 
The obligations are largely divided into two 
categories covering a wide range of activities:
• Rationalization of Energy Use in Public Buildings
- Procuring energy efficient foods
- Acquiring the highest building energy efficiency 
grade (limited to new buildings and expansion of 
existing buildings)
- Carrying out energy diagnosis (every five years) 
and ESCO projects (upon identification of energy 
saving potential greater than 5%)
- Establishing NRE facilities to meet energy 
demand (15% by 2015, limited to new buildings 
and expansion of existing buildings)
- Restricting the heating and cooling systems (i.e., 
room temperature above 28°C and below 18°C 
in summer and winter seasons, respectively) and 
elevators (e.g.,not to stop on lower floors)
• Rationalization of Energy Use for Transportation
- Purchasing sub-compact models or green cars (at 
least 50% of all new vehicles procured)
- Reserving parking spots exclusively for sub-
compact models and green cars, which are 
located closer to the front entrance of public 
buildings
- Implementing the weekly car-free day program 
KEMCO supports MOTIE in supervising the 
compliance of public institutions with the 
abovementioned policies. The representative 
offices of public institutions shall establish a “GHG 
emissions reduction and energy saving committee” 
and hold semiannual meetings to self-monitor and 
assess the outcomes of implementation. The central 
and local government authorities annually conduct 
evaluations on these outcomes and address the 
needs for carrying out complementary measures in 
case of underachievement.
Although the specific outcomes from implementing 
the public mandate have not yet been made 
available, it is without doubt that the public 
institutions of the ROK have played a critical role 
in instilling a culture of energy conservation. In 
addition to operating the public sector TMS (refer to 
Chapter 2), these mandates have strengthened the 
government’s direct control over energy demand 
arising from public institutions. 
In addition, leveraging the purchasing power of 
public authorities has helped expand the markets 
for energy efficient goods (for example, government 
purchase was accountable for approximately 35% of 
the domestic LED display market in 2013). However, 
as the proportion of energy consumed by the public 
sector only accounts for less than 2-3% of the 
nation’s total consumption, substantial savings can 
only arise from the dissemination of energy efficient 
practices among the private sector and the general 
public. 
3.3 Rationalization of Energy Prices
Energy pricing and taxation are important fiscal 
instruments that can promote energy conservation 
and NRE deployment. Fundamentally, energy prices 
provide the direction to efficiently allocate resources 
in the energy market. If the government sets energy 
prices too low without adequately reflecting its 
actual generation costs, energy users are not 
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motivated to exploit energy-saving opportunities. 
Low fossil fuel prices also mean that the energy 
sector is more likely to neglect the development of 
clean energy, which often entails complex financing 
mechanisms and high technical risks.
Most energy industries, in one way or another, 
tend to operate in an imperfectly competitive 
market. The electric power and gas industries, in 
particular, are dominated by local monopolies. In 
addition, energy generation and consumption cause 
externalities in the market such as air pollution 
and traffic congestion, which are regular signs 
of market failure and could lead to inefficient 
resource allocation and inadequate social welfare. 
Accordingly, the government intervenes in the 
market using regulations or taxing mechanisms to 
prevent and deter such market imperfections. In 
light of reinforcing efficiency in resource allocation 
in the context of energy pricing, the government 
essentially adheres to the following principles: 
• Realistic Costs: Applying objective criteria to 
price calculations to reflect the full cost (including 
a reasonable profit margin) of energy supply 
services
• Fair Return: Guaranteeing an optimal and fair 
return for energy companies 
• Equitable Pricing: Avoiding price discrimination 
against a certain group of energy users and 
applying a fair energy cost-return ratio across all 
groups of end-users
Recognizing the importance of energy-pricing 
in achieving low-carbon green growth, the ROK 
government presented measures to revise the 
pricing system for electricity, gas, and heat energy 
under the existing policy framework. In preparation 
for a major policy revision, the government 
acknowledged the shortcomings of its past 
interventions. Prior attempts to improve energy 
efficiency have relied heavily on government-driven 
regulations and energy-saving support programs 
rather than utilizing economic incentives such as 
price signals in the marketplace. In light of the ROK’s 
energy security challenges, the government laid out 
the following goals to boost energy efficiency:
First National Energy Basic Plan (2008)
• Reform the tax system to reflect the full cost of 
energy generation 
• Facilitate a free market mechanism to encourage 
competition among and within energy sources 
• Simplify the energy tax system and allow flexibility 
in operation to help balance the country’s 
conflicting needs in terms of energy security, 
price stabilization, government tax revenues, 
environmental sustainability, and social inclusion.
Fourth Basic Plan for Rationalization of Energy Use 
(2008)
• Electricity Prices: Phase-out cross subsidization 
and streamline the differential tariff system
• Gas Prices: Introduce a pricing mechanism that 
reflects fluctuations in seasonal demand and global 
market prices
• Heat Energy Prices: Introduce a system whereby 
the government induces free competition among 
energy producers under the binding price ceilings 
set at a regional level (to reflect their given 
circumstances)
Nevertheless, the ROK government has yet to 
accomplish the transition to a market-based energy 
pricing system. Despite the ambitious plans and 
prevention of past mistakes, the government’s 
commitment to ensuring domestic market price 
stability and industrial growth by utilizing economic 
stimulus policies has not led to concrete actions. This 
critical gap has overlooked the necessity of energy-
price reforms in line with the low-carbon green 
growth vision. This section briefly touches upon the 
ROK’s imminent challenges and progress in energy 
reforms under the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth.
Electricity Pricing
In the ROK, electricity rates are divided into 
wholesale price determined by the Korea Power 
Exchange (KPX) and retail price set by the Korea 
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). A cost-
based pool (CBP) is operated by KPX to determine 
the System Marginal Price (SMP), while the retail 
prices of electricity are strongly regulated by the 
government. This means that electricity is supplied 
by a state monopolist KEMPO, at a price that 
is controlled by the government. Basically, the 
electricity rates are differently charged according 
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to use: residential, general, educational, industrial, 
agricultural, and street lighting services. 
The core problem of the current electricity pricing is 
that it does not reflect the actual costs of electricity 
supply. Most importantly, the government has failed 
to fully recognize the capital costs involved in energy 
supply, which must be recovered primarily through 
energy consumption costs incurred by end users. 
Driven by the nation’s economic growth policies that 
restrict increase in commodity prices, the consumer 
energy prices have been kept below average 
electricity generation costs since 2005. Even during 
the periods, after the mid-2000s, when the global 
oil prices continuously plummeted, the government 
kept electricity prices low, thus escalating price 
distortions. A good example is how the energy 
consumption for household heating has shifted from 
burning of natural gas and petroleum products to 
electricity-use during this period (Kim, 2014). 
Varying tariffs among user groups, which 
fundamentally reflect the differences in supply 
costs for different electricity usage (with distinct 
load patterns), are also escalating the discrepancies 
in energy pricing in the ROK. A good example is 
how the rates for residential and general services 
are set comparatively high to encourage energy 
saving, while the rates for industrial and agricultural 
services are set significantly lower to help relevant 
sectors maintain their market competitiveness. Such 
interventions have been naturally viewed as cross-
subsidization of energy costs among user groups and 
are being done as the government struggles to deal 
with the snowballing of debts from energy supply. 
On the other hand, the differential tariffs system (for 
household energy use only), which charges higher 
rates on heavy consumers to control excessive 
electricity use, has been scrutinized for its weak 
impact on uplifting the principles of cost recovery. 
Under the ROK’s differential tariff system, unit 
electricity rates are divided into six classes, with 
the maximum rate being set more than 11 times 
the minimum rate. Such diverse scales of unit costs 
have been identified as the cause of the growing 
household burden from energy costs and such 
costs have not been revised (since 2005) to reflect 
the growing levels of household consumption. A 
combination of time-of-use tariff and seasonal tariff 
applies for electricity consumed by the industrial, 
educational, and general services (Park and Kim, 
2012). 
Under the First National Energy Basic Plan (2008) 
and the Fourth Basic Plan for Rationalization of 
Energy Use (2008), the government achieved small 
but positive steps in rationalizing electricity prices. In 
particular, electricity rates were raised significantly 
for industrial services, helping the cost recovery 
rates to increase from 77.7% in 2008 to 88.4% in 
2012 (refer to Figure 10). 
In addition, the government also raised the 
electricity prices by an average of 5.4% in 2013 (6.4% 
for industrial services). Such action naturally helped 
partially resolve the issue of cross-subsidization 
among energy users; the cost-recovery rates of 
energy supplied to the industrial sector (87.5%, 
2011) has now reached the level for household use 
(88.3%, 2011). However, the cost recovery rate of 
energy consumed by the agricultural sector still 
remains low at 34.6%. The overall cost recovery 
rate is also below 90%, indicating how government 
interventions were insufficient to bring about a 
transformative change in the energy market. 
The problems in differential tariff scheme for 
Table 19: Electricity supply costs and average sales price by year 
Source: KEEI, 2013a
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Supply Cost 75.88 80.48 82.95 102.00 92.06 96.27 103.31
Average Sales Price 74.39 76.45 77.71 79.24 84.23 86.80 90.32
Rate of Cost 
Recovery (%) 98.00 95.00 93.70 77.70 91.50 90.20 87.40
Unit: KRW/kWh
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household electricity-use are yet to be resolved. The 
scheme has been heavily criticized for provoking 
social tension as many of the poor communities 
rely heavily on electricity for heating purposes 
during the winter season. It should be noted how 
this circumstance runs contrary to the scheme’s 
objective of easing the financial burden on 
impoverished communities by reducing the unit 
electricity rates for light consumers. The scheme 
is also against equity as it is not applicable to 
industrial consumption of electricity. Despite the 
circumstances, the government has been reluctant 
to take actions on easing the tariff scheme, primarily 
due to the lack of commitment and failure to reach a 
consensus among stakeholder groups with varying 
interests (e.g., consumer groups, energy industry, 
and the National Assembly). In many ways, the issue 
has turned into a political debate as the country’s 
changing livelihood patterns (e.g., increasing number 
of single or double households with high levels 
of income) has made it difficult for the scheme to 
remain as an effective demand-side management 
intervention. Consequently, the ROK government 
has been increasing the unit costs at an identical rate 
across the six-tier system. 
In summary, the average electricity rates of the 
ROK are approximately 32% lower than the OECD 
average, as of 2013. Price distortions are made 
especially evident by the wide gap between prices 
of electricity and other sources of energy. While 
the average electricity rates of OECD countries are 
double the unit prices of kerosene and heavy oil, the 
ROK’s electricity rates for households are only 62% 
of its kerosene prices. It is overwhelming to see how 
government commitment has controlled electricity 
price below the prices of primary energy sources. 
Without doubt, much of the nation’s slow progress in 
deploying NRE facilities is attributed to the failure in 
implementing full-scale reform of electricity prices. 
Kerosene Heavy Oil
Natural Gas Electricity
Household Industry General Household Industry General
Nominal Price Fluctuation (%) 149.1 270.0 110.3 172.1 119.6 15.3 59.2 6.1
Real Price Fluctuation (%) 71.3 172.3 44.6 44.6 61.6 -20.7 17.2 -21.9
Changes in the amount of 
consumption (%) -68.5 -58.8 38.8 38.8 188.5 71.2 88.4 116.4
Table 20: Changes in price and consumption levels by energy source (2012 compared to 2000)
Source: Kim, 2014
Figure 10: Electricity price hikes and the cost-recovery rates by year 
Source: MOTIE, 2014
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Natural Gas Pricing
There has been a dramatic increase in the use of 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the ROK since its 
introduction in 1986. As part of the government’s 
active promotion of LNG deployment, LNG use for 
power generation has significantly increased and 
consequently, LNG demand for residential use such 
as cooking and heating has exceeded that of power 
generation. In the ROK, natural gas consumption is 
twice larger in winter than in summer due to the high 
demand for heating. 
The Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) retains a 
monopoly over gas imports and wholesale, while 
approximately 30 private gas suppliers exclusively 
supply LNG in their respective districts. Though the 
sales of gas are dominated by the district suppliers, 
the consumer prices and revenue caps are regulated 
by local governments. Thus, the consumer pricing 
of LNG is fundamentally determined by both 
the central and local governments. Basically, the 
consumer LNG prices consist of fuel costs (LNG) 
and supply costs. The fuel cost is reviewed every 
odd month of the year to reflect price changes in 
the global market. Despite the fact that fuel costs 
account for more than 80% of consumer prices, the 
ROK government delayed the application of the 
pricing mechanism (reflecting price changes of raw 
LNG) from 2008 to ease the burden on the public of 
skyrocketing prices. Amid consumer concerns over 
high inflation, the government resumed the price 
linkage with the international market in September 
2010, but this was called off again in July 2011, 
thereby damaging the credibility of the pricing 
mechanism. 
Although the impacts of such government 
interventions have not been considered, it is true 
that the distortion of gas prices has contributed to 
the imbalances in the prices of petroleum products 
(e.g., LNG, LPG). With the natural gas price failing to 
send accurate market signals, demand management 
measures such as the Total Management Scheme 
(TMS) and ESCO projects have struggled to gain 
momentum. 
But most importantly, discrepancies in natural gas 
prices have inflicted social costs on consumers, 
including potential hikes in future gas prices. The 
suspension of the price linkage with fuel costs may 
have benefited the energy users, but it has had 
critical implications for KOGAS and private gas 
suppliers that suffered from losses due to worsening 
cash flow. For example, accounts receivable of 
KOGAS rose to over 4.2 trillion KRW as of the end 
of 2010, from 100 billion KRW at the end of 2007, 
and this deficit is highly likely to be passed on to the 
taxpayers. 
As a result of the excessive focus on public welfare 
and industrial competitiveness, the ROK government 
fell short of realizing the main goal of the Fourth 
Basic Plan for Rationalization of Energy Use – to 
establish a flexible pricing system that accurately 
reflects the fluctuations in seasonal demand and 
global market prices. The government has yet to 
achieve positive results from rationalizing gas 
prices in line with the low-carbon green growth 
vision. Given that the gas industry is fully controlled 
by KOGAS, the government needs to redesign its 
pricing system in a way that addresses monopoly-
induced market inefficiencies. 
Table 21: Comparison of household and industrial energy prices 
Source: OECD, 2013
Average Energy Prices (Household Use) Average Energy Prices (Industrial Use)
Kerosene Natural Gas Electricity Kerosene Natural Gas Electricity
ROK 1,753 907 1,082 1,088 839 959
Japan 1,388 2,137 3,218 1,064 908 2,259
Germany 1,287 1,167 3,939 744 703 1,729
U.S. 1,165 455 1,382 - 165 779
OECD 1,370 734 1,991 - 321 1,422
Unit: USD/TOE
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3.4 Government Revenues for Financing Energy 
Sector Programs
The importance of securing sustainable revenue 
flow for the government to fund its policy measures 
cannot be overstated. In the ROK, the government 
has established and managed the Special Account 
for Energy and Natural Resource Projects and the 
Electric Power Industry Basis Fund by imposing 
a levy on supply and consumption of petroleum 
and electricity. The accumulated fund is strictly 
designated to finance the government’s energy 
programs. 
The Special Account for Energy and Natural 
Resource Projects aims to stabilize the nation’s 
supply and demand for energy while fostering 
energy price stability. The fund is mobilized by 
collecting tariff on petroleum/LNG import and sales 
and consumer charges for gas safety. For example, 
16 KRW was imposed per liter of crude oil and 
petroleum products imported as of 2012, leading to 
a fund collection worth 1.1 trillion KRW. 
The accumulated fund is used for investments on 
government-led projects involving the activities 
below: 
• Support toward state-owned energy R&D 
research centers 
• Support for government-led programs related to 
the development and deployment of renewable 
energy technology 
• Support for government-led programs on energy-
saving facilities
• Investment in state-owned companies specializing 
in energy and natural resource development
• Support for private sector projects that 
pursue overseas energy and natural resource 
development 
• Operation of government’s policies and programs 
related to climate change response (e.g., TMS)
On the other hand, the government established 
the Electric Power Industry Basis Fund in 2000 to 
acquire resources to build the foundation for the 
electric power industry and sustain its development. 
The main source of the fund is the fee charged 
at electricity bills, which is capped at 6.5% of the 
electricity rates, and has been set at 3.7% in 2006 
and has remained the same ever since. The volume 
of the fund has continued to increase over the years, 
from 0.3 billion KRW in 2001 to 2.3 trillion KRW 
in 2012. KEPCO is in charge of collecting the fees 
while MOTIE is responsible for managing the fund. 
Under the low-carbon green growth agenda, the 
fund has been channeling its resources for deploying 
smart-grid systems, R&D on NRE technologies, and 
operational costs of the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme. 
The proceeds of the fund will finance grants or 
loans that seek to stabilize the supply of electricity, 
including the activities below:
• Energy suppliers’ efforts to expand the 
deployment of NRE sources
• Government-led programs on electricity demand 
management 
• Government-led projects on rural electrification 
for remote islands and other isolated areas
• R&D projects relevant to electricity use
• Research and public relations on safe electricity 
use
Table 22: Annual revenue and expenditure of the Special Account for Energy and  Natural Resource Projects (2012)
Source: MOTIE, 2014
Category
Annual 
Revenue
Category
Annual 
Expenditure
Government contribution 81 Support towards state-owned energy research centers 201
Tariff on petroleum imports 1,941 Climate change and energy programs 673
Sales tax on petroleum products 282 Low-carbon green growth programs 582
Recollection of loan repayments 
and interests
1,180 Energy and natural resource development projects 1,178
Others 1,211 Others 1,552
Total 4,695 Total 4,186
Unit=KRW/kWh
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4. Assessment
A paradigm shift in energy supply and demand that 
promotes low-carbon green growth requires the 
improvement of fundamental industrial structure. 
However, demand patterns, once created, are hard 
to change in the short term. Energy users may 
respond to incentives in the short term but without 
significant structural reforms, they are likely to 
revert back to the old ways. On the other hand, it 
takes many years to replace existing energy systems 
requiring large front-end costs and with long 
lifespans (i.e., high inertia). Therefore, energy supply-
side policies ideally involve long-term planning 
horizons. 
To understand the context behind the 
implementation of the Five-Year Plan (2009-2013) 
in the ROK, it should be noted that the increasing 
calls for investment in renewable energy became 
less appealing after 2009 due to dramatic changes 
in the energy market, especially when the North 
American Shale Gas Revolution helped stabilize 
the international energy markets. Stabilizing oil 
prices and plummeting price of carbon credits have 
affected the popularity of NRE investments.  In 
addition, the implementation of the post-2012 global 
climate regime was delayed to 2020. The 2011 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster also prompted 
some countries to revert to using fossil fuels like 
coal, and the rising distrust of nuclear power led to 
a heightened public awareness of energy security 
issues. 
Sector 2000 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2009-2013
Growth (%)
Energy Consumption (million TOE) 149.9 182.6 182.1 195.6 205.9 208.1 210.2 15.5
- Industry 83.9 106.5 106.1 116.9 126.9 128.3 130.9 23.4
- Transportation 30.9 35.8 35.9 36.9 36.9 37.1 37.3 3.9
- Residential and Commercial 32.4 36.2 35.7 37.3 37.5 37.9 37.3 4.5
- Public and Others 2.6 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.7 8.7
Energy Consumption by Industry (million TOE)
- Petroleum Products 48.2 54.7 56.4 57.4 59.6 59.7 60.1 6.6
- Anthracite Coal 1.3 3.9 4.2 4.9 5.8 4.8 5.0 18.0
- Bituminous Coal 17.8 21.2 18.7 23.4 26.9 26.4 26.8 43.2
- Electricity 11.4 16.7 17.0 19.2 20.8 21.4 22.1 29.9
- Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG - - - 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5
- City Gas 3.3 5.9 5.9 7.3 8.4 9.5 9.9 68.1
- Others 1.9 3.9 3.9 4.2 4.6 5.8 6.5 68.4
Targeted Energy Intensity (TOE/million KRW) - - 0.236 0.234 0.228 0.222 0.217 -
Actual Energy Intensity (TOE/million KRW) 0.278 0.249 0.248 0.253 0.256 0.252 0.247 -
Source: KEEI, 2014
Table 23: Changes in energy consumption and intensity in the ROK 
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These developments reveal how the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of low-carbon green growth has 
been continuously challenged in the ROK. It is clear 
that skyrocketing oil prices primarily drives public 
interest toward energy-saving initiatives and NRE 
deployment. However, oil price stabilization drives 
the national energy policy away from pursuing 
energy security through a stable energy mix. In 
2011, the nation suffered from rolling blackouts 
because the unexpectedly hot summer temperatures 
triggered high power consumption during the 
maintenance period of a number of nuclear power 
plants. The government also halted the operation 
of several nuclear reactors for safety inspection 
due to growing concerns over the poor quality of 
its components. Following the Fukushima disaster, 
the public has become skeptical of nuclear energy 
as revealed by the local residents’ opposition to the 
construction of new nuclear facilities. 
4.1 Quantitative Assessment
The primary goals under the energy agenda 
presented by the Five-year Plan for Green Growth 
are the improvement of energy-use efficiency and 
expansion of NRE deployment. First, in terms of 
energy intensity which reflects energy efficiency 
performance, the ROK reached another peak in 
2011, thus falling short of meeting the set targets 
under the First National Energy Basic Plan. This 
rebound in energy intensity, which exhibited a steady 
decline after 1997 (0.295 TOE/million KRW), was 
brought by the heightened industrial activities in the 
course of economic recovery.
The increase in the total energy consumption over 
the 2009-2013 period far exceeded the projections 
in 2008. This was driven strongly by the industrial 
sector, which registered a staggering growth of 
23.4% for four years. Note that as of 2012, the 
energy consumption by the industrial and public 
sectors surpassed the government projections 
by 13.6% and 2.7%, respectively, while the 
consumption was below the projected levels for the 
transportation, residential, and commercial sectors. 
Consequently, the share of industrial consumption 
in the total energy use reached 61.4% in 2012, 
which did not meet the anticipated decline as what 
was achieved in the past (57.5% in 2007 to 56.1% in 
2012). 
The GDP growth of the manufacturing sector from 
2009-2013 reached 28%, which surpassed the 
national GDP growth of 16.3% over the same period. 
Thus, the industrial growth propelled the overall 
economic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis 
but impeded the achievement of energy-efficiency 
targets. An in-depth examination of consumption 
patterns by energy source reveals that the increased 
demand for bituminous coal, city gas, and electricity 
by the industrial sector caused significant changes in 
the nation’s energy portfolio:
• A rapid expansion of blast furnace capacities by 
the steel manufacturing sector contributed to a 
43.2% growth (calorie basis) in bituminous coal 
consumption over 2009-2013. 
• High global prices of naphtha – commonly used by 
the oil refinery and chemical industries – were the 
prime cause of the increased consumption of its 
substitute, city gas. Similarly, the increased global 
prices of kerosene (due to increased demand 
for electricity generation after the Fukushima 
disaster) and expanded use of buses powered by 
compressed natural gas (CNG) also triggered the 
increase in city gas consumption. From 2009-
2013, the industry and transportation sectors 
exhibited a 68.1% and 35.3% increase in city gas 
consumption, respectively.
• Taking advantage of the relatively low electricity 
prices, the manufacturing sector specifically 
the steel, chemical, machinery, and electronics 
industries registered an increase in electricity 
consumption (29.9% increase) in 2009-2013. 
Likewise, the households and commercial 
sector’s shift from petroleum (19.3% decrease) 
to electricity (10.2% increase) was evident in the 
same period.
At the heart of the problem is the fact that the 
energy intensity levels of the ROK’s major industries 
are exceptionally high compared to other economic 
activities. For instance, the production of steel, 
chemicals, and transportation materials (i.e., car 
making and shipbuilding) constitute the largest 
components of the overall manufacturing sector 
with energy input ratios10 of 7.6%, 18.9%, and 21.8%, 
respectively. Such figures far exceed the energy 
input ratio for electronics manufacturing, which 
10 | Energy input ratio is equivalent to the amount of energy input divided by gross input in production; the statistics provided in this section are as of 2012.
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stands at 1.4%. Accordingly, the energy consumption 
per capita of the ROK’s industrial sector is well 
above those of the world’s leading manufacturing 
countries, including Germany and Japan. However, 
this does not imply that the ROK’s manufacturing 
sector has high levels of absolute energy intensity 
compared to its global competitors.
In terms of NRE deployment rate, the ROK struggled 
to meet the target of getting NRE to comprise 3.78% 
of the total primary energy supply by 2013. Despite 
the continued annual growth, the NRE share as of 
2013 fell short of the target by 0.26%. While it is 
encouraging that the growth of NRE generation was 
several times higher than the growth of the total 
primary energy supply, it should be noted that bio 
and waste energy make up for more than 80% of 
the total NRE generation in the ROK. While NRE 
constitutes 3.86% of the nation’s total electricity 
generation, this figure drops to 1.67% if energy 
generated from non-renewable resources were to 
be excluded, in accordance with the IEA standards. 
Globally, this figure places ROK at the bottom of the 
list among OECD countries.
The government’s decision to phase out the FIT 
scheme and adopt the RPS has had some positive 
outcomes in increasing the NRE installation capacity. 
As previously pointed out, the RPS was able to 
accelerate the deployment of NRE several times 
faster than the recorded increase in NRE generation 
capacity under the FIT scheme. However, RPS only 
achieved 64.7% and 67.2% of the set targets in 
2012 and 2013, respectively, and most of the new 
installations are related to solar energy. 
Specifically, the targets for wind and ocean energy 
were by far underachieved, as many energy 
producers failed to overcome the obstacles created 
by the government’s strengthened regulations on 
land use and environmental protection. In addition, 
NRE investment plans were heavily challenged 
by local opposition groups, which revealed how 
winning public support for NRE deployment remains 
farfetched. For instance, the approval of offshore 
wind farm projects heavily promoted by the central 
government has made slow progress at the local 
level due to the local governments’ growing fears of 
public backlash. 
Meanwhile, the ROK’s domestic NRE industry 
produced tangible results due to the government’s 
support. From 2008 to 2012, the industry achieved 
a 1.5 times increase in the number of NRE 
companies, 1.8 times increase in employment, a 
two-fold increase in sales, and 1.5 times increase 
in exports. However, the sustained viability of the 
NRE industry is questionable as its growth has been 
fundamentally supported by the government’s 
proactive interventions to leverage low investments. 
The increasing volume of NRE component imports 
from China demonstrated how increasing NRE 
deployment does not necessarily result in the growth 
of the domestic NRE industry. 
Figure 11: Energy consumption per capita by sector  
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4.2 Qualitative Assessment
The  ROK’s  energy  policies  and  plans  under  the  
low-carbon  green  growth  strategy  have  been 
coherently formulated with specific targets and  
policies. Despite the evolving landscape of the 
global energy market, the government remained 
ambitious in terms of meeting the targets. For 
example, the Sixth  Basic  Plan  for  Power  Supply  
and  Demand  (2013-2027)  released  in  2013  
actually  escalated  the nation’s  NRE  deployment 
target, from  7% to  12%  of  the total  primary  
energy  supply  by  2027. Indeed, such goals have 
veered away from the tradition of setting energy 
security as a supplementary objective since past 
government strategies have perfunctorily included 
NRE deployment as a priority without providing a 
detailed action plan.
Despite  the  positive  progress,  the  ROK’s  efforts  
in  transitioning  toward  a  cleaner  and  less energy-
intensive  economy  still  have  a  long  way  to  go,  
as  the economy’s  flagship  industries  remain  
highly energy-intensive.  On  a  positive  note,  the  
2009-2013 period  was  successful  in  highlighting  
the importance  of  influencing  the  demand-side  
Sector 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2009-2013
Growth (%)
Targeted NRE Share
(% of nation’s total primary energy supply) 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.54 3.78 40.0
Actual NRE Share
(% of nation’s total primary energy supply) 2.50 2.60 2.74 3.18 3.52 40.8
Total Primary Energy Supply (thousand TOE) 243,311 263,805 276,636 278,698 280,290 15.2
Total NRE Generation (thousand TOE) 6,086 6,856 7,583 8,851 9,879 (100.0%) 62.3
- Solar 152 195 225 264 372 (3.8%) 144.3
- Wind 147 176 186 193 242 (2.5%) 64.5 
- Hydro (includes large hydro) 607 792 965 815 892 (9.0%) 47.1
- Ocean 0 0 11 98 102 (1.0%) -
- Geothermal 22 33 48 65 87 (0.9%) 293.0
- Bio 580 755 963 1,335 1,558 (15.8%) 168.5
- Waste 4,558 4,862 5,122 5,999 6,502 (65.8%) 42.7 
- Fuel Cell 19 42 63 83 122 (1.2%) 537.8
Source: KEEI, 2014
Table 24: Amount of NRE generation and its share of total primary energy supply
Sector 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of Business Entities 100 134 187 209 225 200
Number of Jobs 3,532 6,496 10,000 13,149 14,563 11,836
Investment Volume (billion KRW) 623 1,901 2,955 3,537 9,357 6,467
Sales (billion KRW) 1,233 3,268 4,463 7,663 9,357 6,467
Export (100 million US$) 7.4 17.1 21.3 39.3 47.7 25.2
Table 25: Growth of domestic NRE industry in the ROK
Source: MOTIE, 2014
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management,  which  was  embraced  widely  across  
the nation and challenged the long-held conviction 
that stable energy supply is the "silver bullet" to 
energy security. The mid- and long-term targets 
on energy intensity and NRE deployment provided 
a strong signal  for  boosting  investment,  while  
serving  as  a guidepost  for  the  required  levels  
of  technological innovation. However, there are 
important shortfalls that should not be overlooked, 
particularly in terms of   achieving   the   practicality   
and   effectiveness   of   energy   policy   instruments 
and the   state’s commitment to implementing the 
much-promised reforms.
Failure in Robust Energy Price Signaling 
The delayed reforms in energy pricing hamper 
the improvement of energy intensity in the ROK. 
Given its  high  energy  imports,  energy  pricing  is  
a  matter  of  national  importance  as  it  has  clear  
and  direct economic impacts at the micro- and 
macro-levels. The bottlenecks in energy price 
reform are largely political,  running  counter  to  
the  public  demand  for  protecting  social  welfare  
and  fostering  economic competitiveness.  Despite  
the  highly  fluctuating  global  energy  prices,  the  
rationalization  of  energy prices  was  still  prevalent. 
Low  energy  prices  act  as  a  critical  barrier  to  
energy  efficiency,  making relevant investments less 
attractive and encouraging energy users to sustain 
their existing energy use patterns.
The ROK’s experience demonstrates the limitations 
of government’s regulatory efforts due to the 
lack of robust energy-pricing signals. Although 
subsidizing energy-conservation investments with 
revenue levied on fossil fuel imports may  have  
positive  short-term  outcomes,  this  strategy  is  
contradictory in the  long  term  as  energy  saving  
runs  the  risk  of  jeopardizing  the  security  of 
budget  required  in sustaining  the  provision  of  
incentives.  Without  doubt,  an  essential  policy  
tool  to  optimize  energy efficiency  and  expand  
deployment  of  NRE  is  to  establish  a  pricing  
system  that  responds  well  to market forces. 
Therefore, the ROK’s urgent task is to push for 
transforming its energy pricing system to reflect the 
real cost of energy use.
Deficiencies in Driving a Fundamental 
Transformation 
The ROK’s ambition for energy efficiency has 
painstaking implications for its economy. Underlying 
the nation’s economic success story is a vicious cycle: 
government’s excessive energy demand projections 
(reflecting aspirations for strong economic growth); 
high public investments in energy infrastructure; 
lowering of energy prices due to oversupply in the 
market; and increase in energy demand (KEI, 2013). 
The idealist dilemma of government policies that fail 
to make fundamental changes to the energy market 
(i.e., piecemeal adoption of regulations that have 
proven successful in developed countries), and the 
nation’s lack of commitment to break away from 
the vicious cycle also contributed to the failure in 
meeting the energy intensity targets.
For instance, the ETS was on the brink of disapproval 
due to the fierce opposition from industries and 
businesses. The government decided to delay 
the proposed tax on vehicle carbon emissions to 
the end of 2020 due to the rising pressure from 
domestic car makers who fear that the levy could 
curb sales. Two important policy interventions (i.e., 
Energy Efficiency Resource Standards/EERS and 
Top-Runner Approach), which were deemed critical 
in transforming the energy marketplace as laid out 
by the First National Basic Energy Plan (2008) and 
Fourth Fourth Basic Plan for Rationalization of 
Energy Use (2008), were also postponed indefinitely.
• The EERS is a scheme that mandates energy 
utilities (and/or distributors) to achieve 
quantitative goals for reducing sales through 
energy efficiency programs for customers. By 
placing responsibility for energy efficiency 
requirements on the utility company, energy 
utilities support energy users to find the most 
cost-effective and readily available ways of energy 
conservation. While the scheme was reviewed as 
an effective market-driven approach for demand-
side management by the government, the state-
owned energy utilities subject to the scheme 
expressed strong opposition, raising questions on 
how the reduced sales could be compensated for. 
The government planned to launch the scheme in 
2012 but it was postponed without further notice.
• The Top-Runner Approach is an innovative 
program that seeks to save energy consumed by 
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the use of electronic appliances by identifying 
the most energy-efficient model (“top runner”) 
for a given product category and setting its 
performance as the minimum standard to be 
achieved by all models sold in the market within 
a specified number of years. Recognizing how 
the nationwide regulatory policies for energy 
efficiency (i.e., TMS, ETS, and EERS) have focused 
on transforming the energy and industrial sectors, 
the ROK government planned to adopt the Top-
Runner Approach from 2010 to stimulate changes 
in the non-industrial sector. However, the plan was 
discarded due to strong opposition from appliance 
manufacturers, who claimed that the scheme 
would be an additional burden to the existing 
measures (e.g., energy efficiency certifications 
and low standby power warning labels). Most 
importantly, the Top-Runner Approach was 
perceived as an obstacle in enabling the domestic 
sales market to recover from the global financial 
crisis. 
Limitations in NRE Strategies 
The core of the ROK’s NRE policies during the 
period of the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth was 
to increase NRE deployment and foster relevant 
domestic industries. Given the nation’s geographical 
and climate-related constraints, aiming for the 
11% (of nation’s primary energy supply) target by 
2030 was by all means very ambitious. For example, 
the UK, with an annual volume of total energy 
consumption similar to the levels of the ROK, 
possesses wind energy development potential of 
approximately 10,600 TWh/year which is more 
than ten times that of the ROK (Lua, et al., 
2009). In addition, the technological levels and 
price competitiveness of the ROK’s domestically 
produced NRE components have remained well 
below the global standards, thus revealing the still 
low financial viability of NRE development. To boost 
NRE deployment, the government provided huge 
subsidies, including long-term contracts with energy 
generators, paying for the wholesale market rates 
for electricity (especially under the FIT scheme). 
The government’s low pricing policy for electricity 
and its shortcomings to create the enabling 
conditions for investment impede the progress in 
NRE deployment. As mentioned previously, under 
the low pricing structure whereby the high costs in 
electricity supply from NRE installations were pushed 
onto the public utilities, government subsidies was 
recognized as an unacceptable fiscal burden, which 
explains why the government decided to switch from 
the FIT scheme to RPS in 2012. On the other hand, 
the government failed to take adequate steps to 
secure potential sites for NRE development. Indeed, 
utility companies under the RPS, which were required 
to source a certain amount of their power generation 
from renewable sources, had difficulties in finding and 
securing sites for their facilities. In particular, many 
wind farm and tidal power projects have not pushed 
through due to strong opposition from environmental 
groups and local residents who are concerned about 
the noise and environmental damage of NRE projects. 
The limited feasible sites for NRE facilities intensified 
competition between power suppliers for securing 
financially viable locations for building new facilities. 
The local residents often demand compensation and 
oppose the construction if their demands are not met. 
Deploying NRE has boosted the local economy but 
the government needs to address the problems 
related to the sites of NRE facilities when the 
demands of locals are likely to increase the front-
end costs of investments, thereby discouraging 
investment by the power producers. Many of the 
favorable locations for wind energy in the ROK (i.e., 
sites with average wind speeds greater than 6m/s) 
are, for example, in ecologically protected areas. 
Moreover, tidal power installations could pose 
serious threats to wildlife and people’s livelihoods. 
The government thus has to maneuver through 
these obstacles by reaching an agreement with 
local authorities, environmental specialists, power 
producers, NGOs, and local stakeholders.  Some of 
the vital tasks that could speed up NRE deployment 
include central government interventions to 
streamline the project approval process (e.g., 
sharpening legislation and implementation 
guidelines to ensure robust assessment of 
environmental impacts); stronger commitment 
of local authorities to resolve the conflicts over 
stakeholder relocation and compensation; and 
awareness-raising activities by investors and NGOs 
to gain public support for NRE development. 
Despite some of the tangible outcomes achieved 
by the local NRE industry, it still accounts for less 
than 1% of the ROK’s export volume. Based on this 
figure, the government’s target to capture 5% of the 
global NRE market by 2012 proved to be unrealistic. 
In many aspects, the government’s efforts to foster 
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NRE industries need to be tested in a longer term, 
given the evolving nature of the global NRE market 
and the ROK’s achievement in narrowing the 
technological gap. The Korea Energy Economics 
Institute (KEEI) reported in 2013 that the nation’s 
average level of NRE technologies stands at 81.7% 
vis-á-vis global leaders – with solar, hydro, and 
bio-energy technologies having reached the world’s 
highest levels (KEEI, 2013c). However, the domestic 
NRE industry still struggles in commercializing and 
pilot-testing its technology goods, primarily due 
to the lack of adequate financing (i.e., presence 
of financiers with an appetite for high risk and 
high returns), human capital (i.e., lack of experts 
in specialized technical fields), and market 
opportunities (i.e., small size of the domestic market 
as a test-bed for export market). 
The global renewable energy market went through 
a volatile period as it recovered from the 2007 
financial crisis, largely hampering opportunities for 
a second-mover market win. The volume of global 
investments in renewable energy development 
has continued to decline in 2012-2013 due to the 
reduced demand from the EU, which has been 
leading the world’s renewable energy market. 
The declining unit prices of renewable energy 
installations have also contributed to the decreasing 
global market volume. The ROK’s challenge lies in 
diversifying its export targets (i.e., China and Japan 
which are countries revealing big plans and numbers) 
while promoting R&D initiatives to help achieve 
higher price competitiveness of domestic NRE 
products. However, it is questionable whether the 
current government is keen on promoting the NRE 
industry as one of its export industries. The target 
has been revised downward from 10% to 8% by 2022 
under the domestic RPS program in 2014 to ease the 
burden on energy producers. In addition, many of the 
large conglomerates have started to scale back their 
NRE businesses due to high global competition. 
5. Takeaways and 
Recommendations
The ROK’s remarkable economic growth over the 
past decades, despite its lack of domestic energy 
resources, can be credited to the government’s 
energy-supply interventions such as reducing risks in 
energy imports, diversifying its energy portfolio, and 
introducing market mechanisms to improve supply 
efficiency. However, the quantitative expansion of 
the energy market – which was driven by sustained 
surplus in energy supply over demand – has long 
neglected to prioritize and resolve the fundamental 
challenge of high dependency on fossil fuel imports 
and increased environmental loads. Accordingly, the 
past efforts to emphasize demand-side management 
and a shift away from fossil-fuel use was seriously 
undermined by the strong prevalence of more input- 
for more output-oriented ideals.
Due to the economic slowdown and energy 
challenges, the ROK’s adoption of the low-carbon 
green growth paradigm was not just an option, but 
a necessity. The nation’s energy dilemma has clear 
implications for other countries in this respect as its 
experience highlights how developing economies 
need to tackle environmental challenges in the early 
stages of development by shaping demand patterns 
considering long-term supply constraints. In an era 
of climate change, overcoming poverty based on 
economic growth that is rooted resource-intensive 
activities and technologies has less chance of 
sustained success and entails greater costs. 
Notwithstanding its limitations, the ROK’s energy 
policies provide several invaluable lessons. First, the 
government’s early efforts to institutionalize and 
mainstream energy efficiency into energy policies 
have had positive outcomes. Amidst the second 
global oil crisis (1979), the government passed the 
Energy Use Rationalization Act and created KEMCO 
to lead the nation’s energy conservation efforts. This 
eventually laid a solid foundation for strengthening 
the energy demand-side management plans (i.e., 
Fourth Basic Plan for Rationalization of Energy Use, 
2008-2012) and implementing energy conservation 
programs (i.e., ESCOs, tax-credits, and government 
loans for energy-saving facilities).
Timely efforts to secure public revenues enabled 
the ROK government to exploit various incentive 
schemes, which were important in balancing its 
use of top-down regulatory schemes. By imposing 
levies on petroleum supply, the government created 
special funds for energy-saving initiatives as early as 
1980. The proceeds of these funds played a critical 
role at the peak of the country’s energy intensity 
in 1997, followed by a steady decline until 2009. 
These funds also served as the financial basis for the 
government’s energy saving and NRE deployment 
initiatives implemented under the Five-Year Plan for 
Green Growth.
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Given the intensive capital and technology required 
in the energy industry, the central government 
in many developed countries is deeply involved 
in the energy market as it has better capacity 
than the private sector to mobilize the necessary 
resources. However, government control over 
energy pricing in the ROK has demonstrated how 
excessive intervention tends to distort investments 
and interfere with the spotting of market signals by 
energy users. In this context, even the most effective 
interventions for enhancing energy efficiency and 
increasing NRE deployment can become ineffective, 
largely due to “government failure” rather than 
“market failure.” 
The government needs to precisely understand and 
monitor the market value of its policy instruments 
as “too much” support will distort the entire 
energy market and “too little” intervention will 
be likewise ineffective. In addition to supporting 
the policymakers’ commitment to sustaining their 
actions, such efforts can also help persuade the 
stakeholders in providing the necessary support. 
Much of the industrial and business opposition 
to government plans in the ROK have arisen 
from disagreements over the impacts of penalty 
and reward scenarios (e.g.,RPS, ETS). Hence, the 
government must properly identify the “winners” 
and “losers” of its policies, prove that the benefits 
outweigh the costs, and avoid triggering of rent-
seeking behaviors.
The ROK government recognized technology 
innovation as the key to realizing its energy 
aspirations, as proven by its subsidies to R&D 
initiatives across a wide range of activities. 
Cooperative efforts by research institutions and 
private sector entities (including public utility 
companies) to commercialize energy saving and 
NRE generation technologies have received frontal 
government support. Such action should be well 
credited for as technologies have become an integral 
part of all energy business models, from production 
of primary energy resources to final use in industrial 
facilities. 
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1.1 Overview
Technological advantage serves as the source of 
industrial competitiveness in an ever-changing 
world. Innovation in technology is often considered 
a prerequisite for economic growth, and the main 
challenge for innovation policies stems from the 
need to fast-track technological development in an 
efficient manner. Generally, the term “technological 
innovation” refers to the development of innovative 
products or realizing groundbreaking improvements 
in manufacturing processes, which are crucial 
elements that determine the competitive edge 
of industries. Experiences of many advanced and 
newly industrialized countries have illustrated 
how this process determines the success or 
failure of businesses; accelerating the technology 
development-commercialization-marketing 
process is key to improving the productivity and 
competitiveness of economies. 
The OECD’s conference proceedings report on 
“Patents, Innovation and Economic Performance 
(2004)” provides concrete examples based on 
empirical analysis of the impact of technological 
innovation on economic growth in OECD countries. 
Investment in technology R&D and protection of 
intellectual assets were listed as decisive factors 
driving economic growth.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) transformed itself 
into a newly industrialized country thanks to the 
efforts of domestic companies that have successfully 
introduced and internalized advanced technologies 
under supportive government interventions. How 
could the ROK achieve such accomplishments 
despite its inherent constraints of having a small 
territory, large population, and limited amount of 
natural resources? Technological innovation has a 
key role to play in overcoming these challenges.
Generally, developing countries implement various 
strategies that aim to transfer technologies from 
CHAPTER 4 
GREEN TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
1. Introduction 
Summary
Technological innovation has been a key enabler of the ROK’s growth especially in its earliest stages of economic ascent. 
Today, it remains paramount in the context of the nation’s low-carbon green growth strategy as it regards green technology 
as a new growth engine – a strategic pivot that creates a virtuous cycle of environmental, economic, and social benefits. 
The ROK has a long way to go in this field given how other developed countries have made advances in the past but by 
adopting the principle of selection and concentration and significantly boosting R&D investments, it has succeeded in 
narrowing the technological gap with the global leaders. Among the 27 key green technologies selected as priority areas 
for investment and commercialization, positive outcomes are most evident in secondary cells and LED while the progress 
in other technologies will require more time and resources to be globally competitive. The government has played 
multiple roles in this endeavor as a provider of direction, target setter, and financier. Key policies include expanding basic 
research and generic technology development through green technological convergence, fostering specific technologies 
for greening energy-intensive industries, investing in eco-friendly technologies with the highest potential impact, and 
strengthening green R&D infrastructure.  
142
advanced countries. Such strategies can typically be 
divided into two types: 
(1) attracting multinational corporations to build 
production bases and thus seeking to maximize 
technological spillovers; and 
(2) strengthening the country’s own R&D capacities 
in an effort to learn and internalize imported 
technologies (Cho, 2000). 
The ROK’s strategy falls within the latter type; the 
government sought to maximize opportunities 
of technology transfer primarily by fostering the 
nation’s own R&D capacity. If the 1960s-1970s 
marked a period when the government’s technology 
policies focused on prioritizing technology items for 
import and promoting their domestic internalization, 
the 1980s-1990s was a period when independent 
technological innovation was strongly supported 
by the government through the provision of grants, 
tax credits, and enacting appropriate legislation 
(e.g., Basic Science Research Promotion Act, 1989; 
Invention Promotion Act, 1994). Accordingly, 
industries that started off from simply importing 
and imitating foreign products aspired to learn 
and internalize relevant technologies that 
eventually engaged them in developing their own. 
Government’s investments that helped create 
effective platforms for technology R&D, and 
interventions to protect domestic industries played 
an important role in this process.
The ROK’s current plans in promoting “green 
technology innovation” also follow this systematic 
approach toward technology development that the 
nation has been pursuing until now. In other words, 
the government once again invested heavily in 
fostering the R&D capacities of industries engaged 
in the manufacturing of energy-efficient and 
eco-friendly products, the sector which has been 
targeted to become a new engine for the nation’s 
economic growth. It is important to note that the 
government strategically focused on key areas that 
were relevant to the country’s existing technological 
capabilities and considered to have the highest 
potential for advancing into or creating new markets. 
One example is solar cell technology. The increasing 
global demand for solar cell components was 
identified as an  opportunity, especially as relevant 
technologies and manufacturing processes are 
already being used in the semiconductor industry, 
which is a sector where the ROK already stands as a 
global leader. 
The government viewed green technology as the 
strategic pivot that creates a virtuous cycle of 
environmental protection and economic growth. 
Against this backdrop, the government developed a 
clear concept of how it envisioned green technology 
and presented directions for investment. Generally, 
green technology refers to technologies that enable 
the sustainable utilization of resources, such as 
renewable energy technologies. However, the ROK 
government expanded this concept by linking it to 
the mechanisms of technological convergence. 
The ROK’s concept of “Green Technology 
Convergence” promotes the convergence of 
existing and/or emerging technologies such as IT 
(Information Technology), BT (Biotechnology), 
and NT (Nanotechnology) in an effort to maximize 
the opportunities of improving environmental 
performance. Indeed, this concept incorporates the 
government’s intention to fully utilize the nation’s 
know-how and competitiveness in emerging IT, BT, 
and NT.
What is technological innovation?  
Technological innovation refers to a transformation 
of economic structure brought about by the 
commercialization of breakthrough technologies. 
Given that the process of technology development 
can be divided into the three stages of invention, 
innovation, and diffusion, the meaning of 
“technological innovation” was perceived (from 
the perspective of academia) to be the second 
stage in which new products or manufacturing 
processes are realized. 
Today, however, it is more broadly acknowledged 
as the entire process of technological development 
and is often referred to as introduction of new 
technologies and practices to a given society or 
economy (GGGI, 2015).
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Source: NSTC, 2009
Conventional Green Technology 
Energy 
Generation
•     New and 
      Renewable Energy
•     Nuclear energy
Efﬁciency
Improvement
•     Electricity
•     Transportation 
      and residential 
      building
End-of-pipe
Treatment
•     Air pollution
•     Waste recycling
Overcoming the limitations of 
existing technologies
Note: CT stands for cultural technology, ST for space technology, and ET for environmental technology 
Creating new 
technology markets
Green 
Technology
Convergence
NTET
ST CT
IT BT
Figure 1: Concept of green technology convergence
+
144
1.2 Baseline Assessment 
Root Causes of Challenges
Advanced countries have long realized that 
“environmental issues” provide opportunities 
to create new engines of economic growth. 
Having witnessed a dramatic increase in demand 
for renewable energy facilities following the 
implementation of the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU-ETS), governments anticipated that 
the creation of such new markets would inevitably 
expand at the global scale if the world was to make a 
transition into a low-carbon pathway. Understanding 
technological innovation as a key success factor 
for entering and competing in newborn markets, 
advanced countries including Japan and the U.S. 
have made early commitments to R&D initiatives. It 
is important to understand that such actions have 
also been followed by several developing countries 
as well. One good example is China, a country that 
has become the largest solar panel manufacturer 
in the world. Such accomplishment is an outcome 
of increasing R&D activities, engaging in M&A 
transactions to accelerate product innovations, 
and strong government commitment to nurturing 
domestic industries.
Amid rapid industrialization, the ROK has failed 
to take enough actions to address the nation’s 
environmental problems and technologies for their 
abatement. More recently, the nation’s economy has 
been experiencing jobless growth and weakening 
of its major growth engines. With climate change 
and resource crisis emerging as immediate risks, 
energy and environmental issues became decisive 
factors determining the future of the national 
economy. Under the circumstances, developed 
countries that were already several steps ahead 
in commercializing green technologies posed a 
significant threat to the ROK’s economy. Technology-
driven regulations of developed countries started 
to act as trade barriers for the ROK’s export items. 
Hence, if the ROK’s industries were failed to keep 
pace with the technological innovations, the nation’s 
export performance was most likely to be severely 
hampered. The trend toward an increasing number 
of TBTs (Technical Barriers to Trade) notifications 
being issued by the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
is a good reflection of the changing context of the 
global market. Under the growing interest in climate 
change and environmental protection, the number of 
TBT notifications related to energy and environment 
has soared from 99 in 2004 to 269 in 2009.
Examples of changes in EU markets due to 
tightening environmental regulations 
Eco-design requirement for Energy-using Products 
(EuPs, 2015)
EuP stipulates environmentally friendly design standards 
for household electronics, including set-top boxes, 
lighting facilities, dishwashers, laundry machines, and 
refrigerators. Strengthened regulations in key areas such 
as energy efficiency have led to prohibiting imports and 
selling goods with low-energy performance goods in the 
EU market. For example:
• Washing machines must comply with standards set 
on energy efficiency and water consumption;
• Dishwashers must be accompanied by information 
on their energy efficiency. 
Mandatory participation of aviation industry in EU-ETS 
From 2012, both EU and non-EU airlines operating flights 
from, to, and within the European Economic Area (EEA) 
receive emission allowances and are required to comply 
with EU-ETS.
Regulations on vehicle emissions   
EU legislation set mandatory emission reduction targets 
for new cars since year 2012. Basically, the fleet average 
to be achieved is 130 g/km, but different emission limits 
apply according to the mass of vehicles.
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Relevant Problems
While the ROK boasts the highest level of industrial 
productivity (3rd out of 24 countries; OECD, 2006), 
the country remains at the bottom of the OECD’s 
list of countries (22nd out of 24 countries; OECD, 
2006) in terms of green productivity, an index which 
takes into consideration environmental performance 
in addition to industrial productivity. As reported 
by the “National Green Technology R&D Master 
Plan (2009),” the ROK’s levels of “green” technology 
remains at 50-70%1  of that of advanced countries, 
and its share of the global green energy market – e.g., 
renewable energy, energy efficient buildings – is 
minuscule at 1.4%. The ROK’s number of technical 
publications and patents, which reflects a nation’s 
technological competitiveness and efficiency of 
R&D investments, falls far behind the average of 
the world’s leading countries. In addition, technical 
publications and patents issued by the ROK were 
also found to lack quality, as indicated by their low 
levels of citations.
The ROK’s commitment to green technology in 
terms of its volume of R&D investments has been 
restricted by the continued needs for fueling 
innovation of its primary manufacturing industries. 
For example, green technology R&D received 
approximately 900 billion KRW as of 2008, which 
accounts for only 9.3% of its total R&D investment. 
While  the  ROK’s  R&D  expenditure  relative  to  
GDP  has continued  to  remain  well  above  the 
OECD  average  since  the  early  2000s,  green  
technologies  were never a part of the priority list of 
investment. Despite restricted budgetary support, 
R&D investments in  the  green  technology  sector  
were  being  centered  on  activities  that  specifically  
aim  for  product development, by-passing the costly 
and time-intensive efforts needed in developing core 
technologies. Such efforts geared toward product 
commercialization through the bundling of imported 
technologies are unlike the nation’s past experiences 
in building technological self-reliance. 
Policy Options
When the ROK announced its Five-Year National 
Plan for Green Growth in 2008, there was a rapid 
growth of the global “green” market, based upon 
expectations that it would reach the scale of the 
1 | Technological levels and industrial competitiveness are often evaluated against the levels of the global leaders in the ROK. Evaluations are primarily    
      based on qualitative analysis such as the Delphi method, expert surveys, and interviews, but are commonly supported by quantitative analysis 
      such as analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and use of relevant indicators (e.g., cites per patents, technology impact index).
Table 1: The ROK’s levels of technical publications and patents in the green technology sector 
Source: Lee, 2009
Sector Sub-category
Number of 
Publications 
Cites per 
Publication
Number of 
Patents
Cites per 
Patent
Prediction 
Technology
Climate change prediction 
and impact assessment
3.7 37.0 25.3 2.0
 
Energy Generation 
Technology 
Renewable energy 
(Solar, wind, bio, etc.)
23.0 49.9 11.2 4.8
Nuclear and nuclear fusion 22.9 33.1 6.4 6.5
Hydrogen and fuel cell 31.8 63.1 12.9 3.0
Efficiency Improvement 
Technology 
Efficiency improvement of transportation 9.5 36.6 9.1 3.7
Green land 5.1 47.4 23.1 4.1
Efficiency improvement of green 
process ad materials
14.5 45.1 15.6 4.2
Efficiency improvement of electricity 22.8 41.3 7.5 2.9
End-of-Pipe Technology
Monitoring and control of air pollution 5.2 72.5 8.0 2.9
Water quality 4.3 47.7 34.5 2.1
Environmental restoration 6.2 29.4 43.5 1.8
Waste recycling 12.1 31.1 16.8 2.5
Environmental health 4.0 38.6 8.5 7.4
Unit: Percentage of 10 global leaders
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global IT market in the near future. For example, 
the value of renewable energy markets projected 
for 2018 was US$ 325.10 billion, which is three 
times that of the US$ 115 billion in 2008 (Makower, 
Pernick, and Wilder, 2009). Although estimates of 
the size of the global green market vary according to 
sources, Innovas – a consulting firm commissioned 
by the British government to conduct market studies 
– estimated that the renewable energy market size 
as of year 2007-2008 was approximately US$ 4.3 
trillion. The report by Innovas breaks down the 
green goods and services (termed low-carbon and 
environmental goods and services, LCEGS) sector 
into three areas: traditional environmental services, 
such as recycling, and water and waste management; 
renewables, such as wind, hydropower and biomass; 
and emerging low carbon, including nuclear power, 
carbon finance and building technologies. Of the 
green market, the low-carbon business is expected 
to account for nearly half of the market, while 
renewable energy and traditional environmental 
activities comprise the remaining half. 
Such explosive growth of the global green market 
prompted the ROK government to envision green 
technology as the new driver for sustaining economic 
growth. The government set an ambitious goal of 
improving the nation’s technological level up to 80% 
of that of the world’s leaders by 2012, and up to 
90% by 2020. To this end, the National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC) formulated the “National 
Green Technology R&D Master Plan,” which is 
a comprehensive outline of the government’s 
strategy and investment plans, overriding all existing 
plans implemented by different line ministries. 
Subsequently, the government formulated the 
“Strategic Roadmap for Commercialization of 
Green Technologies” to help the industrial sector 
build capabilities to compete in the global market.
Source: Lee, 2009
Table 2: Action Plans for Green Technology Innovation under the Five-Year National Plan for Green Growth
Tasks Actions
1. Strategic expansion of 
the investment in green 
technology development 
a. Expand government-led green technology development
b. Strengthen balanced green technology R&D on basic and applied researches and application development  
c. Green the existing national R&D projects and technology development support system 
2. Establishment of 
an efficient green 
technology development 
system
a. Strengthen the integration and coordination system for green technology development  
b. Establish an industry-university-institute cooperation system considering the value chain of green 
     technology R&D 
c. Create a green technology R&D hub and establish local green technology development governance
3. Facilitation of 
the transfer and 
industrialization of 
     green technology 
a. Strengthen the platform to industrialize the outcome of government-led green 
     technology development projects  
b. Carry out projects for a practical use of green technology to promote the transfer and industrialization 
     of green technologies 
c. Build a platform to facilitate green technology startups  
4. Expansion of 
infrastructure for the 
development of green 
technology and industry  
a. Train competent manpower in the green technology to ensure the development of green technology   
     into a growth engine 
b. Build advanced testing, certification, standardization infrastructures for green growth  
c. Set up a world class green technology information system 
5. Promotion of 
international 
cooperation for green 
technology development
a. Promote strategic partnership with world’s powerhouse of green technology through international 
     organizations  
b. Enhance green innovation capability through the globalization of green technology development and  
     diffusion  
c. Build up the substructure of international cooperation in green technology development 
6. Development of green 
technology and industry 
into a new growth 
engine
a. Enhance the core competency of a company by securing green growth related core technology and 
     commercialization technology in advance  
b. Create early markets by adopting the international standards, product certification standards, and 
     mandatory scheme of eco-products procurement 
c. Ensure rational improvement of regulations, policies, and laws that interfere with  technology development, 
     private investment, and market creation
d. Promote green technology as an export drive by opening new overseas markets 
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“Green Technology Innovation” is one of the ten 
policy agenda items presented in the Five-Year 
National Plan for Green Growth and comprises 
six action plans. As shown in Table 2, these action 
plans cover different phases of technology 
development, from the early stage of basic research 
on scientific findings and practice, to diffusion and 
commercialization of technologies. 
Of significant importance is gaining an 
understanding of how this serves as another good 
example of the ROK model of technology innovation, 
which follows the principles of “selection and 
concentration” – to be discussed in the following 
sections of this chapter.
Figure 2: SWOT analysis for engagement in green technology 
•   Government’s strong 
commitment to green 
technology development; 
double R&D investment by 
2012)
•  Acquisition of essential 
technological capacity (IT, 
BT, NT, etc.) 
•   World-class science and 
technology capability 
•  Ability to industrialize new 
green technologies and 
develop competitiveness
•  Restructuring of the green 
technology market 
•  Acquisition of advanced green 
technologies 
-  Climate-related global   market  
-  Renewable and resource 
markets  
-   Green technology as corporate 
competitiveness
 
-   Entering the market in its early 
stage  
-   Engaging in global technology 
competition 
•  Wide NRE technology 
gap compared to 
advanced countries  
•  Inadequate invest-
ments in technology 
development compared 
to advanced countries 
•  Poor interagency 
cooperation 
•  Private sector’s lack of 
commitment 
•  Higher international 
market barriers due to 
strengthened environmen-
tal regulations 
•  Preoccupancy of green 
market by advanced 
countries 
•  Instability in the resource 
and energy market and 
potential risk of price rises 
•  Increased environmental 
and economic risks; 
mega-regionalization  
     synchronization
Strengths Weaknesses
Opportunities Threats
• 
Strategic 
Directions
Strategically promote 
investment
Establish efﬁcient 
technology development system 
Solidify 
infrastructure
Develop regional growth 
engines through 
Green Regional Innovation System
Source: PCGG, 2009b
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1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Growth
Technology innovation is the essential element 
to understanding how economic growth and 
environmental sustainability can be made mutually 
compatible. This is especially true, given how 
the tightening of environmental regulations has 
already reshaped the industrial landscape and 
placed green technologies at the center of business 
strategies. Although there are differing opinions 
on whether green industries will create more 
jobs than conventional “brown” industries, there 
is no doubt that the greening of the industrial 
sector will create additional job opportunities. 
It was within this context that former President 
Lee Myung-bak mentioned that “green growth’s 
success is dependent on technology innovation” 
and encouraged “businesses of all sectors and sizes 
to actively participate in technology innovation” 
(PCGG, 2010b). For the ROK’s economy, the 
emerging green market was a threat as much 
as it was an opportunity. As a latecomer to the 
market, the ROK was not expected to outstrip 
the leading competitors in the short term, but the 
government was optimistic and committed, as many 
green technologies were still at an early stage of 
development.
2. Targets and Strategies
2.1 Principles of Selection and Concentration
Over the course of 50 years, the ROK has achieved 
phenomenal economic development that is still to 
this day considered a rare miracle. While the key 
drivers for economic development can be multi-
faceted, many experts attribute the ROK’s economic 
success to the government’s strategy or principle of 
“selection and concentration.” Under the principle, 
government’s financial assets were directed into a 
selected number of industries or technologies that 
were deemed to have the highest future potential. 
Amid the challenges of confined land space, limited 
natural resources, and poverty (a consequence 
of the Korean War), this principle proved to be 
successful in turning one of the poorest countries in 
the world around to become a bona fide economic 
success within just half of a century. Korea’s related 
experiences provide meaningful implications for 
developing countries. 
The principle of selection and concentration was 
generally applied through the following process; 
first, the government selected primary sectors and 
industries of focus based on analysis of the global 
trends and future prospects. In the following stage, 
governance, law, and political infrastructure needed 
to foster the selected industries and technologies 
were established. In addition, relevant ministries 
came together to formulate mid- to long-term plans 
based on which rigorous R&D investments were 
initiated. Finally, innovators that participated in 
the strategic industry and technology development 
received full frontal support. During this process, 
the government sought to constantly monitor their 
progress as a means of magnifying the success. 
This process has been utilized by the ROK 
government over the past 50 years of economic 
growth. In the 1960s, the textile, cement, and 
fertilizer industries were the focal points. From 
the 1970s to 1980s, the shipbuilding, steel, 
petrochemicals, and electronics industries were 
selected as new areas of focus. At the end of the 
20th century, the IT industry was selected as a new 
strategic industry and received the government’s full 
support. “Green Industries” in the late 2000s under 
the Lee Myung-bak administration and “Creative 
Industry” under the most recent Park Geun-hye 
administration also received strong attention.  
It is important to recognize that the government 
has continued to employ the “sticks and carrots” 
approach, with “sticks” in the form of administrative 
guidance (a euphemism for the government’s 
top-down authority) and “carrots” in the form of 
incentives to the innovators that lead the building 
of strategic industries. For example, in order to push 
forward the policies that promote export production 
during the initial stages of industrialization,  the 
ROK government borrowed heavily from abroad 
and provided the export industries with capital at 
low interest rates, often below the market levels. 
Also, additional incentives such as a variety of tariff 
exemptions, accelerated depreciation, exemptions 
from value-added taxes, and duty-free imports 
of raw materials were provided to motivate and 
encourage exporters to improve their performance. 
However, the government also made sure that 
the corporations that did not respond to the 
government-set goals and targets were pressured. 
For example, corporate tax returns were subjected 
to careful examination, applications for bank credit 
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were studiously ignored, and outstanding bank loans 
were not renewed (Kim, 1997). 
In order to lay a solid foundation to support 
technological innovation, the ROK government 
established government-funded research institutes 
and initiated the “National R&D Program,” which 
helped compensate for the low R&D capabilities 
of the private sector during the early stages of 
industrialization. The Korea Institute of Science 
and Technology (KIST) was built as the first national 
research institute in 1966. The institution branched 
out its work into multiple government-selected 
strategic sectors in the 1970s, to help fill-in the 
technological gaps and capacities of the private 
sector. 
In 1982, the government initiated the “National 
R&D Program” to increase its support for 
technological development in key strategic 
industries. A notable example is the full-fledged 
support of the government for the development 
of the semi-conductor industry. In 1986, the 
ROK government started a monumental project 
for the development of the ULSI (Ultra-Large-
Scale Integration) semiconductor (DRAM) 
with joint participation of the Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), 
Samsung Semiconductor Telecommunication (SST), 
Lucky Gold Star Electronics (Currently renamed 
as LG Semicon), and a research center under the 
umbrella of Seoul National University. Within just 
over three years, the team succeeded in developing 
the 4M DRAM. Government success was duplicated 
in the development of 16M DRAM, 64M DRAM, 
and ultimately led to the development of the world’s 
first 256M DRAM, which helped the nation to gain 
its status as the leader of the global semiconductor 
market.  
Case Studies on the Principles of Selection 
and Concentration
A. Shipbuilding industry in the 1970s
EuP stipulates environmentally friendly design 
standards for household electronics, including set-
top boxes, lighting facilities, dishwashers, laundry 
machines, and refrigerators. Strengthened regulations 
in key areas such as energy efficiency have led to 
prohibiting imports and selling goods with low-energy 
performance goods in the EU market. For example:
• The shipbuilding industry, steel industry, 
machinery industry, and petrochemicals industry 
were selected as the four key industries eligible 
for government support.
• Government anticipated that success in the 
shipbuilding industry is likely to have spillover 
effects into other industries, such as industrial 
machinery, steel, electricity, and electronics.
• Hyundai Heavy Industries was selected as a 
firm entitled to government support, and was 
provided with financial resources in the building 
of the shipyard at Ulsan. Out of the 20 billion 
KRW needed for construction of the shipyard, the 
government shouldered 14.7 billion KRW using 
public capital and provided the remaining 5.3 
billion KRW through the soft-loan program from 
Japan.
• The government also provided additional funding 
for the construction of seawalls around the 
shipyard equivalent to 2 billion KRW.
• Thanks to sustained government support, the 
ROK overtook Japan’s shipbuilding orders and dry 
dock supplies in 1985. 
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2.2 National Strategy and Target Setting
The devising of national strategies for fostering 
green technologies was no exception to the 
principles of selection and concentration; the 
concept of green technologies which started to 
gain attention after President Lee took office in 
2008 were to be supported by massive government 
subvention. Once again, the government started to 
analyze the global trends in the technical market 
and identified industries that were projected to 
grow rapidly amid technological breakthroughs. 
Innovators that participated in the R&D of green 
technologies were to be provided with a diverse 
range of incentives. However, having built a 
democratic governance and competitive market 
economy, the government engagements were not as 
reciprocal to a selected number of corporations (that 
eventually developed into chaebols – the ROK’s form 
of business conglomerate) as they perhaps would 
have been in the 1960s-1990s. 
Establishment of Green Technology R&D 
Master Plan (2009)
The blueprint for the government’s vision on green 
technologies took the form of the “Green Technology 
R&D Master Plan” released in January 2009. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, the plan envisioned to make 
the ROK a global green leader through fostering 
of green technologies, and declared the nation’s 
three priority goals. In the setting of these goals, the 
government looked carefully into the trends and 
future prospects of green technologies, the status of 
early movers in the global green technology market, 
domestic capacities and levels of human resources, 
the nation’s performance in terms of environmental 
sustainability, and the existing strategies and 
policies of different ministries relevant to green 
technologies. Note how the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) was incorporated as 
a means of linking technological advancement 
to the nation’s progress toward environmental 
sustainability.
B. Automobile industry in the 1980s
• The government recognized the automobile 
industry as having the biggest forward/backward 
linkage effect
• In 1973, the government established a “long-term 
plan for promotion of the automobile industry” 
and selected “seven principles for support,” 
including:
- Protection of the domestic market against 
foreign imports
- Tax deductions for domestic automobile 
makers
- Administrative actions and financial loans to 
expand the domestic market share of Korean-
made automobiles
• Under such government support and subsidies, 
Hyundai Motors Group developed the nation’s 
first domestic automobile called “Pony” in 1975. 
Approximately 10 years later, the next generation 
of the Pony – named “Excel” – was selected by the 
government as one of the nation’s top 10 export 
items for the U.S.. Excel was the first Korean-
made automobile to be exported to the U.S.
C. Semiconductor industry in the 1990s
• Along with Japan, the ROK government 
recognized semiconductors as “the rice of 
industry” because the knowledge embedded 
in the chips became the driving force in many 
other industries considered key to economic 
competitiveness. 
• The Ministry of Information and Communication 
took the lead in supporting the domestic 
industries with the enactment of the “Information 
Technology R&D Act” in 1992.
• The government created two specialized 
public funds, the “Telecommunications Service 
Provider Endowment Fund” in 1994 and the 
“Informatization Promotion Fund” in 1996, to 
provide direct support to the semiconductor 
industry.
• National R&D programs were directed to help 
teams of private firms and national institutions to 
advance semiconductor technologies. 
• Samsung Electronics succeeded in developing the 
world’s first 64M DRAM in 1992.
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A notable significance of the master plan is in how 
it set out the concept of “Green Technologies” 
as sought by the government. Aligning with the 
nation’s concept of low-carbon green growth, 
green technologies are defined as those that have 
a direct influence on both economic growth and 
environmental sustainability; basically, they can 
be categorized into technologies that are either 
relevant to:
(1) environmental prediction; 
(2) factors of production; or 
(3) environmentally sound economic activities. 
As mentioned in the previous section, this concept 
upholds the idea of technological convergence 
as it helps in rethinking opportunities, in creating 
creative solutions to drive economic growth, as 
well as in conferring the benefits across different 
dimensions of environmental sustainability. Some 
examples of technological convergence are the use 
of radioactive-rays for treatment of pathogenic 
microbes in waste water; utilizing IT networks to 
minimize losses in energy systems; use of LED lights 
to improve agricultural yields and shorter growth 
cycles; and biological fixation of CO2 from the 
atmosphere by using marine organisms.
Source: NSTC, 2009
Figure 3: Vision and goals of national R&D in green technologies
Three Goals
Becoming a Global Green Leader through Fostering of Green Technologies
Green Technology Investment Directions
Development Strategy
Technology Level Targets
(Comparison to Advanced Countries)
2012: 80%
2020: 90%
Eco-friendly technology
and technology convergence
Increase of 
Basic Research
Greening of existing
strategic industries
Establishment of
green R&D infrastructure 
•    Increase of investment to double the current level by 2012
•    Share of investments in basic research to reach 35%
Selection of key technologies based on the 
nation’s strategic importance
Technological Capacity
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
(Global Rank)
2012: Top 20
2020: Top 10
Strategic Increase in the R&D
Volume of Green Technology 
Fostering of 27 Key 
Green Technologies
Green Industrial Competitiveness Environmental Sustainability
Job creation in Green Technology 
2012: Over 160,000 jobs
Global Market Share
2012: Over 7%
2020: Over 10%
Vision
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• Green technologies relevant to environmental 
prediction (termed prediction technology) are 
those relevant to monitoring and assessment 
of environmental pollution and changes in 
ecosystems, as well as making projections on 
future climate impacts.
• Technologies relevant to the factors of 
production can be divided into three − following 
the input-process-output model of production. 
Green technologies in the “input” domain 
refer to those that seek to minimize utilization 
of depletable resources, while those for the 
“process” domain focus on improving industrial 
efficiency and minimizing pollution loads. End-
of-pipe technologies that focus on removal of 
existing contaminants in the environment (by-
products of industrial processes) are viewed as 
green technologies in the “output” domain. 
• Technology used by knowledge-based industries 
that have direct contributions to climate change 
mitigation form a special category of green 
technology. Augmented reality (or virtual reality) 
technologies that help select the optimal wind 
locations for development of windfarms through 
data visualizations are a good example of 
technologies that fall within this category.
As a document that supersedes all existing R&D 
plans and policies, the master plan entailed 
government’s mid- to long-term investment 
directions and support. A two-fold increase in R&D 
spending by the government was envisaged for 
green technologies during the period 2008-2012. In 
addition, the share of basic research2  in budgetary 
spending was to reach 35% as a means of promoting 
emergence of “core technologies.”3 Following the 
principles of selection and concentration, the master 
plan articulated 27 key green technologies which 
were to enjoy the highest government preference for 
investment; the selection process was divided into 
three phases:
(1) identification of candidate technologies (joint 
ministerial effort); 
(2) evaluation of a portfolio of 75 green technologies 
(expert reviews and ministerial validation); and 
(3) selection and approval of 27 key technologies 
(review by the Green Technology Council, GTC).
• In the first stage, a comprehensive review was 
carried out on existing ministerial strategies, 
R&D master plans and thematic reports, which 
led to the compilation of 75 priority green 
technologies. Among many technology needs 
assessment reports and surveys reviewed, 
the report entitled “Green Ocean Agenda” 
prepared by the Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Energy (MOTIE) served an important 
function. The document presented a total of 100 
priority technological solutions needed to fight 
climate change and resource depletion, based 
on discussions by a group of local academic, 
research and industrial leaders (approximately 
150 individuals) and public surveys.
• In the following stage, the portfolio of 75 
priority technologies was categorized into 
three groups based on evaluations on their 
level of contributions to economic growth 
and environmental sustainability, and 
strategic importance in regard to the nation’s 
development. The level of contributions to the 
nation’s economic growth and environmental 
sustainability was determined based on analysis 
of existing data such as global market outlook, 
thematic reports including IEA’s “Energy 
Technology Perspectives” and research outputs 
from the Ministry of Environment (MoE), which 
promoted a better understanding of recent 
trends in technological innovation. The strategic 
importance of different green technologies was 
assessed through the collection of surveys and 
focus group discussions. As illustrated in Figure 
4, the evaluation eventually provided a basis 
for the setting of investment priorities; three 
groups of technologies were proposed to receive 
different levels of investment according to their 
varying levels of importance.
• The final selection of 27 key green technologies 
was eventually based on assessments of the 
strategic importance, technological capability, 
investment priority (as identified from the 
portfolio evaluation), and needs as asserted by 
relevant line ministries.
2 |   Basic research refers to research for the advancement of fundamental knowledge, without specific application toward processes or products.
3 |   Core technologies refer to those that are fully unique (not relying on any existing technologies), and thus have the potential to be applied in various 
       forms as essential in product development.
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Sub-category Number of Publications 
Depreciation of the quality of life
• Well-being life conditions
• Clean water
• Zero waste
• Well-being architectural design
• Well-being water
• Material re-use from waste recycling 
Global warming
• CO2 reuse
• Low-emissions processes
• IT-based solutions to respond        
to changing climate
• CO2 to plastics
• Low-weight high-insulation aerogel 
materials
• Electricity saving e-Homes 
Depletion of fossil fuels and fossil fuel 
price fluctuations
• Clean coal technology
• Biomass fuels
• Sustainable goods and services
• Ultra-clean coal
• High concentration biofuels
• Energy recovery technology
Source: NSTC, 2009
Source: NSTC, 2009
Figure 4: Process for the selection of 27 key green technologies
Table 3: Technologies identified by the “Green Ocean Agenda”
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Technology Areas
27 Key Green Technologies
Main Mid Category Sub Category
 
Prediction 
Technology
Climate change prediction 
and impact assessment
Climate change prediction Climate change prediction and modeling 
Climate change adaptation Climate change impact assessment and adaptation
Energy 
Generation 
Technology
Renewable energy
Solar energy
Silicon thin-film cells 
(enhancement of efficiency and cost-competitiveness)
Non-silicon solar cells (for mass production)
Bio energy Bio-energy generation systems and facilities
Nuclear/
Nuclear fusion
Nuclear energy
Light water reactor design and construction
Environmentally friendly nuclear nonproliferation 
and fast reactor core
Nuclear fusion Fusion reactor design and construction
Hydrogen
and Fuel cell
Hydrogen production 
and storage
High efficiency hydrogen production and storage
Fuel cell Next generation fuel cell systems
Environmentally friendly manufacturing 
technology/ Increase in materials efficiency
Environmentally friendly 
manufacturing technology 
and environmentally 
friendly products
Accelerated plant growth technology
Efficiency 
Improvement 
Technology
Efficiency improvement and 
high efficiency in fossil fuel
CTL and gasification 
technology
CTL (Coal to Liquid) technology for 
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC)
Efficiency improvement 
in transportation
Automobile, railroad, 
marine vessels, space flight, 
transportation vessels
Highly efficient low pollution vehicles (green cars)
Intelligent transportation and logistics 
Green land
Green city Eco-space and urban regeneration
Green home/ 
Green building
Environmentally friendly low energy buildings
Environmentally friendly manufacturing 
technology/ Increase in materials efficiency
Manufacturing technology/ 
Increase in materials 
efficiency
Green process technologies 
(to optimize energy consumption and environmental 
load)
Efficiency improvement 
in electricity
LED, IT equipment LED display and green IT
Usage of superconductivity, 
Power Information 
Technology
IT system for energy industries, and energy efficiency 
technologies for electric appliances appliances
Energy Storage Systems High-efficiency secondary battery
End-of-Pipe 
Technology
Monitoring and Control 
of air pollution
CO2 capture, process and 
storage
Carbon capture and storage (CCS)
Monitoring and control of 
Non-CO
2
Non-CO2 treatment technology 
Water quality
Water treatment Water quality assessment and management
Water supply Technologies for securing alternative water resources
Waste
Waste recycle and 
waste energy
Waste reduction, recycling, and re-use
Waste and environment preservation Ecology risk assessment
Monitoring of toxic pollutants and environmental 
remediation 
Clean 
Industrial and 
Economic 
Activities
CT, soft technology base IT 
and knowledge service
Virtual reality Virtual reality technology
Table 4: 27 key green technologies
Source: NSTC, 2009
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Green Technology Commercialization 
Strategy (2009)
In recognition of technology development and 
commercialization as evolving processes that 
are highly interactive, the ROK government 
presented another strategy document in May 
2009. This document titled the “Green Technology 
Commercialization Strategy”, aimed to provide 
a blueprint to technology R&D and market 
penetration. First,  the strategic document clarified 
the links between technologies under development 
and their related goods or services which were 
to emerge in future markets. For example, the 
next-generation membrane filtration technologies 
and intelligent process control systems were to 
significantly improve the performances of future 
desalination and water re-use facilities. 
Subsequently, the timeframe for commercialization 
of each technology was drafted (technological 
roadmap), which provided a clear picture to when 
government support needs to be concentrated 
under different purposes. For example, smart grid 
technologies was to require additional efforts for 
applied research (until 2012), before entering a 
stage of pilot testing and commercialization (2013-
2020) and full market penetration (2021-2030). The 
seven technologies (from the 27 key technologies) 
that were assessed as ready for commercialization 
or would even create substantial markets by 2012 
were: 
(1) LED lighting
(2) high-performance silicon solar cells 
(3) hybrid cars
(4) smart grid systems
(5) advanced light water reactors 
      (for nuclear energy) 
(6) fuel cells
(7) carbon capture and storage systems 
Finally, the document identified policy reform 
measures as stimulants for fast-tracking technology 
commercialization for the domestic market and 
these include the following:
• Introducing real-time power trading systems and 
enforcing the nation’s critical energy facilities to 
be equipped with energy storage systems 
• Strengthening building codes for improving 
energy consumption and reducing GHG 
emissions from the building sector
• Revising legislations to allow electric vehicles to 
enter general motorways and strengthening of 
vehicle emissions standards
• Introducing the Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS) program and strengthening of technical 
certification standards for renewable energy 
systems
• Strengthening environmental regulatory 
standards for industrial manufacturing 
processes and introducing of incentive schemes 
for pollution reducing investments
Selection of Ten Core Green Technologies (2010)
In February 2010, relevant line ministries jointly 
presented a proposal to PCGG on further prioritizing 
the 27 technologies of focus into ten core green 
technologies. The selection sought to accelerate 
the commercialization of technologies as derived 
by existing plans, in response to the government’s 
legislative preparations for setting up a national 
emissions trading scheme (ETS). However, this 
process also provided an opportunity to tighten the 
reins of innovation actors, by ensuring that their 
R&D efforts are aligned to the proximate demand 
from the emerging market. The ten core green 
technologies include: 
(1) next generation secondary batteries 
(2) LED display
(3) green PCs
(4) high-efficiency solar cells 
(5) green cars
(6) smart grids 
(7) advanced light water reactors 
(8) fuel cells
(9) CSS (carbon capture and storage) systems
(10) advanced water treatment systems
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2.3 Green Technology Target Setting (Five-Year 
National Plan for Green Growth)
By exercising the principles of selection and 
concentration and investing approximately 6.3 
trillion KRW over the period of 2009-2012, the 
National Science and Technology Council targeted 
to close ROK’s technological gap with the world’s 
leaders to 20% by 2012. 
In the longer-term, the ROK was to close this gap to 
10% by 2020, which would make the nation one of 
the world’s top-five countries in green technology. In 
this process, the government estimated a significant 
increase in the nation’s share of the global green 
market, along with the creation of more than 
170,000 new jobs.
Field
Target
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2020
Green Technology level 
as compared to the global 
leaders
- - - 77.7% 80% 90%
Job creation in the fields 
of green technology 
7,000 13,200 24,100 54,000 74,500 -
Global share of green 
technology market
- - - - 7% 10%
Environmental 
Sustainability Index
(Among OECD countries)
Rank within top 20 Rank within top 10
Share of basic research 
in government’s green 
technology R&D budget
35%
(In 2007: 17%)
Table 5: Green Technology R&D Goals
Source: NSTC, 2009
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3.  Policy Actions and Programs
3.1 R&D Investment Plans
Appropriate and effective allocation of budgets 
to promote technology innovation initiatives is 
a challenge for governments across the world; 
fundamentally, budgetary policies and priority 
setting in this field are not guided by a widely 
accepted theory, thus are often carried out based 
on government appetite without rational decision 
making. In the ROK, the government established 
the National Science and Technology Council 
(NSTC) in 1999 as the platform of coordinating the 
nation’s setting of science and technology agenda 
and budgetary priorities. Supported by all relevant 
ministries, the Green Technology Committee (GTC) 
under the NSTC started formulating annual green 
technology investment plan from 2009, which 
provides the details on how the government is to 
utilize the assigned R&D budget. Basically, a large 
portion of this investment was to be channeled 
into R&D activities for 27 key green technologies; 
for example, more than 70% of the R&D budget 
allocated to green technologies for 2009 was to 
be used for activities relevant to 27 key green 
technologies. However, additional efforts sought 
to prioritize investments based on assessments 
on several factors, including potentials for future 
demand, market growth, and the nation’s current/
future technological gaps. 
Potentials for Future Demand and Market Creation
In order to align R&D investments to the potential 
for technology market creation and future demand, 
GTC divided 27 key technologies into three strategic 
investment groups (Lee, 2009): 
• Group-1 brings together areas where investments 
are to be concentrated in the coming 5-10 years. 
Technologies that have proven cost-benefits and 
increasing market volume fall into this group; 
such characteristics highlight the need for the 
private sector to take the lead in R&D efforts. 
However, the government is to support the private 
sector by filling the gaps in impending human 
resource needs and infrastructure for technology 
commercialization. The ROK’s list of technologies 
in this group includes water quality control, 
high-performance solar cell, and waste re-use 
technologies (7 out of 27 key green technologies).
• Group-2 compiles technologies in need of taking 
a mid- to long-term perspective of 10-20 years, 
under the prospects of seeing new market 
creations. A substantial amount of basic research 
is needed for the technologies of this group, 
many of which have high potential to provide 
public benefits such as resolving the food and 
water crisis. The ROK’s list includes bio-energy 
production systems, high efficiency vehicles, and 
accelerated plant growth technologies (16 out of 
27 key green technologies).
• Group-3 represents technologies that are 
uncertain to lead to market creation, but have 
massive potentials to make an impact in the 
future. Many of these technologies are still at their 
conceptual stage that are likely to occur in the 
future. Sustained investments in R&D activities are 
required for these technology areas, which include 
climate change prediction, urban regeneration, 
and hydrogen production (4 out of 27 key green 
technologies).
Technological Gaps and Investment Timeframe
As different technologies require different periods 
of time and amount of investments to lead to 
commercialization, the government sought to 
understand the projected timeframe of necessary 
financing. Building upon the identification of 
technology related goods and services, and the 
technological roadmap as laid out by the “Green 
Technology Commercialization Strategy (2009),” a 
group of members from a total of 11 government 
ministries and offices came together to explore 
market prospects of different green technologies, 
assess the ROK’s current technology gaps compared 
to the global leaders, and identify domestic issues 
driving R&D activities.
• The group placed emphasis on making sure 
that the ROK’s R&D efforts drive upon opening 
opportunities for domestic industries to enter 
the global green goods and services market; 
the underlying rationale is that the global 
green market is projected to grow annually by 
10.2%, reaching a volume of US$ 5.7 trillion by 
2020. Although the domestic market was also 
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projected to grow rapidly at an annual rate of 
13.2%, in terms of market volume – estimated 
to be US$ 230 billion by 2020 – it was only to 
comprise a small portion of the global market. 
Many of these green markets were to dwell upon 
existing market structure; for example, electric 
vehicles were to make up for 31.4% of the global 
motor industry market by 2020. 
• Many of the green technologies that have 
successfully led market creation were 
dominated by developed countries including 
the U.S., Japan, and countries of the EU. Lack 
of interest and support from government had 
already led to heavy reliance on technology 
imports in the ROK; 75% of solar power systems 
and 99% of wind turbine facilities of the 
domestic energy producers were established 
from imported goods. In this light, the group 
sought to assess the current technological 
gaps and industrial competitiveness for each of 
the technology areas. For example, the ROK’s 
technological edge in energy efficiency left room 
for improvement in terms of localization of 
relevant products, while low levels of technology 
was already acting as a significant barrier 
towards localization efforts for pollution control 
systems. 
• Domestic issues surrounding technological 
development and adoption in different areas 
were identified to better understand the 
budgetary demand in terms of the investment 
type and timeframe. For example, a majority of 
the domestic energy source technology goods 
(e.g., renewable energy systems) were in critical 
need for improving cost-efficiency and scaling-
up of manufacturing facilities to compete in the 
global market, while goods for energy efficiency 
were suffering from a weak technology base and 
lack of pilot testing efforts. 
Four-Tiered Investment Plan
Ultimately, four customized budgetary pipelines 
were prepared for 27 key green technologies. 
The first group, which responds to technologies with 
short-term investment needs, is to see a 30% annual 
increase in public budget, as a means to support pilot 
testing and market entrance by year 2012. 
The second group, which complies technologies 
that are to maximize the first-mover advantage, 
are to receive 20% and 30% annual increases in 
government investment during the periods of 2008-
2012 and 2012-2020, respectively. 
The third group of technologies, whereby the 
government’s budgetary support takes a long-term 
perspective to help the nation become a global 
technological frontier, will see a steady annual 
increase of 10% and 15% in budgetary allocation 
for the periods of 2008-2012 and 2012-2020, 
respectively. 
Finally, the fourth group entitled “technologies for 
sustained investment,” responds to technologies 
that are in need for a substantial amount of basic 
research to demonstrate proof of concept; public 
investment into this group is to increase by 5%, 10% 
and 15% during periods leading up to 2012, 2020, 
and 2030, respectively. 
Strategic Implementation of R&D programs
R&D spending were focused on 27 key green 
technologies based on the four development 
strategies laid out in the Green Technology R&D 
Master Plan of 2009: 
(1) boosting investments in basic research; 
(2) promoting technology convergence to develop 
eco-friendly technologies; 
(3) greening of existing industries and creation of 
new growth drivers; and 
(4) strengthening green R&D infrastructure and 
research collaboration with global institutions. 
It is important to understand that the emergence 
of such strategic agenda was well accompanied 
by many of the existing R&D plans and actions. 
Although it is true that launch of new R&D programs 
was actively promoted and undertaken by the line 
ministries, much of their actions taken were about 
redirecting the provisions of existing R&D programs 
closer to meet the objectives set under the green 
technology agenda. For example, the R&D program 
for fostering the capacities of individuals engaged 
in basic research – which was implemented by the 
Ministry of Education and Science Technology 
(MEST) long before the emergence of the green 
technology agenda – prioritized award of research 
grants to individuals engaged in the fields relevant to 
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green technologies as of the year 2010. Obviously, 
such public investments were accounted as 
increased budget allocations for green technology 
R&D; PCGG and NSTC continued to keep track of 
such changes in budgetary spending on an annual 
basis.
3.2 Institutional Framework
Similar to how the Presidential Committee on Green 
Growth (PCGG) was responsible for deliberating 
on the national plans related to green growth, the 
Green Technology Council (GTC) under the National 
Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was the 
overarching body in charge of the green technology 
agenda. The NSTC was launched in 1999 with the 
missions of establishing pan-ministerial governance 
on science and technology policy and improving the 
efficiency of national R&D. Its main activities include 
allocating and coordinating budgets for major 
R&D projects and managing the entire lifecycle of 
R&D activities by supporting the evaluation and 
utilization of R&D outcomes. Newly established 
in 2008 under the NSTC, the GTC was given the 
responsibility of strategy setting and budgetary 
planning for green technology development. The 
council played a key role in the formulation of the 
National Green Technology R&D Master Plan (2009), 
development of the ROK’s concept and scope of 
green technologies, and prioritization of 27 key 
green technology areas. 
Government ministries that are positioned under 
the NSTC to support coordinated R&D efforts in the 
Group 
Number
Timeframe Technologies Timeframe of budget allocation
1 Short-term 
Silicon thin-film cells, LED display, light water 
nuclear reactors
2
Medium-
term 
Green cars, green process technologies, 
high-efficiency secondary battery, non-CO2 
treatment, water-quality assessment and 
management technologies, alternative water 
resource technologies, waste reduction, 
recycling and re-use, and virtual reality 
technology (8)
3 Long-term 
Climate change prediction and modeling, 
climate change impact assessment and 
adaptation, fusion reactors, nuclear 
nonproliferation and fast reactor core, 
hydrogen production and storage, fuel 
cells, accelerated plant growth, integrated 
gasification combined cycle, eco-space and 
urban regeneration, low energy buildings, smart 
grid systems, CCS, and monitoring of toxic 
pollutants and environmental remediation (13)
4 Long-term 
Non-silicon solar cells, bio-energy generation 
systems, and intelligent transportation and 
logistics (3)
Table 6: Investment plans for 27 key green technologies
Source: PCGG, 2009c
 ‘08 ‘12 ‘20 ‘30
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160
sectors of themes of their expertise had important 
roles to play; they supported NSTC’s setting of 
strategic directions, identified projects of high 
impact, and utilized their network with academia 
and business entities to help engage in cooperative 
development of technologies. As the coordinating 
body, the GTC ensured that government ministries 
minimize the overlapping of efforts in similar 
technology areas. 
For example, in case of prediction technology, the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy (now the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Energy), the Ministry of 
Environment, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
and Rural Affairs were to play key roles in different 
domains. As for energy source technologies, the 
Ministry of Education and Science Technology 
and the Ministry of Knowledge Economy were 
to coordinate their efforts. Disputes that arose 
from conflicts of interest between ministries were 
resolved through discussions under the GTC.
An important success factor in the ROK’s efforts 
regarding green technology was the devising of an 
annual “Comprehensive  Green  Technology  R&D  
Plan.”  To  effectively  achieve  the  targets  set by  
the National Green Technology R&D Master Plan, a 
total of 11 government ministries and agencies came 
together  to  coordinate  their future  efforts  and  
agree  upon  a  single  comprehensive  R&D  plan for 
the coming  year.  The  annual  plans  of  2009-2012 
also  incorporated  the  outcomes  of  implementation 
by different  ministries  from  the  previous  year.  
This  helped  the  PCGG  and  NSTC  monitor  their  
current progress  and  outcomes,  identify  gaps  and  
provide  directions  for  future  work.  Preparation  
of  the annual  plans  also  opened  opportunities  
to  reflect  the suggestions  made  by  government-
funded research institutes and leaders of the private 
sector. Agood example is how the coordinated 
efforts of the  GTC  enabled  government  research  
institutes  and  the Hyundai  Motor  Company  to 
collaborate in commercialization of fuel cell stacks to 
be used in electric vehicles. 
History and roles of government-funded research 
institutes in the ROK
A critical success factor in the development of the 
government’s policies on green technology R&D 
was the existence of strong government-funded 
research institutes (GRIs). The role of GRIs was 
especially important during the catch-up phase 
of technology innovation when the private sector 
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key industry 
technology 
Expert on 
mega-
technics
Expert on 
government-
led tech.
Expert on 
advanced 
convergence 
tech.
Expert on 
infrastructure 
tech.
Expert on 
International 
Science 
Business Belt 
Expert on 
green 
technology
National Science & Technology Commission (Chairperson: President/ Vice-chairperson: Minister of MOE)
Member : Ministerial level (10), Civil member (3)  
Management Committee
(Chairperson: Chief of Education, Science & Culture)
Assistant Admin:  Chief of Education, 
Science & Culture of the Blue House
Assistant Admin: 
Policy Coordination Ofﬁcer of MOE
Figure 5: Organizational structure of the National Science and Technology Council
Source: NSTC, 2009
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had low R&D capacities of their own. This first GRI 
was established in 1966 – the Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology (KIST) – as a comprehensive 
research center covering a wide range of industrial 
sectors to meet their diverse technological needs. As 
technologies and knowledge base of the industrial 
sectors continued to advance and the need for 
deepening of specific technological capabilities 
grew in the 1970s, additional GRIs were established 
with each targeting different industrial sectors or 
thematic areas. 
In addition to GRIs that conduct technological or 
engineering research, the ROK government also 
established government think-tanks (which are also 
GRIs) to meet the diverse needs in public policy 
development. The Korea Development Institute 
(KDI) was the nation’s first think-tank organization 
established in 1971 aimed to focus government 
ministries on the development of economic policies, 
such as the “Five-Year Economic Development 
Plans” which were formulated from the 1960s. 
Similar to the expansion in the number of GRIs, 
additional policy think-tanks were established 
following the government’s initiation of industry 
promotion policies, starting with those for the heavy 
and chemicals industries in 1973. For example, the 
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade 
(KIET) was established in 1976 to provide expertise 
and policy recommendations for a wide array of 
industries. 
It is important to recognize that the structure of 
the GRIs, their funding mechanism and operational 
requirements have evolved continuously to reflect 
their changing roles and needs of the society. 
• As of 2014, the governance structure of the 
ROK’s GRIs can be illustrated as shown in 
Figure 6. Although each GRIs were originally 
under the direct supervision of different 
government ministries, a grouped model of 
administration was introduced in 1999 as a 
means of: (1) reducing duplications in research 
domains and enhancing collaboration between 
GRIs, (2) improving the independence of GRI’s 
management structure (from the supervising 
ministries) and thus enhancing their flexibility in 
responding to evolving innovation needs; and (3) 
creating a competitive environment (between 
GRIs). As a result, GRIs are now categorized into 
those under the National Research Council of 
Science and Technology (NST) responsible for 
conducting R&D activities in the fields of science 
and technology, and those under the National 
Research Council for Economics, Humanities, 
and Social Sciences (NRCS) which are think-tank 
organizations supporting the government’s 
policy formulation. 
• GRIs of the ROK have been the main recipients 
of public budget. Basically, the operational costs 
(including the manpower costs of researchers) 
were covered through government’s allocation 
of lump-sum budget, while the direct costs for 
specific research activities were provided by 
the supervising ministries on a project basis. 
While the lump-sum budget helped improve the 
financial stability of GRIs, lack of consensus on 
their institutional missions among government 
authorities led to excessive monitoring and 
control, creating inefficiencies in budgetary 
spending and leaving GRIs with little room to 
carry out research based on an internally driven 
agenda. Accordingly, the government brought 
about a reform to the funding mechanism in 
1996, by replacing the lump-sum system to 
project-based management system (PBS); GRIs 
were no longer given a budget envelope to fully 
cover their operations costs, and provision 
of research grants by relevant government 
ministries (which are to shoulder the funding 
gaps in operational costs) were to be made 
strictly through a competitive process (against 
other GRIs, universities, and/or industries). 
While the introduction of PBS helped create 
competition and boost the cost-effectiveness 
of R&D activities, GRIs have complained that 
the PBS enforces them to engage in short-term 
projects of less research significance (i.e., applied 
research or commercialization) as a means of 
securing budget to secure their manpower costs. 
• Starting from 1982 when national R&D 
programs entered a stage of refinement and 
fast-paced implementation, the government 
established management agencies to effectively 
administer and periodically evaluate the 
performances of R&D activities (at program 
or project levels). For example, in the field 
of industrial technologies, the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy established 
the Korea Institute of Industrial Technology 
Evaluation and Planning (ITEP) in 1989. Unlike 
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the GRIs (and government think-tanks), these 
management agencies have operated as 
affiliated organizations of the relevant ministries 
under direct supervision. 
The ROK’s past success in establishment and 
active engagement of GRIs for government policy 
formulation and bringing about technological 
advancement was to be replicated under the 
green technology agenda. For example, the Green 
Technology Center of Korea (GTC-K) was established 
under the KIST in 2013 as a think-tank that provides 
advice on devising the nation’s policies on green 
technology. In addition, KISTEP was designated 
in 2009 as the management agency in charge of 
managing government budget and expenditures on 
green technology R&D activities. 
National Research 
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Ministry of Science, 
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Humanities, and 
Social Science (NRCS)
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Korea Institute of Child Care and Education
Korean Women Development Institute
Korea Institute of Public Finance
Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training
National Youth Policy Institute
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Figure 6: Governance structure of the GRIs
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3.3 R&D Programs and Fostering Green Talents
Ministries that individually hold responsibility for 
priority areas and the necessary budget envelope for 
promoting green technology were directed to align 
their R&D expenditures with the four development 
strategies laid out by the Green Technology R&D 
Master Plan (2009). This section provides some 
examples of the related actions undertaken 
(provision of R&D grants) at the program and/or 
project levels. 
3.3.1 Expansion of Basic Research and Promotion of 
Technological Convergence
While advanced countries have gradually achieved 
positive outcomes in science and technology, the 
ROK followed suit in haste. It is thus lacking in 
certain core technologies, which are the critical 
building blocks of all technology systems. 
As a latecomer developed economy, the nation’s 
past R&D efforts have been geared heavily toward 
applied research and commercialization, leaving 
much room to be desired in the field of basic 
research. Strategic expansion was accordingly 
deemed important, especially as the nation’s 
pursuit of low-carbon green growth sought to 
move away from the labor- and capital-intensive 
growth paradigm and promote high value-added 
businesses with a technological edge that cannot 
be easily replicated or surpassed. The government’s 
endeavors toward strengthening basic research 
with long lead-in times to commercialization were 
reflected in its commitment to budgetary expansion; 
the share of budget allocated to basic research was 
to increase from 17% in 2007 to 35% in 2012. It is 
noteworthy that the ROK government sought to 
exploit opportunities of technology convergence 
in carrying out basic research, as a means of 
accelerating the development of core technologies.
Global Frontier Project (Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, MEST)
The Global Frontier Project is MEST’s representative medium- and long-term R&D initiative to secure the core 
technologies of the highest level. MEST supports research clusters or centers composed of multiple research 
entities from the public and private sectors in conducting basic research on high-risk and high-impact areas that 
are pre-selected through expert group meetings, assessments on global issues and future trends, and public 
hearings. The project places an emphasis enabling technological convergence by the grouping of knowledge and 
expertise from various disciplines. The project targets 15 research clusters (2010-2021) with research grants 
that annually amount to 5-15 billion KRW each, over a maximum period of nine years.
Example Project: Center for Multi-scale Energy Systems
The Center aims to develop breakthrough technologies for renewable energy systems, particularly solar 
and fuel cells that can compete with fossil fuels. “Multi-scale” is a new concept proposed by the Center that 
refers to streamlining the energy system design and architecture at nano- micro-macro-scales to improve 
efficiencies. The concept is a good example of converging nano technology (NT) with existing energy 
technology. If the research proves to be successful, the Center expects to reduce the costs of solar energy 
generation to US$  0.5/W. Launched in 2011, the Center plans to operate for nine years on an annual budget 
of approximately US$ 10 million funded by the Global Frontier Project, and engaging 420 researchers from 
universities and national research institutes.
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Figure 7: Flexible photo-electrode and dye-sensitized solar cells (DSSC) being developed by the Center for Multi-scale Energy Systems
Source: Multienergy, 2014
Photoelectrolade Flexible - DSSC
Figure 8: Concept of bio-mass derived biofuels
Source: ABC, 2014
Example Project: Advanced Biomass R&D Center (ABC)
The Advanced Biomass R&D Center has the primary objective of developing technical, scientific, and 
engineering solutions for producing economically viable and environmentally sustainable biomass-derived 
biofuels. The Center mobilized US$ 110 million from 2010 to 2019 through its initiative, the Global Frontier 
Project, employing more than 300 researchers from universities as well as public and private research 
institutes and companies. The Project aims to find breakthrough solutions to make biomass-derived drop-
in fuels economically competitive against petroleum-based fuels. The research topics include recycling of 
waste resources (e.g., organic waste, municipal waste water, and livestock waste) and mass cultivation of 
micro-algal biomass for production of biofuels. The Center’s efforts represent technology convergence – 
integrating bio technology (BT) and chemical technology (CT) to develop bio-chemical materials that can 
replace petroleum-based energy products.
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3.3.2 Technologies for Greening of Strategic 
Industries 
Strategic industries of the ROK that have been 
subject to much of the government’s development 
support (i.e., petrochemicals, steel, automobiles, 
shipbuilding, IT and electronics) have been identified 
as those that have significant production induced 
impacts and job creation capacities, along with 
high levels of contributions to the expansion of the 
nation’s export volume. Most of these strategic 
industries are heavily energy-intensive and account 
for a large portion of the nation’s carbon emissions 
and pollution, which in turn indicates how they are 
to become central to driving  low-carbon green 
growth transformation. Securing transformative 
technologies to reduce emissions and improve 
environmental performance of existing industries is 
therefore a priority. 
Some examples of technological opportunities are 
the application of IT technology to conventional 
power systems for automation and digitalization, 
which can induce energy efficiency; introducing 
geothermal heat pumps to agricultural production 
to boost yield and reduce costs; and utilizing 
architectural materials with better insulation 
properties to improve energy loss of buildings.
The government has sought to ensure that emerging 
technology goods and services in the process of 
industrial greening are fostered as the nation’s 
new engines of growth. Accordingly, the allocation 
of public R&D budgets prioritized several areas 
including clean energy production, energy efficiency, 
green buildings, and green transport, which have the 
highest potential for creating immediate markets.
Generic Industrial Technology Development Project: Transportation Systems
(Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, MOTIE)
This project operated by MOTIE has been channeling research funds into areas that have been prioritized by 
the nation’s evolving economic growth strategies, with the aim of concentrating support on the development of 
core technologies that can help create the nation’s new engines of growth and enhance the competitiveness of 
the flagship industries. In response to the emergence of the nation’s low-carbon green growth paradigm, open 
calls for research proposals (in 11 pre-selected industrial areas) started to place emphasis on the development 
of technologies relevant to GHG emissions reduction, resource efficiency, and pollution abatement; this was 
especially the case in the area of transportation systems where a majority of research grants targeted the 
commercialization of green cars, including electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles. A total of 2-3 billion KRW was 
provided to each research project with 3-7 year periods. Matching fund requirements from the private sector 
recipients vary (25%-50%) according to the number of SMEs participating in the research initiative.
Example Project: Development of fuel cell stacks for fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV)
The fuel cell stack is the heart of the FCEV, where hydrogen and oxygen found in the atmosphere are 
combined to create electrochemical reactions in order to generate electricity. Despite its importance, the 
ROK’s auto industries have fully relied on imported fuel cell stacks in developing their FCEVs. This research 
project aims to develop core technologies required in manufacturing the components of a fuel cell stack 
and designing the stacking process. Led by the Hyundai Motor Company, a consortium of automotive parts 
manufacturers, universities, and government research institutes is conducting this five-year R&D project, 
known as the “Core Industrial Technology Development Project.” These research efforts are in line with 
the government’s plans to help realize the mass production of FCEVs by the year 2015.
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3.3.3 Eco-friendly Technologies
Rapid economic growth has had a severe impact 
on the ecosystem’s capacity to regenerate and 
provide long-term service in the ROK. Over the 
past 60 years, the nation’s landscape experienced 
dramatic changes due to intensive afforestation, 
land clearance, industrial activities, and subsequent 
pollution. Large sections of the coastline and salt 
marshes have been converted into industrial zones, 
urban centers, and tourist attractions.
Fundamentally, green technologies must provide 
comprehensive solutions to avoid or minimize 
the adverse impacts of economic growth on 
environmental sustainability. Although it is true 
that the boundaries of green technology are 
much wider than those set around conventional 
environmental technologies focusing on pollution 
control management, green technologies embrace 
the concept of sustainable development in that they 
seek to improve the quality of human life through 
development within limits tolerable to sustain 
ecosystems services. The 27 key green technologies 
prioritized by the government include a multiple 
number of eco-friendly technologies that are 
relevant to serve such purposes; those categorized 
as prediction technologies and end-of-pipe 
technologies are the most representative examples.
Figure 9: Fuel cell stacks for FCEV application
Source: Hyundai Motors, 2015
Example Project: Development of energy-efficient hull design and thrust system technology 
for green ships
Under the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCCC, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is required to 
regulate the GHG emissions from ships. Accordingly, the IMO developed the Energy Design Index (EDI) 
to promote the use of energy-efficient equipment and engines for reducing GHG emissions; the plans is to 
prohibit the navigation of ships with EDI higher than the stipulated IMO standard. In order to cope with 
such strengthening of international regulations, the project aims at developing technologies that seek to: 
(1) reduce energy consumption; 
(2) reduce frictional resistance; 
(3) improve propulsion efficiency; and 
(4) replace conventional diesel engines (i.e., clean propulsion systems). 
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Program for Technological Advancement of Environment Industries (Ministry of Environment, MoE)
This program seeks to meet the increasing demand for pilot testing of environmental technologies that have 
proven potential for competing in existing markets or opening new immediate markets. Ultimately, the program 
aims to enhance the technological edge of the nation’s domestic industries, especially SMEs that have limited 
resources to invest in technological innovation. Proceeds of the research grant prioritize short-term engagements 
(one year) for technology commercialization or field application in five key areas: 
(1) air quality control; 
(2) ecosystem restoration and management; 
(3) environmental risk assessment; 
(4) eco-friendly manufacturing; and 
(5) improvement of living conditions. 
Funding for commercialization projects is granted based only upon confirmed requests for technology purchases, 
while funding for field application is awarded to consortiums of private firms, universities, or research institutes. 
Example Project: Development of Bio-pellets with High Heat Value and Density
Bio-pellets are an established renewable energy resource consumed widely in Europe, the U.S. and the Asia-
Pacific region. The ROK’s domestic demand for bio-pellets is expected to grow rapidly, from 1 million tons 
in 2014, to 5 million tons in 2020, a trend which is largely driven by governmental regulations concerning 
the reduction of GHG emissions, and thereby increasing the utilization of renewable energy systems for 
power generation. However, the use of bio-pellets is limited in that they have significantly lower heat values 
as compared to fossil fuels. In addition, biomass availability is low in the ROK, which has led to high reliance 
on cheap bio-pellet imports. Recognizing that storage and transportation account for approximately 40% of 
the costs involved in production of bio-pellets, this research project aims to develop bio-pellets that have 
higher densities and heat values (15% increase), which will help improve the profitability of the domestic 
bio-pellet industry. 
Figure 10: Bio-pellet manufacturing facility
Source : Korea Woodpellet Corporation, 2015
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3.3.4 Establishment of Infrastructure 
 for Green R&D
Global competition for technological dominance 
has changed the environment surrounding R&D 
activities. In a society where technology has become 
a critical factor for economies to maintain their 
competitive advantage, simply keeping pace with 
the number and speed of new innovations has 
become increasingly difficult. Modern R&D efforts 
often override past experience and abandon prior 
knowledge, and creativity has become a strategic 
signpost to achieve technological breakthroughs. 
Based on such awareness, the ROK government has 
continued stepping up its efforts to foster creative 
and highly motivated human resources, as well 
as establish strong cooperative arrangements to 
undertake R&D activities.
Green growth policies are expected to reshape the 
demand for skills in the areas of science, technology, 
and engineering. For example, architects will need 
to expand their knowledge of environmentally 
friendly design; heating engineers will seek ways 
to extend the application of energy-conserving 
technologies; and accountants will need to 
understand how to weigh the environmental 
costs and benefits in business operations. In 
addition, strengthened government regulations 
on environmental performance may either create 
or reduce the number of jobs in specific fields. 
For example, demand for nano-science engineers 
and environmental consultants will be on the rise, 
while the demand for engineers in manufacturing 
conventional petroleum-based products may 
lose momentum. Recognizing such impacts of 
green growth transition to the skills market, the 
“Comprehensive National Plan on Green R&D” set 
new directions for existing and new R&D programs, 
which focus on: 
(1) fostering and attracting green technology 
specialists; 
(2) establishing green R&D clusters composed of 
industries, academia, and research institutes; 
(3) creating platforms for green technology 
commercialization; and 
(4) promoting the exchange of green knowledge with 
leading global research institutions.
Example Project: Hybrid air purifying system for simultaneous removal of PM2.5, 
VOCs and malodorous gaseous from the petrochemical industry
A wide range of industries in the ROK have located their manufacturing facilities and technology centers 
in industrial complexes. Oil refinery and petrochemical plants that account for over 50% of these facilities 
are the main sources of the nation’s air pollution from VOCs (volatile organic compounds), along with 
particulate matter (PM2.5). Understanding how acute or long-term exposure – especially for the workers 
and residents of industrial complexes – can have detrimental effects, the government imposed stringent 
ambient air quality standards for key pollutants (Air Quality Preservation Act, 1990), which has hence helped 
improve the ROK’s air quality. However, the nation continues to wrestle with an increasing concentration 
of ultrafine dust which originates from both within Korea and overseas (i.e., China), which has become a 
major threat to public health. Therefore, this research project led by an SME aims to develop an air filtration 
system that can simultaneously remove PM2.5, VOCs and malodorous gas released from petrochemical 
processes. The newly developed system targets a 99% removal of malodorous gas (NH3), VOC (toluene), 
and particulate matters (PM2.5) at an influent air flux of 5 CCM (cubic meters per minute). 
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Program for Development of High-tech Cities  (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, MOLIT)
Cities of the ROK form the hubs of the nation’s economy. While they primarily served as centers of trade and 
industrial activities in the past, cities are today transforming into centers of modern services and innovation. 
However, major cities of the ROK continue to face rising environmental challenges as a consequence of rapid 
industrialization; the nation’s shift toward high energy consumption, air pollution, and water stress in the course 
of economic growth is clearly evident in the ROK’s urban areas. In this light, the Program for Development of 
High-tech Cities led by MOLIT aims to seek technological solutions to creating eco-friendly living conditions 
and driving the revitalization of cities. Promoting the concept of livable, competitive, and sustainable cities, 
research grants are channeled to three key areas: 
(1) commercialization of green buildings;  
(2) low carbon urban transitioning; and 
(3) application of advanced spatial data analysis. 
Example Project: Low-carbon smart city energy management system development 
Load shedding occurred in a number of areas across the ROK in September 2011, as unexpectedly high 
temperatures triggered a surge in electricity use. Unprecedented blackouts affected hundreds of thousands 
of people, causing considerable economic losses. Such power cuts resulting from a temporary overuse of 
electricity highlights the necessity of the Electricity Management System (EMS), a system used to monitor 
real-time use of electricity and optimize the performance of the generation and transmission system. In this 
regard, this research study aims to develop EMS at the city level. Not only will the EMS monitor the overall 
use of various types of energy (electricity, thermal power and gas) in urban areas to prevent emergent 
energy shortages; but its application is anticipated to help improve energy efficiency by 30%, which will 
lead to a significant reduction in CO2 emissions. The system is scheduled to be pilot tested in Ansan city, 
in a group of facilities including the City Hall, daycare centers, community health centers, district offices, 
water treatment facilities, and local community centers.
Example Project: Establishment of a GHG emissions assessment system and integrated 
certification system for green buildings 
Green buildings can offer multiple benefits in addition to cutting GHG emissions, such as lower operating 
costs, increased productivity, and reduced absenteeism, by means of better architectural design, construction, 
and systematic maintenance. Formulating a robust framework and methodology for evaluating the 
environmental performances of new and existing buildings is thus critical for promoting green building 
practices. Given the 50-year average operational lifespans of buildings, performance evaluations must 
be based on life-cycle assessments on various aspects, including resource consumption efficiencies and 
GHG emissions intensities. In response to the national emission-reduction targets – which require a 26.9% 
reduction in emissions from BAU levels by 2020 for the building sector – the project aims to deliver a 
methodology and establish a database required for assessing life-cycle performances of building structures 
in the ROK. By developing a green rating tool for buildings (Green Building Index), the project will help raise 
awareness among developers, architects, contractors, and the public on the need for complying with the 
more stringent performance standards. 
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Eco-friendly technologies (within 27 key green technologies)
Relevant ministries of support
Main Sub Category Detailed technology
Prediction 
technology
Prediction of climate change and 
assessment of its impacts
Climate change 
prediction and modeling
MoE, MOTIE, Korea Meteorological 
Administration (KMA)
Climate change impact 
assessment and 
adaptation
MoE, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Rural Affairs (MAFRA), Rural Development 
Administration (RDA)
End-of-pipe 
technology
Monitoring and control of air pollution
Carbon capture and
storage (CCS)
MEST, MOTIE, MoE
Non-CO2 monitoring 
and treatment
MEST, MOTIE, MoE
Water quality management
Water quality 
assessment and 
management
MEST, MoE, Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT)
Technologies for 
securing alternative 
water resources
MEST, MOLIT
Waste and environmental 
preservation
Monitoring of 
toxic pollutants 
and environmental 
remediation
MEST, MoE, MOLIT
Table 7: Areas of ministerial support in development of eco-friendly technologies
Figure 11: Overview of the EMS platform
Source: Park and Kim, 2013
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Platform Technologies Program for Climate Change Response
(Ministry of Environment, MoE) 
The Platform Technologies Program was launched by the MoE in 2013 with the mission of delivering technologies 
required for effective climate-related policy interventions. As a one-of-its-kind program designed to focus 
primarily on supporting the government’s climate change related decision-making process, its outputs were 
targeted to have a wide range of applications across different activities. These activities include the operation 
of a robust MRV (Measurement, Reporting and Verification) system, downscaling climate projections, reducing 
uncertainties in GHG emissions reduction models, formulation of climate change adaptation measures, and 
optimization of cost benefits in GHG abatement measures. Ultimately, technological advances supported by 
the program were able to strengthen the scientific basis of the nation’s climate change response and rebutting 
misinformation on global warning. 
Provision of research grants prioritize the development of platform technologies in four key areas, which are: 
(1) improvement of the national GHG inventory system; 
(2) integrated assessment of emissions control costs and their benefits; 
(3) climate change impact and vulnerability assessment; and 
(4) climate change adaptation management. 
A total of 83.5 trillion KRW has been allocated over an eight-year period (2013-2020).
Example Project: Development of integrated climate change vulnerability assessment framework 
considering socio-economic scenarios
Climate change adaptation is a comprehensive process of preparing for and adjusting proactively to the 
impacts of climate change. The ROK is projected to experience greater fluctuations in temperature and 
precipitation as a result of the changing climate, underscoring the need for reducing the nation’s levels of 
exposure to climate-induced risks and for improving adaption capacities. According to the Framework Act 
on Low Carbon, Green Growth, relevant government ministries are to jointly establish a mid-term “National 
Climate Change Adaptation Plan.” The plan for 2011-2015 has stressed the importance of conducting 
sectoral climate change vulnerability assessments, which prioritizes measures that can help improve the 
adaptive capacities of local governments, businesses, local communities, and individuals. 
The objective of this research project is to develop an integrated vulnerability assessment framework that 
considers future socio-economic scenarios in addition to future climate projections. The development of 
this new framework is based on the notion that socio-economic scenarios such as changes in the nation’s 
GDP, population, and industrial structure are vital factors that determine future vulnerability. Thus, it is 
essential that identical sets of socio-economic variables are taken into account in vulnerability assessments 
of different sectors. The project also plans to pilot test the new framework in selected areas (e.g., city, 
agricultural land, industrial areas, coastal areas, and mountainous areas). 
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Figure 12: Vulnerability assessment framework
Source: KEI, 2015
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Figure 13: Impact of greening of industries on the job market
Source: Joint Work of Relevant Ministries, 2009
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Fostering of Energy Talents Program (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, MOTIE)
The program aims to meet the rising demand for qualified talents in utilizing clean energy technologies and 
alternative practices, by means of establishing undergraduate and graduate curriculums that specialize in 
energy. A unique feature is that these curriculums are to be fully led by the private sector; industrial leaders will 
ensure that the selection of project recipients meets the actual demand for skill sets in the market, contribute 
to curriculum design process, participate as lecturers of curriculum courses, and help the talents secure jobs 
upon graduation. 
Support toward nurturing highly qualified specialists in specific fields of the energy sector also takes the form of 
large-scale grants directed to research laboratories of graduate schools. Entitled the “Green Energy Technology-
Future (GET-Future) laboratory,” these research teams focus on fostering of talents that align to the demand 
as identified by the national energy strategies and R&D plans. The research grants awarded cover expenses 
for opening of lectures, developing course materials, conducting field training, opening scholarships, payrolls 
for researchers, and carrying out applied research. The total budget allocated to the program was 295 billion 
KRW (2001-2012) for four priority fields of the energy sector, namely energy efficiency (27.4%); renewable 
energy (24.6%); electricity (41.6%); and nuclear energy (6.4%).
Area University and Program Title Participating Firms and Institutions
Energy 
Efficiency 
Improvement
Zero Energy Building Technology Program 
(Konju National University)
Korea Energy Management Corporation, Korea Institute 
of Energy Research, Samsung C&T
ICT Convergence Zero Energy House Program 
(Hannam University)
OCT Acomm, TOP Architects & Associates
Eco-friendly Power Apparatus Program 
(Dongguk University)
Korea Electrical Manufacturers Association, Dongwoo 
Electric Corp.
High Efficient Energy Nano Material Process Program 
(Sogang University)
Dongwoo Fine-Chem, Hyundai Oilbank
GHG Reduction, Green Production Technology Program 
(Soongsil University)
LG Display, Daejoo Electronic Materials
GHG Reduction Technology Program 
(Chosun University)
Hanyoung ENG, Korea Institute 
of Industrial Technology
Renewable 
Energy
PV Energy Generation Platform Technology 
(Dankook University)
Hyundai Heavy Industries, Shinsung Holdings
Wind Turbine and Floating Structure Program 
(Chonbuk National University)
Korea Institute of Energy Research, 
Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials
Ocean NRE Infra-system  (Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science and Technology/ KAIST)
Hyundai Heavy Industries, Khan
Fuel Cell Material and System Program 
(Chonbuk National University)
Fuel Cell Power, Sebang Blobal Battery
Electricity
Program of Power Electronics and ICT Convergence 
Technology for Smart Grid (Myongji University)
LSIS, Hyosung
Flexible Power Grid Technology Program 
(Korea University)
Hyosung, LSIS, LS Cable & System
Smart Distribution System Program 
(Hankyong National University)
Hyundai Heavy Industries, LG Electronics, POSCO
Table 8: Areas of ministerial support in development of eco-friendly technologies
Source: MKE, 2011
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4. Assessment
4.1 Quantitative Assessment
In response to the technology innovation agenda 
under the Five-Year National Plan for Green Growth 
and the National Green Technology R&D Master 
Plan, government investments in green technology 
R&D activities increased steadily, reaching 3.04 
trillion KRW (approximately US$ 2.8 billion) in 2013.
• This figure accounts for about 17.9% of the total 
national R&D budget of 16.9 trillion KRW won 
(approximately US$ 15.4 billion). 
• Average annual growth rate in green technology 
R&D expenditures was 15.8% during 2008-
2013, which surpasses that for the total national 
R&D expenditure that stood at 9.0% over the 
same period.
• As of 2013, R&D investments in 27 key green 
technologies was estimated at 2.31 trillion KRW 
(approximately US$ 2.1 billion), accounting for 
76.2% of 3.04 trillion KRW investment in green 
technologies. 
• The average annual growth rate of the 
investments in 27 key green technologies during 
2008-2012 was recorded at 17.1%. 
Such outcomes in terms of government R&D 
expenditure demonstrate how the “principle of 
selection and concentration” has once again led 
the nation’s technology innovation agenda. The 
government has fulfilled its targets to double its 
investment in green technology, from 1.4 trillion 
KRW in 2008 to 3.04 trillion KRW in 2013 (note 
that these numbers do not strictly coincide with the 
planned budgets given in Section 3.1).The number 
of R&D project engagements relevant to green 
technology also increased in a similar proportion 
over the same period, from approximately 4,000 to 
8,000.
Understanding that the stages which R&D, as of 
2012, are generally divided into are basic research; 
applied research and experimental development; 
and analysis of expenditures, reveals that about half 
of the government investment in green technology 
was allocated to experimental development, 
accounting for about 48.6% or 1.32 trillion KRW 
(US$ 1.2 billion). Basic and applied research were 
accountable for 22.3% and 19.6% of the total 
expenditures, respectively. These figures illustrate 
how the ROK has continued to place the focus on 
technology commercialization rather than nurturing 
knowledge-based assets through basic research; the 
35% target for basic research by 2012 was not even 
met. However, it is important to recognize that the 
growth in the absolute amount during 2008-2012 
was found to be most significant in basic research 
(187%), which far exceeds that of both applied 
research (29.4%) and experimental development 
(59.4%). This outcome is a reflection of the strategic 
agenda on “increasing the volume of basic research” 
Example Project: GET-Future Laboratory for Advanced Lithium-ion Batteries (Hanyang 
University)
Since the commercialization of lithium-ion batteries which was merely 20 years ago, there has been little 
technological progress in terms of improving its lifespan and performance. This limitation has created a 
critical bottleneck to expanding the use of electric vehicles; despite the attractive features of reduced 
pollution, noise, and fuel costs, electric vehicles travel only up to 150-200 km on a single charge. Accordingly, 
the GET-Future laboratory of Hanyang University engaged in a project to develop lithium-air batteries for 
powering electric vehicles. Lithium–air batteries have very high energy storage capacities (i.e., 10 times 
higher than conventional lithium-ion batteries) but their application has been hampered by the restricted 
number of charge–discharge cycles. In 2012, the GET-Future laboratory successfully identified a stable 
electrolyte that allows lithium–air batteries to operate at multiple cycles, bringing the technology a step 
closer to becoming viable. Upon commercialization, lithium-air batteries are expected to give electric cars 
a range of up to 800 km on a single charge. 
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as laid out by the National Green Technology R&D 
Master Plan.
A breakdown of investments by different ministries 
as of 2012 shows that the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy (now the Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Energy) topped the list with 1.27 trillion 
KRW (approximately US$ 1.2 billion), accounting 
for 46.9%. This was followed by the Ministry of 
Education and Science Technology with 0.5 trillion 
KRW (18.6%) and the Ministry of Land, Transport 
and Maritime Affairs with 0.3 trillion KRW (11.0%). 
Such outcomes illustrate how the Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy (MKE) played a pivotal role in 
supporting green technology R&D among various 
government ministries; the Ministry was principally 
in charge of promoting basic research in the fields of 
energy and industrial process, as well as accelerating 
technology commercialization to foster the nation’s 
new growth engines (e.g., secondary cells, LED lights, 
green cars, renewable energy). However, in terms 
of absolute growth in the volume of investment 
during 2008-2012, the Small and Medium Business 
Administration (SMBA) and the Rural Development 
Administration (RDA) recorded the highest growth 
rates of 308% and 424%, respectively. SMBA 
focused its efforts on enhancing the environmental 
performance of industrial processes by SMEs, and 
supporting the technology and knowledge-based 
start-ups. RDA’s research areas of focus were 
climate-resilient agricultural production and energy 
efficiency of the agricultural sector.
Analysis of R&D investments in green technology by 
recipient types as of 2012 reveals that GRIs received 
the largest portion, equivalent to 827.6 billion KRW, 
which accounts for 30.5% of the total investment. 
Research laboratories of universities, large 
corporations, and SMEs followed to take on shares 
of 19.3%, 18.5%, and 18.8%, respectively. In terms 
of the growth in absolute volume of investment, 
universities and SMEs have received a frontal 
support; their growth rates reached 127% and 107% 
during 2008-2012, respectively. The volume of 
investments into GRIs and large corporations peaked 
in 2011 before experiencing a 3-5% decrease in 
2012. 
The ROK’s endeavors to place green technology at 
the center of the nation’s green growth strategy is 
Source: GTC-K, 2013
Figure 14: Investment in national R&D projects relevant to green technologies
Unit: 100 million KRW, number of projects
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to be given much credit; the PCGG was successful in 
providing clear signals on the need for technological 
innovation to achieve a green growth transition, 
while coordinating with different ministries to 
boost their R&D activities in green technologies. 
These efforts paid off in terms of narrowing the 
nation’s technological gap with the global leaders 
and increasing the volume of foreign exports. 
According to the assessment by KISTEP, the ROK’s 
technological levels relative to the world’s leaders 
in 27 key green technology areas range between 
63.5%-90.1% as of 2011 (average at 77.7%). In  turn,  
this  means  that  the  ROK  is  approximately  4.1  
years  behind  globally  leading  the advancement  of  
green  technologies.  As  compared  to  the  year 2009 
when  the  nation  had  only identified one technology 
area where their competitiveness exceeded 80% 
of the global leaders, five different  areas  were  
identified  as  of  2011,  which  include  Si-based  
solar  cells,  advanced  light  water reactors (nuclear 
energy), LED lights, carbon capture and storage, and 
smart-grid systems. 
Source: GTC-K, 2013
Figure 16: Public investment in green technology by areas in 2013
Figure 15:  Public investment in green technology by years
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Table 10: Trends in green technology investment by different ministries
Source: GTC-K, 2013
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
Ministry of 
Knowledge 
Economy 
7,003 48 9,343 48 11,303 50.4 12,572 49.3 12,721 46.9
Ministry of 
Education, 
Science and 
Technology
3,666 25.1 4,307 22.1 4,520 20.1 5,342 21 5,041 18.6
Ministry of Land, 
Transport and 
Maritime Affairs
1,811 12.4 2,584 13.3 2,746 12.2 2,592 10.2 2,998 11
Ministry of 
Environment
1,129 7.7 1,415 7.3 1,500 6.7 1,189 4.7 1,509 5.6
Small and 
Medium 
Business 
Administration
498 3.4 865 4.4 912 4.1 1,320 5.2 2,031 7.5
Rural 
Development 
Administration 
108 0.7 333 1.7 622 2.8 582 2.3 566 2.1
Others 373 2.7 619 3.2 845 3.7 1,884 7.3 2,282 8.4
Total 14,588 100 19,466 100 22,448 100 25,481 100 27,148 100
Unit: 100 million KRW
Table 9: Trends in green technology investment by R&D types
Research Type Basic Research Applied Research Experimental Development Others
2008 2,202 (15.1) 4,118 (28.2) 7,854 (53.8) 414 (2.8)
2009 3,792 (19.5) 3,606 (18.5) 10,426 (53.6) 1,643 (8.4)
2010 5,557 (24.8) 4,070 (18.1) 11,552 (51.5) 1,268 (5.7)
2011 5,433 (21.3) 4,786 (18.8) 12,895 (50.6) 2,386 (9.3)
2012 6,318 (23.3) 5,330 (19.6) 13,192 (48.6) 2,307 (8.5)
2013 8,027 (26.4) 5,992 (19.7) 14,320 (47.2) 2,022 (6.7)
Unit: 100 million KRW
Source: GTC-K, 2013
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Table 11: Trends in green technology investment by recipient types
Source: GTC-K, 2013
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share
National/
Public Research 
Institutes
385 2.6 751 3.9 1,057 4.7 1,048 4.1 1,065 3.9
Gov-funded 
Research 
Institutes
5,539 38 6,953 35.7 8,427 37.5 8,571 33.6 8,276 30.5
Universities 2,306 15.8 3,195 16.4 3,430 15.3 4,811 18.9 5,243 19.3
Large 
Conglomerates
2,984 20.5 3,814 19.6 4,647 20.7 5,256 20.6 5,014 18.5
SMEs 2,458 16.9 3,634 18.7 3,739 16.7 4,346 17.1 5,099 18.8
Government 
Ministries
34 0.2 88 0.5 51 0.2 66 0.3 4 0.01
Others 883 6.1 1,031 5.3 1,098 4.9 1,383 5.4 2,448 9
Total 14,588 100 19,466 100 22,448 100 25,481 100 27,143 100
Unit: 100 million KRW
Source: Hong, 2011
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Outcomes of technological advancement were found 
to be most prominent in the fields of secondary cells 
and LED lights. For example, the lithium-ion battery 
market is an area where domination by Japanese 
companies continued for over 20 years, after Sony 
was the first to successfully commercialize the 
technology in 1991. As of 2013, the ROK took over 
the greatest share of the global market at 36%. 
Leading manufacturers of the ROK including LG 
Chemicals and Samsung SDI are now key players 
in the market, and have recently been successful 
in securing contracts with global auto-makers 
manufacturing electric vehicles. Recognizing how 
lithium-ion batteries dominate the most recent 
group of electric vehicles in development, the ROK is 
well-placed to benefit from the explosive growth in 
demand. 
In the case of LED lights, which are often 
described as one of the most exciting technological 
advancements in the lighting industry owing to 
their extremely high energy-efficiency and long 
durability, the ROK belatedly joined the league 
of source technology developers along with 
Japan and Germany. The government’s intensive 
investments in R&D have helped narrow the nation’s 
technological competitiveness to 85% of the level 
of the global leaders. Technological advancement 
was also supported by government’s expansion 
of ESCO projects and policy incentives directed 
toward energy-saving buildings, which contributed 
to creating a significant domestic market for LED 
lights. The LED lighting industry’s volume of foreign 
exports increased from 1.4 trillion KRW in 2009 to 
5.6 trillion KRW in 2012. 
However, such positive outcomes were not equally 
present in all of the key green technology areas. 
Most importantly, the renewable energy industry 
which was an area where the government was 
confident in seeing a sharp increase in production, 
was only successful in narrowing the technological 
gaps (to 85% of the global leaders). The ROK’s total 
production capacity of solar cells and PV modules 
is still smaller than that of the largest Chinese 
manufacturer “Yingli”; this is attributed to the low 
price competitiveness, which is estimated to fall 
20%-30% behind China. 
The key limitation to government’s endeavors was 
the failure in scaling-up the domestic market volume 
of renewable energy goods which is to provide the 
foundations for entering the international market. 
The importance of stable domestic markets to the 
export performance cannot be overemphasized; 
they provide a springboard for growth of exports and 
cushion to absorb the risks prevalent in the export 
markets. 
The government’s role in terms of promoting the 
growth of domestic renewable energy market has 
been rather limited. Although legal and institutional 
frameworks for boosting the renewable energy 
use have been strengthened, the ROK’s share of 
renewable energy in total final energy consumption 
stood at 3.17% as of 2012. This figure is significantly 
lower than Japan and the UK that share similar 
climatic and geographical conditions. Domestic 
markets that have failed to achieve an economy of 
scale were unable to provide sufficient opportunities 
for renewable energy industries to pilot test the 
performance of their goods for export. Recovery of 
the global renewable energy market in the future is 
unlikely to have any immediate effect on the export 
figures of the ROK. 
4.2 Qualitative Assessment
The ROK’s emphasis on R&D has long been the main 
driver bolstering the nation’s global competitiveness. 
The OECD has recently highlighted through the 
“Science Technology and Industry Outlook 2014” 
that the ROK was the world’s most R&D-intensive 
country in 2012. The Asian Development Bank has 
also reported that the ROK comes in second place 
among 22 Asian economies in terms of the Creative 
Productivity Index (CPI), which is a measure of the 
progress in fostering creativity and innovation by 
taking into account inputs into outputs such as 
patents per capita, published scientific papers and 
export sophistication. Shared understanding on the 
needs for R&D activities from the public and private 
sector lifts off from the notion that anything on the 
global market will eventually be manufactured in 
emerging economies including China at lower costs; 
the only way for the ROK to stay ahead is to continue 
improving the quality and technological edge of their 
products. 
The government’s budgetary spending to foster 
green technology innovation was most meaningful 
in that it helped kick-start a vicious cycle of 
environmental protection and economic growth. 
For example, technological innovation of the LED 
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industry – which is primarily led by SMEs in the 
ROK – has helped accelerate the use of LED lights 
for saving electricity in a large number of public 
facilities, including government buildings, hospitals 
and universities nationwide. Although the share 
of LED light bulbs has been recently reported as 
falling far behind from being on track to meet the 
government’s set target of 60% by 2060, facilities 
such as the office buildings of the Ulsan City 
Government (81% as of 2013), and University 
of Seoul (92% as of 2014) have made significant 
progress. Incheon International Airport announced 
in 2014 that its investment in LED lighting since 
2009 has led to a 18,831MWh reduction in 
electricity consumption, equivalent to 8,832 tCO2 
eq. reduction in emissions. Such outcomes along 
with the expansion in the volume of exports have 
raised the total revenues of SMEs in LED industry 
from 0.23 trillion KRW in 2007 to 2.99 trillion KRW 
in 2012. The total number of employees engaged in 
manufacturing LED lights in the ROK increased from 
approximately 4,750 to 19,900 over the same period. 
Not often are the outcomes of R&D investments 
achieved in the short term, as seen through the 
example of the LED industry. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of the ROK’s spending in green 
technology innovation needs to be evaluated from a 
long-term perspective. However, several limitations 
can be identified in the context of the directions 
taken by government strategies and actions. First, 
it must be noted that parts of the government 
strategies have embarked on anticipations on 
technology commercialization that have proven 
to be unrealistic and idealistic. For example, the 
PCGG has acknowledged in 2012 that several key 
green technologies are unlikely to create significant 
markets even in the long-term (environmentally 
friendly nuclear nonproliferation and fast reactor 
cores) or have significant commercial benefits 
(climate change prediction and modeling). 
Changing trends in market creation and 
technological innovation has also made evident that 
the 27 key green technologies have failed to include 
some technology areas with greater potential, 
including wind energy. Such findings demonstrate 
the need for governments to carefully understand 
the risks involved in innovation planning, as well 
as the need for making periodic monitoring and 
adjustments for strategies to adapt to the changing 
market trends.
One may question whether the ROK’s investments 
in green technology actually followed the principles 
of “selection and concentration,” considering the 
breadth of technology portfolio which covered 27 
key green technology (and the 75 green technology) 
areas. Given the size of the ROK’s domestic 
market, financial resources made available and 
research capacities in successfully bringing about 
technological innovation, it is fair to point out that 
government has been perhaps overly ambitious in 
its attempts to become a “global leader.” Denmark, 
which is a nation that concentrated its efforts in 
fostering wind energy technologies from the 1980s 
and became the only net exporter of oil and gas in 
the EU is a good example of success. Acknowledging 
that denser activity facilitates greater specialization 
and there are high possibilities for technological 
spillovers from one R&D sector to another, the 
government must seek to further prioritize its 
efforts in the future.
Although a significant portion of the government’s 
budget was channeled to promote the R&D activities 
of SMEs, large corporations with sufficient funds to 
finance technology innovation have also benefited 
from the green technology agenda. The government 
must understand that unlike the 1970s-1990s 
when there was a clear need for fostering a selected 
number of corporations to lead the nation’s strategic 
industries, the private sector of the ROK is now 
responsible for more than 70% of the nation’s 
expenditures on R&D activities. Such circumstances 
open windows of opportunities for the government 
to use its public funds to promote technological 
innovation of high-risk and long-term commitment, 
and R&D efforts that can bring about shared 
public benefits and resolve market imperfections. 
Especially in the field of basic and applied research, 
there is a clear need for the government’s 
interventions to support creative ideas that are likely 
to bring about groundbreaking innovations. Success 
in such engagements can only be made possible 
when the actors of research and technology work in 
a culture where failure is reasonably tolerated. 
It is without doubt that the ROK government’s 
selection of 27 key green technologies has primarily 
focused on creation of the nation’s new growth 
engines. Technologies that have greater relevance 
in regard to improving environmental sustainability 
for resolving issues that are closely related to social 
well-being (e.g., food-waste management) have not 
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been well accounted for despite increasing public 
interest and demand. Innovation in such areas 
of technologies have high potential to generate 
immediate and lasting impacts, given how technology 
has become such an important facet of our lives. 
Such limitation in the ROK’s strategic priorities 
dwells on the fact that assessments and surveys that 
have led to the selection of key green technologies 
have mainly targeted the manufacturing sector. 
Portfolios of technologies for R&D investment under 
the green growth agenda must seek to find a better 
balance between environmental protection and 
economic growth as underlined by the concept of 
green growth.
5. Takeaways and 
Recommendations
Despite some of the limitations in the ROK’s 
endeavors under the green technology agenda, 
the nation’s experience provides several valuable 
lessons for emerging countries. First, it is important 
to recognize that technology innovation has 
been a critical element to the national economic 
development plan in the ROK from its earliest stages 
of economic growth. The government thus has 
played multiple roles, as a provider of direction (i.e., 
setting of priority technology areas), target setter 
(i.e., national strategies and action plans), and as a 
financier (i.e., government spending on R&D). 
Such government intervention is most effective 
during the early stages of a nation’s industrial 
development as the scale and complexity of the 
required interventions grow exponentially with the 
deepening of industrial structures. Notwithstanding 
its weaknesses, the ROK’s administration and 
governance has been key to success in this process. 
For example, the NSTC’s first move in response to 
the nation’s green growth agenda was the creation 
of the Green Technology Center (GTC). This council 
formulated year-by-year R&D investment plans and 
coordinated with relevant ministries to minimize 
the overlapping of efforts in technology areas, which 
were periodically reported to the PCGG. Under 
well-defined targets and priorities, the Ministries 
were ready to lead innovation actions by capitalizing 
on GRIs under their supervision and inviting private 
sector actors within their authorities to take part in 
R&D activities. 
The ROK government allocated a large portion 
of its investments to green technology under the 
premise that green industries will unlock new 
global markets. The key driver of motivation to 
innovation actors in the ROK has been competition 
in the international market, which exerts an 
enormous amount of pressure for technological 
learning and development. As a country that owns 
no natural resources for international trade and 
just competitive human resources, developing 
technological competence was not an option but a 
necessity. Developing countries that do not share 
such given circumstances may look away from 
the needs for replicating the ROK’s model, but it 
is important to understand that competition can 
become a critical driver for technology innovation 
under any given circumstances. Although the 
relationship between competition and innovation 
is complex, it is true that innovation is the 
distinguishing trait of many of the world’s leading 
competitors. Industries that rely heavily on closed 
markets are more likely to grow immune against 
pressure for technological innovation.
The main elements to technology innovation 
are people, knowledge, and money. Nurturing 
talents and fostering the required manpower for 
R&D activities has always been at the center of 
the ROK’s innovation strategies. It is true that 
the ROK’s success from taking such a strategic 
direction owes much to the nation’s tradition 
that accords the highest respect to education and 
scholarships. In order to foster top-class scientists 
and engineers, the government implemented 
policy reforms during the late 1990s that aimed to 
create “research-focused universities,” breaking 
away from supporting solely teaching-oriented 
environments. A greater portion of public R&D funds 
were thus allocated to the research laboratories 
of universities, and government’s evaluation of 
university education placed emphasis on the volume 
of research outputs (e.g., academic journals, patents, 
technology certifications) and the number of their 
citations. Under the green technology agenda, 
government once again designated universities 
to become centers of excellence that participate 
in cooperative R&D activities between academia 
and industries. Heightened research capacities of 
universities helped industrial partners maneuver 
through an increasingly competitive commercial 
environment, while the industrial partners provided 
an opportunity for universities to apply their 
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knowledge in the field as well as foster doctorate and 
postgraduate students with skills of high demand 
from industries. 
The need to put into practice the principles of 
“selection and concentration” cannot be overstated, 
especially for developing countries that seek to 
develop and harness homegrown technologies. 
Amid a challenging budgetary environment, 
developing countries should seek to concentrate 
their public expenditures on areas that offer 
comparative advantage. The ROK’s strategies on 
green technologies have demonstrated methods 
of how investment prioritization can take place; 
the process involved understanding of the 
nation’s current technological competitiveness, 
taking note of market demand, projections on 
technology commercialization and market creation, 
and grouping of technologies according to their 
investment needs timeframe. 
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1.1 Overview
Along with the greening of industrial activities 
and the development of green technologies, 
realizing a green lifestyle is an important agenda 
for green growth. Green lifestyle is a way of life 
that recognizes the seriousness of environmental 
degradation and impacts of climate change, thus 
leading to an integrated set of practices and 
habits that utilize resources in an eco-friendly and 
sustainable manner. Green lifestyle is also in line 
with the principles of “Sustainable Consumption and 
Production” based on the Environmentally Sound 
and Sustainable Development (ESSD) model.
The promotion of a green lifestyle is being 
emphasized in the ROK not only because the volume 
of GHG emissions from the non-industrial sector 
(e.g., households and public transportation) accounts 
for over 40% of the nation’s total emissions, but also 
because the marginal cost of mitigation activities in 
this area is often substantially lower than that of the 
industrial sector. Furthermore, there are 
many benefits to be gained by greening people’s 
daily activities, which can have an immediate 
and sustained impact on GHG concentrations. 
Acknowledging that all members of society have a 
role to play in climate change mitigation, the ROK’s 
green growth policies aim to place the general public 
at the forefront of green actions, and emphasize that 
society needs to consume sustainably. These policies 
are also intended to influence producers to commit 
to cleaner and greener production.
An aspect of the ROK’s concept of low-carbon 
green growth that is often scrutinized is how it 
focuses primarily on reduction of GHG emissions 
and economic growth, with less consideration 
given to social sustainability. In addition, many of 
Korea’s green growth actions follow a top-down 
approach and focus on market-driven processes, 
while elements such as democratic governance and 
civil society participation are often overlooked. In 
other words, as opposed to the model of sustainable 
development that underscores the collaborative 
efforts of all sectors of society, the ROK’s concept 
CHAPTER 5 
GREEN LIFESTYLE
1. Introduction
Summary
Promoting green lifestyle presents vast opportunities for green growth in the ROK given the high volume of emissions 
from the non-industrial sector and its relatively minimal mitigation cost. However, this demands behavioral change across 
the whole society, an enormous challenge for the ROK whose rapid economic growth has transformed the once frugal 
culture of consumption to a lifestyle of abundance and waste. From 2009-2013, the ROK has made significant progress 
in greening the consumption patterns by implementing a right combination of binding and incentivizing policies such as 
green public procurement, green business certification program, carbon labeling, carbon point system, waste management 
schemes, and a range of green education and awareness programs. The ROK strategically utilized both top-down and 
bottom-up approaches by launching a nationwide campaign for emissions reduction and a national strategy for promoting 
green life practices while forming local green growth committees in various local government units. Despite the society’s 
high level of awareness of climate change and environmental sustainability, the ROK has not seen more proactive efforts 
from the public to shift to a greener lifestyle and this is unlikely to happen overnight since instilling a paradigm shift in 
favor of green living would require sustained communication strategies and longer time horizon. 
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of low-carbon green growth puts greater weight on 
top-down decision making. Despite this controversy, 
it is important to recognize that the ROK’s agenda 
on “Promoting a Green Lifestyle” emphasizes the 
need for civil society participation. The Framework 
Act on Low- Carbon Green Growth identifies the 
greening of people’s everyday practices as an integral 
component for achieving sustainable development, 
and also adopts the principle of public participation 
rooted in ESSD1.
1.2 Baseline Assessment 
Root Causes of Challenges
The industry and energy sectors are the root causes 
of increasing GHG emissions in the ROK. As of 2011, 
the total volume of GHG emissions in the ROK, 
excluding land use, land-use change, and forestry 
(or LULUCF), amounted to 697.7 million tons of CO
2
 
equivalent, increasing by approximately 141.9% 
from the 1990 levels (GIR, 2014). The nation’s GHG 
inventory comprises five different sectors (energy, 
industrial process, agriculture, LULUCF, and wastes), 
among which the energy sector emits the largest 
volume (597.9 tons CO
2
-eq). A closer look at the 
emissions from the energy sector reveals that fuel 
combustion from energy industries2  (44.7%), and 
manufacturing/construction (31%) account for 
a large portion of the emissions. Transportation 
(14.4%) and other economic activities (9.9% for 
households, commercial businesses, public sector, 
agriculture, and fishery) are responsible for 
approximately 24.3% of emissions by the energy 
sector (GIR, 2014). 
It is true that the various sectors’ shares in the 
nation’s total emissions have experienced a gradual 
decrease over the past two decades, largely due to 
the changing patterns of consumption that replaced 
the use of petroleum and coal to more convenient 
forms of energy such as electricity and gas (GIR, 
2014). However, it should be noted that the non-
industrial sector is also responsible for a fairly 
large portion of the nation’s total emissions. As the 
structure of the national GHG inventory makes it  
difficult to understand emissions from non-industrial 
processes, the ROK’s emissions projections have 
been re-categorized into six different areas in Table 
2: emissions from industry; transportation; buildings; 
public sector; LULUCF; and waste management. 
Projections show that although the share of 
the non-industrial sector is likely to decrease in 
the future, its absolute volume will continue to 
increase. Recognizing how the non-industrial sector 
is responsible for over 40% of the nation’s total 
emissions, mitigation actions have a key role to play 
in meeting the total emissions reduction targets.
An analysis of energy use from the perspective 
of consumption behavior shows how the ROK 
has experienced significant lifestyle changes in 
the course of economic development. Energy 
consumption in households and commercial 
businesses has rapidly transitioned from the use 
of petroleum and coal to the use of electricity and 
gas. While the amount of coal consumption – which 
was the primary source of energy in the past – 
decreased from 9 million TOE in 1990 to 0.94 million 
TOE in 2009, natural gas consumption increased 
substantially from 2.4 million TOE in 1990 to 14.6 
million TOE in 2012. What is most remarkable is 
how electricity consumption increased five-fold over 
the past two decades, from 0.656 MWh/person in 
1990 to 3.481 MWh/person in 2009. Such rate of 
increase in consumption is approximately 3.2 times 
higher than the rate of increase in the total energy 
consumption of households over the same period.
• Transportation: The number of registered cars 
in the ROK increased by about 6.6 times, from 
1.9 million in 1990 to 12.6 million in 2009. 
Accordingly, the consumption of gasoline and 
diesel fuel during this period increased by 2.8 
times and 1.9 times, respectively. While it is true 
that such increase of energy consumption in the 
transportation sector was not as significant as that 
of the energy sector during the period – which 
is a result of government efforts to promote the 
use of public transportation (subway and bus) – 
1 | Following the introduction of “low-carbon green growth” as the nation’s new vision in 2008, changes were made to the nation’s framework on ESSD. The 
contents of the “Sustainable Development Act” were transferred to the new “Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth.” With the establishment of the 
Presidential Committee on Green Growth, the Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development (PCSD) was downgraded to ministerial level (Ministry 
of Environment). Such actions have raised questions on whether the concept of “low-carbon green growth” is able to capture the essential components of 
sustainable development.
2 | Energy industries represent processes relevant to the production and sale of energy (e.g., electricity and heat).
The responsibilities and duties of the general 
public in pursuing green growth as articulated 
in the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green 
Growth (2010):
• Actively practice green lifestyle at home, at 
school, and in the workplace
• Take interest in the greening of corporate 
management practices and promoting the 
consumption of green products and services 
• Recognize that all citizens are ultimately the 
solutions providers for overcoming climate 
change and the energy/natural resource 
crisis
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there is still high potential for reducing energy 
demand. The GHG emissions from privately owned 
automobiles currently accounts for a large portion 
of total emissions from land transport, indicating 
the need for government policies to further 
promote modal shift.
• Building: In 2010, the building sector was 
responsible for approximately 20% of the total 
consumption of energy nationwide, among which 
the proportion of the energy consumption in 
residential buildings, commercial buildings, and 
public buildings accounted for 53%, 37%, and 
10%, respectively. During the 1990-2005 period, 
the average annual rate of increase in the energy 
consumption for this sector was 2.9%, fueled by 
energy consumption from residential buildings 
(3.9% annual growth in the same period). The 
ROK’s economic growth has led to greater energy 
demand for space heating and use of electronic 
goods, which constitute 54% and 19%, respectively 
of energy consumption in residential buildings as 
of 2010. These figures indicate the high potential 
for energy-saving through behavioral and lifestyle 
changes.Waste Management: The ROK has 
many success stories in the waste management 
sector. The amount of waste treated decreased 
substantially from 83,962 tons/day in 1990 to 
48,934 tons/day in 2012 due to the decline in the 
volume of waste generated (waste disposal per 
person decreased from 1.96kg/day to 0.98kg/
day over the same period). Likewise, the volume 
of recycled waste increased consistently as a 
result of government policies that enabled proper 
sorting, disposal, and collection of recyclable 
wastes. However, food wastes – which are 
primarily (70%) generated by households and small 
restaurants – have continued to increase annually 
(approximately 3%) since 2000 as a consequence 
of increased income and spending patterns. As 
food waste is a major source of GHG emissions and 
environmental pollution, there remains much room 
for improvement in terms of reducing food waste.
Relevant Problems
In terms of environmental awareness, the 1988 
Olympic Games in Seoul was a big turning point for 
the ROK when concerns over Seoul’s poor air quality 
helped raise public awareness of the importance of 
environmentally friendly growth. However, tangible 
support from the public only began to be manifested 
in the late 1990s as increasing numbers of reports 
revealed the consequences of environmental 
pollution to human health, and how environmentally 
friendly growth offers better living conditions for 
the public. Moreover, given the prolonged impacts of 
skyrocketing oil prices on Korea’s economy and the 
nation’s extreme vulnerability to such market shocks, 
the government conveyed a strong public message 
that “energy saving means economic growth.” 
Table 1: Past GHG emissions in the energy sector
Category 1990 2000 2005 2010 2011
Energy
Amount of Emissions 
(million tons CO2)
47.8 134.9 177.2 256.1 264.1
Share (%) 20.3 33.2 38,4 45.6 44.7
Manufacturing and 
Construction 
Amount of Emissions 
(million tons CO2)
76.5 129.8 134.9 161.3 182.7
Share (%) 32.5 31.9 29.2 28.7 31.0
Transportation
Amount of Emissions 
(million tons CO2)
34.8 68.6 80.4 85.4 85.0
Proportion (%) 14.8 16.9 17.4 15.2 14.4
Others 
Amount of Emissions 
(million tons CO2)
76.5 73.3 69.5 59.0 58.4
Share (%) 32.5 18.0 15.1 10.5 9.9
Total Emissions by 
the Energy Sector
Amount of Emissions 
(million tons CO2)
235.6 406.6 462.1 561.7 590.2
Share (%) 79.7 79.5 81.1 84.1 84.6
Total Amount of Emissions 295.7 511.3 569.5 667.8 697.7
Note: “Others” include commercial businesses, public sector, households, agriculture, and fishery .
Source: GIR, 2014
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Table 3: Energy consumption and waste disposal in households
Category Statistics 1990 2000 2005 2010 2012
Energy 
Consumption
Coal (thousand tons) 19,217 1,192 2,010 1,859 1,833
Petroleum (thousand tons) 67,510 105,148 75,758 51,651 43,542
Natural Gas (m3) 740 8,594 11,908 11,838 13,267
Electricity (GWh) 28,147 91,753 142,248 181,813 186,619
Waste 
Disposal
Total amount of municipal waste 
treated (ton/day)
83,962 46,438 48,398 49,159 48,934
Disposal per person (kg/day) 1.96 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.98
Amount of waste recycled 
(thousand tons/year)
27,240 30,757 35,289 36,943 
Note: Figures for municipal waste treated and waste recycled in 2012 are figures for 2011 .
Source:  KEEI, 2013; KOSTAT, 2011; KECO, 2014
Table 2: Emissions projections for 2014-2020
Source: Joint Work of Relevant Ministries, 2014
Category Detailed Plans 2014 2016 2018 2020
Industry
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 373.6 395.1 415.4 439
Share (%) 53.8 54.8 55.6 56.6 
Transportation 
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 95 96.7 98.2 99.6
Share (%) 13.7 13.4 13.1 12.8 
Construction
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 154.5 158 162.8 167.6
Share (%) 22.2 21.9 21.8 21.6 
Public sector/others
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 17.4 17.3 17.6 17.9
Share (%) 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 
Land use, land-use change, 
and forestry (LULUCF)
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 30.2 29.6 29.1 28.5
Share (%) 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.7 
Waste
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 14.9 14.7 14.7 14.2
Share (%) 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.8 
Total 694.5 720.8 747.1 776.1
Industrial sector
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 373.6 395.1 415.4 439
Share (%) 53.8 54.8 55.6 56.6 
Non-industrial sector
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 312.0 316.3 322.4 327.8
Amount of Emissions (million tons CO2) 44.9 43.9 43.2 42.2 
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However, as described in the previous section, 
increases in household income have inevitably 
led to increasing energy consumption. Per capita 
household energy consumption now exceeds 
European levels, and it is not expected to 
significantly change in the short term as government 
continues to keep energy prices low. Despite 
many issues surrounding non-industrial energy 
consumption in the ROK, a key problem lies on the 
failure of the public to translate their growing levels 
of environmental awareness into tangible actions. 
In other words, there are various obstacles and 
challenges to be overcome to proactively incentivize 
the public to live a greener lifestyle.
• A study undertaken by the Korea Energy 
Economics Institute (KEEI) in 2008 revealed that 
public awareness of climate change indicated a 
perception level of 70.28 points, comprehension 
level of 59.57 points, and confidence level of 
52.01 points, while the action level was found 
to be significantly low at 30.85 points. These 
figures suggest that a relatively positive public 
reception of climate change issues does not 
automatically translate to concrete actions, 
especially on individual behavior and lifestyle.
• The Green Life Capacity Index (GLCI) developed 
by Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI) 
in 2010 identified significant gaps in facilitating 
voluntary actions for the greening of lifestyles 
in Korea. The GLCI factors in various indicators 
based on the notion that capacity building on 
green governance is necessary for both the 
central and local government to effectively 
promote greener lifestyles. As shown in Table 
4, the ROK ranked above average in the use 
of regulations and technologies among 29 
OECD countries. However, it ranked among the 
lowest in greening governance and behavioral 
norms at the local level. This suggests how the 
discrepancies in the technical capacity of the 
central and local authorities make it difficult for 
drivers of change to actually mobilize efforts at 
the grassroots level.
Policy Options
While there may be various causes behind the lack 
of proactive efforts from the public to shift toward a 
greener lifestyle, despite high levels of awareness of 
climate change and environmental sustainability, the 
following fundamental problems are evident in the 
ROK: 
(1) Insufficient incentives for inducing voluntary 
actions; 
(2) low levels of education and public promotion to 
expand green life practices; and 
(3) absence of an integrated institutional framework 
and diversity of programs to stimulate public 
participation. 
Taking these factors into account, the ROK 
government strategically developed a diverse set of 
incentives to expand green consumption and energy-
saving practices, strengthened foundations for green 
education and capacity development, and initiated 
the “Green Start Movement” as a nationwide effort 
toward reducing GHG emission in the non-industrial 
sector.
1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green Grwoth
Greening of lifestyle practices is increasingly being 
emphasized as a comprehensive measure to respond 
to climate change impacts, reduce GHG emissions, 
and enhance resource efficiency, which are the core 
pillars of the low-carbon green growth policy in the 
ROK. The potential for taking relevant actions can 
be found in a variety of settings, often with low cost 
implications. 
Enabling conditions must be developed under which 
the public engage in green lifestyle practices on 
their own terms, rather than under the direction 
of government regulations. However, as such 
green lifestyle practices do not necessarily lead to 
monetized benefits for individuals, government 
incentives must be channeled to stimulate a virtuous 
cycle of awareness, action, and responsibility.
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Table 4: Green Life Capacity Indicators (GLCI)
Source: SERI, 2010
Sector Category Indicators
Ranking 
of ROK
Capacity
Green Regulation
Use of public transportation 4
Share of renewable energy use 28
Market price of gasoline 3
Volume of fossil fuel consumption 13
Expansion of green areas 1
Quality of regulation 26
Category Total 6
Green Technology
CO2 intensity of electricity generation 20
Energy efficiency 26
R&D capacity 14
Capacities for environmental innovation 16
Category Total 16
Central Government Capacity 12
Local
Government 
Capacity
Green Governance
Support toward enhancing environmental conditions 29
Participation in Agenda 21 activities 19
Environmental governance 22
Political freedom of citizens 27
Government efficiency 19
Rule of law 21
Category Total 24
Green Behavioral Norms
Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index 16
Capacities for environmentally friendly corporate management 15
Ecological footprint per person 6
Volume of household waste generated 7
Value of damage from natural disasters 29
Level of exposure to hazardous environment 23
Category Total 29
Local Government Capacity 28
Green Life Capacity Index (Rank out of 29 OECD countries) 24
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Figure 1: SWOT analysis for “promoting a green lifestyle”
•   Strong social cohesion and 
citizenship
•  Willingness of the govern-
ment to focus support on 
green lifestyle practices
•  Rich ecological resources for 
tourism
•  Expansion of green practices in 
work places
•  Increasing public interest in 
LOHAS culture
•  Changes in public leisure 
patterns
•  Increasing global alliance and 
demand for climate change 
education
•  Environmental awareness 
has not often led to tangi-
ble actions
•  Weak institutional frame-
work to support green 
consumption
•  Low motivation toward 
local government/commu-
nity movement
•  Lack of specialized HR and 
infrastructure to develop 
eco-tourism
•  Green practices can be 
inconvenient and more 
expensive
 
•  Uncertainties in demands 
for green goods and 
services
•  Community resistance 
toward development of 
eco-tourism sites
Strengths Weaknesses
Opportunities Threats
• 
Strategic 
Directions
Institutional framework for 
green education and fostering 
of green talents
Expansion of green 
life practices
Promotion of green 
consumption
Establishment of 
green communities
Expansion of 
eco-tourism activities
Source: PCGG, 2009c
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2. Targets and Strategies
 
At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (Earth Summit), “Agenda 21,” a non-
binding action plan, was agreed upon at the national, 
regional, and local levels for achieving sustainable 
development. Local authorities were to take steps to 
implement programs locally, and these programs are 
commonly known as the “Local Agenda 21 (LA21).” 
The ROK adopted the LA21 in 1995 with the active 
participation of local authorities and civil society. 
In 2000, the “Korea Council for Local Agenda 21” 
was established to foster exchange of information 
between local governments, and approximately 90% 
of local governments had adopted the agenda as of 
2002. The recognition of the need for sustainable 
consumption and production and greening lifestyles 
in the ROK thus dates back to days long before “low-
carbon green growth” was announced as the nation’s 
new growth paradigm in 2008. 
The adoption of LA21 helped the ROK to shift away 
from government-led development planning to a 
bottom-up governance approach. Indeed, a system 
where the local government, community members, 
and private sector cooperate in a balanced manner 
was a new and experimental strategy. However, 
it did not lead to significant engagements on the 
ground due to the still weak legal and institutional 
foundation for LA21, and limited influence and 
environmental awareness of community members. 
In addition, many of the initiatives under LA21 failed 
to receive sufficient financial support, as they were 
budgeted as government assistance for civil society 
groups such as environmental NGOs. 
However, this network of government and non-
government actors under the LA21 eventually 
provided a good starting point for expanding green 
growth initiatives at the grassroots level. In the 
course of developing the National Five-Year Plan 
for Green Growth, the government profiled and 
benchmarked the LA21 along with leading global 
practices of sustainable consumption and green 
lifestyle practices, specifically focusing on how 
public campaigns would lead to measurable actions 
and outcomes. The comparison between the global 
best practices and Korea’s past efforts highlighted 
the failure of the central and local governments to 
create a shared vision and facilitate actions based 
on a network of civil society groups and community 
members. 
Table 5: Specific tasks and actions under the green lifestyle agenda
Tasks Actions
1. Foundation for delivering green education  
     and fostering green talents
a. Establish the foundation for greening the education system
b. Develop green education and capacity building programs 
c. Build capacities to implement green education
d. Strengthen institutional partnerships for green education
2. Expansion of green lifestyle practices
a. Develop and monitor the green lifestyle index 
b. Strengthen the implementation of campaigns on green lifestyle
c. Engage the private sector in green life practices
d. Raise public awareness on green lifestyle through government activities
e. Foster the development of relevant institutions 
3. Promotion of green consumption
a. Promote green consumption patterns across all sectors of the economy
b. Strengthen dissemination of information on green products and services
c. Global cooperation for expanding green consumption and production 
4. Establishment of green communities
a. Develop a “green community” model and roadmap of action
b. Create green communities
c. Establish relevant policies and systems
5. Expansion of eco-tourism activities
a. Develop a Korean model of eco-tourism 
b. Establish infrastructure for expanding eco-tourism activities
c. Develop and promoting eco-tourism products
d. Revise relevant policies and management structure 
Source: PCGG, 2009c
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2.1 Local Green Growth Committees (LGGCs) and 
the Green Start Movement
Under the guidance of the Presidential Committee 
on Green Growth (PCGG) that played the role of 
setting strategies and policies at the national level, 
the Local Green Growth Committees (LGGCs) 
created by the local governments were intended 
to establish an independent green growth plan at 
the local level. The Framework Act on Low Carbon, 
Green Growth stipulates that local governments 
(cities and provinces) are to independently establish 
five-year green growth plans that are tailor-made 
based on the local circumstances and conditions. 
Although the Act identifies local governments as 
important actors to assist the central government’s 
plans and actions for green growth, it fails to specify 
their roles, functions, and authorities; instead, local 
governments are to incorporate them separately 
by issuing “local ordinances on low-carbon green 
growth.”
Establishment of LGGCs
The LGGCs are composed of no more than 50 
members. Individuals with extensive knowledge 
and experience in fields relevant to green growth 
(e.g., climate change, energy, resource management, 
and green technology) are appointed as members 
by either the city mayor or governor. In many local 
governments, LGGC members include high-ranking 
public officials of city or provincial offices. The 
selected members review and deliberate on local 
strategies, agenda, and action plans relevant to green 
growth, as well as monitor their implementation. As 
of November 2009, a total of 16 city and provincial 
governments have established their LGGCs. In order 
to enable close collaboration between LGGCs and 
the central government, one director-level staff (or 
a section chief) from each line ministry and local 
government is designated as a focal point called the 
“chief green growth officer.”
Three Strategies and 10 Agenda Items
Number of Policies and Programs
Seven City 
Governments
Nine Provincial 
Governments
Total 969 1,278
Mitigation of climate change and 
enhancement of energy security
1. Effective reduction of GHG (Low Carbon Society) 82 148
2. Reducing the use of fossil fuel and enhancement of energy self-
reliance
90 112
3. Enhancing the capacity to adapt to climate change 162 182
Creation of new 
engines of growth
4. Green technology innovation 77 94
5. Greening of industries and fostering of green businesses 79 122
6. Advancement of industrial structure 63 112
7. Laying the foundation for a green economy 65 84
Improvement in quality 
of life and enhancement 
of national standing
8. Greening homeland and transportation 241 166
9. Promoting a green lifestyle 109 220
10. Becoming a model, world-class nation of green growth 21 38
Table 6: Distribution of local green growth policies and programs under the National Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (as of 2011)
Source: PCGG and Korea Research Institute for Local Administration, 2012
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The LGGCs initiated various policies and programs 
related to the three strategic directions laid out in 
the National Five-Year Plan for Green Growth. A 
large number of initiatives focused on transforming 
public lifestyles and developing climate and 
environmentally friendly spaces. Recognizing the 
limitations of the central government in reaching 
out and engaging with different sectors of society, 
especially at the grassroots level, to transform their 
lifestyles, the LGGCs focused their efforts on closing 
this gap. A wide range of actions were planned and 
implemented taking into account the given context 
of regional development along with public demand 
and budgetary constraints of local government 
offices. 
For example, the city of Busan actively invested in 
the creation of green recreational areas (e.g., parks, 
green streets, and ecologically restored streams), 
installation of renewable energy facilities (e.g., 
green energy systems for public welfare buildings), 
promotion of green transportation (e.g., launching a 
weekly car-free day program, replacing diesel buses 
with compressed natural gas or CNG buses, and 
expanding cycling tracks), and greening of buildings 
(e.g., subsidizing green rooftops and investments in 
energy efficiency). 
This initiative of LGGC also comes with catchy labels 
for each city such as “climate-friendly city” (Seoul), 
“low-carbon city” (Daejeon), “national hub of green 
industries” (Gyeonggi), “carbon-neutral central 
administrative city” (Sejong) and “land of the green” 
(Jeonnam).
The government closely monitored the LGGC 
initiatives by mandating the heads of local 
governments to conduct annual performance 
reviews for submission to PCGG. For example, 
the performance review for 2011 revealed that 
88.3% of the 2,267 initiatives (refer to Table 6) 
were completed or were on-track for successful 
completion, while 11.7% were either cancelled, 
revised or being delayed. The reasons cited for 
underperformance include the lack of coordination 
among government offices, deficiencies in budget, 
low economic feasibility, and failure in securing the 
required land titles. Such rigorous monitoring and 
evaluation mechanism enabled the LGGCs to take 
leadership in building a solid governance structure 
for pursuing green actions.
Table 7: Overview of the Green Start Campaign and Green Start Network 
Details
Green Start 
Campaign
Concept
Help reduce GHG emissions in the non-industrial sectors such as households, 
commercial businesses, and public transportation.
Description
A nationwide campaign that: (1) seeks collaborative efforts from public and private 
sectors; (2) encourages voluntary citizen participation; and (3) sets forth clear 
guidelines on how to implement a green lifestyle.
Green Start 
Network
Concept A broad network in support of the Green Start Campaign
Date of Inauguration October 2008
Participating Groups/Institutions Central government, local municipalities, religious bodies, civil society groups
Status (as of Dec. 2011)
One nationwide network, 16 regional (city and provincial level) networks, 
228 local networks
Sample Policies 
and Programs
- Climate change education programs and green leader development programs
- Green labeling, carbon point system, and policies that mandate green procurement
- Promotion of bicycle use
Initiation 
Strategy
Enhancing Awareness
- Carry out a diverse number of creative policies and programs 
- Provide free education to enhance public capacity
Dissemination of Practices
- Provide model guidelines of reducing GHG emissions
- Establish a system to expand voluntary participation 
Networking
- Build an effective network to support the emissions reduction activities
- Carry out actions with measurable outcomes in groups
Source: MoE, 2012b
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Launch of the Green Start Movement 
Despite the strengthening of policy and institutional 
framework at the local level, the central government 
believed such efforts were not sufficient to earn 
broad participation by the general public and private 
sector. Accordingly, the Ministry of Environment 
(MoE) initiated the “Green Start Movement” as a 
nationwide public campaign for GHG emissions 
reduction. The government, private sector, and civil 
society jointly established a nationwide network 
called the “Green Start Network” and disseminated 
specific guidelines for reducing GHG by persuading 
people to change their habits. For example, 
households were encouraged to maintain room 
temperature at above 26°C during summer and 
below 20°C in winter, to replace conventional light 
bulbs with energy-saving bulbs (e.g., LED), and to 
keep electric appliances unplugged when not in use.
The Green Start Network adopted the existing 
institutional framework under LA21, composed of 
a single nationwide network, 16 regional (city and 
provincial level) networks, and 228 local networks. 
After its inception in late August 2008, the total 
number of participating organizations in regional and 
local networks has expanded to 3,900. Some of the 
main organizations include civil society groups such 
as consumer associations, religious movements, and 
women activist groups, and corporate or business 
entities such as local manufacturers, suppliers, and 
shop owners (MoE 2009; MoE 2012b). Based on a 
report from the MoE, the Green Start Movement 
has led to a significant number of outcomes (MoE, 
2012b), namely the following:
• Expansion of public-private partnerships for 
action: A total of 13 MOUs on supporting and 
implementing climate change mitigation and 
green lifestyle practices were signed with 46 
corporations.
• Development and implementation of GHG 
reduction programs: A diverse range of programs 
was developed and implemented, such as the “home 
energy diagnosis,” “green office program,” “parental 
education on climate change impact,” and the “green 
touch program” (which aims to conserve energy of 
personal computers in standby mode).
• Fostering of “Green Leaders”: Green leaders are 
green activists who play a pivotal role in leading 
the Green Start Movement. The development of 
systematic educational programs for fostering 
green leaders at different levels (beginner, 
intermediate, and advanced) honed the skills and 
capacity of promising green leaders, launching “me 
first” actions to encourage the participation of the 
general public.
• Expansion of participatory campaigns promoting 
green life practices: The distribution of action 
toolkits – which are information materials that 
set out a number of actions on GHG emissions 
reduction – helped initiate participatory 
campaigns in households, schools, and offices.
           
   
2.2 Government Plans and Strategies
2.2.1 Plan on Expansion of Low-Carbon 
 Green Life Practices (2009)
Under the guidance of PCGG, the MoE led the 
development of national level plans and strategies 
for promoting a green lifestyle. Marking the one-
year anniversary of the proclamation of Low-Carbon 
Green Growth as the new national vision, the MoE 
came up with the Plan on Expansion of Low-Carbon 
Excerpts from the Declaration of the 
Green Start Network
• We shall be at the forefront of GHG reduction 
efforts, setting examples of “me first” actions to 
encourage participation of the general public.
• We shall develop various programs to reduce 
GHG emissions and initiate relevant capacity 
development and information dissemination 
activities.
• We shall bring together wisdom to create an 
enabling condition for expanding voluntary 
mitigation actions by all members of the society.
• We shall strive to build the Green Start 
Movement into a nationwide campaign.
Source: MoE, 2012b
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Green Life Practices in August 2009. As the first 
national blueprint on promoting a green lifestyle, the 
plan laid out three strategic priorities and ten agenda 
items that aim to achieve a 10% reduction in GHG 
emissions by the non-industrial sectors. 
The action programs under different agenda items 
sought to: 
(1) be customized to reflect the circumstances of 
different social groups; 
(2) strengthen the use of government incentives – 
often provided in monetary terms to individuals 
– to expand public participation; and 
(3) focus on building legal and institutional platforms 
to support the activities of LGGCs and the Green 
Start Movement.
As shown in Table 8, the 2009 plan served as a 
comprehensive strategy for individuals, private 
sector, and public offices to engage in green life 
practices. The action items were broken down to 
pinpoint specific groups of society (e.g., students, 
housewives, and office commuters) or locations 
where greening of social and economic activities 
can be realized (e.g., households, workplaces, shops, 
construction sites, farms, transport, restaurants, 
schools, and universities). Nationwide incentive 
schemes for subsidizing green life practices such as 
the carbon points system and green certification 
schemes were proposed to be carried out by the 
central government’s line ministries, while basic 
instruments such as education and public campaigns 
for green life and production systems were to be led 
by the Green Start Network.
Table 8: Summary of the Plan on Expansion of Low-Carbon Green Life Practices (2009)
Action Plans Detailed Plans
A. Building momentum for 
changing lifestyle practices
1. Customized campaigns 
      and programs
• Nationwide dissemination of the “Wisdom of Green Living” 
• Holding periodic public-participatory events on green lifestyle
2. Promoting green living and 
consumption in households
• Dissemination of guidelines on “Low-carbon Living Standard” 
• Campaigns on saving water/energy use and reducing the use of disposables
3. Green workplaces
• “Cool Mapsy” Campaigns 
• Private sector led programs on greening office spaces
4. Green transportation 
• Campaigns on “Green Driving Practices”
• “Ride a Bicycle” programs
B. Strengthening 
      of incentive systems
5. Incentives for practices 
in households and 
workplaces 
• Nationwide carbon point systems
• Incentive schemes for green employees in business
6. Incentives for procurement 
and supply chain sectors 
• Green product certification
• Disclosure of carbon information on goods and services
• Green store certification
7. Government awards 
     and recognition programs
• Green awards to recognize and honor efforts of businesses and individuals
C. Building legal and 
institutional foundations
8. Fostering of green 
     lifestyle leaders 
• Green campus initiative
• Green leaders program
9. Online campaigns 
     and communication
• Internet campaigns on greening life practices
10. Legal framework • Establishment and/or strengthening of relevant legal framework
Source: MoE, 2009
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2.2.2 Follow-up Plans from the Ministry of 
Environment
At the 11th meeting of the PCGG in June 2011, 
the MoE released an additional plan titled “Plan on 
Expediting Expansion of Green Life Practices.” This 
document was prepared based on the recognition 
that public participation in nationwide programs 
is still weak despite continued efforts of different 
levels of government and civil society networks. 
The 2011 plan aimed to embed green life practices 
into the economic activities of the general public to 
attract greater public interest and participation. 
The following action programs were designed to 
further incentivize and publicize how greening life 
practices can help reduce household and individual 
spending: 
(1) green card systems for expansion of green 
consumption; 
(2) environmentally friendly food consumption 
campaigns to reduce food waste disposal; 
(3) dissemination of LED lighting for energy saving; 
and 
(4) promotion of urban farming practices. The 2011 
plan showed how measurable annual targets 
were addressed for each action program. 
The PCGG held the 10th monitoring and evaluation 
session in June 2012, where the outcomes relevant 
to “green lifestyles” were comprehensively reviewed. 
Of the many programs being implemented by 
different line ministries and local governments, 
those relevant to green consumption were not found 
to be fully on-track to meet the agreed targets. For 
example, despite the significant achievement made 
in the number of “green cards” issued (2.7 million), 
the lack of manufacturers and distributors of goods 
participating in the green card program was a 
limiting factor in boosting green consumption. 
In addition, public awareness on environmental 
performance certificates and labels was deemed 
to be relatively low, indicating how information 
disclosure has yet to bring actual changes in 
spending patterns. As a response, the MoE released 
an additional plan focused on “accelerating 
green consumption and participation in green 
life practices,” immediately after the June 2012 
PCGG session. The 2012 plan prioritized three 
supplementary strategies: 
(1) expanding the use of green cards; 
(2) strengthening the foundation for green 
consumption; and 
(3) bolstering public campaigns on greening 
consumption.
2.3 Target Setting
The ROK’s National Five-Year Plan for Green 
Growth proposed a set of specific targets relevant to 
establishing a “green lifestyle” among all members of 
society. As described above, the central government 
primarily focused on providing directions to the 
LGGCs, initiating nationwide movements, and 
introducing incentives to accelerate self-motivated 
and voluntary participation of the general public. 
As the emissions from non-industrial sectors of 
the economy account for over 40% of the national 
emissions, translating public awareness (on 
environmental sustainability and climate change) 
into measurable actions was addressed as a critical 
agenda to achieving the national GHG reduction 
targets.
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Key Measures Targets and Benefits
Accelerating the use of 
“Green Cards”
Green Cards are mileage cards that accumulate “green points,” which can be earned by reducing energy use (e.g., 
electricity, water, gas) and consuming government-certified green goods. The accumulated points can then be used 
as cash in purchasing goods and services. The additional incentives are given to Green Card holders in using public 
facilities (e.g., parks and public transportation).
• Target: Issue five million green cards by 2015
• Expected outcomes
− Reduction of GHG emissions (by two million tons of CO2 equivalent per year)
− Expansion of green product market volume to 40 trillion KRW in 2015
− Creation of green value chain (consumption – distribution – production) 
Promoting environmentally friendly 
food consumption
• Agenda Items
− Mandatory regulations on restaurants to reduce food waste disposal
− Provision of incentives to restaurants that use smaller plates to control food waste 
− Revision of local municipality ordinances to reduce food waste generation
− Training programs and campaigns on “zero-food waste”
• Target: 20% reduction in food waste generation by 2012
Expanding the use 
of LED lights
• Agenda Items
− Establishment of a “Roadmap for increasing the use of LED lights”  
− Mandatory regulations on public facilities to replace existing lights with LED lights
− Government support toward LED industries (manufacturers)
• Target: Increase in the share of LED light bulbs 
− 60% of all lighting systems by 2020 (2.5% as of 2010)
− 100% of all lighting systems in government facilities by 2020 (8% as of 2010)
Increasing the volume 
of urban farming
• Agenda Items
− Government incentives on urban farming practices
− Development of urban farmlands as park facilities 
− Government support for increasing the market volume of seed/plant providers
• Target: Establish 3,000 ha of green urban spaces by 2020
− Install 8,000 urban farm facilities by 2020
− Engage five million people in urban farming (approximately 10% of urban population)
Table 9: Measures to expand green living culture in daily life (as of 2011)
Source: MoE, 2011
Table 10: Supplementary plan on green consumption and green life practices (2012)
Action Plans Detailed Plans
Expanding the 
use of green cards
• Increase the number of goods that provide green points upon purchase
Strengthening the foundation 
for green consumption
• Strengthen incentives for the manufacturers and suppliers of certified goods
• Expand campaigns on environmental performance certificates and labels
Bolstering public campaigns 
on greening consumption
• Hold “me first” campaigns with the manufacturers and suppliers of green goods
• Publish “green goods consumer reports”
Source: MoE, 2011
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Table 11: Target setting under the agenda of “establishment of a green lifestyle” 
Target Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1. Green Education and Fostering of Green Leaders
Number of green citizens fostered (as cumulative % of population) - 10 15 20 30
2. Expansion of Green Living Practices 
Number of green citizens fostered 500,000 700,000 800,000 900,000 1,000,000
Number of green households (number of households) 160,000 180,000 200,000 250,000 300,000
3. Increasing the Volume of Green Consumption
Amount of green purchases (KRW trillion) 2.5 3.1 3.4 3.6 4.0
Number of certified green products 50 100 250 400 500
Number of corporations that have agreed to green procurement 102 120 130 150 170
Number of green stores 387 450 500 550 600
4. Establishment of Green Villages
Number of green community centers - 20 50 80 100
Number of green villages - 12 4 58 16
5. Promoting eco-tourism
Public awareness of eco-tourism 70 80 95 100 100
Number of green tourism services (e.g., accommodation, tourist attractions) - - 10 20 100
Source: PCGG, 2009c
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3. Policy Actions and Programs
3.1 Green Procurement and Consumption
Green procurement and consumption provide 
practical and transformational measures for the 
general public to pursue green living as part of their 
daily routines. Along with the rising public awareness 
of consumer social responsibility, green products are 
increasingly capturing the attention of businesses 
and individual customers in the ROK. In particular, 
products that offer monetized benefits (e.g., energy-
efficient appliances) or support human well-being 
(e.g., organic foods) are gaining popularity in the 
market. It is worth noting that the growing levels of 
awareness and participation in green consumption 
naturally lead to an increase in green production, 
as producers are likely to redirect their interests to 
meet the growing demand. 
The ultimate goal of the government is to create 
a virtuous cycle that connects green production, 
green procurement, and green consumption as an 
integrated system. In light of this goal, this section 
aims to introduce and draw some lessons from the 
ROK’s policy and programmatic interventions on 
green procurement. 
3.1.1 Mandatory Green Public Procurement 
The program for mandatory Green Public 
Procurement (GPP) requires public institutions to 
procure goods (or, aptly named as “green products”) 
with reduced environmental impact throughout 
the whole cycle of production, distribution, 
consumption, and disposal. The program intends 
to take advantage of the purchasing power of 
the ROK’s public institutions given its sheer size 
(total government procurement was worth 106 
trillion KRW or approximately US$ 96 billion in 
2012). Unlike programs that are implemented on a 
voluntary basis, the program is made enforceable on 
all public institutions running on government budget. 
Table 12: Environmentally friendly product certifications of the ROK
Source: MoE, 2011
Action Plans Korea Eco-Label Good Recycled (GR) Mark
Label
Characteristics
Products with low levels of environmental impacts 
during production and consumption, or offer the 
benefits of reducing resource use
Products with proven quality that have been 
manufactured with recycled materials
Category
Items under 147 categories including stationery, home 
appliances, and furniture, along with three service 
products (i.e., hotels, recreation condominiums, 
automobile insurance)
Items under 17 categories including recycled paper, 
recycled bottles, and recycled plastic goods
Number of Goods 
(as of 2013)
10,035 goods produced by 1,952 companies 248 goods produced by 207 companies
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Implementation 
The program defines green products as those that 
serve the same purpose as conventional ones, 
but can better contribute to reducing resource 
consumption and negative environmental impacts. To 
be eligible, products must meet both environmental 
and quality standards; environmental standards 
ensure minimum environmental performance of 
goods (e.g., safe exposure level, efficient energy and 
water consumption, and recyclability) throughout 
the entire life cycle of a product, while quality 
standards are equivalent to the requirements 
set by the Korean Industrial Standards Council 
(KISC). Products that have acquired either the 
Korea Eco-Label or Good Recycled (GR) Mark (in 
addition to KS certification) can be referred to as 
representative products eligible for procurement 
under the program. While the participating 
institutions are mandated to purchase green 
products, decisions are overruled in cases where: 
(1) there is no available green product available on 
the market; 
(2) the green product available lacks quality or 
exhibits poor stability of supply; and 
(3) the purchase is considered inappropriate by 
the head of the institution (e.g., purchase for 
emergency purposes such as aid delivery, or the 
available green product is much more expensive).
The public institutions covered by this program 
are government institutions, local authorities, 
state-owned enterprises, local medical centers, and 
metropolitan landfill management corporations. 
They are required to establish and announce 
annual green product procurement plans observing 
the green product procurement guidelines, and 
submit the procurement records to the Ministry 
of Environment (MoE) for evaluation. The 
procurement can be classified into three types: 
direct purchase, indirect purchase via contract or 
bidding order such as Vendor-Managed Inventory 
(VMI), or direct purchase and installation carried 
out by construction firms at a construction site. 
Table 13: Environmentally friendly product certifications of the ROK
Source: MoE, 2013b
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Amount of 
Green Procurement
7,870
(43.3%)
8,616
(58.3%)
13,437
(69.3%)
15,840
(51.3%)
16,296
(64.5%)
16,412
(53.7%)
16,455
(59.5%)
17,270
(33.7%)
Central 
Administration 
3,396 2,839 3,569 3,488 2,887 4,132 3,462 5,001
Local 
Authorities
1,626 2,512 3,889 6,720 5,428 4,826 5,009 5,187
Educational 
Institutions
2,150 2,336 4,283 4,066 5,481 4,878 4,975 5,581
State-owned Companies, 
Quasi-government 
Agencies, and 
Other Public Institutions
698 929 1,696 1,566 2,500 2,576 3,009 3,490
Note: Figures in brackets refer to the share of green purchase for items where green products have been made available (statistics for the years after 
2009 have only taken into account the green purchases made in selected categories).
Unit: 100 million KRW
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The MoE is responsible for the overall management 
of the program. The support of the Public 
Procurement Service (PPS) is critical as it is the 
central government organization responsible for 
procuring commodities and arranging contracts for 
construction projects involving government facilities. 
The PPS not only provides technical support to 
participating institutions during their procurement 
activities, but continues to update the database 
on goods eligible for priority purchase through the 
government’s e-commerce system. In addition, PPS 
keeps track of all procurement records for annual 
evaluation by the MoE. The Korea Environmental 
Industry and Technology Institute (KEITI), which 
is an affiliated institution under MoE, provides 
working-level support for the program by developing 
and revising the legal provisions and green product 
procurement guidelines. KEITI is also the institution 
in charge of Korea Eco-label certifications.
Outcomes and Takeaways
The number of public institutions obliged to 
participate in GPP has been fluctuating due to 
frequent changes in the legal provisions that 
prescribe the applicability of the policy to public 
institutions. Despite the fluctuation, approximately 
700 to 850 public institutions have continued to 
participate in the Mandatory GPP program. As 
shown in the Table 13, the volume of Mandatory 
GPP spending continuously increased annually 
and reached 1.7 trillion KRW in 2012; the amount 
has increased more than twofold since 2005 when 
the policy was first introduced. Out of the 846 
participating institutions in 2012, the Ministry of 
National Defense and Ministry of Education topped 
the list in terms of the volume of green procurement. 
The most popular products in the market – 
representing 38% of the total green procurement 
– are personal computers (18%), asphalt concrete 
for construction (7.4%), windows and frames for 
buildings (6.2%), and sidewalk blocks (6.2%).
The environmental and economic benefits derived 
from Mandatory GPP may not be directly evident, 
especially as environmental externalities are often 
underpriced and not always observable. From a 
business standpoint, producing green products 
minimizes the environmental impact and reduces 
environmental restoration cost, thereby minimizing 
social costs. On the other hand, from a consumer’s 
perspective, purchasing green products not only 
brings social and environmental benefits but 
may also lead to economic gains. For example, 
additional cost implications and inconvenience 
can be outweighed by the direct benefits such as 
energy savings and reduced costs of waste disposal. 
According to an assessment conducted by KEITI, the 
total amount of green purchases made under the 
program (2005-2012) has led to approximately 4.9 
million CO
2
 tons of emissions reduction, equivalent 
to 7.4 billion KRW of monetized benefits. 
The government’s lack of will to impose fines or 
penalties upon failure to comply with the legal 
provisions of the program is a major drawback to 
expanding the positive momentum gained thus far. 
The law in force only states how the vendors or 
suppliers will be penalized in the event of violation, 
in terms of producing and distributing certified 
products (e.g., fakes and counterfeit goods), but 
mentions nothing of the purchaser’s compliance. 
Given the extensive frequency of procurement 
transactions that are taking place by public 
institutions, systematic monitoring or auditing of 
procurement records is difficult to achieve in reality. 
The legal provisions must adequately regulate the 
purchasers, in addition to making sure that their 
purchase records are reflected in the government’s 
annual performance evaluations of public facilities.
3.1.2 Green Store Certification Program
A “Green Store” is a store that meets eco-friendly 
certification standards, not only from the hardware 
perspective (e.g., energy-efficient lighting systems) 
but also the software-related aspects such as store 
management, product distribution, and staff training.
The Green Store Certification Program accredits 
large retail stores including department stores 
and supermarkets committed to the environment 
by promoting the distribution of eco-friendly 
products and installing and operating eco-friendly 
facilities. The government’s underlying objective is 
to make sure that large retailers are able to exercise 
a significant influence over public consumption 
patterns by helping improve the greening of 
product distribution, and contribute to meeting the 
nation’s GHG-reduction targets. Large retailers are 
accountable for approximately eight million tons 
CO
2
 eq. per year which is approximately 14% of the 
nation’s emissions from commercial, residential, 
and primary industries (agriculture, fisheries, and 
forestry) sectors.
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Implementation
Large retailers designated by the government under 
the Distribution Industry Development Act and 
markets that sell agricultural produce, seafood, and 
livestock products (with floor areas greater than 
3,000 m2) are eligible to receive the Green Store 
Certifications starting October 2011. As of 2013, 
small-scale retailers such as community markets 
and shops that are operated directly by producers 
of green products have also been made eligible 
for participation. The certifications are provided 
based on voluntary applications by interested 
entities, which are evaluated by a committee 
comprised of staff from KEITI (the implementation 
agency) and external experts. The committee 
conducts site inspection to verify whether the 
applicant store meets more than 80% of the given 
standards. As shown in Table 14, the evaluation 
standards are comprised of four categories that 
are further divided into 26 specific sub-categories. 
A simplified and less stringent version of this 
standard is applied for small-scale retailers.
Outcomes and Takeaways
As of 2014, a total of 216 Green Stores have been 
certified across the nation. More than 85% of 
these stores are small and large markets selling 
agricultural produce that are common in residential 
areas while the rest are mostly department stores 
located in major cities. Although the number of 
certifications may not seem overwhelming yet, 
the scheme has gained strong support from retail 
giants including E-mart, Homeplus, and Lotte Mart, 
which have taken early voluntary actions to improve 
the environmental performance of their facilities 
even before the scheme was launched in 2011. For 
example, E-mart was the first large retailer to do 
away with the use of plastic bags in 2009, and its 
green stores have continued to sell highly energy-
efficient goods such as LED light bulbs. Homeplus, on 
the other hand, has started to open new stores that 
follow the “Green Store” concept as early as 2008; its 
store in Bucheon city reported that it has been able 
to reduce GHG emissions and energy use by 50% and 
40% respectively, by introducing innovative facilities 
such as ice thermal storage systems and solar panels. 
Lotte Mart, which owns the greatest number of 
Green Store certifications out of the three retail 
giants, has been leading in green product sales by 
initiating a program in 2012 that provides additional 
credits on the purchase of environmentally friendly 
goods. 
Category
Sub-category 
(example criteria)
Points Distribution
Department Store Large Markets
Hardware
 facilities
Architectural design and construction
(Building energy certification)
45 45
Eco-friendly facilities (Use of energy and 
water saving facilities and equipment)
Logistics 
and vehicle 
operations
Shipping
(Use of energy-efficient or low-emission vehicles)
13 25
Loading and unloading, storage, and display
(Level of waste-reduction practices)
Product sales 
and packaging 
control
Product and sales management
(Number of green product items for sale)
52 65
Product packaging control
(Use of easily disposable packaging)
Store operation, 
training, and 
promotion
Store operation
(Level of resource-saving practices)
65 65
Office operation (Number of internal training 
sessions on green procurement)
Total 200 175
Table 14: Green Store Certification Standards
Source: MoE, 2012a
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The good examples set by these retail giants 
have had positive spill-over effects to small-scale 
stores that have been made eligible to participate 
in the scheme starting 2013. In order to support 
small stores with less capacities and resources 
to qualify for certification, the government has 
initiated a program in 2013 that provides free 
technical assistance (i.e., energy and GHG-emissions 
diagnosis) and financial grants for installing heat-
shielding film and switching to LED light bulbs 
to help them meet the certification criteria. In 
addition, some large-scale retailers have decided to 
return their savings in environmental improvement 
charges3 accrued from participating in the program 
to small stores that are willing to enhance their 
operations to be certified as Green Stores. Such 
actions were guided by the government as a means 
of mitigating the growing public concerns over how 
market domination by retail giants is leading to the 
dwindling performance of “mom-and-pop stores.” 
Thanks to such coordinated efforts, small stores 
make up for 38% of all certifications released as of 
2014. 
The Green Store Program, which was designed and 
supervised by the MoE, is a response to the low 
level (38%) of green consumption actions by the 
public, despite their high interest (81%) in green 
procurement as revealed by a nationwide survey 
conducted in 2010. Although the scheme has 
been widely recognized, the lack of government 
incentives is a significant barrier to increasing the 
momentum. Given how applications are more likely 
to come from existing stores that must transform 
their practices and/or retrofit their facilities, there is 
currently a lack of legal and institutional support for 
this. This was the case of the Daejeon Metropolitan 
Government, which signed a voluntary agreement 
with large retailers to create green stores in 2009. 
The city faced challenges when it could not attract 
retailers as expected due to the unavailability of 
strong incentive measures such as subsidies for 
eco-friendly facility installation, tax cuts, or relevant 
awards. As a result, Daejon city hosts only eight 
Green Stores. Launching the nationwide Green 
Store Certification Program in 2011 was unable to 
bring about significant efforts in addressing these 
challenges. 
It is important to recognize that Green Stores 
need to be competitive in the market to ensure the 
success of the Green Store Certification Program. 
High-level public awareness programs must seek 
to enable the concept of Green Stores to boost 
business reputations, and so companies vying for 
the label should involve consumers in various eco-
friendly activities such as reusing shopping bags, 
donating recyclable products, engaging in energy-
conservation movements in the local community, 
and purchasing green products. In addition, if such 
activities would lead to meeting the requirements 
of the Green Store Certification Standards, more 
businesses would voluntarily participate and 
customers would increasingly become aware of 
their contribution to environmental protection 
through green consumption. Earning a Green Store 
3 | Environmental improvement charges are government fees collected from the owners or occupants of buildings, motor vehicles using light weight fuel, and 
facilities which directly cause environmental pollution.
Figure 2: Green Store certification logo
Source: MoE, 2012a
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Certificate proactively demonstrates that the 
businesses share their communities’ commitment to 
environmental protection with customers, thereby 
affirming the role of Green Stores in promoting 
sustainable development in the local community.  
3.1.3 Voluntary Agreement for Green Procurement
The Voluntary Agreement (VA) for Green 
Procurement is a voluntary social agreement 
concluded between the MoE and business 
enterprises to support the manufacturing and 
purchase of eco-friendly products. The scheme 
was introduced in response to the growing interest 
in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and 
the tightening of environmental regulations on 
export products, particularly in the EU. Basically, 
the agreement views businesses as consumers of 
high-spending capacities that are likely to shape 
the values and practices of green production-
distribution-consumption cycle within the economy. 
From 30 business entities that signed the VA in 
September 2005, there are now 150 entities that are 
participating (or have participated) in the scheme.
Implementation
The specific actions to be carried out by entities that 
have signed the VA are: 
(1) modifying internal procurement regulations; 
(2) preparing and implementing a multi-year 
corporate plan for green procurement; and
(3) conducting training for employees to raise 
awareness on green procurement. 
In addition, they are recommended to create a 
team accountable for green procurement and to 
practice the setting of green procurement targets 
at their own discretion. For example, Lotte Group, 
which owns 21 affiliated companies participating 
(or have participated) in the scheme, has designated 
products with environmental certifications, “Good 
Recycled (GR)” certifications, and high energy 
efficiency certifications as priority items. The 
company’s integrated procurement system is 
supported by a database of product information 
that flags these priority items, and the total amount 
of green procurement serves as a basis for annual 
performance evaluations of all affiliated companies.
Incentives
The duration of the VA is three years. Gaining the 
support of management-level staff and identifying 
a sufficient number of products (and their vendors) 
eligible for green consumption are critical factors 
of success. KEITI regularly provides information 
booklets on green products available in the market; 
products include domestic and imported items 
with various environmental and energy efficiency 
certifications. Due to the voluntary nature of the 
agreement, restrictive measures in the event of a 
breach are not clearly described. Accordingly, the 
ROK government offers a package of incentives to 
Source: KEITI, 2012
Table 15: Outcomes of the VA for green procurement
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Number of entities that have submitted 
their purchase data
27 41 51 64 78 82
Government-
certified Green 
Products
Korea Eco-Label 99,172 136,945 169,445 195,390 307,550 401,075
GR Mark 69,069 69,042 69,567 75,187 78,899 20,737
Subtotal 168,241 205,987 239,012 270,577 386,450 421,812
Products with carbon labels 21,245
Products with high energy efficiency 14,587 37,742 48,599 168,593 415,771 126,940
Products with environment certification (imports) 69,283 1,074,548 124,246 645,990 165,736 248,790
Other products designated individually by 
participating entities
14,562,841 17,440,479 20,030,154 21,041,533 22,271,778 26,274,527
Total 14,814,952 18,758,756 20,442,011 22,126,693 23,239,735 27,093,314
Unit: million KRW
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encourage active participation in the VA such as free 
training for greening the manufacturing process (by 
KEITI), awarding the most “green” companies, and 
giving extra credits to companies when applying for 
eco-friendly certificates. The Life Cycle Assessment 
(LCA) and the Design for Environment (DfE) are two 
approaches offered by the KEITI’s training programs 
for manufacturers. LCA provides a fundamental 
methodology that evaluates the environmental 
impact in the complete life cycle of a product. DfE 
is a decision support tool that helps a designer 
reduce environmental impacts by improving the 
product design. DfE incorporates the consideration 
of national regulations, human health and safety, 
hazardous material minimization, disassembly, 
recovery, recycling, and disposal into the design 
process (Fitzgerald et al, 2005).
Outcomes and Takeaways
Among the 150 entities that signed the VA, 
84 entities (56%) have amended their green 
procurement guidelines, 62 entities (41%) have 
successfully established a “green procurement 
system” that identifies green products during 
the purchasing stage, and 54 entities (36%) have 
conducted internal training sessions on green 
procurement. In addition, 65 entities (43%) have 
reported that they have actively engaged in the 
promotion of green procurement initiatives through 
various channels such as corporate environmental 
reports, brochures, and webpages. Due to the 
voluntary efforts of participating entities, the 
total amount of green purchases in 2011 reached 
27 trillion KRW. This figure includes purchase of 
government-certified goods (Korea Eco-Label 
and GR Mark) and items that have been identified 
individually by participating entities (e.g., products 
with a low degree of waste generation, and reduce 
the use of environmentally hazardous substances). 
The total purchase volume has continued to increase 
over the years of implementation; although this is 
primarily a result of the increase in the number of 
participating entities, it was also supported by an 
increase in the number of green products made 
available in the market. 
Voluntary agreements are often referred to as the 
“third wave” of regulation in environmental policy. 
It is a scheme that capitalizes on the free will and 
discretion of individuals and business enterprises, 
unlike the conventional regulations based on 
command and control. The policy is low in regulatory 
costs, high in flexibility, and fosters a cooperative 
relationship between the government and industry. 
However, despite its merits, the overall effectiveness 
is being questioned as the scheme is not enforceable. 
Although the number of participating entities has 
been increasing, the government should actively 
integrate the scheme with other government-led 
certification programs such as the “Green Store 
Certification” and “Carbon Labelling System,” as 
a means of strengthening the flow of information 
between consumers and producers. Stimulating 
market distribution of green products is critical to 
entice participating entities to renew their VA upon 
termination after three years.
3.1.4 Carbon Labeling
Carbon labeling is a system of indicating the amount 
of GHG emitted during the life-cycle of the product 
− namely, pre-production, production, distribution, 
consumption, and disposal. Building upon a system 
that was pioneered by the UK’s Carbon Trust in 
2007, various labelling schemes have evolved 
rapidly around the world. The policy instrument 
seeks to disclose carbon information and instill 
environmental awareness into consumer behavior 
and thereby catalyze change within the supply chain. 
The ROK was one of the pioneer countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region to introduce the scheme in 2009 
as the government acknowledges the need for the 
country’s products to keep pace with the changing 
international standards and customer norms.
Implementation
The ROK’s carbon label certification has two labels: 
Carbon Footprint Certification Label (CFCL) and Low 
Carbon Product Label (LCPL). The CFCL provides the 
baseline amount of GHG emissions in the product 
lifecycle as approved by the government. On the 
other hand, products with LCPL are those that have 
taken a step further by earning certification for their 
low levels of baseline emissions as compared to the 
average of products of the same kind. LCPL products 
that have proven to be “carbon neutral” are provided 
with yet another special label launched in 2014 – the 
Carbon Neutral Product Label (CNPL). A product 
is considered carbon neutral if the total amount of 
its life cycle emissions has been mitigated through 
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the purchase of emission allowances or emission 
reduction activities carried out by the producer.
With the exemption of primary agricultural products 
as well as forestry and medical products, all other 
types of products are eligible for carbon labeling. 
Certification is relatively simple and straightforward 
for products that do not use energy to perform their 
function; a general Product Category Rule (PCR) 
serves as a guideline to define the scope of GHG-
emission activities that must be taken into account 
during a product lifecycle, and provides equations 
that allow applicants to calculate the baseline GHG 
emissions for specific products. However, separate 
sets of PCRs with “design scenarios” apply for 
products that consume energy, as their emission 
performance is dependent on the frequency or time 
of usage, along with conditions for standby mode. 
For example, the baseline GHG emissions for display 
monitors are calculated under the assumption that 
they are under on-mode, standby-mode, and off-
mode for 40%, 5%, and 55% of their lifetime period 
(four years), respectively. 
Certifications are provided based on voluntary 
applications by the producers. Under the MoE, which 
is the supervisory organization of the certification 
system, KEITI takes on the role of developing PCRs 
and undertaking the certification upon submission of 
applications. The certification of approved products 
is valid for three years during which KEITI annually 
conducts post-certification measures to ensure 
sustained performance of products. Since 2012, 
MoE and KEITI have been shouldering 50% of the 
certification fee for SMEs to support their voluntary 
participation.
Outcomes and Takeaways
The number of certified goods has been increasing 
at a rapid rate, from 111 products in 2009 to 1,499 
products as of September 2014. A total of 172 
companies have benefited from CFCL, and and 34 
companies from LCPL applications, respectively. In 
particular, the number of certified goods produced 
by Korea’s top conglomerates has been increasing. 
In 2013, Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics 
attained 193 and 92 certifications, respectively. 
This increasing trend of manufacturers of home 
appliances pursuing high-efficiency and eco-
friendly products indicates positive progress in the 
implementation of the carbon labeling policy. It 
should be noted that 41% of the total certifications 
were awarded to products that consume energy. 
In recognition of the five years of successful 
implementation, KEITI conducted an assessment 
that reported 228 LCPL products have contributed 
to GHG reduction of approximately 2 million ton 
CO2 eq. during 2012-2014 (Park, 2014). According 
to the National GHG Emissions Inventory, this figure 
is equivalent to annual emissions from running 
77,000 privately owned vehicles, or annual carbon 
reductions expected from 301 million fully grown 
pine trees (which would cover three times the area 
of Seoul). Success stories on reputational benefits 
gained from participating in the program have also 
been reported by some exporters; certifications 
responded well to the demand for environmental 
performance guarantees by clients of developed 
countries including Spain and Australia.
Figure 3: CFCL, LCPL, and CNPL designs
Source: MoE, 2013a
Note: “000g” is to be filled out as the actual baseline emission of products
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Although carbon labelling has been successfully 
initiated in the ROK, public surveys have identified 
persistent gaps in consumer awareness of carbon 
labels. Before the launch of the labeling system 
in 2008, a consumer survey indicated that 69.2% 
responded positively to purchasing products with 
low-carbon footprints, and 78.6% of them retained 
this position even under the given assumption that 
low-carbon goods may be more expensive than 
conventional items. However, surveys on public 
level of awareness indicated that 56.1% (2012), 
53.7% (2013), 49.8% (2014), respectively, of the 
respondents had actually never heard of the term 
“carbon labeling,” revealing that more than half of the 
population is still unaware of the policy. Moreover, 
only a small portion of consumers among those 
who claimed to be aware of the system responded 
that they actually check on the carbon label upon 
purchase. But amongst those who were well-
informed on the scheme, 90.6% responded positively 
to buying products with the least emissions, given 
that all products come with carbon labels. 
Based on the perspective that carbon labelling 
serves as a pivot that links green production and 
consumption in the market, the ROK still has much 
more work to do in stimulating the latter portion of 
this chain. In other words, the system has failed to 
strike a balance between demand-led (customer pull) 
and supply-led (production push) drivers; compared 
to the level of government support channeled to 
product manufacturers (e.g., free training sessions 
on PCRs, levying costs for certification, creating 
booklets that introduce certified items), government 
actions and benefits offered for strengthening 
customer pull have been relatively weak. The 
government must seek ways to build and sustain 
consumer engagement through various practices 
such as public campaigns, education, and direct 
incentives upon purchase. In addition, producers 
and distributors must recognize that success 
in marketing of low-carbon goods comes from 
highlighting their performance characteristics such 
as cost-saving benefits since a marketing strategy 
that is purely based on emission performances can 
only attract those with good understanding of the 
climate change issue.
3.1.5 Carbon Points System
The Carbon Points System is a nationwide voluntary 
GHG reduction scheme that incentivizes the 
reduction of electricity, water, and gas consumption 
in households and businesses through the provision 
of carbon points. In exchange for the saved 
energy, participants earn carbon points that can 
be converted into various forms of rewards. This 
scheme is also known as the “Carbon Cashbag 
System” as points can readily be used as cash. 
This system informs participants of their levels of 
contributions to GHG-emissions reduction, which 
helps raise favorable public awareness of climate 
policy.
Implementation
Recognizing how consumption patterns are driven 
by multiple factors under different circumstances, 
the Carbon Points System provides incentives 
commensurate to the amount of GHG emissions 
reduced based on the participant’s past resource 
consumption records. Specifically, calculations 
are made on the average monthly GHG emissions 
of individuals based on their electricity, water, 
and natural gas bills over the period of two years 
prior to participation. The monthly reductions in 
emissions achieved relative to this baseline figure 
2006 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sept. 2014
CFCL 111 301 502 735 1,112 1,270
LCPL - - 9 72 172 229
Total 111 301 511 807 1,284 1,499
Source: Park, 2014
Table 16: Total number of CFCL and LCPL certifications
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are monitored and accumulated as carbon points; 
rewards are provided twice a year into “eco-money 
cards” held by participants or in other forms to 
those who do not hold such cards (e.g., cash, gift 
certificates, public transportation cards, and 
merchandise such as waste bags). However, only 
those who have achieved GHG reductions greater 
than 5% in each of the semiannual periods are 
entitled to collect the rewards. 
The target participants of this policy are members 
of households and group entities such as buildings, 
businesses, apartment complexes, and schools. As 
long as the amount of resources consumed can be 
verified, the program is open to everyone, including 
studio apartments and stores in shopping malls. 
However, if there are two or more individuals to 
benefit from a single household or a group applicant, 
points are given to the first individual who has 
applied for the membership. 
Obviously, support from the public utility companies 
(regional electricity providers, waterworks, and gas 
suppliers) is critical in collecting relevant data for 
computing points rewards. A web-based operating 
platform has been established to automatically 
access relevant records from utility companies, 
reducing the cumbersome procedures involved in 
data input and validation. 
The points earned for each semiannual period are 
capped at 17,500 points as shown in Table 17. The 
local governments independently decide on the 
monetized value of each transaction point in the 
eco-money cards; each point is given a maximum of 
2 KRW for individuals of households and 10 KRW 
for individuals of group entities. Therefore, the 
maximum amount of monetized benefits for a given 
semiannual period is 35,000 KRW (approximately 
US$32) and 175,000 KRW (approximately US$159) 
for individuals of households and group entities, 
respectively. Note that the public budget necessary 
for the incentive award is borne equally by the 
central and local governments, which is the basis 
for allowing local governments to operate a flexible 
reward plan.
Outcomes and Takeaways
After 24 local governments pilot tested the scheme 
for 4,300 households from November 2008 to 
June 2009, the Carbon Points System Operating 
Regulations was enacted in June 2009. This marked 
the period when local governments began to submit 
their applications to MoE for participating in the 
scheme, and by March 2010, all local governments 
in the nation (232 local governments) had joined 
the program; the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
and Gwacheon City Government have decided to 
operate similar schemes separately from the MoE. 
As of 2013, a total of 3.88 million households and 
group entities have participated in the scheme. 
The figure accounts for a reasonable portion 
(19%) of the total households in the nation, 
but is still well below the target subscription 
rate of 40 percent by 2018 set by the MoE. 
Despite the success, the scheme has experienced 
the following challenges that provide meaningful 
lessons for introducing similar incentive schemes at 
a nationwide level:
• Initially, incentives were offered based on 
the actual amount of GHG emissions reduced 
(10 g of CO2 = 1 point) relative to the baseline 
value of past consumption, which was also to 
be deducted by the same amount. However, 
deductions in baseline emissions worked as 
a hindrance to sustained outcomes, as there 
is a practical limit to reducing emissions by 
households. Ultimately, a policy revision in 
2011 aimed to fix the baseline emissions in 
order to sustain the level of mitigation actions. 
Despite such revision, the incentive scheme 
was criticized for favoring households with high 
levels of resource consumption to start with; in 
other words, households that have voluntarily 
taken early actions to reduce consumption 
are less likely to benefit from the scheme. In 
response, the MoE announced in 2014 that the 
scheme should periodically reduce the baseline 
emissions by 3-6% based on the participant’s 
past performances (e.g., 6% reduction for 
households that have achieved GHG emission 
greater than 10%). 
• One of the most critical shortcomings of 
the Carbon Points System is the failure to 
resolve the issue of budgetary burden on local 
governments. Obviously, a greater number 
of subscribers means greater budgetary 
responsibilities, which fails to motivate local 
governments operating on a tight budget. One 
city government reported in 2013 that they have 
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failed to fully grant the payment to beneficiaries 
on time due to budgetary constraints. The Seoul 
Metropolitan City Government initially opted 
out from participating in the scheme due to 
concerns over funding uncertainties. 
The Carbon Points System is now firmly positioned 
as a representative government incentive scheme 
for reducing GHG emissions from the non-industrial 
sector. The scheme opens opportunities for citizens 
to pursue low-carbon green growth by directly 
taking part in the green initiative. The MoE reported 
that the scheme has contributed to reduction of 
approximately 0.7 million tons of GHG emissions 
per year, equivalent to 1.6 billion kWh of electricity 
savings. An important aspect that has captured 
public attention is how the scheme eases the 
financial burden of households thanks to reduced 
utility bills, in addition to accrual of carbon points. 
The support of the local government is critical as 
they manage and operate the scheme at their own 
discretion while reporting regularly to the central 
government to request additional funding. For 
example, the subscription rate of Seogwipo City 
of Jeju Island reached 43.4% as of 2013, thanks 
to the persistent efforts of the local government 
to promote the policy; the local authorities even 
initiated an annual award targeting the participating 
local towns and villages. Several local governments 
have drawn agreements with participants to donate 
their carbon points to those in need within their 
communities.
3.2 Green Education and Environmental Awareness
The Green Start Campaign is a nationwide campaign 
launched to engage the public in GHG reduction 
in the non-industrial sector. As a governance 
consultative group born out of government-
private sector cooperation, the campaign aims 
to establish and disseminate a low-carbon, eco-
friendly living culture; relevant programs under 
the initiative prioritize shared eco-friendly values 
and environmental concerns among the citizens 
to respond to climate change. In many aspects, the 
campaign envisioned replicating the nation’s success 
from the Saemaul Movement of the 1970s, which 
was the cornerstone of Korea’s rural revitalization. 
The movement put forward a forceful mantra 
emphasizing diligence, self-help, and collaboration 
to encourage citizens to participate in the nation’s 
efforts toward overcoming poverty and achieving 
economic development. Nurturing of community 
leadership and social reforms inducing cognitive 
attitudes toward shared values for communal 
prosperity was a critical factor of success; the 
Saemaul Movement led the six-fold increase in the 
average income of rural households during 1970-
1979.
In line with how the Saemaul Movement seeks to 
overcome obstacles through the active participation 
of citizens, the Green Start Campaign mobilizes the 
public to take part in worthwhile activities, whether 
big or small, such as choosing public transportation 
or walking instead of driving a vehicle, and switching 
from hard copies to electronic files. Sustaining 
continuous public participation in such initiatives 
requires diversification and extension of incentives 
provided by the government. It is also desirable for 
the public to develop a sense of ownership in putting 
“green consciousness” into practice by actively 
participating in green policy programs. This section 
aims to introduce some of the many programs 
that have been carried out under the Green Start 
Campaign: 
Category Reduction by 5-10% Reduction by 10% or more
Electricity 5,000 Points 10,000 Points
Water 1,250 Points 2,500 Points
Gas 2,500 Points 5,000 Points
Total 8,750 Points 17,500 Points
Table 17: Performance standards and payment for the Carbon Points System
Source: PJ Park, 2014
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(1) Green Leaders Program to foster leaders who can 
widely promote the value of low-carbon green 
growth; 
(2) Green Campus Initiative to instill eco-friendly 
practices in colleges and universities; and 
(3) “Cool-Mapsy” Campaign to reduce GHG 
emissions and save energy in people’s daily lives.
3.2.1 Green Leaders Program
A Green Leader is an activist or champion of 
change who plays a key role in leading the Green 
Start Campaign. Primarily, he/she supports the 
development, implementation, and promotion of the 
Green Start Campaign by working in four specific 
areas: 
(1) assessing the amount of GHG emitted by 
households and businesses, and providing 
consultation services at the local community 
level; 
(2) educating residents in GHG reduction and 
climate change response; 
(3) developing and disseminating green public 
programs that have been customized to the local 
circumstances; and 
(4) developing and implementing green education 
programs for public schools.
Given how the work of green leaders essentially 
helps to improve public awareness and participation 
on climate change mitigation, the level of public 
participation in the Carbon Points System – a 
flagship scheme for reducing emissions through 
lifestyle changes – serves as an indicator to gauge 
the outcomes of the program.
Implementation
All local governments were guided to formulate 
strategies for fostering of green leaders and 
develop operational plans with the support of 
their local Green Start Network. Accordingly, local 
governments came up with different concepts on 
the roles and given responsibilities of their green 
leaders, along with criteria for monitoring and 
evaluating the outcomes. The engagement of green 
leaders by local governments involves the following 
stages:
1.  Selection and Posting: Local governments 
invited individual applications from future green 
leaders. Invitations are to be disseminated in 
coordination with the local community centers, 
NGOs, public schools, and businesses through 
various forms including emails, public campaigns, 
and advertisements on local media. Making 
sure that the selection of applicants strikes a 
balance between different community groups 
(e.g., restaurant managers, teachers, students, 
homemakers, and the elderly) is important for 
green leaders to have an impact across society 
as a whole. Eligible applicants are shortlisted and 
assigned to relevant duty stations based on their 
background and experience.
2.   Education: A package of educational programs 
is provided to the selected applicants. The 
curriculum is divided into three stages – beginner, 
Goal: Establishment of a green living culture by fostering Green Leaders
[Short-term targets, 2010] 
(Output) Educate 10,000 leaders across different regions and sectors
(Outcome) Expand public participation in Carbon Points System to 2.5 million households 
[Mid-term targets, 2011-2012] 
(Output) Develop education programs in specialized subject areas and expand the number of leaders to 30,000
(Outcome) Expand public participation in Carbon Points System to 3.5 million households
[Long-term targets, 2013-2015] 
(Output) Develop education programs to cover all subject areas related to green growth and expand the number of leaders to 50,000
(Outcome) Expand public participation in Carbon Points System to 5.0 million households
Table 18: Short and long-term goals of the Green Leaders Program
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intermediate, and advanced – reflecting the 
knowledge and skills to effectively fulfill the 
responsibilities. The Green Start Network is 
responsible for providing the necessary materials 
and educators to run the curriculum in local 
governments, with the support of the central 
government and educational institutions such 
as universities and specialized schools. The 
higher level curriculum covers more detailed 
and extensive syllabi, such as introduction 
to global climate negotiations, fundamentals 
of renewable energy systems, theories of 
resource circulation, and measures for greening 
production and consumption. These advanced 
curriculums ultimately seek to foster educators 
who can utilize the curriculum for the beginner 
and intermediate levels. Applicants must attend 
a minimum number of hours and complete a 
number of scheduled syllabuses to be granted the 
letter of certification and be appointed as green 
leaders.
3. Engagement: Green leaders who have completed 
the training process are expected to perform their 
respective roles (classified by the level of training 
completed) of promoting green living at their 
duty stations. As shown in Table 19, green leaders 
are provided with the opportunity to engage 
in a variety of Green Start Campaign activities 
that may take place within their respective 
communities.
4. Supervision and Management: The local 
government office develops and operates a 
database that keeps track of information (e.g., list 
of names, contact information, and duty stations) 
relevant to fostering and engaging green leaders. 
Proper supervision and management of the Green 
Leaders’ activities enables them to monitor their 
own performance and gain a sense of personal 
accomplishment from the activities that they are 
engaged in. Accordingly, a Green Leader Working 
Group is established within the local Green Start 
Network, composed of green leaders from at 
least the intermediate level. 
The working group coordinates between MoE, 
local governments, and the Green Start Network 
to build the support necessary for the successful 
engagement of green leaders. The budget for this 
program comes from the Green Start Network, 
which is funded by the MoE.
5. Evaluation: This stage seeks to ensure the quality 
of service provided by green leaders. Individual 
evaluations are carried out, which provides 
a basis for future target setting, provision of 
awards, and needs for receiving supplementary 
education or changing of duty station. Given the 
voluntary nature of green leader engagement, a 
fair and transparent evaluation is critical to avoid 
unnecessary complaints or misunderstanding. 
In this regard, the MoE has set out standard 
criteria for evaluation, which include factors 
such as number of hours served, the degree 
of responsibility, personal achievements, and 
innovativeness of engagement. Green leaders 
are to provide feedback on ways to improve 
the effectiveness of their engagement during 
the evaluation process. In addition to individual 
evaluation, local governments are also evaluated 
by the central government on their efforts to 
foster and engage green leaders. The evaluation 
is made primarily on a quantitative basis using 
indicators such as number of green leaders 
fostered, number of participating households 
in the Carbon Points System, number of green 
campaigns held, and amount of GHG emissions 
reduction.
Outcomes and Takeaways
As of 2011, a total of 29,510 green leaders 
(25,158 - beginner, 3,274 - intermediate, 1,078 
- advanced) were trained across the nation. The 
number of households that received GHG emission 
assessments from green leaders (intermediate level) 
reached 101,962, and the number of people trained 
by green leaders (advanced level) totaled 494,290 
by May 2012. The annual “Green Leader Challenge,” 
which is an event organized by MoE to identify and 
award activities supervised by green leaders with 
outstanding achievement, have demonstrated how 
the green leader program has embedded green 
living into the community through the provision of a 
diverse range of activities (refer to Table 20). Most 
importantly, green leaders have been successful in 
translating the growing levels of public awareness on 
climate change into tangible actions.
The green leaders program recognizes that the most 
powerful lever is education, and enhanced education 
at all levels of society can therefore make a big 
difference in improving the future environmental 
quality. Both the challenge and opportunity in 
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education are anchored on providing a direct and 
strong sense of connection between the everyday 
lives of the public and the environmental quality; 
selfish behaviors of individuals that often arise 
from perceived self-interest and cultural norms 
are difficult to overcome in a short period of time. 
Although the program has enabled the public to 
take the front seat in hastening the transition to 
a green lifestyle, sustaining progress demands 
more standardized and specialized curriculums 
on fostering green leaders to account for the 
evolving policies and practices on climate change. 
The discrepancies among education curriculums in 
different local governments has hindered creating 
a centripetal movement across the nation and 
complicated the process of gauging the individual 
outcomes of green leaders. 
The lack of rewards for green leaders is a 
demotivating factor for participants. Given how the 
applicants for the program are requested to invest 
a significant amount of time and effort just to earn 
the green leader certificates, some have inquired 
whether green leaders are provided with regular jobs 
or monetized benefits for engagement. Although the 
central government is continuously monitoring the 
efforts made by the local governments and the MoE 
is annually holding the “Green Leader Challenge” 
event, the impacts of these measures are limited and 
short-term. Understanding how green leaders are to 
Green Leader Specific Duties Sample Activities
Beginner
Initiate green living promotion campaigns at the local level, 
in line with the directives of the central administration
- “Me First” campaigns for emissions reduction
- Green consumption campaigns held in wholesale markets
- Holding weekly “Green Days” for green living
Intermediate
Visit households to assess their GHG emissions and provide 
advisory for emissions reduction
- Household consulting to make the most out of the 
   Carbon Points System
- Household assessment on energy use
- Public surveys on energy use and GHG emission
Advanced
Provide training for fostering green leaders (beginner, 
intermediate, advanced)
- Education for fostering green leaders
- Climate change education in public schools
Table 19: Duties of green leaders by level of training courses
Category Example Activities
Student-led 
activities
- Campaigns promoting the use of tumblers, handkerchief, and used papers 
- Awareness programs on the use of fossil fuels and deployment of renewable energy systems 
- Programs on growing mosquito shoo geranium plants to replace mosquito repellent sprays  
- Activities to identify standby power consumption of electric appliances in schools
Low-carbon living 
practices (beginner)
- Assessment of electricity consumption patterns in private and public buildings   
- Late-night visits for double-income households to collect applications for joining Carbon Point Systems 
- Recycling of disposed umbrella skeletons in community centers 
- Establishment of rooftop gardens 
- Opening of second-hand goods market for saving resources   
Low-carbon living 
practices (intermediate) 
- Consulting services for apartment complexes to improve energy efficiency 
- Urban heat island analyses to inform public on the needs for green urban planning 
- Provision of community receptacles collecting used cooking oil to be used for making eco-friendly laundry soap
Climate Change 
Education (advanced)
- Storytelling education programs on climate change for primary school students   
- Summer and winter school courses on climate change for public schools 
- Training curriculums and site-visit programs for public school teachers
Table 20: Examples of activities led by green leaders
Source: MoE, 2014f
216
engage on a voluntary basis – rewarding values such 
as social responsibility, cooperation, and leadership 
– is critical to ensure long-term commitment by 
participants. A systematic process of target-setting 
and self-evaluation of outcomes can promote a 
sense of achievement, which is important to keep the 
participants motivated.
3.2.2 Green Campus Initiative
The Green Campus Initiative aims to transform 
university and college campuses into eco-friendly, 
energy-efficient institutions that foster green talents 
and lead community efforts on GHG-emission 
reductions. Basically, it is a government-funded 
project that supports activities related to: 
(1) eco-friendly school management; 
(2) establishment of eco-friendly facilities within 
campuses; 
(3) curriculum development on environmental 
sustainability; and 
(4) campaigns on eco-friendly living initiatives. 
This project aims to increase awareness and 
participation of students as future leaders who 
can provide solutions to the rising environmental 
challenges. In this light, campuses are envisioned 
as hubs for education and research on green living 
practices to help achieve low-carbon green growth. 
Campuses that have been selected to participate 
in the program will become key channels for 
disseminating the government’s green growth 
policies in the local communities and help boost 
public awareness on green lifestyle.
Implementation 
The universities and colleges that wish to “green” 
their campus should submit applications to the 
Korea Environment Corporation (KECO), which is 
the implementing agency for the project under the 
supervision of MoE. The annual call for applications 
contains evaluation criteria for the selected green 
campuses, which identifies categories of activities 
that are most relevant to achieving the objectives 
of the program. Successful applications lead to the 
signing of a “Green Campus Agreement,” which 
promises technical support from MoE and KECO – 
the signing parties of the agreement – in addition to 
the 120 million KRW grant from MoE over a period 
of three years. The presidents of universities and 
colleges participating in the initiative have created 
a “Cooperative Council” to serve as a platform for 
sharing of information, ideas, and experiences. The 
outcome of the three-year implementation are 
evaluated by the KECO; green campuses recognized 
for outstanding performance are awarded with 
ministerial commendations from MoE. 
The technical support provided by KECO focuses 
on the establishment of GHG inventories for 
universities and college campuses and the adoption 
of technologies for reducing GHG emissions. 
Recognizing campuses as high carbon emitters, 
KECO released the Guidelines for the Establishment 
of GHG Inventories of Universities and Colleges 
in 2011, and the Guidelines for the Formulation 
of Emissions Reduction Plans for Universities 
and Colleges in 2012. These guidelines provide 
easy-to-follow instructions on applying different 
tools and methods (e.g., BAU projections of 
emissions and feasibility assessment on mitigation 
actions), which enable and encourage campuses 
to establish their own GHG inventories and set 
voluntary GHG reduction targets. The universities 
and colleges participating in the Green Campus 
Initiative are eligible for free training from KECO; 
a total of 10 green campuses selected for the first 
implementation year (2011) have created their GHG 
inventories for the year 2010.
Outcomes and Takeaways
A total of 30 universities and college campuses were 
selected to take part in the initiative from 2011 
to 2014. The participating campuses have come 
up with a series of activities such as upgrades into 
energy-efficient facilities, energy-saving campaign, 
green space expansion, and organization of a green 
school management committee. The MoE has laid 
out additional efforts to reinforce the project such 
as hosting a public contest, “Practice of Green Living 
Contest: Essay, Idea, and UCC” and organizing 
events to share and promote successful cases among 
selected universities and colleges. In 2014, three 
out of ten universities and colleges that completed 
their three-year implementation period (2011-
2014) were awarded the Ministerial commendation 
for their outstanding performance, such as Seoul 
Women’s University (SWU), which was recognized 
for requiring all students to attend a semester course 
entitled “Climate Change and Green Growth.” The 
course seeks to inform students on the need for the 
217
ROK to respond to the impacts of climate change and 
understand how the concept of green growth seeks 
to transform trade-offs into synergies.
The success of MoE’s Green Campus Initiative 
has been followed by the development of similar 
initiatives from local governments. For example, the 
Seoul Association of Green Campus Initiative was 
launched in 2013 as a coalition of the 34 universities 
and colleges located in Seoul that is supported by 
the city government, the Korea Energy Management 
Corporation, and the Climate Change Center (NGO). 
The participating universities and colleges have 
signed an agreement and released a declaration to 
reduce their energy use by 10% by 2017 (compared 
with 2012), which has provided the basis to the 
primary functions of the association in identifying 
and supporting a variety of voluntary energy-saving 
programs within campuses. 
A survey regarding the “Green Campus Initiative,” 
involving more than 800 students from the three 
selected universities, indicated how to maximize 
student participation by designing effective incentive 
measures (Green Korea, 2011). A large number of 
respondents identified the development of a wide 
range of participatory programs (40%) that meet the 
diverse needs and preferences as being critical to 
the establishment of green campuses. Specifically, 
the activities under the Green Campus Initiative 
should focus on promoting energy saving (32%) and 
installation of renewable energy systems (30%). 
An interesting point revealed in the survey was the 
question on how to improve student participation 
in the Green Campus Initiative as a large number 
of respondents (34%) highlighted the importance 
of providing monetized benefits for students in the 
form of tuition fee discounts. Such response implies 
how the high tuition fees in Korea lead to negligence 
on resource consumption; the provision of adequate 
incentives could thus be the most effective tool to 
improve student participation and induce a spirit of 
collaboration. 
In the ROK, universities and colleges have become 
the core of R&D activities, aside from performing 
academic functions. As a result, they now account 
for 10 of the nation’s top 50 organizations with 
Category Elements to be Evaluated Example Activities
Environment
Sustainable energy Use of renewable energy; installation of energy-saving facilities
Resource circulation and 
waste management
Purchase of eco-friendly products; waste segregation and recycling practices
Water quality Rainwater re-use; installation of water-saving facilities 
Air quality Installation of facilities preventing air-pollution; limiting the use of private vehicles
Land-use planning Development of green recreational areas
School 
Management
Strategies and plans Formulation of green campus development plans and sustainable college management plans
Operational guidelines Development of guidelines and declarations on green campus
Information exchange Disclosure of all relevant information on the campus website  
Institutional framework Establishment or designation of teams or individuals to lead the greening of campus
Monitoring Monitoring of outcomes for sustained environmental performance
Participation
Education Curriculum related to sustainable development
Research Research projects related to sustainable development
Student participation Engagement of student organizations in the Green Campus Initiative
Faculty participation Engagement of faculty members in the Green Campus Initiative
Interaction 
with the Local 
Community
Local resident participation
Educational program for local residents; in-campus events on green living practices involving 
local residents
Institutional partnerships 
Cooperative research with local and international universities; establishment of environmental 
governance networks with local public institutions, corporations, NGOs, and schools
Table 21: Evaluation criteria for the selection of Green Campus
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the highest energy consumption. In addition, the 
academic community has significant transportation 
demand, which is a root challenge for urban centers 
accommodating a large number of campus facilities. 
Such circumstances have justified the need for the 
government to take proactive actions on placing 
campuses at the forefront of reducing GHG 
emissions. However, recognizing how the potential 
for emissions reduction in campuses centers on 
bringing about changes in the operation of physical 
assets such as buildings, it is true that the ROK’s 
Green Campus Initiative has failed to focus on those 
that exercise authority over facility operations. As 
is often the case, facility operations are under the 
authority of entities that are less likely to interact 
directly with students and affect the board of 
management, which has the power to decide on the 
organization’s vision, strategies, and activities. Thus, 
it is crucial to support a governance structure in a 
way that would highlight priorities on greening the 
campus operations. 
3.2.3 “Cool-Mapsy” Campaign
The ROK exhibits a clear seasonal pattern of energy 
and electricity consumption, which typically peaks 
in winter and summer from running of heating and 
cooling devices. The government has struggled 
to meet the increasing energy demand under the 
changing climate, as depicted by the nationwide 
blackout in 2011, which was unprecedented in scale 
and caused by a failure to prepare for the surge 
in electricity use due to unusually high autumn 
temperature and uncoordinated maintenance 
schedules of power generation facilities. 
The “Cool-Mapsy” campaign is a nationwide 
campaign that aims to reduce energy consumption 
during the summer season and thus contributes to 
GHG reduction by changing the dress code in the 
workplace. The campaign encourages employees to 
dress in comfortable clothes to stay cool at a higher 
office temperature, while maintaining due formality 
in the workplace. “Cool-Mapsy” is a combination 
of the word “cool,” which refers to enjoying a cool 
summer, and the Korean word, “Mapsy,” referring 
to one’s personal fashion style; the initiative 
originates from the Cool-Biz (Cool & Business) 
campaign proposed in Japan, which also inspired a 
similar initiative, “Cool Work” in the UK. The ROK 
government kicked off the “Cool-Mapsy” campaign in 
2009, targeting both public and private institutions. 
Implementation 
After naming the campaign as “Cool-Mapsy” through 
a public contest, the MoE hosted public symposiums 
and policy forums consisting of experts in related 
fields to discuss the dress code culture in response 
to climate change. In addition to serving the primary 
purpose of reducing energy consumption (which 
translates into monetized benefits for employers), 
dress codes that enable people to better adapt to 
the changing climate bring about benefits in terms of 
maintaining better health conditions and improving 
work efficiency. In order to formulate “recommended 
dress codes” that are well supported by the public, 
the MoE recognized the need to understand not just 
the function-utility, but public preference in terms of 
style and fashion. 
As shown in Figure 4, the Cool-Mapsy dress code 
advises workers on desirable hairstyles, dressing 
tips, use of functional cooling items, and footwear 
including loafers and sneakers. As for the hairstyle 
of females, the bangs shall not cover the face and 
the hair shall be trimmed short or tied neatly. Men 
shall not let their hair on the sides or the rear of 
their heads touch the collars of their shirts. It is 
recommended that men do not wear ties, and that 
they unbutton the neck area, and wear short-sleeved 
shirts. Brightly colored tops in stripes or patterns 
are desirable since they look cool and refreshing 
visually. The pants should have pleats in front of 
the waist to ensure that they are not too tight, and 
the bottom hem should be wide enough to breathe 
and absorb moisture. Clothes made from functional 
cooling materials such as light linen and bamboo are 
recommendable since they tend to be stiff and have 
little contact with the body. Additionally, workers 
are encouraged to wear loafer-style summer shoes 
made of thin and light material or light sneakers to 
decrease the temperature of the feet, making them 
more comfortable and healthy.
Outcomes and Takeaways
The campaign spread rapidly from the public sector; 
many welcomed the Cool-Mapsy dress code to 
serve as a means for upholding the government’s 
commitment to maintain room temperatures of 
work places at above 28°C. Posters, television 
advertisements, and social media informed the public 
how government offices should lead the adoption 
of the Cool-Mapsy dress code, which helped ease 
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concerns over how civil servants may appear less 
professional. Government offices including the 
Seoul Metropolitan City and Chungnam Province 
have taken proactive steps, allowing employees to 
wear shorts and sandals to work and encouraging 
the management-level employees to create an 
environment where the Cool-Mapsy dress code is 
well respected. On the other hand, the promotional 
activities led by the Green Start Network, NGOs, 
and civil societies played a critical role in earning 
the participation from the private sector and 
households. For example, NGOs, fashion schools, 
and community groups partnered with department 
stores to hold “Cool-Mapsy Fashion Shows,” which 
helped demonstrate how the dress code can be 
implemented, in addition to raising awareness of 
relevant clothing items. In response to the increasing 
demand, clothing stores launched special sales 
events on clothing items corresponding to Cool-
Mapsy dress codes. 
Although an official evaluation of the outcomes of 
the Cool-Mapsy campaign has not been undertaken 
yet, it has been widely recognized for reshaping 
public opinion toward energy consumption and 
savings. According to MoE, the Cool-Mapsy dress 
code has the equivalent effect of reducing the 
sensory temperature by 2°C. This in turn enables 
the indoor temperature to be increased by 2°C; 
adoption by all public commercial sectors across 
the nation is expected to lead to 1.97 million tons 
of annual CO2 emissions reductions, which is 
equivalent to planting 700 million young pine trees. 
The monetized benefits from increasing the room 
temperature by 1°C during the summer (58 days of 
use) can save about 2,600 KRW in electricity bills 
from each air conditioning system. Health benefits 
such as preventing headaches, dizziness, and dry skin 
occurring from overexposure to excessive cooling 
that may arise from cutting down on air conditioning 
use are additional factors that have helped attract 
public participation. Following the success of the 
Cool-Mapsy campaign in the summer, the MoE 
has organized a similar campaign entitled “On 
(which means warm)-Mapsy” for the winter season. 
Through its promotion to wear innerwear and 
reduce the use of heaters, it is expected to deliver 
cost savings by reducing the amount of consumption 
in spatial heating. 
3.3 Waste Management
Waste management is an area where the ROK 
government has carried out some of its most 
successful policies since the 1990s. Korea’s high 
population density, rapid economic growth, and 
industrialization changed Koreans’ once frugal and 
minimalistic lifestyle to a generation of abundance 
and waste. In response, the government launched 
efforts to curb waste generation by improving 
environmental awareness, launching waste-
reduction campaigns, enforcing waste segregation, 
and implementing a volume-based waste fee 
system. These attempts proved to be effective and 
significantly decreased waste generation from 2.3 
kg/day/person in 1991 to 1.05 kg/day/person by the 
end of 1997. 
When the government first introduced the volume-
based waste fee system, clarifying the rationale 
behind the “pay-as-you-discard” principle to the 
public posed a great challenge as shown by a surge of 
Figure 4: Cool-Mapsy Poster and Lookbook
Source: Korea Climate and Environment Network, 2014
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complaints from citizens and reported cases of illegal 
dumping of wastes. Nonetheless, the policy gradually 
gained public acceptance through consistent public 
education and awareness-raising campaigns. As 
a result, substantial changes were seen in the 
lifestyle and consumption culture of households. 
The adoption of a systematic recycling process has 
enabled the ROK to overcome resource constraints 
and boost the resource recycling industry.
In developing countries where industrialization is 
proceeding at a rapid pace, the government needs 
to demonstrate a stringent waste-management 
strategy since faster economic growth usually comes 
with an exponential increase in waste generation. 
In addition, building public consensus – grounded 
on a comprehensive public understanding of waste 
management policy leading to compliance – cannot 
be achieved in a short timeframe and thus requires 
sustained efforts on information, education, and 
communication. Korea’s success stories in the field 
of waste management can provide a number of 
meaningful insights and implications for developing 
countries, especially with regard to designing and 
implementing effective systems based on strong 
public education and community outreach, backed 
up by strict policy reinforcement.
3.3.1 Volume-based Waste Fee System 
Based on the “pay-as-you-discard” principle, the 
volume-based waste fee system aims to create a 
clean and waste-free environment by mobilizing 
citizens to voluntarily reduce their waste and 
adopt recycling as part of their daily routine. Unlike 
previous policies that imposed disposal fees based 
on the size of the residence or the total amount of 
property tax, the volume-based system mandates 
residents to pay a disposal fee that is directly 
proportional to the volume of waste they discharge 
through the sales of pre-paid garbage bags. The 
disposal of municipal waste must be done through 
the use of these bags that come in different prices 
according to their sizes. The local governments with 
the legal mandate for waste treatment have the 
flexibility to decide the price of pre-paid garbage 
bags that are to be used strictly within the local 
regulations. Although the sole profit from the sales 
of garbage bags cannot cover the entire cost of 
waste collection, transportation, and treatment, 
experience has shown that it is enough to make up 
for a minimum of 20-30% of the total cost in most 
local governments. 
Implementation 
The volume-based waste fee system applies 
to individual households and small businesses 
generating waste of less than 300 kg per day. The 
items eligible for disposal using the pre-paid garbage 
bags are municipal waste (i.e., inorganic waste), 
which excludes recyclable wastes, food wastes, 
and large-sized wastes (e.g., electric appliances 
and furniture). The residents dispose of the pre-
paid garbage bags at centralized waste collection 
sites established in convenient locations of the 
community. However, in communities that are less 
densely populated (e.g., detached houses) and thus 
are not provided with centralized waste collection 
sites, residents should discharge their wastes in front 
of their homes at designated days and times of the 
week. Collection trucks regularly pick up the garbage 
bags for transport to landfills (some via incineration 
facilities for volume reduction) for permanent 
disposal.
The enforcement of waste segregation was 
implemented along with the volume-based waste 
fee system in 1995. The recyclable wastes that are 
to be disposed of into separate receptacles at the 
waste collection sites are categorized into papers, 
metal cans, glass bottles, scrap iron, and plastics, 
respectively. The segregation of food waste from 
the pre-paid garbage bags was made mandatory in 
all city and county governments only in 2005. After 
direct landfilling of food waste was banned by law, 
the government introduced a separate receptacle 
for collecting food waste at waste collection sites. 
However, since charging flat fees for disposal 
through the use of receptacles does not encourage 
the reduction of waste volumes, the government 
expanded the application of volume-based waste 
fee system to food wastes in 2010 (details to be 
provided in the following section on Weight-based 
Food Waste Fee System). The large-sized wastes 
are disposed of individually on a case-by-case basis; 
recyclable wastes are collected free of charge by 
community resource-recovery centers, but non-
recyclable wastes are disposed of through the 
engagement of privately owned waste-treatment 
companies. 
The MoE is in charge of overseeing the operation 
of the volume-based waste fee system and waste 
segregation practices. Specifically, it is responsible 
for revising national laws and operational guidelines 
on waste management, providing technical support 
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to local governments, and monitoring and evaluating 
their performance. On the other hand, local 
governments are at the frontline of implementation, 
preparing and revising their regulations and policies 
for enforcement to better meet the unique local 
conditions. Local governments are given the legal 
mandate to collect, transport, and treat municipal 
waste; in 2012, a large portion of the landfills (95%) 
and waste incineration facilities (94%) were directly 
owned and operated by the local governments. The 
civil society groups also have an important role 
to play, specifically by actively engaging in public 
awareness campaigns on waste management, 
ensuring that residents’ concerns or complaints 
are well reflected into the government plans, and 
monitoring the fairness and effectiveness of local 
governments’ operations and budgetary decision-
making. 
Private businesses are at the heart of 3R (reduce, 
re-use and recycle) of resources in the ROK. As a 
response to the increasing amount of recyclable 
wastes after the enforcement of waste segregation 
practices, the government engaged private 
companies to pursue profit from re-using waste, 
under the guise of cutting public costs, increasing 
amount of recyclable wastes segregation practices, 
the government engaged private companies to 
pursue profit from re-using waste, under the 
guise of cutting public costs, increasing efficiency, 
and fostering waste management industries. The 
community leaders of communal residences (e.g., 
apartment complexes) with the authority over the 
operation of the centralized waste collection site 
are free to sign contracts with privately owned 
recycling companies that are willing to buy their 
recyclable waste. However, in communities of small 
group residences or detached housing, recyclables 
collected are often insufficient for private companies 
to make profit as it is outweighed by costs in waste 
collection and transportation. As a complementary 
measure, the local government authorities directly 
collect, transport, and treat recyclables in such 
communities. As of 2012, privately owned resource-
recovery centers shoulder approximately 62% of 
total recyclables of municipal waste generated in 
Korea. 
The central government’s Waste Control Act (1986) 
and Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling 
of Resources (1992) provide the maximum amount 
of fine the local governments are allowed to impose 
for not meeting the waste disposal requirements. 
For example, a fine of 100,000 KRW is levied in 
many communities for the use of unauthorized 
garbage bags, illegal burning of waste, and mixing 
recyclable wastes or food wastes in pre-paid garbage 
bags. In order to effectively crack down on illegal 
activities, many local governments have installed 
surveillance cameras in waste collection sites, in 
Figure 5: Pre-paid garbage bag and waste collection sites with receptacles for segregated waste disposal
Source: The Jeju Weekly, 2012
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addition to operating inspection teams and hotlines 
for reporting violations. Waste collection trucks 
refuse the collection of garbage bags that contain 
recyclables and food waste; waste collectors rip 
them open for on-site inspection on an occasional 
basis and place warning labels indicating the need 
for waste segregation. The rewards for reporting 
of illegal disposal activities reach up to 10-20% of 
the fine imposed on illegal activities. As shown in 
Table 22, the number of reported violations has been 
decreasing, implying how government enforcement 
is continuously gaining stronger public acceptance. 
Outcomes  and Takeways
As of 2012, the volume-based waste fee system has 
been adopted in almost all administrative districts 
of Korea; this is equivalent to 20,212 out of 20,180 
households nationwide. Of the total municipal 
waste generated, the share of disposal through the 
use of pre-paid garbage bags was 43.4%, while the 
rest accounted for waste segregation practices. 
Out of the total spending by local governments 
for collection, transport, and treatment of waste 
disposed through pre-paid garbage bags, an average 
of 25.2% was covered by profits derived from sales 
of garbage bags nationwide, with Ulsan city having 
the highest share at 54.3%. The sale of pre-paid 
bags has fallen slightly (under 2%) over the period 
of 2008-2012, which has been the primary reason 
to the declining coverage of costs from the sales of 
pre-paid garbage bags; the nationwide average was 
36.2% in 2008.
As shown in Figure 6, the volume-based waste fee 
system proved effective in controlling the total 
volume of municipal waste generated in the ROK. 
Despite a 2.5-fold increase in the nation’s GDP from 
1994 to 2013, the total amount of municipal waste 
decreased by 16%. The declining trend is more 
evident in terms of the amount of waste generated 
per capita, which experienced an approximately 60% 
decrease over the same period. 
Although the progress has been slow, waste per 
capita figures continuously dropped in the 2009-
2013 period (this is also the implementation period 
of the Five-Year National Plan for Green Growth), 
reaching 0.94 kg/person/day, which is far below 
the average of OECD countries at 1.48 kg/person/
day (OECD, 2013). The major underlying factor 
that enabled the reduction of waste was behavioral 
changes of the public in relation to the sales of 
pre-paid garbage bags. In order to reduce their 
spending on garbage bags, people sought to curb 
their absolute waste disposal by various means 
such as consuming efficiently and purchasing goods 
with less waste. However, it is equally important 
Year
Number of violations Amount of fines charged (million KRW)
Total
Report from 
residents
Report by 
government 
inspection 
teams
Total
Report from 
residents
Report by 
government 
inspection teams
2009 457,937 65,556 392,381 14,518 1,434 13,084
2009 409,191 30,524 378,667 13,955 1,027 12,928
2010 371,584 27,182 344,402 10,755 749 10,006
2011 351,691 25,741 325,950 12,160 932 11,228
2012 258,193 23,453 234,740 7,219 875 6,344
2013 267,212  25,024  242,188  7,942  963  6,979
Source: MoE, 2015a
Table 22: Number of illegal waste disposal reports and fines charged nationwide
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to understand that the government also enforced 
regulations upon product manufacturers and 
retailers to keep pace with the changing social 
behavior. In 1994, the Act on the Promotion of 
Saving and Recycling of Resources prohibited the 
use of single-use disposables such as paper cups 
and plastic tablecloths in restaurants, as well as 
restricting their free distribution (e.g., free plastic 
bags and complimentary drinks in paper cups). In 
order to reduce the use of disposable plastic bags, 
the government enforced a scheme in 1999 that 
mandates department stores and wholesale markets 
to provide refunds to customers who return used 
plastic bags. More recently, the use of disposable 
plastic bags has become fully prohibited in large 
retailers; they should use paper bags or sell pre-paid 
garbage bags to serve the same purpose. 
The volume-based waste fee system was not only 
effective in reducing waste generation, but was also 
instrumental in the promotion of recycling. The total 
amount of waste recycled increased by 26.7% in the 
year after the enforcement of waste segregation, and 
annual increases continued until 2008; recyclables 
cover approximately 60% of the total municipal 
waste discharged. It is worth noting that increasing 
rate of resource-recovery is also an outcome of 
government control over product manufactures. In 
1993, the government enacted a law that mandates 
manufacturers to bear the disposal cost of their 
products that are not easily recyclable. The law 
also restricts product manufacturers from over-
packaging; for example, this law was strengthened 
in 2012 to limit the empty package volume of 
confectionery goods to 20% of the total volume of 
the product. 
The direct benefits that arise from volume-based 
waste fee system and waste segregation practices 
are the cost savings from waste management 
(collection, transport, and treatment) and increased 
economic value of recyclables. The Korea Institute 
for Industrial Research reported in 2005 that the 
total direct benefits accrued from 10 years of 
implementation (1995-2004) reached approximately 
8 trillion KRW, equivalent to US$ 7.3 trillion (Kim, 
2005). 
However, it is equally important to understand 
that there are indirect benefits involved, such as 
lowering of social costs. By reducing the volume of 
waste, communities are able to prolong the life of 
existing landfills and postpone the need to locate 
new disposal facilities. This spares the government 
from building additional landfill sites and from having 
to resolve social conflicts regarding the location 
of new landfill sites. Admittedly, the benefits of 
environmental protection such as the prevention 
of landfill leachate and air pollution are difficult 
to monetize. The implementation of the scheme 
also paved the way for the promotion of resource-
recovery industries, which was initially believed to 
have limited feasibility in Korea. 
Without doubt, the volume-based waste fee 
Source: MoE, 2014
Figure 6: Amount of municipal waste discharge by treatment (ton/day)
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system succeeded in improving the environmental 
awareness of the public. The economic burden 
placed on waste discharge catalyzed public 
understanding on the need for effective waste 
management, which extended to enhanced public 
interest in the nation’s environmental challenges and 
embracement of the “polluter pays principle.” 
The public campaigns and the government’s 
strong will to punish illegal conduct played a 
critical role in the process. In the early years of 
system enforcement, public indifference and 
disobedience led to problems such as illegal waste 
dumping and fierce complaints on mandatory 
use of pre-paid garbage bags. Local government 
offices suffered from inadequate administrative 
capacity to fully support the policy implementation. 
However, building public consensus based on solid 
government-citizen cooperation helped in gaining 
public acceptance and ensuring successful policy 
enforcement. For example, the local government 
offices trained individuals to be appointed as 
honorary inspectors monitoring waste disposal 
activities in their communities. Honorary inspectors 
also served as champions of change by providing 
public guidance and education to embed the 
system across a wide range of stakeholders. 
The official inspection teams composed of local 
government officers also worked seamlessly to 
identify individuals responsible for illegal conduct, 
despite the challenging process involved in securing 
evidence from waste examination. 
3.3.2 Weight-based Food Waste Fee System
Despite the success of the volume-based waste 
fee system, the amount of food waste generated 
continued to increase in the ROK, owing to the 
rising levels of income, increasing dining out habits, 
and tradition of preparing a large number of small 
dishes. The total amount of food waste generated 
increased from 11.4 tons/day in 2000 to 14.5 tons/
day in 2007; disposal per capita also increased from 
0.24 kg/day to 0.29 kg/day over the same period. 
As a response to the continued increase in the 
amount of food waste generated, the “pay-as-you-
discard” model was extended to food wastes for 
pilot testing in 2010, and made fully enforceable 
in all administrative districts in 2013. Before the 
policy was introduced, the disposal of food wastes 
was either free or charged a flat rate (which made 
up for less than 30% of their treatment costs) 
among local governments. The launch of the weight-
based food waste fee system enabled a full-fledged 
implementation of the principle, “waste disposal 
charge = amount of waste disposed.”
Implementation
The weight-based food waste fee system applies 
to households and small-scale restaurants 
with floor area less than 200 m2 in 144 city and 
county governments (out of a total of 230 local 
governments) that are practicing food waste 
segregation. Local governments are to choose one of 
Figure 7: Amount of municipal waste discharge per person (kg/day/person)
Source: MoE, 2014
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the following three ways of operation to impose fees 
on food waste disposal: 
• Pre-paid Garbage Bags: Food waste is disposed of 
using specially designed and distinctively colored 
pre-paid garbage bags for collection at centralized 
waste collection sites (or in front of homes for 
detached housing). 
• Pre-paid Chips or Stickers: Residents dispose of 
food waste into standardized disposal containers 
that have attached a pre-paid chip or sticker that 
can be purchased in local wholesale markets. 
When waste collectors empty the containers, 
they remove the chip or stickers to allow re-use of 
food disposal containers. However, the containers 
without pre-paid chips or sticker attached are not 
emptied by waste collectors. 
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Tags: The 
local government makes available disposal booths 
specifically for food waste that are equipped 
with magnetic card reader and weight measuring 
device. Households provide their information 
upon disposal using their magnetic cards, which 
opens the booth to measure the exact weight 
of food waste. The information on the weight of 
the disposed food is transmitted to a centralized 
online management system; the monthly disposal 
data serves as the basis for charging fees to each 
household.
The central government has strongly recommended 
that all local governments adopt the use of RFID 
tags as it enables accurate imposition of fees and 
avoids single-use of chips, stickers, or plastic bags. In 
addition to the method illustrated in Figure 8, several 
alternative methods have been proposed to make 
the most efficient use of RFID tags. For example, 
in communities of single-family detached housing, 
households are required to dispose of food waste in 
containers with RFID tags attached to allow waste 
collectors with portable RFID readers to retrieve 
and transmit information for imposing disposal fees. 
Waste collection trucks may be individually equipped 
with RFID readers and weight measurement 
device to serve the function of RFID food waste 
disposal booths. However, given the varying 
circumstances of communities and local government 
offices, the central government has been flexible 
in allowing the use of pre-paid chips or stickers; 
only in exceptional cases is the method of pre-paid 
garbage bags can be adopted on a long-term basis.
Setting the food waste disposal fee is to strictly 
follow the “polluter pays principle” based on the 
actual weight of the waste disposed. In other 
words, the monthly fee is equivalent to the unit 
cost of waste treatment (cost/kg) multiplied by the 
total weight of disposal (kg). In cases where the 
waste disposed is measured by volume (e.g., use 
of pre-paid garbage bags), local governments are 
to utilize appropriate weight-volume conversion 
factors. However, it should be noted that the unit 
cost of waste treatment may vary in different areas, 
leading to differentiated fees. In addition, the local 
government may choose to impose fees at a common 
flat rate among households in selected communal 
residences. In other words, households are to 
share an equal burden for the total amount of food 
waste discharge from their communal residence.
Local governments also have the flexibility to ease 
the burden of households by imposing only a portion 
of the treatment cost as fees to the households. 
For example, the central government specifically 
guided local governments to impose 28.1% of their 
unit treatment cost as fees during the first year of 
policy implementation. Accordingly, the fee was 
fixed at 73 KRW (approximately US$ 0.06) for each 
kilogram of waste disposal. However, the plan is to 
annually raise the rate so that 80% of the treatment 
cost can be covered by revenues from fee collection 
by 2015-2016 in cities and by 2017-2018 in 
counties. The central government is also considering 
the introduction of tiered pricing to incentivize 
households with lower volumes of waste disposal. 
The  MoE  takes  charge  of  the  overall  management  
of  the  weight-based  food  waste  fee  system  
with the  support  of  the  Korea  Environment  
Corporation  (KECO),  which  operates  the  
centralized  online management  system  that  
collects  waste  disposal  data  of  households.  The  
local  government  offices are in charge of imposing 
and receiving disposal fees in their respective 
regions. In addition, they are mandated  to maintain  
good  sanitation  conditions  of  disposal  sites  by  
providing  cleaning  and disinfection services on a 
regular basis.  
In order to accelerate the adoption of RFID tags, the 
central government has provided financial grants for  
the installation  of  RFID food  waste  disposal  booths 
in  local  governments  that have  taken  part  in 
pilot   projects   during   2010-2013.   Approximately   
11.3   billion   KRW   was   provided   to   25   local 
governments,  and  funding  of  1.6  billion  KRW  was  
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provided  for  the  establishment  of  the  centralized 
online management system in KECO. The central 
government has planned to shoulder 30% of the 
installation cost in all local governments until the end 
of 2015.
Outcomes and Takeaways
As of 2014, the weight-based fee system has 
been adopted by 143 out of 144 city and county 
governments that account for more than 95% of the 
entire population. The effectiveness of the system is 
yet to be determined as it was enforced nationwide 
only in July 2013. However, a significant number 
of local governments that have taken early actions 
through pilot projects have already confirmed that 
the system has led to a notable reduction in the total 
amount of disposed food waste. 
For example, the city of Gimcheon, which was one 
of the first cities to adopt the use of RFID tags in 
2012, reported that the total food waste generated 
decreased by 47% compared to the previous year. 
Accordingly, the residents pay less fees from food 
waste disposal as the average monthly fees per 
household decreased from 1,500 KRW to 700-800 
KRW. Likewise, the city of Gumi reported that food 
waste reduction has reached 40% after the phased 
adoption of the system into different city districts 
from 2012 onwards. This outcome has led to 290 
million KRW of savings in public expenditures and 
approximately 6,385 tons CO2 eq. of GHG emissions.
As shown in Table 23, public surveys have confirmed 
that the volume-based fee system is widely 
supported by the public as awareness of sustainable 
waste management continues to improve. It is worth 
noting to understand that the government’s sideline 
efforts to boost the effectiveness of the system have 
played a crucial role, and these include the following:
• Customized programs on food waste reduction 
have started in government offices from 2010 as a 
means of ensuring that the public sector leads by 
example. For example, the MoE started day-to-day 
monitoring of the amount of food waste generated 
and natural gas used for cooking activities in all 
offices and institutions under their authority. 
The cafeterias of the central government office 
complex started to operate “fast-track” dish return 
counters for guests with zero food waste from 
their meals. In addition, there was a switch from 
multi-compartment garnish trays to regular plates 
to prevent overfilling. 
• Public schools and universities were supported by 
the government to launch customized programs 
and campaigns on food waste reduction. The 
Figure 8: Process of RFID weight-based food waste fee system
Source:  MoE, 2012c
①Distribute RFID cards 
to households
② Residents swipe cards in order to 
insert food wastes in collection bin to 
households
③ The weight of the food waste is 
automatically calculated and the 
weight will be read out loud
④ Aggregated data collection is sent 
to KECO information system
⑤ Local governments impose disposal fees on 
individual households (utility bills, etc.)
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implementation of food-waste-fee days, day-to-
day monitoring of food waste of students or class 
groups by instructors, and provision of free drinks 
to students with zero food waste are some of the 
notable activities.
• Cafeterias of large private firms, rest areas on 
expressways, military units, and hospitals were 
requested by the government to voluntarily 
implement waste reduction through several 
means, such as changing the serving sizes and 
garnishes, allowing takeaways of left-overs, 
reducing prep-waste and improperly cooked 
food, and modifying the menu to boost customer 
satisfaction and reduce the portions left uneaten. 
The central government made sure that sufficient 
grace period was provided to prepare for the 
enforcement of the weight-based fee system 
in advance. Most importantly, pilot projects on 
introducing RFID tags that started as early as 2010 
provided insights into the preconditions, which the 
local government needs to create in order to enable 
households to adapt to the new system. However, 
nationwide enforcement was not without hardships 
and challenges. Differences in the adopted methods 
of disposal and fees imposed by local governments 
were at the center of public discontent. 
The following lessons learned provide some useful 
pointers for designing similar systems that embrace 
the polluter-pays principle:
• Households that are required to use pre-paid 
garbage bags, chips, or stickers complained that 
their expenditures for disposal were inevitably 
higher compared to those of communities with 
access to the convenient RFID food waste disposal 
booths. Given how food waste must be removed 
frequently to keep their homes sanitary and to 
prevent foul odor, it has been difficult for these 
households to make the most out of the pre-paid 
garbage bags and standardized disposal containers 
that come in substantial volumes. 
• Households of communal residences who pay 
the imposed flat fees have raised complaints 
that they have not been given opportunities to 
benefit from reduced waste discharge. Their 
rationale holds true, based on a survey conducted 
by a local NGO (Korea Zero Waste Movement 
Network, 2013), which reported that the amount 
of waste reduction achieved by households paying 
individual fees was significantly higher than those 
of communal residences.
• Cases of illegal dumping of food waste are found 
to be high in communities using pre-paid garbage 
bags, which are often viewed inappropriate 
(compared to the original method of simply 
segregating food waste into separate receptacles 
at centralized waste collection sites) as it leads to a 
greater amount of waste, thus failing to incentivize 
waste reduction practices. In addition, unpacking 
food waste from the pre-paid garbage bags prior 
Method Advantages Disadvantages Application
Pre-paid garbage bags
- Convenience in disposal
- Simple and easy means of charging 
  disposal fees
- Volume-based measurement
- Causes odors and not aesthetically 
   appealing
- Residents with small amount of 
   waste discharge, regions with poor 
   waste collection circumstances
Pre-paid chips or stickers
- Reduces odors and more  
   aesthetically appealing compared  
   to pre-paid garbage bags  
- Standardized waste containers 
   enable mechanical collection
- Volume-based measurement
- Inconvenience in maintaining the 
   cleanliness and functionality of 
   containers
- Single-family detached housing
RFID tags
- Free from odors and aesthetically 
   appealing
- Charges fees based on accurate 
   weight of food waste disposed
- High installation cost and
  operation fees
- Requires consistent facility 
   maintenance and management
- Communal residence such as 
  apartment complexes
Table 23: Comparison of food waste disposal methods
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to treatment has proven to be a costly and time-
consuming process.
• The large front-end costs of installing RFID food 
waste disposal booths has been a challenge 
to many local governments despite subsidies 
provided by the central government. Disposal 
booths have been reported to be costly at over 2 
million KRW while their projected lifetime was 
short (five years). The need for maintenance as 
verified through pilot installations has kept local 
governments hesitant in making the necessary 
investments.
• Under the strong guidance by the central 
government to increase the coverage of waste 
treatment cost by revenues from collection of 
disposal fees, the unit disposal fee has diverged 
significantly among local governments as they have 
different operating and contractual conditions 
for treatment. Transparency in setting adequate 
fees and improving awareness on the required 
measures to achieve publicly agreed targets is 
important to earn the buy-in of the public and their 
active participation. 
4. Assessment
4.1 Quantitative Assessment
The outcomes of the ROK’s endeavors to promote 
green lifestyle practices can be evaluated on the 
basis of different indicators being monitored 
by the government. To start with, a simple yet 
comprehensive approach focuses on the changes 
observed in the amount of consumption by 
households and individuals that represent the 
non-industrial segments of the nation’s economy. 
During the period under the Five-Year Plan for 
Green Growth, the ROK has made small yet steady 
improvements in reducing household consumption 
of basic necessities and these include the following:
• The trend in energy consumption remained 
consistent prior to the implementation of the 
Five-Year Plan. The consumption of energy in 
households amounting to 0.434 TOE/day/person 
in 2007 experienced a decline over the period of 
2008-2009, but increased again in the following 
years. The ROK’s household energy consumption 
is well below the OECD average, which amounts 
to approximately 0.6 TOE/day/person. As of 
2013, the share of households controlling 
room temperatures based on government 
recommendations for summer (above 26°C) and 
winter (below 18-20°C) seasons was found to 
reach 82.2% and 76.9%, respectively.
• Water consumption per capita decreased annually 
from 340 L/person/day in 2007 to 332 L/person/
day in 2012. Although not a significant amount, 
this progress is deemed notable, as the ROK’s 
level of household water consumption is well 
below those of many developing countries. As of 
2013, 24.3% of the households used water-saving 
equipment such as toilets and shower heads.
• The amount of household waste generated 
fell below 1 kg/person/day in 2010. Although 
household waste accounts for only approximately 
13% of the nation’s total waste as of 2013, it is 
another sign of positive progress. Note that the 
industrial waste (excludes municipal waste) and 
construction waste comprise the rest of the share 
of total waste, with 39% and 48%, respectively. 
The ROK’s total waste generation exhibited a 
continued annual increase during 2010-2012 at 
a rate between 2.0-2.3%, but the rate decreased 
significantly to 0.02% in 2013. As of 2012, the 
average household waste generation of OECD is 
approximately 1.45 kg/person/day.
From the perspective of greening household 
patterns of consumption and lifestyle, the ROK was 
found to have made significant progress during the 
2009-2013 period. Based on the data released by 
Statistics Korea (KOSTAT), many of the indicators 
relevant to green household practices, such as public 
use of transportation, and community activities, 
exhibited positive changes. In particular, the number 
of “certified environmentally friendly products” and 
“products with carbon labels” was found to have 
grown significantly in response to the increased 
public awareness of environmental sustainability 
and climate change. 
In terms of public transportation, the reduction in 
the average distance traveled by privately owned 
vehicles and increased domestic sales of small-
sized cars helped reduce energy consumption. The 
growing number of people taking part in the Carbon 
Points System was an indication of the public’s 
growing interest in emission-reduction activities, as 
reflected in Table 25. 
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As described in the introductory section of this 
chapter, a key challenge identified in the ROK 
was the lack of proactive initiatives from the 
general public to translate their growing levels of 
environmental awareness into tangible actions. In 
order to identify the changes in the level of public 
engagement, KOSTAT carried out a comprehensive 
survey on the status of green lifestyle practices in 
2011 and 2013. The survey of 2013 drew responses 
from approximately 19,000 persons (aged over 20) 
selected randomly. As shown in Figure 10, the survey 
was divided into three categories, including 
(1) green households 
(2) green transportation 
(3) green communities
• Responses from the “green households” 
category indicated that public efforts toward 
reducing household energy consumption have 
continued to improve, yet public participation 
in government policies and programs that 
promote low-carbon goods and services 
remained low. As opposed to how the public is 
well engaged in energy-saving actions based 
on long-established perceptions that the 
nation imports nearly all of its energy needs, 
participation in newly introduced programs 
aimed at GHG emission reduction was still 
relatively low.
• The survey on public engagement in “green 
transportation” was aimed at understanding 
the progress made in terms of reducing non-
essential travel (demand management) and 
improving transport patterns and behavior. 
Responses indicated that voluntary actions 
that are closely tied to providing financial 
benefits to individuals (e.g., reduced costs 
for fuel purchases and vehicle maintenance) 
have increased, indicating the importance of 
framing incentives based on personal benefits 
to generate voluntary  participation. However, 
public participation in the government-
led programs such as the “weekly car-free 
day” failed to reach levels targeted by the 
government.
• Combining the selected responses from 
the “green transportation” and “green 
communities” categories enables a better 
understanding of the progress made by 
the average middle-class commuters. An 
important indicator is the percentage of public 
transportation use, which is only 29.1%. There 
are many different causes that account for the 
high public resistance toward making a modal 
shift; challenges are multi-dimensional but the 
primary cause is the increasing commuting 
distance of the working class, which is a result 
of rapid and continuous urbanization and 
rising costs of residential spaces. Enhancing 
the accessibility and convenience of public 
transportation system is thus a long-term goal 
of many city governments in the ROK. 
• On the other hand, the number of people 
participating in green practices at their 
respective work spaces was found to have 
increased. Particularly, there was a notable 
increase in the amount of energy-saving 
practices, such as turning off the lights during 
lunch hours, due to the support of corporate 
leaders, who agreed to take the lead in 
government-led initiatives. 
• Responses in the “green community” 
category provided a good insight into the 
levels of public awareness and participation 
in environment-related policies and 
programs. It is interesting to note that while 
public awareness on initiatives related to 
green lifestyles was found to be low, public 
understanding and interest in climate change 
issues was relatively high. Without doubt, 
the level of public engagement in greening of 
lifestyle practices improved in 2013 relative 
to 2011, but its impacts are yet to be strongly 
felt. Many have responded that they “are still 
not sure of how to participate (44.3%)” and 
“do not have sufficient access to relevant 
information (21.8%)”. progress of government 
strategies and plans in achieving targets, 
measurements for evaluating impacts should 
be made available.
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Source: MoE, 2015b
Table 24: Public survey on food consumption and weight-based food waste fee system
Statement 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Waste management is a serious issue in the ROK. 84.5 89.3 87.0 87.9 87.3
I am aware of the weight-based food waste fee system. 68.8 73.8 80.4 86.9 85.5
The weight-based food waste fee system is necessary 
for waste reduction.
84.6 83.1 85.1 87.6
I agree with the implementation of the weight-based 
food waste fee system.
56.9 65.5 62.5 65.2 70.2
I intend to exert efforts on food waste reduction. 87.4 86.8 85.2 94.0 96.0
Unit: %
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Household Energy Consumption
(TOE/day)
0.434 0.432 0.418 0.429 0.434 -
Household Water Consumption 
(L/person/day)
340 337 332 333 335 332
Household Waste Generation 
(kg/person/day)
1.02 1.04 1.02 0.96 0.95 0.95
Source: KOSTAT, 2013 
Table 25: Changes in household consumption in Korea (2007-2012)
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Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Green 
Households
Eco-friendly 
Products
Number of certified environmentally 
friendly products
5,105 6,005 6,531 7,904 7,777 9,140 9,803
Environmentally friendly vegetable 
produce (% of total vegetable produce)
8.3 10.5 11.0 12.6 8.3 7.8 -
Energy 
Efficiency Number of goods with carbon labels - - 111 301 511 807 1,022
Waste Recycling Recycling rates of household waste (%) 57.8 59.8 61.1 60.5 59.1 - -
Pollution from 
Households
Amount of daily food waste disposal 
(kg/person/day)
0.30 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 - -
Green 
Transportation
Efficient Use of
Privately Owned 
Cars
Energy consumption in transport 
(TOE/person/day)
0.763 0.731 0.731 0.748 0.741 0.743 -
Average daily distance traveled by 
privately-owned vehicles (km/day/vehicle)
40.9 35.5 35.7 34.2 32.6 - -
Use of 
Eco-friendly 
Transportation
Share of small-sized cars 
(% of total number of cars registered)
6.3 7.5 7.9 8.3 8.9 9.6 9.8
Share of hybrid and electric cars 
(% of total number of cars registered)
0.00 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.30 0.52 0.62
Green 
Communities
Promotion of 
Green Lifestyles
Subscription to the Carbon Points System 
(% of total households)
- - 4.2 9.6 14.1 16.2 17.7
Source: KOSTAT, 2013 
Table 26: Changes in indicators relevant to green household practices (2007-2013)
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It will benefit me and my family
It helps economically in the long run
I feel responsible to environment
Everyone is doing it
of Green Living campaign that the local community pronotes
It is not that hard to practice
Etc.
I do practice 
Green Living 
because...
Figure 9: Results of the Green Living Study: Overall Practice of Green Living
50.1
30.9
14.4
2.5
1.2
0.5
0.3
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it will benefit me and my family
it helps economically in the long run
I feel responsible to envioronment
everyone is doing it
of Green Living campaign that the local c mmunity promotes
it is not that hard to practice
etc.
I DO practice Green Living because ... 
Unit: %
Source: KOSTAT, 2013 
I do not know how to
I do not have enough information
It is tiresome
It does not seem necessary
I do not have enough time
Etc.
It is financially burdensome
of lack of supportive system
I do not 
practice 
Green Living 
because...
44.3
21.8
13.7
10.1
4.9
3.4
1.7
0.2
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
I don't know how to
I don't have enough informati
it is t resome
it doen't seem neces ary
I don't have enough ti
of lack of supportive system
it is financi lly burdensome
etc.
I DON'T practice Green Living because  ...
Unit: %
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Figure 10: Green Living Practice Indicators
     I. Green Home
69.9
83
59.8
69.3
85.2
63
60.5
Reduce synthetic detergent use
Reduce food wastes
Participate in volume-based food waste fee system
Use shopping baskets
 ★  synthetic detergent use
 ★ educe f od wastes
 se sho ping baskets
 Participate in Volume-based food waste fee system
4. Wastes &
     Pollutants 
     Reduction
79.9
73.6
79.5
90.3
57.3
80.9
72.4
78.8
24.3
92
49.6
Save water - Brush teeth using a cup
Save water - Wash face faucets closed
Save water-  Shorten shower time
Use water-saving equipment
Sort out recyclable wastes
Reuse print cartridges
Save water - rush teeth using a cup
Save water -  face faucets closed
Save water - use basin for washing 
face instead of leaving the faucet on
Use water-saving equipment 
 ★ Sort out clable wastes
Reus i t cartridges
3. Resource
     Conservation
      & Recycling 
70.4
48.2
77.9
70
77.1
56.8
59.3
82.2
76.9
Blockout standby power
Practice On-Mapsy
Minimize energy use during peak hours
Maintain recommended indoor temperature - Summer
Maintain recommended indoor temperature - Winter
lockout standby power
Practice “ n-Mapsy”
Minimize energy use during peak hours
Maintain recommended indoor temp. - Summer
Maintain recommended indoor temp. - Winter
2. Efficient
    Energy Use
32.2
31.1
71.9
56.9
46.6
56.1
82.3
31.8
32.9
73.7
52.5
43.9
56.6
83.4
Eco-labled products
Low-carbon products
Energy-saving products
Env. Friendly agricultural products
Local agricultural products
After identifying food additives
Refillable goods (Detergents)
Eco-lab led products
Low-carbon products
Env. friendly agricultural r cts
Energy-saving products
Local agricultural products
After identifying food ad iti
Refillable g ods (Detergents)
1. Eco Friendly  
Consumptions: 
Purchase
2011 2013
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1. Economic 
     Use of 
     Automobiles
17.5
28.5
88
88.2
80
81.2
13.4
25.2
94.3
93.4
92.6
84.4
87.3
Participate in car-free day
Keep automobile-account book
Practice Eco-friendly Driving - Reduce quike braking
Practice Eco-friendly Driving - Maintain cruise control
Practice Eco-friendly Driving - Reduce engine idling
Practice Eco-friendly Driving - Examine tire pressure
Practice Eco-friendly Driving - Unload unnecessary cargo
icipate in car-free day
Ke p a t ile-a count b ok
Eco-friendly Driving - 1) educe sudden braking
Eco-friendly Driving - 2) Maintain speed control
Eco-friendly Driving - 3) Reduce engine idling
E o-friendly Driv ng - 4) Examine tire pressure
Eco-friendly Driving - 5) Unload unn cessary cargo
6. Eco-friendly
   Transportation 
uses ★★
27
1.5
29.1
2.2
Commute by using public transportation
Commute by riding bicycles
★ Co mute by using public transpor ation
★ Co mute by r ding bicycles
     II. Green Transportation 2011 2013
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Source: KOSTAT, 2013 
4| The percentages refer to the proportion of individuals/households out of total population who are practicing or making attempts to practice green 
      living of corresponding index
5| Indicators with ★ used figures from 2010 and 2012
6| Indicators with ★★ used figures from 2010 Housing Census Report and 2013 Green Living Census Report
7. Active Green
     Living
     Campaign 85.3
94
19.4
40.4
28
72.7
57
57.9
81.4
82
30.2
30
83.8
92.9
83.8
24.6
40.9
31.8
78.1
68.5
69.2
58
64.7
79.5
84.9
34.4
28.1
Awareness on Envionmental Problems - Climate Change
Awareness on Envionmental Problems - Lifestyle ruining
environment
Awareness on Envionmental Problems - Environmental Response
as potential economic growth opportunity
Understanding Green Living Programs - Carbon Points System
Understanding Green Living Programs - Eco-label system
Understanding Green Living Programs - Carbon Scorecards
Understanding Green Living Programs - Energy-use Efficiency
Grades
Understanding Green Living Programs - Volume-based food waste
fee system
Understanding Green Living Programs - Power-use peak hours
Practicing Green Living at workplace - Having one's own mug cup
Practicing Green Living at workplace - Blockout standby power
Practicing Green Living at workplace - Use scrap paper
Practicing Green Living at workplace - Sort out recyclable wastes
Willingness to pay environmental charges
Participating in environmental campaigns
Awareness on - 1) Climate Change
Awareness on - 2) Lifestyle and environmental impact
Awaren ss on - 3) Env. response as economic opportunity
Understanding Green Programs - 1) Carb n Points system
Understanding Green Programs - 2) Eco label system
Understanding Green  3)  Carbon Scorecards
Understanding Green Programs - 4)  Energy - use Efficiency Grades
Understanding Green Programs - 5)  Volume-based food waste fee system
Understanding Green Programs - 6)  Reducing consumption in peak hours
r  iving at orkplace - 1) Having one’s own m g cup
Green L ving at workplace - 2) Eliminating all standby power usage
 i i   rkplace - 3) Use scrap paper
Gr  l ce - 4)  S r out recyclable wastes
★ Willi gness to pay environmental charges
★ Participating in environmental campaigns
    III. Green Community 2011 2013
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4.2 Qualitative Assessment
The ROK has acted vigorously to resolve the 
environmental challenges neglected in the early 
days of its economic development. The central 
government has been well-equipped with 
regulatory and economic instruments, and the 
local governments have played a bigger role in 
implementing policies on pollution abatement. In 
response to the government’s continued efforts to 
cope with the growing pressure on the environment, 
the general public has grown increasingly concerned 
about sustainable and eco-friendly living. Therefore, 
it could be inferred that “greening lifestyle practices” 
was not an entirely new concept to the general 
public, and the intended transformational changes 
by the Five-Year Plan sought expansion of existing 
public engagements, to GHG reduction, resource 
saving, and environmentally friendly actions in 
homes and workplaces. Despite the favorable 
foundation on which to build a strong momentum in 
society, the government has failed to fully meet its 
initial expectations in promoting a green lifestyle.
The lack of promotion and communication with the 
public persists as an obstacle to many government-
led policies and programs in the ROK. As indicated 
by different indicators and public surveys described 
in the previous section, the low level of public 
participation stems from the lack of knowledge and 
confidence among the people. A good example is the 
development of “certified environmentally friendly 
products” and “products with carbon labels.” Despite 
an explosive growth in the number of products with 
green labels, the market consumption of these goods 
remained low, indicating how the labels have had 
a limited impact on the decision-making patterns 
of consumers. In order to realize the full potential 
of consumers, government initiatives should have 
clarified what their objectives are, why they are 
needed, how they can be supported, and what 
benefits they are willing to offer. Tapping the use of 
print, broadcast, and internet media is one powerful 
way to spread these messages. Thus, the government 
should design tailor-made information, education, 
and communication strategies for different types of 
stakeholders to better convey its message to specific 
target groups. 
Another factor behind the low-level of public 
participation in “green” initiatives is the insufficient 
provision of adequate incentives. The Carbon 
Points System is a good example of how the 
government has felt short of fully incentivizing 
voluntary participation. Individuals or households 
participating in the system receive monetized 
points commensurate with the amount of savings 
in electricity, water, and gas consumption. The 
monetized points were accumulated in a special 
type of personal credit card, called “Green Card,” 
which were issued by the commercial banks. Despite 
the benefits of gaining extra credit points, what 
was missing in the Green Cards was the customary 
rewards that regular credit cards have to offer (e.g., 
mileage provided upon purchase of specific goods or 
services). In reality, many consumers were already 
holding credit cards that provide incentives that 
outweigh the benefits of Green Cards. As a result, 
the amount of Green Card transactions was low 
in comparison to the number of cards issued. This 
example highlights how incentive schemes need to 
be carefully tailored to market circumstances. In 
addition to making incentives appealing enough to 
bring about behavioral changes, the government 
must focus on ensuring that beneficiaries 
understand why and how their incentives are linked 
to the interests of society as a whole.
Living a green lifestyle is often inconvenient and 
can even have significant cost implications. Given 
how a majority of the Korean population belongs to 
what is dubbed as the “affluent generation” (born 
after the Korean War), behavioral changes have 
become much more difficult to instill in society. 
In this regard, the role of the family and academic 
institutions in incubating the values of green living 
from childhood to adolescence is critical. The ROK’s 
endeavors to strengthen the academic curriculums 
on climate change, environmental sustainability, and 
green growth in public schools have significantly 
contributed to raising public awareness. 
Participatory programs were also successful in 
enabling students to take interest and engage in 
improving the environmental performance of their 
campuses. However, such efforts need to be further 
systemized to achieve lasting outcomes. 
The development of visual aids and other innovative 
teaching materials that are age-appropriate, building 
the capacities of public teachers, allocating budget 
to extracurricular activities related to green lifestyle 
practices, and encouraging colleges and universities 
to offer courses on climate change and green growth 
are some of the ways to accelerate green education. 
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The members of civil society who took part in the 
“Green Start Network” in the ROK are forerunners 
in bringing about the successful transition toward 
green life practices among households. For example, 
capacity building programs that specifically targeted 
the housewives helped raise societal interests on 
“ways to reduce household spending through DIY 
recycling” and “how to prepare environmentally 
friendly and healthy dining at homes.” Based on this 
experience, it is worth noting that the greening of 
lifestyle practices often starts at understanding 
people’s consciousness, and especially how they 
perceive one another. In other words, individuals 
often choose to practice green actions as an 
expression of social ethics and responsibility, thus 
gaining the respect and appreciation of others. 
Developing such sense of social accountability and 
personal sense of fulfillment from being socially 
responsible into a “social trend” is crucial to reach 
a wider audience. Despite its economic success, 
Korea needs to further concentrate on improving 
the society’s level of cultural ethics from a green 
growth standpoint. Acknowledging that leadership 
extends beyond mere entitlements and requires full 
commitment to fulfilling social responsibilities, the 
public figures, opinion leaders, and social media must 
take the initiative of valuing green lifestyle as “cool” 
and “fashionable.” Public sentiment should be stirred 
to the point where absence of engagement in green 
practices is perceived as a breach of social norms and 
customs. 
The fact that the government has not yet formulated 
a comprehensive and balanced set of indicators to 
monitor the performance of green lifestyle practices 
is a significant setback. As presented in the previous 
section, KOSTAT has been releasing indicator figures 
relevant to green lifestyles but such data failed 
to take into account two important targets in the 
Five-Year Plan − greening the education system; and 
fostering of green citizens. Rather, the indicator sets 
have placed emphasis on the level of participation in 
government-led programs and the number of green 
goods and services made available in the market, 
which does not necessarily represent the actual 
amount of GHG emissions reduced or the volume 
of green consumption. To objectively monitor the 
progress of government strategies and plans in 
achieving targets, measurements for evaluating 
impacts should be made available.
5. Takeaways and 
Recommendations
Strategies and policies relevant to the “greening 
of lifestyles” are aimed at transforming people’s 
individual habits. Given the multi-dimensional 
and context-dependent nature of human values 
and behavior, a wide range of programs is needed 
to target different groups from multiple levels of 
society (e.g., individuals, households, communities, 
workplaces, corporations). The ROK’s experience 
illustrates the importance of collective efforts from 
the central and local government authorities, and 
sharing of leadership among all sectors of society. 
However, it is also important to recognize that such 
collaboration was fundamentally supported by 
widespread public awareness on issues relevant to 
climate change and environmental sustainability. 
Thus, decision makers should first focus on 
raising awareness and strengthening advocacy, 
before mainstreaming green living practices into 
government policies and incentives. The process 
requires meaningful engagement at different 
levels of society with a possible focus on bottom-
up approach as it tends to be more organic and 
therefore more effective in mobilizing actions.
A prerequisite for widespread participation in 
government-led programs is the widespread 
recognition and acceptance of the public. Given how 
programs are developed based on the existence 
of a perceived problem or opportunity, the target 
participants’ understanding of the given context 
is extremely important in shaping their actions. As 
such, the lack of understanding is unlikely to lead to 
public participation; for example, the general public 
needs to be fully convinced that the changing climate 
is brought about by human-induced GHG emissions 
in order for mitigation actions to gain public 
momentum. Therefore, significant efforts should 
be made to publicize government-led programs 
prior to implementation. This process should clearly 
articulate the expected societal and individual 
benefits of participation. 
Public authorities often do not wish to wield 
the instruments necessary for transforming life 
practices, primarily because they do not have 
sufficient leverage to effect change within society. 
The importance of government incentives cannot be 
overlooked; they can play a critical role in changing 
238
individual and community practices, just as much 
as how they influence investment decisions in the 
market. The ROK’s experience has demonstrated 
that incentives can be designed either as direct 
incentives (e.g., accumulation of monetized points 
from energy saving) or indirect incentives (e.g., 
tax breaks for cars participating in the “weekly 
car-free days” program). The government must 
commit to allocating the budget necessary to 
administer incentive schemes properly and in a 
sustainable manner, with the respect to abide by the 
initially agreed terms even if the budget decreases 
or the expected outcomes do not immediately 
materialize. While it is true that excessive provision 
of government incentives may lead “green life 
practices” into the trap of populism, well-designed 
incentive schemes can have powerful impacts, even 
under budgetary limitations. 
Under the ROK’s Five-Year Plan for Green Growth, 
the agenda item for promoting a green lifestyle 
was actually articulated (in Korean) as the “green 
revolution of life practices.” The use of the word 
“revolution” implies the call for transformational 
changes in people’s lifestyles, thus challenging the 
conventional unsustainable practices. 
In order to achieve this, the public should be 
equipped with the proper tools to strengthen 
its capacity to effect change. Capacity-building 
programs were thus undertaken at different levels 
throughout the five-year period, which include 
“capacity-building curriculum on low-carbon, green 
growth vision for the general public,” and “academic 
courses on green growth and climate change for 
schools and communities.” Countries may seek to 
replicate ROK’s approach to build public consensus 
and capacities to trigger significant lifestyle changes 
in favor of green growth.
The fundamental dilemma hindering growth 
in developing countries is that the demand 
for economic growth far outweighs that for 
environmental and social sustainability. Since market 
capital and government budget are both limited in 
developing countries, sustainability policies and 
practices are not given sufficient attention during the 
process of resource allocation. The ROK’s concept of 
low-carbon, green growth opens an opportunity to 
bridge the gaps between growth and sustainability. 
In particular, the greening of lifestyle, where changes 
gradually take place over a long period of time, must 
be initiated during the early stages of implementing 
green growth policies. Considering the reality of 
developing countries, which do not have sufficient 
capital for investment, support from the developed 
countries through ODA or international climate fund 
must be provided to the developing countries (Kang 
et al., 2014). In order to achieve this, developing 
countries must show clear determination to adopt 
policies in favor of green lifestyle and must actively 
contribute to furthering international cooperation 
to attract more investment capital. Promoting green 
lifestyle should be part and parcel of any green-
growth programs (in the form of capacity-building 
and/or policy development, etc.) as opposed to a 
stand-alone activity. 
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1.1 Overview
Amid the success in implementing a series of Five-
Year Economic Development Plans that began in 
1962, the ROK achieved astounding annual growth 
rate of 9% until the mid-1990s. However, although 
the nation’s economy quickly bounced back from the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the average GDP growth 
rate plummeted to 3-4% per annum after the mid-
2000s. It was clear that the deceleration of growth 
was no temporary phenomenon, but the inevitable 
outcome of a number of structural economic 
problems. Most importantly, unlike the days of rapid 
economic expansion that were fueled by production 
efficiency generated from production elements – 
abundant skilled labor, cheap energy supplied from 
overseas, and capital secured from active foreign 
investments – the production efficiency of the ROK 
started to lose competitiveness with increasing 
environmental challenges and the rise of new 
developing countries with low-cost sourcing.
To counter the economic slowdown, the ROK’s 
paradigm of low-carbon green growth identified 
“green industries” as the nation’s new engine for 
growth, and sought to move away from growth that 
is primarily dependent on increasing the quantity 
of the factors of production. In other words, green 
industries were to turn the nation’s energy and 
environmental challenges into opportunities for 
business, which is an important feature of the ROK’s 
green growth model. In principle, green industries 
aim to decouple resource-use and pollution from 
industrial development and promote the growth of 
sustainable productive sectors and entrepreneurship 
in developing and transitioning countries (UNIDO, 
2011). 
Specifically, the ROK’s strategies on green industries 
were two-fold: 
(1) greening of the nation’s existing industries; and 
(2) creation of new green industries that provide 
environmental goods and services. 
CHAPTER 6 
GREEN INDUSTRIES
1. Introduction 
Summary
Greening its industries is essential for the ROK, given the obvious limitations of its input-driven economy that is highly 
dependent on exports, and also vulnerable to the tightening of environmental regulations on trade. To tap new growth 
engines amid the current energy and environmental crises, the ROK intended to green the existing industries and 
also create new ones. Specifically, it formulated a blueprint for realizing the “green transformation” of the industrial 
sector focusing on three major targets: green innovation of core industrial sectors; industrial restructuring for low-
carbon development; and greening of the value chain. Given the ROK’s success in pressuring businesses to incorporate 
environmental considerations in business operations, considerable progress has been achieved in greening its major 
industries such as steel, chemical, automobile, and electronics, which consume much energy and emit large amounts 
of GHG. To advance structural reform, the government has selected 17 industries with the highest potential to create 
new markets and generate positive spillover effects. Greening the value chain, on the other hand, requires the fostering 
of green SMEs, promotion of resource circulation in the industrial processes, and the establishment of green industrial 
complexes incubating high-tech industries and innovative public-private partnerships. 
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The first component – greening of industries – aims 
to enhance the environmental performance or 
minimize the production of pollutants during all 
stages of production including design, procurement, 
manufacturing, packaging, and distribution. This can 
be achieved through various measures, including: 
(1) increase in production efficiency through the 
optimal use of resources; 
(2) enforcement of waste management and 
reduction activities; and 
(3) phasing out of toxic substances and avoiding 
creation  of  pollutants  during  the manufacturing 
process and  consumption  stages.
Although greening of industries is increasingly 
being adopted as an important element of corporate 
strategies following the rise of public consciousness 
on environmental sustainability, stimulating the 
necessary investments from the private sector 
remains a challenge. The strengthening of the 
government’s regulatory policies is a key enabler for 
accelerating the greening of industries. 
The second component – creation of green 
industries – involves the development of industries 
that provide goods and services reducing negative 
environmental impacts. Examples of such 
enterprises include those specializing in renewable 
energy, heat recovery, waste management and 
treatment, pollution monitoring and analysis, 
and treatment equipment. Green industries also 
encompass environmental and energy consultants, 
in addition to the providers of integrated solutions; 
for example, Energy Service Companies ESCOS 
that offer design, implementation of energy saving 
projects, energy conservation, energy infrastructure 
outsourcing, power generation, energy supply, and 
risk management (UNIDO, 2011). 
1.2 Baseline Assessment
Root Causes of Challenges
In its early development stage, the ROK’s economic 
strategy was characterized by a top-down approach, 
where the government took the lead in the 
accumulation of capital, management of foreign 
currency, and generation of investments. This 
policy served the manufacturing businesses well, 
particularly the conglomerates, as these companies 
gained a competitive edge in the export market 
by exploiting high price competitiveness and high-
quality labor force. This policy has indeed enabled 
the conglomerates to become the backbone of the 
nation’s economic miracle. During the 1960s and 
1970s, the ROK recorded a significant 40% annual 
average increase in exports. In the 1970s, exports 
contributed to more than 40% of the total economic 
growth. 
Figure 1: The ROK’s two-pronged strategy for the green industry
Greening of Industries Creation of Green Industries
Greening of Industy
Safe 
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Productivity
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Driven by its export-driven growth strategy, the 
ROK’s economy advanced as a manufacturing power, 
with strong industrial capacity not only to produce 
basic materials such as steel and petroleum but also 
value-added products such as electronics and cars. 
After the 1990s, the ROK succeeded in establishing 
global production systems and nurtured more 
industries of world-class standards by boosting R&D 
investments. As of 2013, the contribution of the 
nation’s 10 key industries represented 60.6% of the 
added value, 64.5% of exports, and 46.7% (2012) 
of employment from the entire manufacturing 
sector. The share of the ROK’s manufacturing sector 
in the total GDP as of 2012 was 31.1%, which is 
significantly higher than other OECD countries.     
One major factor behind the ROK’s rapid 
industrialization was the effectiveness of its 
input-driven strategy. However, after the foreign 
exchange crisis in 1997, the nation’s fast-aging 
labor force and low birth rates, reducing corporate 
spending on facility investments, and limited 
competitiveness of small enterprises (as compared 
to large conglomerates) have led input-driven 
growth to reach its limits. Moreover, the nation’s 
technological catch-up strategy – characterized 
by imitating and enhancing the technologies of the 
leading players – was starting to lose its efficacy, as 
the world’s technology-driven markets started to 
evolve around the introduction of new (not similar) 
and innovative products. According to the Korea 
Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), 
the average technology localization rate of the 
ROK’s manufacturing sector was 72.9% in 2012, but 
the rates for the manufacturing industries leading 
the nation’s economy remain much lower than this 
rate; for example, 36.4% for semiconductors, 65.2% 
in telecommunication devices, and 61.5% in display 
systems.     
Heavy reliance on exports and trade is a recognized 
weakness of the ROK’s economy, especially given the 
current volatility of the global business landscape. In 
terms of the contribution of exports to the nation’s 
total GDP as of 2012, the ROK recorded 56.5%, 
which was slightly higher than Germany (51.8%) but 
significantly higher than Japan (14.7%), U.S. (13.5), 
U.K. (31.5%), and France (27.4%). This makes the 
ROK’s economy highly vulnerable to external shocks, 
given the myriad external factors such as oil price 
shocks, global market instability, and the like. For 
example, despite the recent slump in oil prices, the 
sluggish growth of the ROK’s export destinations 
and high fluctuations in the global financial market 
are making it difficult for the economy to exit from 
the low-growth trend. 
Excessive focus on large conglomerates came at the 
expense of the small-scale businesses, which explains 
the heavy dependence of the Korean economy on 
global trade. With its participation in the WTO’s 
Doha Development Agenda, the expansion of free 
trade agreements, and the huge influx of FDI, the 
ROK has embraced globalization rapidly. As of 2013, 
the ROK’s exports and imports ranked seventh 
(3.0%) and ninth (2.7%), respectively. While this 
implies opportunities for employment and revenue 
generation, excessive trade dependence can cause 
serious problems at times of sharp downturns in 
the global economy – indicating how the strategy 
of bolstering growth through exports has reached 
its limits. The need for building up the nation’s 
service industry as a way to ensure the domestic 
industry must now play a greater role in promoting 
sustainable growth. In 2009, the ROK’s reliance on 
trade was 92.3%, which is significantly higher than 
the U.S., Japan, and U.K.
• China’s economic rise has significant 
implications for the ROK’s export-oriented 
economy, as its manufacturing sector not only 
competes with the ROK in light industry (i.e., 
textiles), but also in technology-intensive fields 
such as IT, machinery, and aviation. While the 
share of ROK’s exports in the world market 
increased marginally from 2.3% in 1994 to 3% 
in 2013, China’s share rose sharply from 2.9% to 
11.7% during the same period.   
• A significant portion of the ROK’s imports – 33% 
as of 2014 – are fuel and raw materials such 
as crude oil, natural gas, coal, and iron ore, the 
prices of which are heavily affected by global 
demand. In 2013, the ROK imported 915.1 
million barrels of crude oil, equivalent to US$ 
99.3 billion (19.2% of the nation’s total import 
volume); if global oil prices increase by US$ 1 per 
barrel, the increase in the ROK’s spending on 
crude oil imports rise by US$ 900 million.
• For the ROK, which has been struggling to 
break away from lackluster growth, the need 
to reduce GHG emissions represents a heavy 
burden. However, in the context of international 
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climate negotiations, the ROK cannot avoid 
the responsibility given its economic size and 
emission rates. In terms of GDP, ROK is the 
14th largest in the world in 2013 and it ranked 
seventh globally in terms of CO2 emission rates. 
The country’s emission rate increase is actually 
the fastest in the OECD. 
Relevant Problems
The sluggish growth of the domestic market and 
investment has been identified as a key challenge 
to the ROK’s sustained industrial development 
(and thus fostering of green industries). Unlike 
how the contribution of domestic consumption 
and investment to GDP growth was above 100% 
during the 1980s-1990s, it showed a significant fall 
to around half of that value by the 2000s. Falling 
contribution from the private sector spending and 
corporate spending on facility investments were 
the most notable; contribution from private sector 
spending decreased from an average of 56.4% during 
the 1990s to 33.3% during the 2000s (2000-2005), 
while the contribution from facility investments 
fell by more than half from 14.6% to 6.9% over 
the same period. In contrast, the contribution of 
imports and exports during the 2000s rose by 2.3 
times and 1.4 times, respectively, compared to the 
1990s. This trend is attributable to the nature of the 
government’s structural reforms, which significantly 
promoted exports while overlooking domestic 
consumption and investment.
The continuation of government policies to keep 
energy prices low has been a critical factor shaping 
the nation’s industrial development, which led to 
the rise of energy-intensive industries, especially 
manufacturing. In terms of energy intensity, or the 
total primary energy supply divided by GDP, the ROK 
still shows a decreasing trajectory despite continued 
growth in GDP, indicating how there is much to make 
up for the nation’s industry to transform from being 
input-driven to productivity-driven. Understanding 
how the economic structure is difficult to change 
1995
2012
Source: UNSTATS, 2014
Figure 2: Technology trade balance of the ROK compared to the global leaders (as of 2007)
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Demography
The growth rate of working-age population was 2.3% in the 1980s, but this rate has since shown a rapid decline, falling to 
1.1% in the late 1990s and 0.5% from the early 2000s.
Investment in 
Manufacturing
The average annual growth rate of corporate spending on facility investments was 24.8% during the 1970s; after falling to 
8% in the 1980s, negative rates of growth were seen in the late 2000s and mid-2010s.
Productivity
The productivity of the service industry as compared to the manufacturing industry was 96.3% in 1995, but this figure fell 
significantly to 46.6% in 2013. Especially, the productivity of small businesses as compared to large conglomerates was only 
34.1% in 2001 and 30.3% in 2013.  
Table 1: Indications of how input-driven growth has reached its limits in the ROK
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in the short term, the government’s low energy 
pricing is hampering the effectiveness of its 
industrial policies promoting structural reform 
that encourages key industrial players to pursue 
efficiency innovation and engage in manufacturing 
high value-added products. 
During 1998-2007, which was the decade following 
the Asian Financial Crisis, the ROK’s economy was 
able to accomplish a trade surplus due to its growing 
volume of exports. Although the nation’s recovery 
from a severe liquidity crisis (and bailout by the 
IMF) was encouraged by the growth of technology-
intensive industries, the ROK still lags behind most 
of the OECD countries in terms of technology trade 
balance,1 which is a determinant of technological 
competitiveness. As of 2007, the ROK’s technology 
trade balance was 0.43, which is approximately 12% 
of the top-ranked country, Japan. Technology trade 
balance specific to the areas of energy resource and 
environment is even lower at 0.15, demonstrating 
how the ROK’s industrial sector has neglected 
1 |Technology trade balance is equivalent to the volume of technology export divided by that for technology imports
Figure 3: Growth rates of gross fixed capital formation in the ROK (1971-2013)
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Table 2: Contributions of domestic spending and trade to GDP growth
Unit: %
Category 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s (2000-2005)
Domestic Spending 109.8 101.1 106.1 65.4
- Total consumption 71.6 65.4 67.1 44.3
- Gross fixed capital 
formation
38.2 35.7 39.1 21.1
Net Exports -5.1 -3.0 -4.3 33.5
- Exports 21.4 20.9 45.7 105.2
- Imports 26.5 23.9 50.0 71.7
Others -4.7 1.9 -1.8 1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: KCCI, 2007
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to account for efficiency and environmental 
considerations during its pursuit of quantity-
oriented growth. Despite intensive government 
efforts to strengthen environmental regulations, the 
low technological capacity of companies remains a 
huge obstacle in greening the industrial sector.
Policy Options
Acknowledging the pressing need for developing 
green industries, the government packaged its 
strategies into “green innovation” and “green 
restructuring.” Green innovation reduces 
environmental impacts: by increasing energy 
efficiency, reducing waste or GHG emissions, and/or 
minimizing the consumption of nonrenewable raw 
materials (OECD, 2013). The government placed 
an emphasis on ensuring that green innovation 
takes place in a balanced manner across all key 
industries, and customizing innovation strategies for 
different industrial sectors according to their specific 
structural and market conditions. For example, the 
strengthening of the EU’s CO2 emission regulations 
resulting from climate change indicates the need 
for the region’s automobile industry to direct its 
efforts toward the emerging green vehicle market. In 
response, the government has to raise the standard 
for auto fuel efficiency and GHG emissions. On the 
other hand, steel industries that are highly energy-
intensive were to prioritize boosting the efficiency 
of production process over developing new market 
products. 
“Green restructuring” envisions turning the nation’s 
resource- and energy-intensive economy into 
a low-carbon and knowledge-based economy. 
Figure 4: Technology trade balance of the ROK compared to the global leaders (as of 2007)
Source: Bank of Korea, 2009
Italy
0.43
3.49
2.12
1.97
1.76
1.6
1.28 1.24
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0.08
Table 3: Share of energy consumed by energy-intensive industries in nation’s total consumption (2012)
Source: IEA/OECD, 2014
ROK Japan U.S. Germany France U.K.
Iron & Steel 6.6 6.6 1.2 3.9 2.3 1.0
Chemical & Petrochemical 5.2 4.9 3.7 6.5 4.1 2.9
Non-metallic Minerals 3.3 2.5 1.3 2.5 2.6 2.1
Total 15.1 14.0 6.2 13.2 9.0 6.0
Unit: %
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Figure 6: SWOT analysis and strategic directions for the green industry agenda
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Figure 5: Green industrial development strategy of the ROK 
Source: MKE, 2008
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Understanding how the nation’s development 
constraint lies in manufacturing-oriented growth, 
the government targeted increasing the share of its 
service industries, such as emission trading service 
and energy management consulting. 
1.3 Opportunities and Challenges for Green Growth
Greening of  industry  presents  vast  opportunities  
for  economic  growth.  The  first  component  of  the 
ROK’s green industry agenda –“greening of existing 
industries”– brings about environmental effects 
of  reduction  in  atmospheric  pollutants  and  GHG  
emissions  by  enhancing  resource  and  energy 
efficiency, and  the  economic  effects  of  reduction  
in  energy  costs  and  reducing  energy  dependency 
from overseas. The second component –“creation 
of new green industries”– is expected to promote 
economic growth by accelerating the development 
of the green market through green technology.   
The strengths of the ROK’ key industries – 
specifically IT, shipbuilding, and car manufacturing 
– include high global competitiveness, high-quality 
human resources, and practical technological 
advantages. However, its weaknesses mainly include 
the excessive reliance on imported resources, 
persistence of its highly energy-intensive industrial 
structure, and low levels of technology of the green 
industry. In this light, the Five-Year Plan for Green 
Growth set forward the following key tasks: 
(1) establishing an economic/industrial structure 
that promotes resource circulation; 
(2) greening the industrial sector and boosting 
innovation; 
(3) undertaking green small business ventures; and 
(4) building knowledge-based green clusters. 
2. Targets and Strategies
2.1 Green Transformation of the Industrial Sector
The Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy or 
MOTIE (formerly the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy or MKE) was at the forefront promoting 
green growth in the industrial sector, which is the 
driving force of the behind ROK’s economy. In setting 
the direction for nation’s low-carbon green growth 
vision back in 2008, the Ministry acknowledged 
that the ROK is still on its course to fully achieve the 
status of a high-income country, thus it should strive 
to strike a balance between sustained economic 
growth and sustainable consumption. Based on the 
premise that environmental protection can only be 
achieved when driven by strong economic growth, 
MOTIE formulated strategies that ensured a degree 
of flexibility in greening its industries.  
The Knowledge and Innovation-driven Green 
Growth Industrial Development Plan, published by 
the MKE in December 2008, served as a blueprint 
for executing the “green transformation” of the 
industrial sector. The knowledge and innovation-
Tasks Actions
1. Establishment of a  
     resource-circulating 
     industrial structure
a. Establish a resource circulation management system
b. Promote resource circulation and strengthen its foundation
c. Invigorate foster resource circulation industry
2. Green transformation 
      of industries and 
      expansion of 
      innovation activities
a. Green innovation in key industries and expansion of new growth engines
b. Green the value chain, including product distribution, marketing, and service
c. Green construction industries and create environmentally friendly agricultural industry
d. Facilitate the entrance of domestic green industries into the overseas market and increase in exports
3. Fostering of green 
     SMEs and venture 
     companies
a. Enhance response capabilities of small enterprises toward climate change
b. Strengthen the small businesses’ “greening” capabilities
4. Establishment of  
     knowledge-based 
     green clusters
a. Create knowledge-based green clusters
b. Green the industrial complexes
Table 4: Specific tasks and actions under the green industry agenda
Source: PCGG, 2009b
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driven paradigm promoted by this plan differs from 
the factor-intensive, catch-up oriented industrial 
development based on price competitiveness that 
was unquestionably pursued in the past. In seeking 
to create markets of high-value businesses through 
convergence of new technologies and existing 
industries, the paradigm recognized knowledge 
and innovation as production factors that are more 
decisive than tangible assets like labor and capital. 
Specifically, plans to realize “green transformation” 
presented three targets: 
(1) green innovation of core industrial sectors (Green 
Innovation); 
(2) industrial restructuring for a low-carbon 
development (Green Restructuring); and 
(3) green transformation of the value chain (Green 
Value Chain). 
Green Innovation
The “Green Innovation” agenda targets greening of 
the industrial sector through the active adoption 
of innovative technologies. The agenda places an 
emphasis on the nation’s major industries that 
already have the competitive edge but need to 
enhance environmental performance to keep pace 
with the changing market standards; such efforts 
were anticipated to have spill-over effects across the 
other industrial sectors. The ROK’s major industries 
include the nine sectors, namely iron and steel, 
petrochemicals, textile, automobile, shipbuilding, 
machinery, semiconductor, display, and home 
appliances.
a) Iron and Steel
The steel industry of ROK experiences difficulties 
due to the downfall in market demand and increase 
in Chinese imports, along with strengthening of 
international regulatory standards related to energy 
and environment. As a response, the steel industry 
set a vision to become globally competitive by 
enhancing its energy efficiency to meet the highest 
of standards. Specifically, it was to actively adopt 
technologies for decreasing energy consumption 
and reusing waste heat, along with developing steel 
goods that can help cut down on energy use (i.e., 
light-weight steel for automobiles).
b) Chemical and Petrochemicals
The ROK’s petrochemical industry has shown a 
dynamic growth, thanks to sufficient production 
capacity guaranteed by steady investment in 
production facilities and continued technological 
advancements. However, the industry is strained 
between the oversupply of goods from the 
developing countries and enforcement of strict 
environmental regulations led by developed 
counties. To overcome the situation, the concept of 
industrial combines (Russian, Комбинат) was adopted; 
industrial combines refer to a large industrial 
zone that accommodates different enterprises 
that are related to each other by technological or 
administrative process to enhance the productivity 
of manufacturing industry. Relevant actions include 
recycling industrial by-products, and optimization of 
resource and energy use (e.g., substitution of high-
cost raw materials, production of high value-added 
products).
c) Automobiles
The automobile industry of ROK has stood out in 
the global market, consolidating its competitive 
advantage through continuous technological 
development. The global automobile market, 
however, is having many active players having 
the key technology for low-pollution automobiles 
(green car), and second movers like China and India 
are catching up fast with low-cost vehicles. Thus, 
industry-wide effort and governmental support are 
necessary in order to acquire key source technology 
for green car in advance, a leader in the next 
generation market for automobiles. Accordingly, the 
government established a vision of being one of the 
top four major players in the automobile industry, 
and set out a plan to: 
(1) develop and mass produce of clean energy 
vehicles (i.e., green cars); 
(2) foster automobile parts suppliers for green cars; 
and 
(3) provide incentives for vitalizing the domestic 
prevalence of green cars.
d) Shipbuilding
The shipbuilding industry of the ROK still remains 
the top player in the global market, but is facing 
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new challenges such as the decreasing demand 
for new vessels from global recession and rise of 
second movers like China that are increasing market 
shares based on low-price competitiveness. The 
ROK planned to overcome this crisis by developing 
and adopting green shipbuilding technologies. 
Relevant technologies include fuel-efficient hull 
design, environmentally friendly propulsion system, 
and optimized navigation control using remote 
supervision and control.
e) Machinery 
Along with manufacturing, the machinery industry 
does not consume energy much in itself. However, 
the tools and construction equipment produced by 
this industry are intensively utilized by the export-
oriented industries of the ROK, and emit a large 
volume of GHG. The machinery industry inevitably 
faces a great deal of environmental regulations; 
developed countries, which possess the competitive 
edge in the market, are leading the regulatory 
dialogue and so high environmental standard on 
machinery goods are serving as a new trade barrier 
to domestic players. The government’s vision (aptly 
put as “another leap forward for the machinery 
industry with green technology”), is composed of the 
following strategies: 
(1) securing environmentally friendly source 
technology (i.e., clean diesel engines); 
(2) promoting green management and creating high-
value added products; and 
(3) creating market demand for green products. 
f) Semiconductor 
The ROK is currently the third producer of 
semiconductor in the world, and as of 2013, the 
semiconductor industry accounts for 2.2% of the 
national GDP and 10.2% of total export. In the global 
semiconductor industry, the goal of technological 
innovation is shifting from productivity improvement 
to cutting down on energy use and promoting 
environmentally friendly process. This means that 
securing technology on reducing GHG and toxic 
substances, which are generated in large amounts in 
the semiconductor manufacturing process, is crucial 
to sustain the growth of the industry. Accordingly, in 
line with the ROK’s vision of becoming the second 
largest producer of semi-conductors in the global 
market by 2020, it set up a strategy to respond 
actively to stronger environmental regulations 
and develop semiconductors that minimize power 
consumption (e.g., automotive semiconductor 
products that help reduce fuel consumption). Also, 
it sought to strengthen the production of solar cells 
that efficiently utilize the existing semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment and technological 
development of optical semiconductors (LED).
g) Display
Through bold investment and government support, 
the display industry of the ROK has soared to 
number one in the global market. However, the 
reinforcement of regulations by developed countries 
and climate change conventions have continuously 
intensified the case for the need to reduce GHG 
emissions and the development of environmentally 
friendly, low-cost products. In this light, the ROK 
formulated a vision of maintaining the number one 
position in the world display market by increasing 
energy efficiency of existing product lines, utilizing 
efficient process development, and paving the 
market for convergence display such as solar window 
and wall-to-wall display system.
h) Textile
The ROK’s textile industry possesses a uniformly 
developed manufacturing technology and balanced 
production base from upstream to downstream, 
including thread, fabric, dye processing, and 
clothing. The Korean textile industry, ranking eighth 
worldwide, accounts for 7.9% of the number of 
employees in the manufacturing sector. Similar to 
other industries, it also imports one-third of its raw 
materials from abroad, manufactures finished goods, 
and exports two-thirds of the completed products. 
The government set plans focused on greening the 
manufacturing process as well as technological 
development on environmentally friendly fiber (e.g., 
recycled fiber or non-petroleum fiber) and ultralight 
fiber (i.e., to be utilized in automobiles or airplanes).
i) Home Appliances 
The home appliance industry of the ROK is leading 
the global market with its excellent production 
technology and state-of-the-art IT infrastructure. 
The current challenge is to keep up with the 
tightening demand of regulations on consumption of 
service power and standby power, while providing 
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an incentive to purchase highly energy-efficient 
products, thus creating a steady need for incessant 
technological innovation. The government made 
an attempt to support the home appliance industry 
in maintaining its lead in the global market by 
actively supporting technological development 
through legal and institutional reforms that 
promote the production and consumption of highly 
energy-efficient products. In addition, it promoted 
environmentally friendly management practices 
throughout the home appliance industry, thereby 
enhancing the environmental competitiveness 
of enterprises and providing an opportunity for 
creating new business activities.
Green Restructuring
Manufacturing and energy-consuming industries 
take up a large part of the ROK’s industries, thus 
requiring high carbon emission reduction costs 
compared to developed countries. The major 
drawback for the ROK is the heavy dependence 
of its economy on manufacturing to boost its 
exports. The innovations that have been fueling the 
Korean economy has been largely concentrated on 
manufacturing, and the added value of service sector 
also stems from manufacturing.
Considering the fact that the ROK’s industrial 
structure is too much oriented toward 
manufacturing imported raw materials and exporting 
processed goods, fundamental restructuring of 
industries is necessary to cut down on energy 
consumption and carbon emissions. In this regard, 
the Knowledge and Innovation-driven Green Growth 
Industrial Development Plan (2009) highlighted 
“green restructuring” as its second target, which 
entails promoting new service industries with lower 
resource consumption per added value, and service 
industries that facilitate the green transformation 
process of manufacturing industries (i.e., energy-use 
consulting and chemical management services).
The New Growth Power Vision and Development 
Strategy announced in January 2009 through joint 
efforts of all line ministries of the government 
specified the plans toward green restructuring. 
Following the principles of selection and 
concentration, the strategy intended to identify and 
narrow down the new industries and business areas 
crucial to the green restructuring process, based on 
three factors: 
(1) marketability; 
(2) spillover effect; and 
(3) relation to green growth. 
Such cross-ministerial shortlist of industries and 
businesses has been created through careful 
consultation with the private sector and working 
committees (e.g., New Growth Power taskforce 
under the Prime Minister’s Office, National Science 
and Technology Council). As presented in the 
following tables, the ROK selected 17 industries, 
which are divided into green technology industries, 
high-tech convergence industries, and high-value 
service industries. Green technology industries 
have great capacity to help address climate change 
and energy crisis, thus could serve as a foundation 
for future growth. On the other hand, high-tech 
convergence industries cover new areas that 
fuse sectors – in which the ROK already has the 
technological edge – with the large global markets. 
Lastly, high-value service industries have the 
potential to create new jobs and achieve high growth 
rates.
To support the 17 industries, the government 
pursued the following supply-side interventions: 
(1) enhance regulations to facilitate investment; 
(2) support the creation of new markets to increase 
demand of the public sector; and 
(3) standardize technology and provide incentives 
such as certification programs. 
For instance, tax relief was to be offered for 
expansion of green cars (high-tech green transport 
system), mandatory replacement of LED lighting of 
public institutions (LED industry), and arrangement 
of technological standardization for equipment (new 
and renewable energy). Meanwhile, support in the 
demand-side focused on expanding government 
R&D investment and human resource training for 
industrial growth (e.g., establishment of professional 
graduate curriculum and expert training programs). 
Additionally, the New Growth Power Vision and 
Development Strategy (2009) grouped the 17 
industries into short-term (3-5 years), mid-term (5-8 
years), and long-term (around 10 years), providing 
differentiated strategies for each categories.
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Table 6: Selection of six high-tech convergence industries and main strategies
Source: New Growth Power Vision and Development Strategy, 2009
New Growth Engine
(Main outputs)
Main strategies Category
1. Broadcasting convergence  
     industry (IPTV services,    
     next generation wireless 
     communication)
• Enhancement of regulatory systems such as the reform of broadcasting 
communications regulations
• Establishment of infrastructure for fostering broadcasting communications 
• Development of next generation IPTV technology and IPTV public service standard 
models
short-term
2. IT Convergence system
     (intelligent automobiles,
     flexible display)
• IT Convergence application and development of source technology in automobiles 
and shipbuilding
• Development of RFID/USN core technology
short-term
3. Robot application
     (fire protection robots)
• Development of core technology for intelligent robots
• Fostering robot competitions with worldwide authority 
• Creation of demand for robots through space like robot lands
long-term
4. New materials: Nano- 
     convergence (materials 
     to reduce weight     
     of hybrid cars)
• Development of core technology on nano-convergence materials 
• Promotion of technological development projects through international 
cooperations
long-term
5. Biomedicine: 
     medical devices
     (Stem cell medicine)
• Development of biomedicine like DNA or cell medicine
• Development of bio-diagnosis system and medical imaging/bio-diagnostic devices
• Expansion of insurance fee on newly developed medical devices and the subjects of 
elderly care insurances
long-term
6. High value-added food  
      industry (natural food      
      additives)
• Globalization of Korean food (extension of PR and R&D)
• Fostering of traditional fermented food industries (e.g., Kimchi Research 
Laboratory) 
mid-term
New Growth Engine
(Main outputs)
Main strategies Category
1. New and renewable energy 
     (thin film solar cells, fuel cell 
     generation system)
• Technological development for thin film solar cells, bio energy, tidal energy, second-
generation hydro fuel cells
• Promotion of Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS)
short-term / mid-term 
/ long-term
2. Carbon reduction energy 
     (next generation nuclear     
     plants)
• Development of advanced pressurized reactors (APR+)
• Development of core production process for CO2 collection and utilization
mid-term/ long-term 
3. High-degree water 
     treatment
     (treatment plants)
• Technological development for water treatment (seawater desalination, membrane 
filtration system)
• Projects on unified operations of local water services, expansion of reuse of treated 
wastewater
mid-term
4. LED application
     (LED lighting)
• Development of LED core technology
• Trial use of efficient LED lighting in public institutions (public buildings, road and 
traffic facilities)
mid-term
5. Green transport system
     (green car, World-leading, 
     Intelligent, Safe, 
     Environment-friendly or    
     WISE ships)
• Development of hybrid car core technology
• Technological development for offshore plant, ships for frozen waters, and high 
value-added ships
• Reduction of environmental charges for clean diesel, tax relief for expansion of 
green cars
short-term
6. High-tech green cities
     (Ubiquitous Eco-Cities)
• U-Eco City trial projects
• Creation of the National Spatial Information Act
• Reform of regulations for Intelligence Transportation System (ITS)
• Preparation of construction regulations for low-energy, environment-friendly 
apartments
long-term
Table 5: Selection of six green technology industries and main strategies 
Source: New Growth Power Vision and Development Strategy, 2009
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Green Value Chain
The retail sector, the middle ground between 
production and consumption, is the main non-
industrial sector with the significant potential for 
GHG reduction. Since it can play a significant role 
in promoting the production and consumption of 
green products, it can help pursue green growth in a 
number of ways. 
The influence of retail on manufacturing is especially 
growing, a good example of which is the SSM (Super 
Supermarket) stores establishing private brands and 
dominating the product planning and development 
process. In this regard, the government put greening 
the value chain as the third task of the Knowledge 
and Innovation-driven Green Growth Industrial 
Development Plan, targeting the greening of the 
entire process of the value chain from production, 
distribution, marketing, and retail services. 
Promotional 
Strategy
Main implementation measures
Greening of retail sector
• Conduct of a status quo survey on GHG emission in the retail sector for the establishment of GHG inventory
• Trial projects on GHG reductions for SSM stores 
• Subsidies for projects in which retail businesses cooperate with manufacturing or distributing businesses to 
reduce GHG 
Efficient distribution
• Government support to establish a co-distribution center for small and medium retailers
• Standardization of and efficiency improvements in packaging, transport, storage, and loading through 
regulation of Logistics Management System
• Establishment of Point of Sale (POS) data service system, which enables retailers and manufacturers to acquire 
accurate information on sales and consumption trends, thereby leading to cost savings for marketing and 
improved sales
Efficient reverse logistics
• Utilization of retail as a reverse logistics hub (e.g., installing recycling collection box in SSM store parking lots)
• Government support toward the use of radio-frequency identification (RFID) tagging system to improve the 
efficiency of handling retail returns
• Establishment of an online channel for returned products
Table 8: Strategies for promoting and implementing the Green Value Chain
Source: New Growth Power Vision and Development Strategy, 2009
Table 7: Selection of five high-value service industries and main strategies
New Growth Engine
(Main outputs)
Main strategies Category
1. Global Healthcare
     (attracting foreign patients)
• Reform of medical law (e.g., allowing brokering for foreign patients)
• Adoption of a national certification system for medical institutions
• Arrangement of a dispute resolution system for foreign patients
short-term
2. Global education services
     (attracting foreign students)
• Expansion of governmental support for promoting Korean education programs 
abroad 
• Improvement of system and expansion of support for attracting foreign students
short-term
3. Green Banking
     (CER Exchange)
• Support to the establishment of the CER Exchange 
• Development of green stock price index and listing of green funds
• Development of stock markets for green stocks (Green Industry League)
long-term
4. Contents: Software
     (Game contents)
• Reform of regulations on the promotion of cultural industry
• Improvement of irrational practices in the software business (e.g., expanding the 
use of intellectual property rights)
long-term
5. MICE tourism (Meetings,       
     Incentives,     
     Conferences, and 
     Exhibitions) (Ecotourism)
• Establishment of infrastructure for MICE industry
• Global promotion of domestic performances in festivals 
• Expansion of domestic tourism infrastructure such as information centers or 
related personnel
long-term
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2.2 Development of Green Venture SMEs2
In promoting green industries as a national growth 
engine, the role of SMEs is critical as the nation’s 
major industries are heavily dependent on SMEs 
that produce components and parts along the 
supply chain. Without a competitive SMEs, the 
large manufacturing companies of the nation are 
likely to degenerate into those that simply assemble 
imported parts. This calls for increased government 
support to foster green SMEs,3 which can also 
help create green jobs and advance technology 
commercialization. Note that green SMEs of 
the ROK were found to have greater interest in 
undertaking R&D activities than general SMEs; 
during the period of 2005-2007, 22.0% of green 
SMEs made spending on R&D, while the portion was 
only 9.4% for general SMEs. Moreover, the number 
of job creations per unit production (one billion 
KRW) was found to be 9.2 for general SMEs and 
12.9-13.3 for green SMEs, according to the Small and 
Medium Business Administration (SMBA, 2010).
Green SMEs in the ROK face considerable 
challenges. First, they mostly belong to equipment 
installation, which has low added value while those 
SMEs manufacturing core materials and components 
are very few. As they lag behind in technology 
compared to developed countries and are less 
competitive in price than China, these businesses 
find it hard to penetrate the manufacturing market. 
Secondly, green SMEs face hardships in financing 
their activities, as loans from banks are not easily 
accessible. Banking institutions lack standards 
and selective capacity for “green businesses” and 
differentiated financial instruments have not been 
developed properly. Thirdly, the green SMEs find it 
difficult to fill the demand for manpower brought by 
market expansion due to insufficient human resource 
training and intensification of manpower outflow 
to large enterprises. Lastly, the limited domestic 
market and lack of robust information management 
or marketing capacity for overseas expansion further 
obstruct the growth of these businesses.
2 | SMEs make up 99% of business establishments and take up more than 85% of total employment in the ROK. The criteria for defining SMEs in the ROK vary 
according to sector; for the manufacturing sector, those with number of workers fewer than 300 and capital worth 8 billion KRW (approximately US$ 7 
million) or less are considered to be SMEs.
3 | Green SMEs are those enterprises that continue to strive to improve energy efficiency, reduce GHG emissions, and minimize environmental impacts in the 
process of manufacturing goods and services, and/or practicing green management.
Table 9: Operational characteristics of public buses in Seoul
New Growth Engine
(Main outputs)
Main strategies Category
1. Promotion of green 
     venture firms
• Utilization of university and government research labs as base for green ventures
• Expansion of investment on green ventures (e.g., venture funds, venture investment road 
shows) and dissemination of success stories
short-term
2. Green banking and   
      strengthening of human 
      resources
• Expansion of governmental support for promoting Korean education programs abroad 
• Improvement of system and expansion of support for attracting foreign students
short-term
3. Enhancement of green 
      technology
• Selection of promising green technology areas for SMEs, and concentration of R&D on 
these areas
• R&D and commercialization of green technologies
long-term
4. Expansion to overseas 
      green market
• Sharing of information on overseas markets and establishment of support center for green 
SMEs
• Operation of support programs for overseas project orders to green SMEs (e.g., grants for 
pre-feasibility studies) 
long-term
5. Expansion of green  
     management practices in 
     SMEs
• Selection of Green-biz and provision of various incentives (e.g., tax support, prioritized 
evaluation in the case of patent applications)
• Establishment of Consulting and Green Supply Chain Management System for green 
management 
• Support of R&D activity and facility retrofit for the expansion of “Green Factory” with 
an enhanced manufacturing process considering environmental pollution and energy 
consumption 
long-term
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To overcome these problems and increase the 
contribution of green SMEs to green growth, the 
SBMA formulated the Support Plan for the Creation 
and Growth of Green SMEs in 2010. This plan set 
out a target of fostering 1,000 green SMEs that 
use core green technology, and 2,000 “Green-Biz” 
that practice green management. For this task, five 
strategies outlined in Table 9 were set along with 
various plans to fulfill these goals.
2.3 Building an Industrial Structure based on 
Resource Circulation
As energy and resource use issues remain crucial 
in deciding the future of the economy, developed 
countries are actively promoting resource 
circulation policies as part of both economic 
strategy and climate change response. The rise of 
the resource circulation industry – characterized by 
collecting, recycling, and processing waste materials 
– is a fast emerging trend, with the aim to prevent 
the depletion of raw materials and reduce the 
environmental overload from waste by minimizing 
waste resources. 
In line with this objective, the ROK has prepared 
strategies and measures to promote sustainable 
resource circulation. The ROK’s waste management 
policy has evolved through the decades to respond 
to the needs of time – from safe processing in the 
1980s, expansion of recycling in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, and to resource circulation from the 
mid-2000s. It has achieved considerable success in 
slowing down waste production and increasing the 
recycling rate due to the consistent promotion of 
the Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, and Recover (4R) policy 
and expansion of waste management infrastructure 
(refer to Chapter 5 for further information on the 
ROK’s waste management practices). However, 
qualitative progress specifically on maximizing the 
added value of waste materials through resource 
circulation is still insufficient, and thus offers rooms 
for improvement. In other words, the government 
should further promote upcycling by enhancing the 
quality and increasing the added value of recycled 
and recovered materials and products, or collecting 
and recycling the rare metal from home appliances.
The implementation plan for the “foundation of 
resource circulating economy/industrial system,” 
a task set out in the green industry agenda of the 
Five-Year Plan, was presented as the First Basic 
Plan for Material Cycles (2011-2015). This plan – 
formulated under the cooperation of Ministry of 
Environment, Ministry of Public Administration and 
Security, Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, Ministry of Knowledge Economy, and 
Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs 
– has integrated the separate resource circulation 
plans of each institution, establishing itself as a 
government-wide resource circulation guideline. The 
Basic Plan earned its status as an official plan as the 
article on its revision every five years was inserted 
into the existing regulation (Enforcement Decree of 
the Act on the Promotion of Saving and Recycling of 
Resources).
The Basic Plan has set “Low-carbon, Zero-Waste 
Society” as its vision, with a goal of resource 
circulation rate of 20.3%, and a reduction of landfill 
by 26% by the year 2015, compared to 2009. 
To realize these goals, various implementation 
measures have been proposed under five strategies, 
as outlined in Table 10. The government expects that 
if the Basic Plan is fulfilled, about 5.3 million tCO2 
will be reduced by using landfill gas, and about 37.7 
million tCO2  will be avoided through the production 
of new and renewable energy (energization of 
waste resources). Furthermore, the economic value 
from the reduction of waste materials, increase 
in recycled goods, and production of new and 
renewable energy will amount to approximately 9.4 
trillion KRW, with an effect of creating 11,528 jobs 
related to waste recycling.
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Strategies Tasks Representative Action Plans
1. Switching to a 
     material recycling 
     social structure 
Establishment of foundation 
for resource circulation 
• Development of a national indicator set for setting of targets and monitoring 
performance of material cycles
• Improvement of regulations for the promotion of resource circulation 
Strengthening of material 
cycle performance of 
development projects
• Development of a material cycle guideline to be used throughout the entire cycle of 
development projects (i.e., project preparation, design, construction, operation)
Expansion of resource 
circulation for all processes 
of products
• Strengthening of regulations on packaging materials and methods
• Arrangement of specific methods and standards for recycling discarded products; 
stronger penalty when not implemented 
Facilitation of green 
production and consumption 
trends
• Preparation of stakeholder participatory program to reduce waste materials and 
facilitate sharing of second-hand products
• Creation of low-carbon, energy self-sufficient green villages
2. Realizing waste       
     upcycling
Minimization of disposal of 
useful resources
• Reduction of direct landfilling of municipal waste to zero by 2020
• Strengthening of regulatory requirements for landfilling of industrial waste to 
increase material cycle
Establishment of a national 
waste cycle network 
• Establishment of a national resource circulation information network to control the 
waste cycle
• Creation of regional resource circulation cooperation network that supports 
industrial resource circulation (e.g., information sharing, consulting)
Promotion of reuse of 
resources
• Provision of second-hand furniture and home appliances to low-income families
Strengthening of Extended 
Producer Responsibility 
(EPR)
• Expansion of products for which enterprises must collect discarded products to recycle
• Strengthening of the regulations on the use of recycled aggregates in construction 
activities
• Reinforcement of quality standards for recycled products
Expansion of use of waste 
resources as energy source
• Expansion of refuse-derived fuel (RDF) production facilities, livestock excretions 
energization facilities, and biogas facilities
3. Creation of unified 
      waste processing   
      infrastructure
Optimization of waste 
processing 
• Optimization plan for collection transport, and processing of waste materials (e.g., 
allowing treatment of waste across administrative borders to improve efficiency)
• Promotion of public-private investment and operation of waste treatment facilities
Reinforcement of toxic 
substance management
• Reinforcement of management of toxic waste from daily life (e.g., discarded 
medicine and fluorescent lighting) and agricultural waste (e.g., discarded vinyl and 
agricultural chemical containers)
• Strengthening of the management of imported and exported toxic substances
4. Promotion of 
     resource 
     circulation industry 
     and technological 
     development
Development of high value-
added resource circulation 
technology
• Expansion of R&D for high value-added recycling technology such as collecting rare 
metals
• Conduct of periodic technical forums on waste energy recovery to help knowledge 
dissemination and promote related investments
Strategic promotion of 
resource circulation industry 
and foundation of overseas 
expansion
• Government support for enhancing the position of the recycling industry 
• Awarding of government grants to private firms to conduct feasibility studies for 
overseas projects on waste reuse and recovery
Table 10: Strategies, tasks, and action plans for realizing a zero-waste society
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2.4 Establishment of Green Industrial Complex and 
Clusters
The ROK’s industrial complex has served a pivotal 
role in the nation’s economic growth. According to 
the Industrial Complex Corporation (KICOX), each 
period saw different outcomes throughout the 50-
year history of the nation’s industrial complex, which 
is a result of the changing government policy in line 
with the national industrial structure (Park, 2014a). 
The shift in policy paradigm can be summarized as 
follows:
• 1960s: Creation of light industry export 
industrial complex in regions where cheap labor 
is abundant
• 1970s: Building of large scale coastal industrial 
complex to back up the government policy of  
shifting from labor-intensive light industry to 
heavy chemical industry
• 1980s: Creation of local industrial complex 
and agricultural industrial complex in line with 
the government policy of balanced regional 
development
• 1990s: Pursuit of multiple complex with various 
services like R&D, distribution, and welfare, 
given the growing importance of technological 
innovation in industrial growth 
• 2000s: Creation of venture complex, software, 
and information technology industrial complex, 
scientific research complex, and high-tech 
medical complex to execute the industrial policy 
of fostering high-tech industries and establishing 
innovation cluster (Porter, 1998)
With the successful execution of such government 
policies, the ROK’s industrial complex has provided 
the strong physical foundation for the growth of 
manufacturing industries and to the economy at 
large. It is worth noting that the cost of creating 
industrial complexes was mainly borne by the 
government, which thus spared the enterprises from 
the huge investment burden. A good example is the 
Guro Industrial Complex – the nation’s first export 
industrial district – which sparked the nation’s 
industrialization in the late 1960s. 
The government arranged industrial complex 
infrastructure like industrial water supply and road 
system in Guro in Seoul, which had large areas of 
state-owned land and with good accessibility for 
transport of raw materials and shipping export 
freights. As a result, the Guro Industrial Complex 
grew to shoulder approximately 10% of the nation’s 
total export during the late 1960s to 1970s. 
Note how the weight of industrial complex in 
the entire manufacturing industry of ROK is still 
significantly high. As of 2012, it accounts for 69% 
of the entire manufacturing production, 81% of the 
exports, and 47% of employment, and these indices 
have seen a steady increase since the year 2000. The 
establishment of industrial complexes has played 
a key role in facilitating regional economic growth 
and convergence in the ROK. Small and medium 
cities have developed around regions with industrial 
complex, with a high GRDP per capita (Park, 2014a). 
The ROK’s industrial complex cannot be spared 
from economic and environmental issues. While 
it is indeed a major contributor to national 
economic growth, it is also a main source of fossil 
fuel consumption. The Five-Year Plan has set the 
greening of industrial complex as an important 
task. The government has planned to go beyond 
the concept of environmentally friendly industrial 
complex that reduces energy consumption and 
promotes resource circulation, and further aim 
for creating industrial clusters that foster relevant 
industries with a focus on green technology. While 
minimizing environmental problems, this goal 
aligns with the low-carbon green growth vision by 
nurturing new industries for the industrial complex 
development plan to achieve economic growth. This 
is modeled after the experiences of Spain’s strong 
industrial cluster in the wind power sector in the 
Basque region, which was able to overcome the 
challenges in the steel and shipbuilding industries, 
and the French Solar Valley, which was an attempt to 
revive the local economy of the Rhône-Alpes after 
the withdrawal of the air force base. In relation to 
this, the government has proposed a plan to support 
the creation of the following clusters: 
• Regional Green Industrial Clusters: Industrial 
clusters refer to a network of enterprises, 
universities, and research centers in close 
proximity that promote innovation through 
frequent interactions and information flows. 
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The ROK’s model of green industrial clusters 
emphasize fostering of green industries. Evolving 
around manufacturing platforms that produce 
green goods, green industrial clusters involve 
the participation of innovation actors (research 
centers, universities), technology intermediaries 
(technology support and commercialization 
centers), and corporate support providers 
(financing agencies and strategic consultants). 
• Eco-Industrial Parks (EIP): The ROK has been 
promoting the creation of EIPs from the mid-
2000s. EIP is a resource-circulating industrial 
complex in which the by-products, wastewater, 
and sludge from the production process are 
used as resource or energy source for other 
businesses through a network of enterprises. 
The government plans to increase the number 
of EIPs from five in 2009 to seven in 2010, and 
further expand annually. To maximize the effect 
of EIP, the regulations on recycling waste has 
been enhanced, and the residual heat from EIP 
is supplied to nearby regions for residential 
heating. 
• Low-Carbon Industrial Complex: The 
government noted that industrial complexes, 
where small and medium businesses are 
concentrated, are the main source of carbon 
emissions. Thus, it has planned the creation of 
Low-Carbon Industrial Complex that actively 
promotes GHG reduction programs (i.e., 
CDP projects) for SMEs. The implementation 
measures include the installation of renewable 
energy facilities in idle sites inside the industrial 
complex, execution of energy efficiency retrofit 
activities, installation of refuse-derived fuel 
power production facilities, and shifting to 
the use of LED lights as street lamps for the 
industrial complexes.
• Ubiquitous Industrial Complex: The 
government has planned the creation of 
Ubiquitous Industrial Complex that enhances 
productivity and environmental quality of the 
industry through IT infrastructure. Diverse 
methods were sought to promote recycling 
of waste, such as monitoring the wastewater 
by blocks of the industrial complex through 
water quality sensors, and operating a real-
time information sharing system on the waste 
generation of each company through GPS.
2.5 Target Setting
As described in this section, the government 
strategies and plans under the green industry agenda 
of the Five-Year Plan were structured around the 
two key goals of greening of the existing industries 
and fostering of new green industries as the nation’s 
new growth engine. 
Amidst the challenges of global recession and 
slowdown of domestic economic growth, green 
industrial transformation was sought as the 
solution to increase the number of jobs and 
improve corporate competitiveness, in addition 
to overcoming the risks of climate change, global 
resource scarcity, and environmental degradation. 
Such redirecting of industrial growth – which has 
built on resource-intensive patterns – was to drive 
new norms in industrial processes that exploit 
opportunities for renewed and sustainable growth.
Target Indicators 2009 2013 2020
Rate of material cycle 15.0% 17.0% 17.6%
Share of green products in exports from key industries 10% 15% 22%
Number of large businesses and SMEs participating in green partnership 685 1,500 2,900
Number of green industrial complexes 5 10 20
Table 11: Main targets set under the “Green Industry” agenda
Source: PCGG, 2009b
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3. Policy Actions and Programs
3.1 Green Certification and Financial Instruments
Stimulating public private investment in the 
green growth sector – which involves greening of 
technologies, industries, and corporate management 
– is critical in realizing transformation toward a low-
carbon economic structure. Free market principles 
is the most effective way to allocate funds, and the 
sectors relevant to green growth are no exception. 
However, the underlying challenge for greening of 
the industrial sector lies in how relevant investments 
run the risk of high uncertainties and long payback 
periods, in addition to private returns falling short 
of social returns. Due to the lack of financier’s 
confidence in green investments – an area that is 
still relatively new and for a select few – it is natural 
that investments continue to place preference on 
conventional forms of investments such as simple 
manufacturing and construction that match their 
needs and risk profile. The ROK government 
emphasized that the existing financial mechanisms 
based on market dynamics in the ROK is insufficient 
to channel investments to the green sector due to 
the following (Joint Work of Relevant Ministries, 
2009):
The number of green projects that meet the existing 
market requirements is limited, while the definitions 
of “green projects” and “green businesses” in the 
financial market are unclear, making it difficult for 
investors to deploy capital on projects that maximize 
positive environmental and/or climate benefits. 
• The domestic financial market is not mature 
enough, with gaps in the diversity of financial 
instruments and investors that are willing to 
deploy capital into long-term projects, and 
expertise required in assessing the profitability 
of green technologies.
• Uncertainties in government policies (i.e., 
commitment, sustainability) on green growth 
and climate change as perceived by the private 
sector are too high to motivate the investors 
that are reluctant to shoulder risks.
Against this backdrop, the ROK government planned 
to take on a “catalytic role” of supplementing gaps in 
investments that cannot be filled by existing market 
function, and attempted to develop a wide range 
of financial instruments that can diversify the risks 
involved in green projects. Typical examples of such 
efforts are the “green certification scheme” and “low-
interest government loans on green projects”; these 
schemes played an important role in channeling 
public and private funds to foster the nation’s green 
industries based on the principles of selection and 
concentration.
3.1.1 Green Certification Scheme
The idea of green is often painted with a very broad 
brush, encompassing multiple benefits (whether 
in the form of energy efficiency or environmental 
quality) with different magnitudes of impacts. 
Recognizing how there are different shades of green 
and relative greenness, investors are often puzzled in 
differentiating green investments from conventional 
alternatives, and understanding why it is a good 
investment. The ROK government introduced the 
Green Certification Scheme in 2010 to provide a 
clear guideline on “what is green and what isn’t” 
in terms of green technologies, green products, 
green projects, and green enterprises. Not only was 
the scheme aimed at alleviating the uncertainties 
in green investments by providing government 
assurance through certifications, it was to shed light 
on the diversity of green investment opportunities 
and portfolio options available. The scheme anchors 
on the Framework Act on Low-Carbon Green 
Growth, which specifies the government authority 
that is to certify the appropriateness of green 
technologies and industries. 
Implementation
Green certifications are issued in four areas, based 
on scores from different sets of evaluation items; 
those that have scores of 70 and above (out of 100 
points) are issued with green certificates. 
• Green technologies refer to those that help cut 
down GHG emissions and pollution through 
efficient consumption of energy and resources, 
and improving material cycles in all economic 
and social activities of the society. Specifically, it 
targets 1,870 technologies classified in 10 areas:
 
(1) new and renewable energy, 
(2) CO2 reduction; 
(3) water quality and consumption; 
(4) green IT systems; 
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(5) green automobiles and vessels; 
(6) green buildings and cities; 
(7) innovative materials; 
(8) green production; 
(9) environmentally-friendly agricultural products; and 
(10) environmental protection and preservation. 
The certification of technologies is based on 
evaluations on the superiority (60 points) 
and greenness of technologies. Note that 
technological superiority refers to the potentials 
for commercialization and the scale of its 
anticipated impacts.
• Green products refer to goods on sale in the 
market that have benefited (e.g., during the 
manufacturing process) or directly derives 
from commercialization of green technologies 
described above. Certification criteria includes 
the level of quality management, success 
in production (i.e., whether production is 
sustainable, and whether the business owns the 
production facilities), and product performance. 
Note that certification is only issued for 
applications made by the applicant that either 
directly owns or is given the rights to practice 
the green technology that has been certified 
under the scheme. 
• Green projects indicate those that help minimize 
GHG emissions and pollution by means of 
energy and resource savings. Main examples 
include installation of new and renewable 
energy systems, retrofits to cut GHG emissions 
in production activities, and introducing 
wastewater reuse facilities. A total of 95 types of 
projects are subject to certifications, categorized 
into areas identical to that of green technologies 
(nine areas, excluding the area titled “innovative 
materials”). Rigorous evaluations are made 
to validate the project’s level of technology 
utilization (30 points), anticipated benefits from 
positive environmental impacts (50 points), and 
consistency with government’s policy goals (20 
points) prior to the issuance of certifications. 
• Finally, green corporations or business entities 
refer to those that own one or more certified 
green technologies. Certification requires the 
applicant entity to have been in business for at 
least one year after foundation, and a minimum 
of 20% of the latest fiscal year’s revenue derived 
from green technologies. 
The main government organ overseeing the 
green certification scheme is the MOTIE and the 
administrative organization is its subsidiary, the 
Korea Institute for Advancement of Technology 
(KIAT). Nonetheless, the participation of other 
ministries and their affiliate institutions with 
expertise across the wide range of sectors relevant 
to the green certification is critical. Certification is 
issued on a voluntary basis, by applying to KIAT’s 
online system. KIAT is given the role of designating 
appropriate evaluation entities (i.e., a total of 11 
public research institutes, technology evaluation 
centers) and commissioning evaluations upon 
receipt of applications. For example, applications 
on technologies in the marine and energy industries 
are reviewed by the Korea Institute of Marine 
Science and Technology Promotion, and the Korea 
Institute of Energy Technology Evaluation and 
Planning, respectively. The certification review 
committee housed under KIAT is responsible for 
making the final decision for certifications based on 
the evaluation reports. Certifications are valid for a 
period of two years from the date of issuance and is 
renewable upon request. 
Technologies, products, projects and business 
entities that have acquired green certifications are 
offed a wide range of benefits from the government, 
most of which take the form of “preferential 
treatments” relating to the use of financial services. 
Note that most of these financial services such 
as government’s policy loans and grants refer to 
those that have long been operating in the market; 
green certifications have sought to take advantage 
of existing financial instruments, to avoid efforts 
and risks inherent in developing benefit programs 
of its own. For example, the government’s “Policy 
Loan Program for SMEs,” which aims to increase the 
competitiveness of domestic SMEs through low-
interest loans offers priority access and loosening of 
loan limits to corporations with green certification. 
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Outcomes and Takeaways
After the launch of the scheme in April 2010, a total 
of 1,960 green technologies, 437 green products, 38 
green projects, and 233 green businesses have been 
certified up to February 2015. The total number of 
applications during this period was 4,770, 56% of 
which were successful in certification issuance. KIAT 
reported that the number of annual applications has 
been on a steady increase, with growing interest 
especially among SMEs. During the first two years 
of implementation, SMEs accounted for more than 
75% of the green corporate certifications issued. 
Technologies under the “new and renewable energy,” 
“environmental protection and preservation,” and 
“green IT” categories covered more than 50% of the 
certifications issued for green technologies. 
It is difficult to quantitatively justify the outcomes 
of the green certification scheme as its benefits do 
not take monetized forms, and especially because 
green certifications may have played important role 
in attracting finance, but it is not the sole factor 
of success. However, it is without doubt that the 
scheme has sparked the domestic banking sector 
in developing financial products that are exclusive 
for businesses and projects with green features; 
corporate loan products from private entities 
entitled “New Green Corporate Loan (Shinhan 
Bank),” “Green Business Loan (Kyongnam Bank),” and 
“Green Growth Loan (Kookmin Bank)” are some of 
the leading examples. Green certification has helped 
these domestic banks to do away with the hassle of 
validating the appropriateness of green investments. 
From the government’s perspective, the scheme is 
an effective means of fostering green technologies, 
expanding the green product market, and creating 
new jobs, as demonstrated by two certification 
issuances that have received MOTIE’s special 
recognition in 2014. Kumho E&G, a business that 
produces power management devices that help 
boost energy efficiency, reported an increase in 
revenues by 2.9 billion KRW and creation of 10 
new jobs through the sales of its certified green 
products. Also, Booster Co., LTD. reported that 
it was able to secure 3.9 billion KRW of private 
sector and government investment, and achieve 
350 billion KRW worth of revenue from the sales 
of its green certified product. On the other hand, 
green certification is a relatively simple, cost-
effective, and rapid means of having access to a 
wide of benefits, from the perspective of industry 
and innovation actors. Under growing interest, the 
government has taken timely actions to expand the 
scope of certification; for example, certifications 
on green products was only included in December 
2012, approximately two years after the launch of 
the scheme. Nonetheless, as the number of green 
certifications increase and the scope is enlarged, 
possible overlap with existing certification programs 
is becoming an issue of concern. Duplication 
creates confusion and hampers effectiveness of 
certifications, in addition to placing unnecessary 
burden for businesses. 
Table 12: Benefits from green certifications
Category Examples of Benefits
Financial support • Priority access to loans, loosening of loan limits, increased insurance coverage 
Marketing support
• Additional points awarded in government procurement
• Financial support for holding of exhibitions and roadshows for showcasing green 
products
Foundations for green 
technology commercialization
• Certified green corporations exempt from costs in green technology certifications
• Government support for employment of distinguished overseas professionals
Green technology 
commercialization • Preference in the award of public R&D grants and patent applications
Others 
• Business start-up funds for certified green corporations
• Operation of free training programs for certified green corporations
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3.1.2 Financial Instruments in Support of Green 
Industries
It was only after the government announced low-
carbon green growth as the new national vision in 
2008 when the term “Green Finance” started to 
gain public recognition in the ROK. Government 
strategies placed strong emphasis on how green 
finance not only brings about economic growth 
opportunities and positive environmental impacts, 
but it was to serve as a new area of business to 
financial sectors. Consequently, the government 
actively reached out to various institutional and 
private capital entities including national and 
commercial banks to stimulate the development 
of financial programs that meet the demand for 
capital needed to push forward its agenda on green 
industries. Fundamentally, green finance in the ROK 
is divided into those that: 
(1) support green business activities such as 
enhancement of energy efficiency and 
environmental protection; 
(2) channel funds necessary in fostering green 
corporations; and 
(3) provide export credits for certified green 
corporations. Representative financial 
instruments that can fulfill these roles are loans, 
guarantees, investment funds, and insurances.
• Green Commercial and Policy Loans: Various 
public institutions including the national and 
regional banks utilized the government’s special 
account to prepare policy loan programs that 
support investments in business activities 
consistent with the goals under the low-carbon 
green growth vision. These loans provide funds 
to green businesses under conditions of credit 
lines and discount rates that are highly favorable 
as compared to those of the commercial banks. 
The government urged the commercial banks 
to also arrange similar loans, which led to a 
total of 36 new programs being established and 
operated during 2009-2014.
• Green Policy Guarantees: A multiple number of 
financial institutions including the Korea Credit 
Guarantee Fund, Korea Technology Guarantee 
Fund, and the Export-Import Bank of Korea have 
been providing guarantees ensuring that the 
liabilities concerning green technology, green 
products, and green businesses will be met. In 
other words, these guarantees cover any loss 
that may arise in transactions against green 
businesses (i.e., green product manufacturers) 
to the insured (i.e., green product purchasers). 
Obviously, these green policy guarantees offer 
favorable conditions compared to conventional 
guarantees, such as ease in the maximum 
guarantee amount reduced guarantee fees. 
Policy guarantees are extensively used by SMEs 
that possess the technological assets but lacks 
financial solvency. 
• Green Policy Fund: Green policy funds are 
fixed income financial instruments that are 
used to raise funds dedicated exclusively to 
green growth from both the public and private 
sectors. This provides investors an attractive 
investment proposition as well as an opportunity 
to meet capital needs from green businesses 
and projects. Considering how investments in 
green industries are often characterized by long 
pay-back periods, and high risk and high return 
profiles, blending of government funds with that 
of the private sector helps render longer term 
access to finance affordable. 
• Green Policy Insurance: A number of public 
financial institutions operate insurance 
programs exclusively for green corporations to 
prevent loss that may arise in business activities. 
Insurances that compensate for loss from 
export contracts (i.e., implementation of trade 
receivables) or transaction of emissions permits 
under the Emissions Trading scheme are some 
of the representative examples. Green policy 
insurances are special in that they offer coverage 
on losses specific to green business areas (which 
are not often covered by conventional insurance 
products) at favorable conditions. 
Implementation
A large portion of financial products that support 
government’s commitment to make enough funds 
available to the green industry sector (excluding 
green policy funds which were largely new to 
the market) are actually products that have long 
existed and operated by a wide range of financial 
entities. The essence of what makes them “green” 
is the additional benefits or preferences placed 
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exclusively for green businesses and projects. 
Accordingly, the implementing entity, source of 
funds, and beneficiaries of these green financial 
products vary according to their originally intended 
purposes (i.e., fostering of SMEs, increasing export 
capacities). This section seeks to shed light on some 
of the government’s green policy loans, a category 
of financial products that have been most well 
correlated to the “green certification scheme.” 
The government’s policy loan products can be largely 
categorized into: 
(1) new and renewable energy loans; 
(2) energy saving facility loans; 
(3) agriculture synthetic fund loans; 
(4) tourism fund facility loans; and 
(5) environmental industry loans. 
• New and Renewable Energy (NRE) Loan: NRE 
loans make available capital for installation 
of NRE facilities, as well as investments by 
manufacturers that produce NRE goods. In other 
words, these low-interest loans are divided into 
facility loans, manufacturing loans, and working 
capital loans. Note that working capital loans 
seek to help secure liquidity of small-scale NRE 
manufacturers (SMEs). The source of these loans 
is the government’s Electric Power Industry Basis 
Fund, which is a collection of tax imposed on 
retail electricity users. The total annual volume 
of loans have fluctuated to meet the changes in 
demand; in 2015, a total of 115 billion KRW has 
been budgeted, 97% of which are to be directed to 
facility and manufacturing loans. 
• Energy Saving Facility Loan: Low-interest loans 
are given to cover investments on installation 
of new facilities with high energy saving 
performance or retrofits for improving the 
energy efficiency of existing facilities. A list of 
pre-determined energy saving facilities is made 
available to guide loan applicants. The source 
of loans is the government’s Energy Utilization 
and Rationalization Fund – a collection of special 
consumption tax on petroleum products – which 
was created to vitalize the domestic economy and 
promote investments on energy saving facilities. 
Annual budget for the year of 2014 was 500 
billion KRW, with ceilings placed on single loan 
transactions (15 billion KRW). Loans typically have 
a three-year grace period followed by a five-year 
payback period, and are to only cover a portion of 
the total investment. 
• Agriculture Synthetic Fund Loan: As the most 
widely recognized agricultural policy loan of 
the nation, the Agriculture Synthetic Fund 
Loans provide capital for various needs such as 
infrastructure related to agricultural production-
storage-distribution, R&D on agricultural 
technology, and agricultural machinery 
manufacturing industries. In order to help 
the greening of the industrial sector, the loan 
program started to provide additional points for 
loan applications by certified green technologies, 
projects, and business entities. Investments on 
facilities for expanding environmentally friendly 
Table 13: Types and conditions for Green Industry Loans
Product Supervising Ministry Source of Fund Loan Provider
New and Renewable 
Energy Loan
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy
Electric Power Industry 
Basis Fund
Korea Energy Management 
Corporation
Energy Saving 
Facility Loan
Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy
Energy Utilization and
 Rationalization Fund
Korea Energy Management 
Corporation
Agriculture Synthetic 
Fund Loan
Ministry of Agriculture 
Forestry, and Fisheries
Comprehensive 
Agricultural Fund
National Agricultural Cooperative 
Federation
Tourism Fund 
Facility Loan
Ministry of Culture, 
Sports and Tourism
Tourism Promotion and 
Development Fund
Korea Development Bank
Environmental 
Industry Loan
Ministry of Environment
Environment Industry 
Promotion Fund and Environment 
Improvement Fund
Korea Environmental Industry and 
Technology Institute
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agricultural practices, process of livestock 
excretions, and replacement of old livestock 
sheds are some of the example items of the 
loan beneficiaries. The proceeds of the loans 
come from the government’s Comprehensive 
Agricultural Fund and is operated by the 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, 
which is a federation of agricultural cooperatives 
that provides supply, processing, marketing, 
and banking services to the nation’s agricultural 
sector.
• Tourism Fund Facility Loan: Additional points 
have been given to loan applications by certified 
green cooperation, to allow preference on 
investments in green tourism in operating 
the Tourism Fund Facility Loan. This financial 
product utilizes the government’s Tourism 
Promotion and Development Fund to shoulder 
investments on facility infrastructure and 
business operation (i.e., working capital for 
travel agencies and hotel management). The 
total annual budget reached 480 billion KRW in 
2014, with more than 80% allocated to facility 
expansion and modernization. 
• Environmental Industry Loan: Operated by the 
MoE, the Environmental Industry Loan targets 
SMEs of the environmental industry that often 
face greatest problems in accessing finance. 
Under the ultimate goal of fostering the nation’s 
environmental industry, interest subsidies are 
granted to accelerate investments in installation 
of pollution prevention facilities, implementation 
of environmental remediation projects, and the 
conduct of R&D activities. Interest subsidies 
refer to the difference the interest rates of 
commercial and public policy loan programs. 
Preferences have been given to applications by 
SMEs with green certifications. 
Outcomes and Takeaways
 
Analogous to the outcomes of the green certification 
scheme, tracking the exact amount of capital 
mobilized to green industrial activities is difficult, 
as the evaluation on the “greenness” of investment 
is only one of the many factors in the due diligence 
of loans administered by a long list of financial 
institutions. However, it is clear that government 
endeavor has had positive impacts, both in terms 
of the diversity of financial products in support 
of green industries made available and their level 
of alignment to the government’s agenda on low-
carbon green growth. 
In year 2009 alone – the year after government’s 
announcement on low-carbon green growth vision 
– more than 40 financial products exclusive to green 
investments were created. A total of 80 different 
green policy funds have been launched, thanks to 
the active interaction and collective efforts between 
the heads of banks and asset management groups 
under the Green Finance Council, which was created 
and led by the president of Korea Federation of 
Banks. Unfortunately, such positive trend is at risk 
of collapsing after the entrance of new government 
in 2013. Policy-financing channels is bound to 
Table 14: Amount of capital mobilized for green finance
Product 2009 2010 2011 (1~3Q) Total
Lending 47,790 83,128 80,910 211,828
Guarantee 46,931 59,674 65,980 172,584
Insurance 7,426 41,386 37,973 86,785
Policy Fund 40 2,280 2,968 5,288
Venture Capital 4,579 5,530 4,817 14,926
Total  106,766  191,997 192,648 491,411 
Unit: hundred million KRW
Source: PCGG, 2011
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evolve with the changes in government policies, 
and low-carbon green growth has now become 
“the favorite agenda of the predecessor.” Despite 
the positive achievements in engaging commercial 
banks to finance green industrial inspirations, the 
government’s support for green finance has lost 
its momentum. Many of commercial banks’ green 
financial products have already vanished from 
the market, and the “Green Finance Council” has 
reached de facto truant status. 
3.2 Regional Green Industrial Clusters
Cluster-based industrial parks were first introduced 
during the 1990s in the ROK as an effective tool 
for   developing   competitive   industries   and   
generating   employment.   Following   the   success   
in establishing  industrial  complexes  which  
started  in  the 1960s, the  government  strongly  
promoted industrial cluster policies in relation to 
achieving a balanced regional development. With 
the advent of intensifying  technology  innovation  
and  reconfiguration  of  global  manufacturing  set-
up  (i.e.,  rise  of China  as  a  major  manufacturer),  
industrial  clusters  were  established  at  the  vicinity  
of  existing industrial   complexes   to   strengthen   
their   competitiveness, primarily   by   reinforcing   
innovation capabilities.
The green industrial clusters of the ROK refer to 
a geographical concentration of green industries, 
service providers, research centers, universities, 
and government institutions. The term “green” in 
this context obviously refers to achievement of 
“low-carbon green growth” through the production 
of green goods and services, such as enhancing the 
efficiency of energy and resource consumption. 
Compared to conventional industrial complexes 
that primarily exploit the cost benefits arising from 
shared infrastructure and services, the concept of 
industrial clusters take another step forward, toward 
reaping of benefits that arise from stimulating 
networking and collaboration between industries 
and innovation entities. Green industrial cluster 
adopts such concept of industrial clusters, but with 
additional goals of establishing a strong foundation 
for vitalizing regional industrial development in a 
low-carbon and environmentally sustainable manner. 
Interregional Industry Promotion Program
Launched in 2009 under the objectives of fostering 
new industrial growth engines to propel regional 
development, the “Interregional Industry Promotion 
Program” was the government’s most systematic 
approach to support establishment of regional green 
industrial clusters. Basically, the program offers 
grants to proposals from groups of enterprises, 
universities, and research institutes that seek to 
work towards developing innovative products which 
lead to increase in corporate revenues and creation 
of new job opportunities. Note that the program was 
also designed to help rally regional development 
and balance regional disparity which manifested 
during the nation’s period of rapid economic growth. 
Grants with a maximum of three-year duration are 
categorized into two groups: 
(1) R&D projects that focus on technology 
commercialization and product development; 
and 
(2) Non-R&D projects that support knowledge 
sharing, business development, and fostering of 
talents. 
The central government provided a list of priority 
areas of region’s industrial growth, which served the 
basis for the selection of grant awards. Assessments 
were conducted to comprehensively evaluate the 
level of R&D capacity, potentials for technology 
commercialization, competitiveness of relevant 
industries, and potentials for regional market growth 
across the nation’s 14 main cities and provinces 
Table 15: Comparison of concepts of industrial complexes and clusters
Industrial Complex Industrial Cluster Green Cluster
• No common goal
• Low correlation
• Low cost of land use
• Common use of infrastructure
• Common goal
• High correlation 
• All kinds of industries
• Common use of network and human 
resources
• Common goal for Low carbon, 
Green Growth, and improving 
environmental quality
• Green industries
• Use of renewable energy
• Promoting energy efficiency
• Developing green technology
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(excluding the nation’s capital Seoul and its host 
province Gyeonggi-do), which eventually translated 
into a list of priority industries most suitable for 
the selected regions. Obviously, no single city or 
province owns the highest level of capacities in all 
four areas of the assessment; green clusters were 
to establish inter-regional networks to complement 
and integrate the core capacities relevant to the 
entire value chain of industries. Below are some 
conclusions drawn from the assessment: 
• The prerequisite conditions for fostering of solar 
PV industries come in the order of potentials 
for technology commercialization, level of R&D 
capacity, and geographical potentials for solar 
power generation. Daegu-Gyungsang (City-
Province pairs) region with high capabilities for 
technology was best suited for establishing silica 
based solar cell industrial clusters, while the 
Daejon-Chungcheong region with nation’s top 
R&D capacity was found ideal for establishing 
non-silica based solar cell industrial clusters. 
• The competitiveness of relevant industries and 
the level of R&D capacity were identified as 
critical conditions for development of green 
car (e.g., electric vehicles, fuel-cell vehicles) 
industries. The Ulsan-Gyungsang region, which 
hosts the nation’s leading car manufacturers, 
was identified most suitable for the creation of 
green car industrial clusters.
As opposed to the first phase of the program 
(2009-2012), which simply placed an emphasis on 
“innovative product commercialization,” the second 
phase of the program (2012-2014) stressed the 
importance of “stimulating job creation”; grant 
applications were to specifically identify the number 
of new employment opportunities that arise both 
during and after project implementation. Under such 
guidelines provided by the central government (i.e., 
MOTIE as the supervisory organization supported by 
Korea Institute for the Advancement of Technology), 
the program’s seven regional offices were given the 
role of project selection, management, and post-
evaluation.
The outcome from the first phase (2009-2012) of 
the program has shown promising results. During 
the first two and a half years of the three-year 
period, a total of 11,681 new employments, 5.5 
trillion KRW worth of revenues, and US$ 3 billion 
worth of exports were reported to have derived 
from the regional industrial clusters supported by 
the program. Approximately 1,100 entities (64% of 
which were enterprises) benefited from the grants 
provided in the form of matching funds, which 
totaled approximately 1 trillion KRW; each project 
averaged in 0.5 billion KRW. 
Table 16: Priority areas by region under the Interregional Industry Promotion Program
Regions
(Province)
Phase 1 (2009-2012)
Phase 2 (2012-2014)
Areas of Future Industrial Growth Primary Industry Areas
Chungcheong
Bio 
pharmaceuticals
IT
Bio and 
pharmaceuticals
Renewable energy 
(solar) and 
secondary cells
IT Machinery
Jeolla Renewable energy 
(solar and wind)
LED and 
Hybrid cars
Renewable energy 
(solar and wind)
Life-care 
products
LED and lighting
Green cars and 
vessels
(North) 
Gyeongsang 
New and renewable 
energy (solar, fuel 
cells)
IT
New and renewable 
energy (solar, fuel 
cells)
IT
Smart mobile 
products
Innovative 
materials
(South)
Gyeongsang
Green cars and 
vessels
Innovative 
materials
New and renewable 
energy (wind and 
nuclear)
Chemicals
Green cars and 
aircrafts
Green vessels and 
offshore plants
Gangwon Bio pharmaceuticals Medical tourism Innovative materials
Bio 
pharmaceuticals
Health care
Jeju Water industry
Meetings, Incentives, 
Conferences, and 
Exhibitions (MICE)
Renewable energy (wind) Health and food MICE
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Although it is incorrect to assert that the grants from 
the program is the sole basis of the outcomes, the 
program has clearly contributed in stimulating the 
formulation of industrial clusters, especially for the 
green industry sector. The success of the program 
has also helped its beneficiaries to attract 450 billion 
KRW worth of investments. For example, Gumi 
City of the North Gyeongsang region hosted a solar 
cell plant from investments by Japan’s Sanko Metal 
Industries, Inc. The government spending under the 
program has been widely accredited for having laid 
the foundations for balanced regional economic 
development.
Green Cluster Initiatives by Local Governments
The Five-Year Action Plan for Green Growth 
(2009-2013) specifically articulated targets for 
establishment of regional green industrial clusters; 
a total of eight new green clusters were to be 
developed by 2013. Supported by the strategic 
interests and strong momentum of the PCGG, local 
governments rushed many plans for developing their 
regional green industrial clusters starting in 2009. 
Based on the assessment of various factors – such as 
the region’s concentration of employment, industry 
presence (i.e., manufacturers, assemblers, and 
component suppliers), technological specialization, 
patterns in relationships among industrial entities, 
geographical advantages, and market demand – local 
governments came up with rather ambitious plans 
that were packaged to reflect their uniqueness. 
Unlike how the “Interregional Industry Promotion 
Program” sought to support R&D activities, stimulate 
information flows, and enable product development, 
many of the local government plans took a step 
further. One example is the construction of special 
industrial districts or testbed facilities, pursued 
in the way that the ROK government supported 
the establishment of the nation’s major industrial 
complexes. 
Many of the local government plans sought to 
replicate the success of developing countries; 
for example, wind power clusters of Ringkøbing, 
Denmark, the Basque Country in Spain and the 
state of Texas in the U.S., and the solar energy 
clusters of the state of Thringen in Germany, the 
Rhne-Alpes in France and the Silicon Valley in the 
U.S. These examples set “good” representations 
of how green technologies can be foundations of 
new regional growth. The Basque Country’s wind 
power cluster has helped overcome the fall of its 
steel and shipbuilding industries. The increase in 
jobs related to green technology in California tripled 
that of the total jobs in the state during 1995-2008, 
among which jobs related to solar power occupy the 
greatest proportion (Lee, 2010).
At the national level, STEPI’s strategic report 
entitled “Green Cluster Strategy to Vitalize Regional 
Economy” provided strategic guidance toward 
the formulation of green cluster plans by local 
autonomies. The report identified Korea’s industrial 
areas of highest potentials to develop green 
clusters by technologies, based on an analysis of 
the conditions for market formation, R&D capacity, 
industrialization capacity, and potentials for making 
use of existing related industries. For example, the 
South-Eastern regions of the nation (Gyeongsang 
region) was found to have the highest potentials 
in the field of hydrogen and fuel cells, with a well-
balanced possession of all four core conditions. 
The existence of a strong automobile industry, and 
plans of nation’s major steel maker – POSCO – to 
construct a stack (i.e., a core component of fuel 
cells) manufacturing factory in the region were 
identified as a significant advantage for the region’s 
establishment of a fuel cell cluster. 
4. Assessment
4.1 Quantitative Assessment
The ROK’s pursuit of green industrialization has 
been showing positive results both quantitatively 
and qualitatively thanks to forceful government 
policies and active greening efforts of enterprises 
The government has sought to provide 
systematic and financial support to promote 
green industrial development while reinforcing 
various environmental and energy regulations 
and standards. Meanwhile, many domestic firms 
including conglomerates have begun to acknowledge 
the importance of greening their business 
operations as a key factor to survive in today’s fierce 
competition, domestically and globally.
As explained previously, the ROK put forward four 
main strategies in developing its green industry 
− namely, pursuing the green transformation 
of the industrial sector, promoting resource 
circulation in the economic and industrial structure, 
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strengthening green SMEs, and establishing green 
industrial complex clusters. Tangible results have 
been achieved regarding these strategies, although 
in varying degrees depending on the unique 
circumstances in the implementation process for 
each strategy.
Green Transformation of the Industrial Sector
Environmental friendliness is rapidly becoming an 
important factor for companies to be competitive 
in the global market, along with price and quality. 
As a result, businesses have been pressured 
to comply with certain practices related to the 
green transformation of industries such as the 
development of green production technology and 
products, reduction of air and water pollutants, 
cutting down on energy and resource usage, and 
the like. The ROK recognized the necessity of these 
efforts given its considerable progress in greening its 
major industries such as steel, chemical, automobile, 
and electronics, which consume much energy and 
emit large amounts of GHG. However, most of the 
outcomes of the ROK’s green transformation are still 
quantitatively limited due to the long-term period 
required to reap the full benefits of such efforts. 
• The accumulated number of firms that gained 
certification from ISO 14001 – an international 
standard on environmentally friendly 
management – shows a sustained increase in 
the ROK, although the annual number of newly 
approved firms has decreased since 2005. 
The outcomes from such expansion of green 
management practices by enterprises are most 
evident in the reduction of pollutants. In the 
ROK, the total quantity of pollutants emitted 
by the manufacturing industries4 might have 
increased due to the growth in production 
activities, but the index divided by the added 
value, or the intensity of emitted pollutants, in 
other words, is making positive progress.
• The level of efforts exerted by businesses 
on green management practices can also 
be examined in terms of the amount of 
investments made in improving and protecting 
the environment. Although the growth in 
Total emission of 
pollutants (ton)
Discharge 
(1,000 m3/
day) Added value 
(billion)
Intensity of emission
(ton/billion)
Intensity of 
discharge 
(1,000 m3/
day/billion)
SOx NOx
Industrial 
wastewater
SOx NOx
Industrial 
wastewater
2006 159,903 157,774 2,687 242,292 0.309 0.651 0.011
2009 180,882 200,920 3,324 300,036 0.324 0.670 0.011
2011 219,220 234,296 3,118 379,521 0.290 0.617 0.008
Table 18: Fluctuation and intensity of emissions in the manufacturing industry
Source: MOE, 2014 Bank of Korea 2014
Table 17: Total number of ISO 14001 certified firms
Year 1996 2000 2005 2010 2014
Newly certified 48 180 2,899 1,668 1,394
Maintaining certification 48 405 5,016 6,626 8,018
Source: Korea Accreditation Board, 2014
4 | Emissions generated from combustion and manufacturing process 
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annual spending on pollution prevention 
related activities stagnated in 2009, there was 
a rebound in 2012, indicating that the ROK’s 
manufacturing businesses were responsive to 
government strategies to expand responsibilities 
for sustainability on all levels, and practice 
“leaner” production. It should be noted that such 
investments in the prevention of environmental 
pollution usually lead to an increase in sales by 
related industries; sales of equipment, resources, 
facilities, and services that reduce emissions can 
help gauge the extent of green transformation. 
The share of turnover of the nation’s green 
industry, which was 0.63% in 2005, has steadily 
increased to 1.44% in 2013.
• In the case of GHG reduction, the outcome 
was found to vary by industries. Key industries 
such as steel, petrochemical, oil refining, 
semiconductor, and display have actively 
pursued methods to cut down on GHG emissions 
on a company-wide level − such as enhancing 
energy efficiency and production processes, 
and expanding the use of waste resources like 
waste energy. For instance, POSCO, one of 
the ROK’s main steel producers, set a target 
of reducing the CO2 emissions per one ton of 
crude steel produced in the steel mills by 9%, 
from the average 2.18 CO2 ton in 2007-2009 to 
1.98 CO2 ton in 2020, with a scheme to invest 
approximately 1.5 trillion KRW by 2018 to 
achieve this target. POSCO is also planning to 
invest 5.5 trillion KRW in green growth projects 
such as developing high-tension steel plates 
that enhance automobile fuel efficiency and 
high-quality electrical steel that enhance energy 
efficiency in motors and transformers. On the 
other hand, LG Chemicals, a major petrochemical 
company, has planned to reduce emissions by 
23% compared to BAU by 2020 and is managing 
its energy use and GHG emissions through the 
IT system, with a scheme to further expand its 
green management system.
• These efforts by industries have covered the 
entire process of production – from product 
design to production process and waste disposal 
– and have been revealing diverse results on 
energy efficiency and GHG reduction. However, 
the basic units of GHG emissions based on 
Table 20: Basic units of CO2 emissions in the ROK’s steel and petrochemical industries
2005 2010 2012
Steel
Added value 
(billion)
19,878 25,362 22,189
CO2  emissions 
(million CO2 ton)
64.8 108.0 121.4
Basic units of CO2 emissions 
(1,000/CO2 ton)
306.8 234.8 182.8
2007 2010 2013
Petrochemical
Added value 
(billion)
7,382 11,036 21,040
CO2 emissions 
(million CO2 ton)
41,594 46,409 48,942
Basic units of CO2 emissions 
(1,000/CO2 ton)
177.5 237.8 429.9
Source: KOSTAT, 2014; KOSA, 2014; KPIA, 2014
Table 19: Share of environmental industry in total industry turnover (%)
Source: MoE, 2013; Bank of Korea, 2013
Note: Numbers with asterisk are projections
2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
0.63 0.81 0.96 1.05 0.93 1.43* 1.44*
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“added value” differ greatly from one industry 
to another. In the case of the steel industry, 
which is responsible for almost 30% of the GHG 
emissions of the manufacturing industries, the 
basic unit of GHG emissions (added value/CO2 
emissions, 1,000 won/CO2 ton) in the Five-
Year Plan was 312 in 2009 and was expected 
to hit 352 by 2013, which is a 12.8% increase. 
However, in reality, it steadily fell to 234.8 in 
2010, and declined further to 182.8 in 2012. 
Although such results stem from the fact that 
the energy efficiency of the ROK’s steel industry 
is already one of the highest in the world (making 
further improvements largely difficult), the low 
performance of added value in steel products 
(from the worldwide oversupply of steel) played 
a large part. Meanwhile, in the case of the 
petrochemicals industry, which is the second-
largest emitter of GHG after the steel industry, 
the added value is rapidly increasing relative 
to CO2 emissions, thus showing swift progress 
toward green transformation.
Development of Green Venture SMEs
The ROK government announced a comprehensive 
plan to increase the contribution of green SMEs to 
green growth in 2010, setting out specific targets 
on fostering a growing number of SMEs that utilize 
green technologies, developing the required human 
resources, expanding access to finance, and building 
capacities to implement environmentally sustainable 
business management practices. The following 
milestones represent the major progress made 
under this initiative:
• Creation of Green SMEs: A growing number of 
green SMEs in the ROK – which is defined as 
companies whose certified green technologies 
account for over 20% of the total annual 
sales turnover under the “Green Certification 
Scheme” – are not monitored by government 
statistics, thus making it difficult to evaluate 
the level of progress made. An imperfect proxy 
indicator may be the number of SMEs engaged 
in “Sewage, Wastewater, Waste Treatment, 
Material Reuse, and Environmental Recovery 
Services Industries,” which is one of the 11 
service-industry groups categorized under the 
annual Korea SME Statistics Report. During 
the period of 2009-2013, the number of SMEs 
and employees engaged in this industry saw a 
41.4% and 23.6% growth, respectively, which 
significantly exceeds the average figures for 
all sectors over the same period (11.4% and 
14.2%). The number of new company formations 
in this industry also showed a steep increase − 
from 352 in the year 2009 (equivalent to 7.8% 
of the total number of companies) to 619 in 
the year 2013 (equivalent to 9.7% of the total 
number of companies). These positive outcomes 
were attributed to the significant extent of 
concentrated government support for new 
start-ups; for example, leading universities of 
the nation were designated to provide free 
office space, mentoring, training, and extensive 
networking opportunities to green start-up 
founders.
• Access to Finance: The government’s policy fund 
for enterprises in the green industrial sector 
increased more than three-fold, from 173 billion 
KRW in 2009 to 561.5 billion KRW in 2011. A 
large portion of this fund was channeled in the 
form of low-interest loans for financing projects 
utilizing green technologies; the total volume of 
these loans increased steadily from 156 billion 
KRW in 2010 to 258 billion KRW in 2011. The 
total amount of green R&D expenditures by 
the government granted to SMEs also showed 
a significant increase, from 363 million KRW in 
2009 to 510 million KRW in 2012. 
• Capacity Building: The government’s flagship 
initiative to enhance the capacity of SMEs 
came in the form of a program promoting the 
partnership between large companies and SMEs. 
Launched in 2001, the “Green Partnership 
Program” aims to transfer knowledge on green 
management practices and cleaner production 
by facilitating a two-year contract between 
large enterprises and SMEs; these SMEs are 
often companies within the value chain of large 
enterprises (i.e., manufacturing) in need of 
support to comply with global environmental 
standards such as REACH (Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of 
Chemicals) of the EU. When low-carbon green 
growth was proclaimed as the new national 
vision in 2008, the program was revised 
drastically to place emphasis on supporting 
the carbon reduction efforts of SMEs. Through 
the signing of “Carbon Partnerships,” large 
companies are to share their experiences 
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with SMEs in establishing GHG-emissions 
inventory, calculating the carbon footprint of 
products, and improving the carbon efficiency 
of manufacturing processes. Partnerships 
during the period of 2009-2011 involving 166 
projects have been reported to have cut down 
approximately 27.5 trillion KRW in SMEs’ 
spending on reduction of CO2 emissions and 
energy consumption. 
• Green Industrial Certifications: Introduced 
in 2010, the “Green Certification” scheme 
launched by the government played a critical 
role in engaging the SMEs in green growth. The 
certification covers green technologies, green 
products and services, green projects, and green 
businesses, and extends eligibility for receiving 
various forms benefits. It is important to note 
that a large portion of these benefits have been 
designed specifically to support SMEs, such 
as preferential treatment for small-scale loan 
applications, and operation of special export 
credit insurance programs for SMEs.
Resource Circulating Economy and Industrial 
Structure
The ROK enacted the “Act on the Promotion of the 
Conversion to Environmentally Friendly Industrial 
Structure” in 1995 to enhance the productivity 
of natural resource use and promote industrial 
activities that reduce environmental pollution. 
Following the efforts made in support of this 
legislation, the Five-Year Plan pursued diverse 
policies, the outcomes of which were fundamentally 
reflected in the domestic material consumption 
per GDP and the recycling rate. Positive results 
demonstrate the progress made by the nation’s 
industry in reducing costs through resource-use 
efficiency and enhancing product’s added value.
• The ROK’s material consumption per unit GDP 
has continued to decrease over the years – by 
22.9% from 0.811 kg/1,000 KRW to 0.625 
kg/1,000 KRW during the period of 2002-2011. 
Domestic material consumption intensity is a 
measurement of the total amount of material 
directly used per unit GDP, reflecting the 
nation’s overall efficiency in terms of resource 
consumption.
Source: KECO, 2014
Table 22: Industrial waste generation and recycling rates
Category 2005 2008 2010 2013
Waste Generation 112,419 130,777 137,875 149,815
Waste 
Treatment
Landfill 16,604 24,285 23,309 24,629
Incineration 7,326 6,937 7,983 9,339
Ocean Disposal 11,532 6,940 6,956 2,609
Recycling 76,957 92,615 99,627 113,238
Recycling Rate (%) 68.5 70.8 72.3 75.6
 Unit: Kg/1,000 KRW
Table 21: Domestic material consumption per GDP
Source: KOSIS, 2014
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
0.814 0.697 0.660 0.628 0.625
 Unit: Kg/1,000 KRW
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• The industrial waste recycling rate has greatly 
increased from 68.5% in 2005 to 75.6% in 2013. 
Out of the main industrial waste, the waste 
synthetic resin, waste metal, and wastewater 
saw a steep rise in recycling rate; in particular, 
waste metal was recycled almost entirely as of 
2013. The industrial waste recycling rate reflects 
the industrial sector’s willingness to protect and 
preserve the local environment, as well as to 
divert waste to more economical use. 
Green Industrial Clusters
Among the government’s various efforts to promote 
the green transformation of industrial complexes, 
the most fruitful to date has been the establishment 
of the Eco-Industrial Parks (EIP). The ROK’s EIP 
program is being carried out in three stages, from 
2005 to 2019. Over the decades, the concept of eco-
friendly industrial parks has become increasingly 
flexible to embrace different types of networks 
that strive for high environmental and economic 
benefits. In the ROK, EIP mainly aims to form an 
industrial community that achieves both economic 
and environmental goals by minimizing the discharge 
of waste and by-products, based on cooperation 
between enterprises on the one hand and the 
regions around the park on the other. 
Following the completion of the first phase (2005-
2009), which focused on pilot testing the EIP 
model in five selected industrial complexes, the 
second phase (2010-2014) of the program sought 
to expand the number of EIPs across the nation 
and adopt the Hub-Spoke network. Unlike the EIPs 
established during the first phase of the program 
– which bring together businesses within a single 
complex to collaborate towards achieving collective 
benefits – the Hub-and-Spoke network promotes 
cooperation between businesses housed within 
a regional industrial complex (i.e., Hub), on the 
one hand, and a multiple number of its outskirts 
complexes (i.e., Spoke), on the other. There were 
three new constructions of EIPs in 2010 and one 
additional construction in 2013; a total of nine EIPs 
are currently in operation. The government provides 
financial grants (as matching funds) for projects 
proposed by businesses in these parks; related 
projects include investments for the development of 
technologies and networks for efficient waste re-use 
and reduction, energy recovery, and wastewater 
treatment. 
A group of researchers led by Park (Park, 2014b) 
assessed the economic and environmental benefits 
of the EIP program. The assessments of a total 
number of 244 projects completed during the 
2005-2013 period indicated that 118 projects have 
led to successful technology commercialization or 
actual operation of business networks to improve 
material cycles. Such success have led to 828,113 
tons/year reduction in generation of waste and 
by-products; 215,517 ton/year reduction water 
usage and generation of wastewater; 250,475 
TOE/year savings in energy use; and approximately 
1.1 million tCO2/year of avoided emissions. Such 
outcomes translate into a significant rate of 
environmental return (i.e., 5,408 tons of waste and 
by-products; 1,407 tons of water usage and waste 
water generation; 1,635 TOE of energy; 7,231 
tCO2 of emissions) per unit government spending 
(approximately US$ 100,000) through the provision 
of project grants. Some actual examples of project-
level outcomes are as follows:
• Steam supplied from waste-incineration 
facilities of Hyundai Heavy Industries to the 
production lines of Hyundai Motors and Hyundai 
Hysco in the Ulsan EIP has been reduced by 
approximately three billion KRW of annual 
energy spending, in addition to 12,736 tons of 
avoided CO2 emissions each year.
• Hankuk paper Mfg. Co., Ltd. located in the Onsan 
industrial complex is being supplied with dense 
CO2 and steam from a refinery of Korea Zinc 
Company Inc., which leads to approximately 
64,000 tons of avoided CO2 emissions each year.
• Cheil Industries, which produces imitation 
marble in Yeosu EIP, has been able to avoid 
approximately 300 million KRW of spending 
each year from waste disposal by allowing 
resource recovery businesses to utilize their 
waste free of charge. The wastes recovered are 
being repurchased as materials for production of 
imitation marble, generating approximately 190 
million KRW of annual profits for waste recovery 
businesses. 
4.2 Qualitative Assessment
As the quantitative assessment illustrates, some of 
the government’s efforts in greening the industries 
are evident but despite the positive results, several 
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gaps remain. For example, the basic benchmarks 
for CO2 emissions and energy efficiency were not 
met to the extent that was planned. Despite the 
increase, the number of SMEs engaged in green 
industries has not fulfilled the target set under the 
Five-Year Plan. Most importantly, the ROK’s share 
in the world’s green market is still insignificant, 
despite the government’s strong support for 
green R&D and market expansion. A confluence of 
complex factors influenced this performance such 
as the ambitious nature of original targets and the 
evolving unfavorable conditions of the domestic 
and international economic environments. In 
addition, the government’s economic policy serves 
as a limitation to fostering green industries – by 
still concentrating on expanding the supply when it 
should rather be focusing on circulation instead of 
consumption, and regional distribution, instead of 
central concentration.
As part of the low-carbon green growth policy, the 
green transformation agenda for the industries 
has contributed significantly to advancing 
environmental friendliness and improvement of 
businesses. Just ten years ago, there were very 
few enterprises – usually the large enterprises – 
that considered green management as their core 
business value. Nonetheless, as the government 
expanded R&D investment in green technology 
and promoted various green growth policies, the 
industries’ perspective has eventually changed, 
given the corporations’ increasing recognition of 
the value of developing green products, reducing 
pollution emission, enhancing resources and energy-
consumption efficiency, reducing waste discharge, 
and increasing the recycling rate as part of their core 
management strategy as revealed in their active 
efforts to advance into the global market using green 
technology development as an entry point. 
However, the ROK’s green transformation success 
is concentrated mainly on large enterprises, as 
demonstrated by how “green partnerships” between 
large enterprises and SMEs are primarily initiated 
and led by large enterprises. Many SMEs are still 
looking at green transformation from a passive 
stance; apparently, there is an imbalance between 
large enterprises and SMEs in achieving green 
transformation. To resolve this, there is a need 
to change the focus of the greening strategy to 
focus rather on incentivizing and developing the 
capacity of SMEs to be actively engaged in green 
transformation.
The policies and systems that ROK is using to 
encourage the recycling of industrial waste has 
contributed greatly to reforming the enterprises’ 
perspectives on material cycles and promoting 
technological development. Nevertheless, a large 
proportion of small-scale industrial sites continue 
to show insignificant recycling rates as compared 
to those of developed countries from the lack 
of technology access and capacities. In addition, 
government policies that have centered on 
increasing recycling rates have created negative side 
effects, such as insufficient ex post facto management 
of toxic substances and even production of 
inaccurate recycling statistics. As for resource 
circulation outcomes of the EIP projects, the current 
results are largely based on government support, 
raising concerns that the current policy may raise 
overdependence of the enterprises on government.
The strengthening of energy efficiency standards, 
setting of national mid- and long-term targets for 
GHG reduction, and implementing the TMS and 
ETS have played a significant role in actively seeking 
ways to reduce GHG emissions. The ETS, launched 
in January 2015, greatly contributed to leading 
the active reduction efforts in the industrial sector. 
As firms need to keep their emissions within their 
allocated Certified Emission Reduction (CER) or 
purchase CERs in order to emit additionally, the 
reduction of GHG emissions is directly reflected in 
the enterprise’s revenue under the ETS. Yet, whether 
the ROK may successfully induce GHG reduction 
through the ETS will be evaluated in due course. 
The ROK has settled into a high energy-consumption 
structure, and the energy efficiency of domestic 
top energy consumers is already at its highest 
level, which makes it very difficult to reduce GHG 
emissions yet further by increasing energy efficiency. 
As the main rivals of the ROK, like China and Japan, 
are not pursuing strong reduction policies of GHG 
emissions, if the ROK’s green transformation is 
really going to succeed in strengthening the national 
competitiveness while reducing GHG, it must gain 
consistent support from the industrial sector.
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5. Takeaways and 
Recommendations
The intensification of environmental problems and 
the increasing level of complexities to resolve them is 
a common challenge that comes with rapid economic 
growth. Environmental pollution, especially during 
the early phase of the ROK’s economic takeoff, was 
perceived naturally as a symbol of development 
rather than an alarming social concern. For example, 
it is inscribed in the monument built in 1967 wishing 
for the development of Ulsan, the hub of the nation’s 
earliest industrial complexes, “The moment the black 
smoke from industrial production reaches far into 
the atmosphere, it will be a sign that the hopes and 
progress of the people of the nation have arrived at 
our doorstep.” 
However, the developing countries have started 
to understand and consequences of accepting 
environmental deterioration for the sake of swift 
economic growth. Put aside the warnings over “the 
earth is finite” and continued resource extraction 
will eventually cause our systems to collapse, there 
are already visible signs in newly industrialized 
countries such as China and India that public health 
impacts attributed to environmental pollution are a 
significant obstacle to sustained economic growth. 
With the growing awareness that high growth alone 
does not necessarily assure better social outcomes, 
“quality of growth” is being picked up as an important 
agenda in developing countries.
Green industry brings economic, social, and 
environmental benefits (UNIDO, 2011). From an 
economic viewpoint, green industry promotes the 
development of green industrial technology and 
environmentally friendly products. For example, 
developing technologies that collect reU.S.ble 
materials from wastes creates ripple effects such as 
a reduction in production costs and new investments 
aiming to increase resource production, a reduction 
in waste and pollutants, creation of new jobs, and 
rise in incomes. Since the inefficient use of resources 
inflicts serious environmental pollution, the 
ecological effects of improving resource efficiency 
will be especially significant. 
Despite the array of benefits of fostering green 
industries, there are numerous obstacles that must 
be overcome in developing countries. Green industry 
fundamentally favors conservation over supply 
and material circulation over simple consumption, 
but the economic growth strategies of developing 
countries often prioritize continued supply to meet 
the growing demand. Within this context, developing 
countries have inadequate market structure to 
pursue efficiency and resource circulation measures 
as both the public and private sector pursue short-
term payoffs at the expense of long-term gains, 
thereby making green industries less attractive.
Based on the ROK’s experience, developing 
countries must recognize how much more difficult 
the greening of industrial practices can become if it 
is trapped in an economic strategy mostly driven by 
increased material supply. Restructuring industrial 
consumption is an enormous task; the inertia of 
investments in the fixed assets of manufacturing 
industries makes changes in their consumption 
patterns much more difficult to achieve. Once 
industries lock-in to resource-intensive consumption 
patterns, their momentum inevitably restricts the 
government’s ability to enforce strong regulatory 
controls that support market transformation – this 
is arguably one of the primary constraints to the 
limited success of the green industry agenda in the 
ROK. Striking the right balance between growth and 
conservation is complex, but developing countries 
that are in the early stages of industrialization 
must recognize that they have the opportunity to 
minimize the potential for later regrets and begin 
to make the most out of interventions that can offer 
short-term benefits.
One factor behind the immediate successful 
outcomes of the ROK’s green industry policy is 
the nation’s adequate technological capability 
to support the process. Not only did the nation 
accumulate technologies during its period of 
rapid economic growth, but it became a global 
leader in multiple areas of innovation such as 
information and communications technologies. 
Technology convergence (i.e., IT-based energy 
management systems) served as the launch 
pad for green industries and the government 
ensured that R&D activities continue to fuel 
innovation-led transformation. It is indisputable 
that government patronage for sustained public 
and private investment in technology R&D served 
as the foundation for realizing a green industrial 
transformation. Considering such strong evidence, 
an uppermost priority in developing countries is in 
the accumulation and application of technological 
assets. Although strengthening of technological 
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cooperation with developed countries serves as 
a good starting point, success can only build upon 
strong motivation of the government to master 
innovative technologies. 
The ROK’s strategies highlighted how the greening 
of existing industries and creation of new green 
industries must be pursued simultaneously. Such 
strategic direction is based on the notion that the 
fostering of green industries can only be successful 
when there is sufficient demand for its outputs, 
which can be naturally driven by the process of the 
greening of existing industries. In other words, the 
greening of existing industries alone that is likely to 
rely heavily on imported goods would fail to capture 
the essence of green growth, which is to magnify the 
synergies between environmental sustainability and 
economic growth. The common engine driving these 
two parallel processes is the government policies 
on emission cuts and resource efficiency. Unlike 
strategies for industries strictly founded on market 
principles, government interventions that allocate 
appropriate incentives and regulations are critical 
in the early stages of advancing the green industry 
agenda.  
The ROK’s performance in end-of-pipe treatment 
has kept pace with the growing level of economic 
development. In the mid-1990s, the Ministry of 
Environment led the reinforcement of various 
regulatory environmental standards and successfully 
induced private investments on pollution prevention. 
As such, the green industry agenda presented in the 
Five-Year Plan was intended to tackle issues beyond 
the scope of traditional environmental protection, 
such as optimizing energy use and promoting 
resource circulation. In contrast, developing 
countries that have not yet established standards 
to improve pollution management practices must 
seek to expand the green industry agenda to foster 
traditional environmental industries engaged in 
waste recycling and pollution control. The related 
plans in developing countries may involve improving 
end-of-pipe treatment in the agricultural, fishery and 
forestry sectors, which are often the main sources 
of income. It should not be overlooked that the ROK 
embarked on technological innovation to foster its 
traditional environmental industry as early as the 
1990s, which was well before the idea of low-carbon 
green growth was conceptualized.
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1.1 Overview
Cities are the epicenter of human activities. In most 
countries, cities have been the key drivers of national 
growth, job creation, and innovation. The OECD 
(2011) reported that just 2% of the OECD regions, 
the largest OECD urban areas, generate about 
one-third of all growth in the OECD. Driven by rapid 
industrialization, however, cities have also been the 
primary sources of environmental problems and 
resource-use inefficiencies. The International Energy 
Agency (2010) noted that cities and urban areas 
across the globe, where close to 50% of the world 
population reside, accounted for 67% of the global 
energy use and 71% of energy-related CO
2
 emissions 
in 2007.
Since the 1960s, cities and urban areas have been 
fueling the ROK’s economic growth. Its rapid pace 
of urbanization has made urban areas the center for 
concentrated and intensified business and industrial 
activities.  The OECD (2012) reported that the 
ROK’s real GDP increased sixteen-fold from 1970 to 
2009, while its share of urban population, following 
the UN definition, doubled over the same period 
from 40.7% to 81.9%. In 2009, seven metropolitan 
cities1  along with Gyeonggi Province, comprising 
only 16% of the nation’s territory but 69.2% of 
the total population, produced 66.3% of the gross 
regional domestic product (GRDP) (Statistics Korea, 
2015).
Aside from the industrial sector, the transport and 
building sectors have contributed significantly to 
GHG emissions and energy consumption in the 
ROK’s cities. In 2009, the transport sector consumed 
19.7% of energy, of which 80.8% was from road 
transport; it accounted for 14.8% of total GHG 
emissions, of which 94.6% was from road transport 
(KOTI and KEMCO, 2014). 
CHAPTER 7 
GREEN HOMELAND AND TRANSPORTATION
1. Introduction 
1 |These include Seoul, Busan, Daegu, Incheon, Daejeon, Gwangju, and Ulsan in the order of population size.
Summary
Since the 1960s, urbanization has been fueling the ROK’s economic growth but at the same time, has contributed 
significantly to GHG emissions, energy consumption, and other multifaceted challenges. To transform the energy-
intensive industrial structure of the cities, the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth has focused on three major entry points: 
urban planning, buildings, and transportation. In line with the country’s low-carbon green growth vision and through the 
strong political buy-in from the local authorities, the ROK has achieved great strides in pilot testing green model cities 
along with carrying out proactive urban regeneration activities in various city sprawls. Furthermore, the efficiency of the 
ROK’s public transportation system has improved significantly through the years and now serves as a good benchmark 
for other countries given its state-of-the-art and innovative transport infrastructure. The building sector also showed 
progress in terms of curbing emissions by strengthening green-design construction standards and energy efficiency 
rating certifications based on rigid and transparent procedures. The ROK’s experience in the area of green homeland 
and transportation underscores the importance of addressing complex urban problems − not as stand-alone issues but 
as a part of the larger integrated system encompassing physical, economic, social, and behavioral factors. 
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On the other hand, the building sector contributed 
25.4% of the total energy consumption and emitted 
22% of the total national GHG emissions in 2009 
(KEMCO, 2014). It should be noted that 40% of 
national energy use and emissions in 2009 were 
from the building and transport sectors. Thus, the 
cities, specifically the buildings and transportation 
system, are crucial entry points for the ROK to 
substantially reduce energy consumption and GHG 
emissions.
Given the continuous focus on economic growth 
while striving to mitigate GHG emissions in the 
urban sector, policymakers have proposed measures 
to pursue green growth in the ROK’s cities. In light of 
this, the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth selected 
“green homeland and green transport” as one of 
ten policy directions, along with transforming the 
energy-intensive industrial structure. The plan 
focuses on three major areas: 
(1) green urban planning; 
(2) green buildings; and 
(3) green transportation.
1.2 Baseline Assessment 
In furthering economic growth and industrialization, 
national policies have been anchored in enabling 
and facilitating business and industrial activities 
to maximize output. However, this entails huge 
environmental and social costs, especially in cities 
and urban areas, where most of the country’s 
activities, industries, and infrastructures are 
concentrated. 
Root Causes of Challenges
Since the early 1990s, sustainability and climate 
change issues have been the subject of serious 
discussions in Korean cities due to the worsening 
air pollution, rising temperatures, increasing 
precipitation, and frequent heatwaves. In pursuing 
low-carbon green growth, the urban challenges that 
policymakers should resolve are therefore multi-
faceted – covering environmental, demographic, 
socioeconomic, as well as climate change and 
sustainability issues.
Figure 1: GDP and the urbanization process in the ROK (1970-2009)
Source: OECD, 2011
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Consistent with other developed countries, the 
ROK’s economic growth and urbanization moved in 
tandem. The share of urban population increased 
substantially, as did the Korean economy, reaching 
a share of over 90% of the national population 
in 2009. Virtually all urbanization activities took 
place between 1970 and 1990 but the trend has 
gradually declined since then. In particular, Seoul, 
covering only 0.2% of the nation’s entire area, was 
home to 21.1% of the national population and 
contributed 23.7% to the total GDP in 2009. Also in 
the same year, the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA), 
including Incheon and Gyeonggi Province, accounted 
for 49.3% of population and 52.2% of total GDP 
(KOSTAT, 2015).
The UN estimated that close to 50% of the world 
population resides in urban areas in 2010. In the case 
of the ROK, it is one of the most urbanized countries, 
where nine of its metropolitan areas belong to the 
top 50 cities (among 268 urban areas in OECD) 
with the highest population density. The Seoul 
metropolitan area, including Incheon, ranked eighth 
with more than 15,000 persons/km2 and Pohang 
ranked 51st with over 5,000 persons/km2.
The ROK’s rapid economic growth has resulted in 
increased disposable income and affordability of 
urban amenities, leading to a consumption-oriented 
lifestyle that entails greater utilization of resources 
and higher GHG emissions. The use of electric 
Industry Building Transport Other
Five-year mean temperture of Korea (°C) Five-year mean precipitation in Korea (mm)
Figure 3: Trends in temperature and precipitation on the Korean Peninsula (1912-2005)
Figure 2: Percentage of national energy use and GHG emissions by sector in 2009
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devices for household activities has increased 
significantly, along with better quality of housing 
and transportation. Between 1990 and 2009, the 
average urban household income and expenditure 
per month increased by 391.2% (from 938,000 KRW 
to 3,670,000 KRW) and 276.6% (from 603,000 
KRW to 2,180,000 KRW), respectively. On the 
other hand, the corresponding average household 
expenditures for transport and housing, including 
water, electricity, gas, communication and other fuel, 
increased by 586.8%, from 121,000 KRW to 710,000 
KRW over the same period as seen in Figure 4.
The worsening traffic caused by the rapid pace 
of motorization remains a daunting challenge 
for urban policymakers. Due to the continuous 
rise in income and living standards, nationwide 
vehicle ownership soared more than 136-fold 
from 126,000 in 1970 to 17.3 million in 2009 
(KOSTAT, 2014). The mainstream Korean transport 
policy until the 2000s was anchored in building 
and expanding infrastructure to facilitate the 
development of transport networks and at the same 
time, accommodate the increasing travel demand 
through capacity expansion. Despite the substantial 
investments to ease bottlenecks in the transport 
Index 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
Annual Average Growth (%)
70-80 80-90 90-00 00-09
Population (‘000) 32,241 38,123 42,869 47,008 48,182 1.69 1.18 0.93 0.41
Urbanization (%) 50.1 68.7 81.9 87.7 90.8 3.21 1.77 0.69 0.36
Table 1: ROK’s urbanization rate and GDP growth (1970-2009)
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service
Figure 4: Average monthly income and expenditure of urban households (1990-2009)
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service
Income Total Housing, etc Transport Communication
K
R
W
 (1
,0
0
0
)
Income Total Housing etc. Transport Communication
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
U
n
it
:  
th
o
u
sa
n
d
 K
R
W
285
systems such as roads, railways, ports, aviation 
and metro, most resources were invested in road 
transport facilities while overlooking public transit 
systems and other modes. Yet vehicular demand 
continued to grow, outstripping the enhanced 
capacity of the road transport system, thereby 
promoting dependency on automobiles. 
Expanding road capacity remains a great challenge 
especially in urban areas considering the chronic 
congestion on urban roads every day, causing 
poor transit service and negative environmental 
externalities. Since the 2000s, transport policy has 
started to focus on service improvements rather 
than expansion to respond to the public expectation 
of improving service quality. However, the problem 
of congestion still worsened, inflicting higher costs 
as shown in Figure 5. Although the trend has slowed 
down since 2000s, the number of registered vehicles 
still increased by an annual average of 3.86% 
between 2000 and 2009, and this trend continues.
Relevant Problems
From the 1960s until the 1980s, the Korean urban 
policy focused on developing large cities that would 
Figure 5: Congestion costs in seven metropolitan cities (1994-2009)   
Source: National Transport Statistics of Korea, 2013; Korea Transport Database Center, 2013Seoul Busan Daegu Incheon Gwangju Daejeon Ulsan
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Table 2: The pace of motorization and urban railway expansion in the ROK (1970 - 2009)
Source: National Transport Statistics of Korea, Korea Transport Database Center, 2013
Index 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
Annual Average Growth (%)
70-80 80-90 90-00 00-09
Vehicles registered 
(‘000)
126 527 3,394 12,509 17,325 15.38 20.47 13.52 3.85
Intercity railway 
lengths (km)
3,193.2 3,134.6 3,091.3 3,123 3,373
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accommodate rapid economic growth. Over this 
period, metropolitan cities (e.g., Seoul and Busan) 
and heavily industrialized cities (e.g., Ulsan, Gumi, 
Pohang, and Changwon) were developed as major 
economic and industrial centers, and designated 
respectively as a “National Industrial Complex.” 
Numerous new town development projects involving 
large-scale commercial and housing plans were 
initiated in and around the large cities. Along with 
the speedy and massive scale of urbanization, 
cities rapidly evolved as modern hubs and covered 
more spaces for new developments, even gradually 
occupying more lands that are once designated as 
protected inner areas while sprawling to surrounding 
outer areas at the same time. Meanwhile, a number 
of new cities in the outer areas have emerged, with 
increasing concentration of activities and industries. 
Small-sized cities became large or medium-sized 
cities, forming metropolises with adjacent cities and 
urban areas (See Figure 6).
Despite the decentralization policy initiated in 
the 1980s that promoted balanced territorial 
development by restraining the concentration of 
population and industry in the Seoul metropolitan 
region, the problem still persists. Existing 
urban areas expanded constantly, adding more 
environmental and ecological burdens on urban 
residents, while old towns further deteriorated.
The number of high-rise buildings has steadily 
increased, particularly due to the government’s 
strong support for housing and new town projects. 
From 1984 to 2009, the total number of buildings 
in the ROK increased from 5.88 to 6.62 million, yet 
residential buildings decreased from 4.96 to 4.50 
million. In the same period, 10-story (and above) 
buildings substantially increased from 1,739 to 
78,874; this means that most newly constructed 
residential buildings are high-rise structures. It 
should be noted that between 1990 and 2010, 
58.43% of the total new houses were high-rise 
apartments. In 2005, the share of high-rise 
apartments in Seoul was 54.3%, which is higher than 
in Sydney (20%) and Toronto (40%). Between 1975 
and 2005, each housing unit became bigger and the 
space occupied by a person increased from 8.2 m2 to 
22.8 m2.
The widespread ownership of private cars created 
greater decision-making opportunities for people 
regarding housing, work, business, recreation, and 
Figure 6: Growth of cities in the ROK by population size
1960 1980 2005
Source: KRISH Gazette, 2011
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other activities. However, excessive automobile 
dependency has exhausted the transport carrying 
capacity of cities and urban areas. Until today, road 
transport remains dominant while the share of 
railway and other transit modes declined for both 
passengers and freight (Figure 7). Road transport 
accounts for 94.9% of the total carbon emissions, 
of which private vehicles accounted for 60.6% of 
CO
2
 emissions, followed by freight trucks at 24.4% 
in 2009. These patterns are consistent with most 
developed countries (IEA, 2008) and reflect the 
trend of increasing dependence on private vehicle 
use (KEEI, 2007). Furthermore, as congestion 
increased, nationwide average travel time for 
commuters increased from 29 minutes in 1995 
to 32.9 minutes in 2010, while that of Seoul alone 
increased from 35.9 minutes to 41.2 minutes in the 
same period. 
Policy Options
To cope with the multi-faceted urban challenges, 
urban policy should reduce externalities and 
resource use as well as minimize negative impacts 
on the environment and urban residents. Against 
this backdrop, green cities have emerged as a policy 
option. The concept of the green city has evolved 
from various related models such as sustainable city, 
eco-city, and low-carbon city and it encompasses all 
the components of such models.2
Since the concept includes all components of the 
urban sector, a green city strives to create clean 
and efficient energy, transportation, and building 
infrastructure. In doing so, some of the measures 
include linking city, countryside, and forest resources 
while implementing regional resource-recycling 
schemes; improving institutional measures on low-
carbon urban planning; promoting low-carbon urban 
regeneration projects; and developing, designating, 
and supporting new cities for testing low-carbon 
energy-saving measures.
The concept also encompasses fostering green 
buildings by applying a variety of regulatory 
and incentive measures that can alter energy 
demand and improve energy efficiency. Since 
buildings account for nearly one-third of all global 
GHG emissions, simple efficiency and design 
improvements can make a drastic difference in 
emissions reductions. Stringent design standard, 
certification, and rating systems are possible 
regulatory options while financial support, tax cuts, 
and credits for landlord or tenants are possible 
incentives. Furthermore, the dissemination of green 
building construction techniques with strengthened 
2 | A green city is defined as a unit of space that reduces energy consumption and emissions by expanding the green area with land use reformation; including 
preservation of the natural ecology, improvement of transport systems, adaption of green IT technology, new and renewable energy sources and through ex-
pansion of the bio-ecological area. It means a new way of enhancing the sustainability of urbanized areas with ecosystem services at the core of the concept. 
(New Growth Engine, 2015)
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The Presidential Committee on Green Growth
G een Technology
Industry
Green Growth 
Strategy
Climate Change 
Countermeasure
Energy
Secretariat
Table 3: Housing conditions in the urban areas (1980-2005)
Source: Korea Statistics Office
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
% Change
(1975-
2005)
Space per housing (m2) 68.1 68.4 72.6 80.8 80.7 81.7 83.7 122.9
Space per person (m2) 8.2 10.1 11.3 13.8 17.2 20.2 22.8 278.0
Persons per room 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.9 1.3 56.5
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guidelines for design, construction, and maintenance, 
and the use of renewable energy are also good 
instruments. 
To reduce emissions in the transportation sector, 
being one of the fastest growing sources of GHG 
in the ROK, the fundamental approach should be a 
package of push and pull policies to drive significant 
modal shift to a green transport system. 
The “push” policies include financial instruments 
such as congestion pricing, toll, parking charge as 
well as technical and regulatory instruments such 
as auto restricted zone (ARZ) and parking removal. 
Such approach focuses on influencing the individual’s 
travel decisions by bearing its real costs. The “pull” 
policies, on the other hand, intend to discourage 
the use of inefficient modes - autos and trucks - by 
making alternative modes more attractive such as 
public transport and improving the walkability and 
ease of biking in and around the city. Greening the 
transportation also implies encouraging the public 
to use low-carbon green transport such as bus and 
rail by providing and supplying more integrated 
transit links and promoting public transportation, 
integrated transit center, and bus rapid transit 
(BRT). It also entails developing and commercializing 
green transport technologies such as hybrid or 
electric vehicles, Intelligent Transport System (ITS), 
and developing and applying eco-friendly logistics 
facilities and equipment.
The efforts concerning the greening of city, buildings, 
and transportation are interrelated. Integrated 
planning between land use and transportation is 
thus critical for the ROK to pursue green growth. 
Since most of the nations’ green efforts must 
be implemented at the local level, the central 
government should design a set of policies coherent 
with the local level to effectively facilitate and 
support the greening efforts on both national and 
subnational levels.
1.3 Challenges and Opportunities for Green 
Homeland and Green Transport
Having eco-friendly cities with green transportation 
requires political commitment and government 
actions involving various ministries and governing 
entities. It also necessitates serious involvement 
from related industries and technologies. The Five-
Year Plan carved out the creation of green homeland 
and green transport as one of ten policy agendas, 
under the national strategy of “Improving the 
Quality of Life and National Prestige.” 
The strategic directions for achieving the green 
homeland and green transport agenda were then 
analyzed through SWOT analysis. The results of 
the SWOT analysis clearly indicate that there was 
great room for improvement in this respect despite 
the anticipated difficulties. The plan also prioritized 
Figure 7: Share of different transport systems in passenger and freight (1970-2009)
Source: KRISH Gazette, 2011
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five strategic directions under this agenda as well as 
specified the policy actions to be taken: 
(1) greening the homeland and cities; 
(2) expanding ecological space; 
(3) promoting construction of green buildings; 
(4) establishing a green transport system; and 
(5) facilitating bicycle use.
Figure 8: Conceptual development of green city
Source: GGGI, 2011
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Green City
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Figure 9: SWOT analysis and directions for the green homeland and transport agenda
Source: PCGG, 2009
•   Active government interventions 
and R&D activities that uphold the 
concept of “greening” the nation’s 
homeland and cities
•  Increasing prevalence and adoption 
of IT technologies for smart land-use 
and city planning 
•   Government’s strong institutional 
and ﬁnancial support for construc-
tion of energy-efﬁcient buildings 
•  Widespread support toward increas-
ing the use of bicycles
Strengths
•   Weak understanding of the concept 
of low-carbon green growth, and 
lack of ﬁnancial resource and 
expertise by local governments for 
implementation
•  Uncertainties arising from the lack 
of evidence in the feasibility of 
low-carbon interventions
•   Adverse weather and topographic 
conditions for expanding bicycle use
Weaknesess
•   Low-carbon green growth interven-
tions have high potentials for impact 
as implementation is still at the 
outset
•  Nation’s past experiences in develop-
ment of new cities with environmen-
tally friendly features serve as a 
stepping-stone for facilitating a swift 
“green” transformation
Opportunities
•   Use of unproven technologies 
involves risks of unsatisfactory 
outcomes
•  Investment on infrastructure for 
greening of the nation’s homeland 
and the transportation sector 
runs the risk of being ineffective 
if not supported by strong public 
consensus and support for realizing 
the green growth vision
Threats
Strategic 
Directions
Establishing grounds for low-carbon green 
growth vision by reorganizing government’s 
land-use and city planning strategies in a way 
to prioritize lowering of GHG emissions
Introducing a diverse package of programs 
for expanding and improving the quality of 
ecologically-friendly green spaces at 
national-, regional-, and urban-scale
Strengthening building standards and 
promoting the construction of green buildings 
that can effectively cut down energy 
consumption and improve energy efﬁciency 
Expediting a full-ﬂedged transition into low-car-
bon green transportation modes
Facilitating the use of bicycles
Tasks Actions
1. Greening of homeland 
     and cities
a. Establish a green homeland that champions low-carbon green growth
b. Transform the city and region into LCGG-oriented structure
c. Strengthen green homeland by securing safety and carbon sink as well as providing baseline database
2. Expansion of ecological 
     space
a. Foster image of green Korea via systematic management of nature reserves
b. Enhance the quality and efficiency of eco-space
c. Expand symbiotic eco-space and strengthen their connections
d. Provide institutional framework for expansion of eco-space
3. Expansion of green 
     buildings
a. Amend institutional infrastructure and framework to establish the groundwork for green buildings
b. Obtain social consensus and conditions for expanding green buildings
c. Devise action plans for expanding green building by types of buildings
4. Establishment of green 
     transport system
a. Expand green transport network
b. Shift to green logistics
c. Amplify the growth potential of green transport and logistics 
4. Promotion of bicycle 
     usage
a. Enhance the role of the bicycle as a means of green transport and regional development
b. Create a bike-friendly environment 
c. Promote a bicycle culture 
Table 4: Specific tasks and actions under the green homeland and green transport agenda
Source: PCGG, 2009
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2. National Strategies and Target 
Setting
2.1 GHG Reduction Targets under the Green 
Homeland and Green Transport Agenda
As promised at the G7 summit in 2008, the ROK 
officially finalized the mid-term national GHG 
reduction target at 30% lower than 2020 BAU level 
in 2009 based on rigorous scientific assessment.
Note that this goal is the highest reduction rate 
recommended by the IPCC (MoE, 2014). The setting 
of the national GHG reduction target was followed 
by the preparation of sectoral mid-term reduction 
targets by 2020, which was announced in 2011. As 
touched upon extensively in Chapter 2 of this report, 
the process of setting the national and sectoral 
reduction targets involved numerous quantitative 
analysis and discussions with relevant ministries and 
experts, along with public consultations as a means 
to build a strong social consensus and support. 
As shown in Figure 10, the sectors with the highest 
reduction target was transportation (34.3%) and 
building (26.9%), thus demonstrating how these 
sectors were identified as key areas to achieving 
the nation’s GHG reduction target. As of 2008, the 
combined GHG emissions from these two sectors 
account for over 40% of the total national emissions.
2.2 Strategies: Green Cities and Green Buildings
Green City
The Five-Year Plan aimed to transform the ROK’ 
major cities to uphold its vision of low-carbon green 
growth. In the process of strategy formulation, 
benchmarking studies were conducted to 
understand the wide range of relevant concepts 
made available and implemented by the developed 
countries, such as “compact cities,” “new urbanism,” 
and “urban villages.”  The Ministry of Land, 
Transportation and Maritime Affairs (MLTM) played 
a key role in developing the green city strategies 
with coordinated efforts of other relevant ministries 
Figure 10: Percentage of GHG reduction by sector in 2020 BAU level
Source: MoE, 2014l
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and public agencies; they worked together to ensure 
that the Five-Year Plan provides clear directions 
supported by a list of exemplary project-level 
interventions – such as rehabilitation of dilapidated 
urban areas, construction of energy-independent 
homes – to be carried out by ministries and local 
government authorities. 
To help guide the implementation of the Five-Year 
Plan’s green city agenda at the subnational level, the 
MLTM developed the Guidelines for Low-Carbon 
Green City Planning in July 2009. This document 
aimed to demonstrate how to systematically 
incorporate climate change issues in urban planning, 
through the elaboration of standards, predictions, 
evaluation, and countermeasures. For example, 
local government’s city planners were to analyze 
the sources of urban GHG emissions, make future 
emissions projections, propose spatial plans that 
help minimize energy consumption, and recognize 
the role of urban greenery on carbon balance. 
In November 2009, the MLTM, along with four other 
ministries and the Forest Service Agency, proposed 
an action plan called “Strategies for Green City 
and Green Building Initiatives,” which served as 
the blueprint for the project-level interventions on 
green cities. Elaborating the directions set forward 
in the Five-Year Plan, the document prioritized the 
following actions:
• Energy-Saving Urban Planning: The urban 
consumption of energy was to be minimized 
through the promotion of spatial plans for compact 
cities, realizing intermodalism (i.e., provision of 
connections between different transportation 
modes through construction of transfer centers), 
proactive application of information technology 
to improve material productivity and resource 
management, introduction of low-carbon 
transportation infrastructure (i.e., bus rapid transit 
and exclusive bus lanes), and construction of green 
homes (i.e., energy-independent homes).
• Strengthening Foundations for Resource-
Circulating Cities: As a means of enhancing the 
resource productivity of urban activities, local 
governments were to expand waste recycling 
practices by introducing automated waste 
collection centers, energy management systems, 
and rainwater harvest facilities. 
• Creation of Urban Ecological Spaces: Areas 
surrounding reservoirs and waterways of cities 
were to be developed into ecological spaces 
offering opportunities for recreation, and the 
city’s high-density areas were to accommodate 
green spaces (e.g., parks, carbon grove) which help 
mitigate urban heat island effects. 
In order to localize these national-level action plans, 
pilot projects to promote green cities were to be 
undertaken by local governments in partnership 
with the responsible ministries. Pilot projects were 
either “green the new city plans” or “green existing 
cities,” incorporating several district features of 
green cities – such as adoption of energy saving 
building codes (green homes), establishment of 
new and renewable energy systems (zero energy 
towns), and improvement of urban parks and 
greenery (low-carbon cities) – that best meet the 
local circumstances. In other words, a range of 
different pilot city proposals was suggested by 
the Strategies for Green City and Green Building 
Initiative, stimulating local governments to develop 
their own green city concepts that embrace the 
existing local development agenda. The central 
government provided strong signals on the need 
for relevant ministries to be strongly involved in the 
local initiatives, especially in terms of ensuring that 
the necessary budgetary and financial resources are 
made available.   
Green Buildings
Recognized as one of the most energy-intensive 
sectors of the nation, the government pledged 
to take nationwide measures in transforming the 
building stock. Unlike the locally-centered initiatives 
under the green city agenda, interventions for 
greening of buildings were to bring about nationwide 
transformations on how buildings are designed, 
constructed, and utilized. Under an ambitious target 
of achieving a 31% reduction in GHG emissions from 
the building sector by 2020 (against the emission 
levels of 2005), the Strategies for Green City and 
Green Building Initiatives emphasized that relevant 
actions must evolve around: 
(1) strengthening of energy standards for new 
buildings; 
(2) energy efficiency improvements for existing 
buildings; 
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(3) inducing voluntary energy-reduction efforts from 
building residents; and 
(4) supporting development of innovative 
technologies and establishment of infrastructure. 
In order to provide a legislative basis for the 
government’s efforts toward green buildings, the 
Act on the Creation and Support of Green Buildings 
prepared by MLTM came into force in 2010. In 
addition to providing the guiding principles on green 
buildings, the Act prescribes incentive measures to 
support green building investments. 
Of the nation’s many major cities that actively 
promoted the government’s concept of green 
buildings, Seoul played a leading role. The city had 
adopted the Seoul Initiative on Green Growth 
in 2005, which led to a comprehensive plan that 
sought to reduce urban energy use in two phases; 
the first phase targeted public building retrofits and 
the second phase aimed for the expansion to the 
private sector. In 2007, the city created the Green 
Architecture Standards – which is similar to the 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) scheme developed by the U.S. Green Building 
Council – specifically to be applied for buildings 
in Seoul. The newly constructed public buildings 
in Seoul are mandated to meet this requirement, 
while incentives are made available to private 
sector partners in the form of tax cuts on building 
acquisition and registration.
2.3 Strategies: Green Transport
To efficiently implement green growth strategies 
in the transport sector, the MLTM quickly devised 
a legal framework by enacting the Sustainable 
Transportation Logistics Development Act in June 
2009, which came into force in December 2009. The 
Act aims to present rudimentary policy directions for 
the transport sector to promote the development of 
a sustainable transport logistics system based on the 
six basic principles: 
Plans Project-level interventions
1. Strengthening of energy 
     standards for new buildings
a. Strengthen the building design codes
b. Introduce standards that regulate a building’s total annual energy consumption
c. Subsidize the construction of “one million green homes” (energy independent homes) by 2018
d. Mandate the application of environmentally friendly and renewable energy technologies in public buildings
2. Energy efficiency 
     improvements for existing 
     buildings
a. Expand voluntary participation in building certification schemes
b. Provide subsidies and non-monetized benefits for energy efficiency investments
c. Carry out government-led programs for energy efficiency improvements in public office and school buildings
3. Promotion of voluntary 
     energy-reduction efforts 
     from building residents
a. Expand the carbon-points system (refer to Chapter 5)
b. Mandate the assignment of energy management expert in buildings with annual energy consumption greater than 
2,000 TOE
c. Expand the green start campaign (refer to Chapter 5)
4. Support for development 
     of innovative technologies 
     and establishment of 
     infrastructure
a. Provide public grants for R&D projects on green building technologies
b. Offer specialized training for green building experts
c. Establish a nationwide building energy consumption database
Table 5: Action plan for green buildings 
Source: Strategies for Green City and Green Building Initiatives, 2009
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(1) promoting a low-carbon transportation logistics 
system by reducing emissions; 
(2) advancing environmentally friendly 
transportation systems; 
(3) promoting a transportation system that saves 
energy and resources; 
(4) improving the mobility, accessibility, and safety in 
transportation; 
(5) promoting a balance among different modes of 
transportation; and
(6) effectively integrating urban land use and 
transportation planning. 
In line with this Act, local governments were 
mandated to formulate the Master Plan for 
Sustainable Transport and Logistics Development 
with a planning horizon of 10 years, which should 
devise specific policies and measures along with 
their required financial needs. The Sustainable 
Transportation Logistics Development Act was 
indeed innovative in the sense that it suggested 
a wide variety of comprehensive and integrated 
measures to promote green transportation across 
different modes of transport. 
The government’s Green Transportation Strategy 
prepared in November 2009 by the MLTM and MKE 
served as the blueprint to realizing the essential 
provisions of the Act. The document declared making 
an ambitious paradigm shift in transport policies: 
from energy-consuming and automobile-oriented 
Plans Project-level interventions
1. Strengthening of the  Travel 
Demand Management (TDM)
Strengthen the TDM: congestion pricing scheme, car-sharing programs, eco-driving habit,  telecommuting, etc.
Build low-carbon Smart Transport System for best utilization of existing facilities: Intelligent Transport System (ITS), 
Smart Highway Project, Electronic Toll Collection System (ETCS) on freeways (high-pass system), and multi-modal 
integrated travel information center
Introduce Green Transport Zone (GTZ): green traffic priority zone, vehicle volume restriction by district, Transit-
Oriented Development (TOD)
2. Promotion of bike use and 
pedestrian
Integrate public transit and bike: bicycle racks on buses and rail vehicles and at rail stations and bus stops, improved 
amenities in large buildings and facilities for bike users
Build safety-enhanced bicycle infrastructure: lifestyle adapted network (transit station connection, rapid bikeway, 
stricter legal standards on the sidewalks for combined use for bike and pedestrian)
Improve human-oriented pedestrian environment: pilot pedestrian mall and transit mall projects, and pedestrian day 
(Nov. 11)
3. Use of convenient and faster 
public transit systems than 
private automobiles
Enhance competitiveness of bus services: new regional services, transfer center at freeway rest stations, bus rapid 
transit (BRT), elimination of blind transit service catchment areas
Expand urban and regional rail services: new rail systems in metropolitan area, initiation of express services
Expand national high-speed rail network: early completion of the Phase 2 Korea Train eXpress (KTX) project, “Design 
Standards for Accelerated Railway Service” to reduce costs
4. Establishment of rail and 
coastal water-based green 
transport systems
Implement two-layer loading DST operation: new connection between Busan port and Gwangyang port
Expand rail-based intermodal transport system: enhance rail infrastructure to enhance rail model share
Expedite modal shift to green transport modes: subsidy for trucking industry
Promote coastal water transport system: port charge reduction and tax exemption
Build the Geyoungin Aragil inland waterway: opening of China route, financial support ship design and building
Establish carbon reduction logistics: national network of logistics complex, reduced dead-head travel distances, 
certification of green logistics, green port development, create short-distance air routes
Table 6: Summary of project-level interventions proposed by the Green Transportation Strategy
Source: MLTM and MKE, 2009
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system toward a human-oriented green transport 
system, and from supply-oriented to demand-
oriented approach through the establishment of 
coordinated and strengthened networks among 
different modes of transport with strong emphasis 
on operationally efficient intermodalism. Ultimately, 
the strategy was to help ensure a 33%-37% 
reduction in GHG emissions from the transportation 
sector against BAU levels by 2020, equivalent to 
20%-24% reduction in annual emissions as compared 
to the level recorded for 2005.
Through a combination of “push” and “pull” 
measures,3  the Green Transportation Strategy 
focused primarily on inducing modal shift from 
road transport to more energy-efficient and 
environmentally friendly modes, such as railway, 
walking, and bicycles. The push measures included 
strategies such as congestion charges and Green 
Transport Zone (GTZ) in large cities to control the 
heavy demand for private cars. On the other hand, 
the promotion of public transit, rail and water, and 
non-motorized modes with expanded networks and 
enhanced services were suggested as pull measures, 
along with the urban densification policies, such as 
Compact City and Transit-Oriented Development. 
In order to minimize the construction of road 
infrastructure, improved efficiency in the use of 
existing road facilities through the adoption of 
Intelligent Transport Systems was also proposed.
In July 2008, the Ministry of Public Administration 
and Security announced the promotion of bicycle as 
one of its long-term national strategic agenda backed 
up by an implementation plan (Comprehensive Plan 
on Bicycle Promotion; MOPAS, 2008). Consultation 
meetings with all relevant ministerial and local 
government agencies were held to support the 
implementation of the plan, which specifically 
targeted the construction of 3,114 km of additional 
bicycle lanes nationwide between 2009 and 2018, 
and 1,700 km of bicycle lanes along the waterfront 
pavements in four major rivers. Such investments 
were expected to boost the nation’s share of bicycles 
use in transport (i.e., modal split) from 1.5% in 2009 
to 5% in 2013. In June 2010, the Comprehensive 
Plan on Bicycle Promotion was updated into the 
Master Plan for National Bicycle Road, which is 
essentially a 10-year construction plan for the 
nationwide network of bicycle roads. 
3 | Push measures are those imposed on individual travelers’ behavior and decision, while pull measures are designed to encourage less use of road 
       transport modes, typically privately owned cars and trucks (Vuchic, 2005).
Source: MLTM, 2010
Actions
Targets
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Urban rail modal share (%) 19 20 21 22 23
KTX network length (km) 240.4 240.4 364.6 364.6 364.6
Openings of light rail transit line - 1 2 - 1
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) routes - 2 2 2 2
% of High-Pass usage 40 50 60 65 70
Multi-modal transfer centers - 4 4 4 3
Subsidy for green logistics (million KRW) - 1,500 5,000 5,000 65,000
Newly designated logistics complexes 2 8 10 5 -
Expansion of radio frequency identification (RFID) system and infrastructure 13 20 51 68 -
Shift to liquefied natural gas (LNG) trucks 45 50 1,500 1,750 2,000
Attendees for Eco-Drive training program - 1,280 1,280 1,280 1,280
Pedestrian Malls - 5 5 5 5
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) infrastructure on national highway network (%) 17.5 18.0 20.8 23.6 26.3
Table 7: MLTM’s targets for the green transport agenda (2009-2013)
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Apart from those introduced above, the MLTM 
ensured that the strategies and plans already 
existing under the nation’s transportation framework 
were refined to fully uphold the concept of low-
carbon green growth. The representative examples 
include the Second National Railway Master Plan 
(2011-2020) and the Second Public Transportation 
Master Plan (2012-2016). Table 7 summarizes the 
targets set forth by all national-level transportation 
plans and strategies for the period subject to the 
Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013).
2.4 Target Setting 
The creation of green homeland and transport is 
one of the ten policy directions under the Five-Year 
Plan for Green Growth. Placed under the objective 
of “improving the lives of people and enhancing the 
national prestige,” the agenda item placed forward a 
total of five key programs: 
(1) construction of carbon-neutral new green cities 
and rehabilitation of the dilapidated areas of 
existing cities; 
(2) expansion of nature reserves (ecological space) 
through the restoration of city streams and 
forestation within the city areas; 
(3) expansion of green buildings through the 
introduction of energy efficiency ratings and 
incentives; 
(4) expansion of green transportation and public 
transit system; and 
(5) promotion of using bicycles (PCGG, 2009).
Table 8: Quantitative targets in the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013)
Programs Target Indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1. Green Homeland and City
Build carbon-neutral cities 0 1 3 5 8
Low-carbon green regeneration of cities (%) 5 10 20 30 40
2. Nature Reserves
Eco rivers and streams (%) 60 61 62 65 70
Nature reserves (ha) 1,800 1,900 2,000 2,300 2,500
Multi-purpose street (%) 5 10 18 25 30
3. Green Buildings
Green homes (‘000) 55 70 95 105 675
Energy rating and green certification (%) 40 50 60 90 100
Green design standard and criteria (%) 20 40 60 80 70
Green homes (%) 10 30 40 50 60
Reform of existing buildings (%) 10 30 40 50 60
4. Green Transport
Public transit share (%) 50 51 52 53 55
Rail mode share (%) 19 21 23 25 30
Auto share for short-distance trip (%) 43 40 37 34 30
5. Bicycle Usage
Modal share 1.5 3 4 5 5
Bike city 1 3 5 10 20
National cycling lane (km) 100 300 500 1,000 1,400
City bikeway (km) 50 100 300 600 1,000
Use rate (%) 10 15 20 25 30
Fiscal expenditures (trillion KRW) 4.7 9.5 11.0
Source: PCGG, 2009
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3. Policy Actions and Programs
3.1 Green Transportation
Exhaust gases from automobiles account for 
more than 60% of air pollution, underscoring the 
need for stringent environmental policies to be 
reconciled and pursued in the transportation sector. 
As part of the Five-Year Plan, the government 
devised various action plans for promoting green 
transportation. Some of its low-carbon policies that 
have shown progress include the formulation of a 
comprehensive transportation demand management 
plan; distribution of green cars; provision of 
incentives to stimulate a modal shift to public 
transportation; improvement in fuel efficiency 
standards; and imposition of regulations on CO
2 
emissions. In the ROK, the green transportation 
trend began to emerge largely from the cities that 
possess strong basic infrastructure. Accordingly, this 
section introduces the main policies and actions of 
the transportation sector in the ROK, focusing on 
the nation’s capital, Seoul, where the greening of 
transportation services is best carried out.
3.1.1 Transportation Reform in Seoul and the 
Metropolitan Area
An enabling legal and institutional environment is 
critical to the establishment of green transportation 
systems, in addition to the infrastructural measures 
that bring about physical changes. On this note, the 
Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) pushed for 
an extensive reform of the public transportation 
system in 2004, and after the introduction of the 
Five-Year Plan, it introduced electric vehicles and 
compressed natural gas (CNG) buses to lessen 
the carbon footprint of the transportation sector. 
The SMG’s public transformation reform in 2004 
especially focused on transforming public bus 
travels, specifically through the following actions: 
(1) enhancing the efficiency of bus operation 
systems; 
(2) improving the charging system; 
(3) providing exclusive median bus lanes; and 
(4) introducing a quasi-public bus operation system. 
Moreover, it created the T-Money system that uses 
contactless smart cards to pay for all transportation 
expenses covering bus, metro, or taxi. Today, the use 
of transportation cards is not just a tool for payment; 
it represents significant progress in Seoul’s public 
transportation policies, facilitating the transparent 
operation of transport income and reduction of 
operation costs of transport facilities. 
Efficiency of the Bus Transportation System
Traffic conditions in Seoul worsened as the number 
of automobiles rapidly increased from one million in 
the early 1990s to two million in the 2000s. Despite 
the changing circumstances, improvements in the 
city’s bus operating system were not explored for 
decades, and citizens thus began to turn away from 
the deteriorating quality of bus transport service. 
As such, the SMG began to restructure the bus 
operating system to induce citizens to give up driving 
cars and choose public transportation instead. 
Replacing the original operating system – that was 
merely divided into city, express, and circular buses – 
the new system is composed of: 
(1) the Blue bus that crosses the main points of the 
city directly; 
(2) the Green bus that circles the neighborhood and 
is linked to the subway station; 
(3) the Red bus that links Seoul and the metropolitan 
area; and 
(4) the Yellow bus that covers the downtown areas. 
Based on this system, the bus routes were 
completely reformed as well. The winding routes 
were straightened and the intervals between buses 
were shortened to increase efficiency. The colors 
signify the type of bus, which can be easily seen by 
the commuters at a glance.
Integrated Fare System
The public transportation charging system in Seoul 
was not integrated in the past, which means that 
commuters paid an additional fare for every change 
of mode of transport. This was an irrational system 
in which the commuter was often overcharged for 
changing buses, mainly because there was no direct 
(single mode) route to the destination. To overcome 
this problem, the SMG instituted a comprehensive 
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charging system for public transportation. This 
system allows passengers to make bus-to-bus or 
bus-to-subway transfers for the price of one ticket, 
using a single card. Under the new system, 1,050 
KRW was charged if the total distance is less than 10 
km, regardless of the means of transport or number 
of transfers, and an additional 100 KRW for every 5 
km (note that these prices are as of 2004 when the 
system was first introduced). The number of transits 
may not exceed a maximum of five times (otherwise, 
additional charges apply), and the comprehensive 
transit discount is applied only when the transfer 
interval of transit is within 30 minutes. This charging 
system enhanced the convenience of passengers, 
and at the same time, made public transportation 
more accessible and affordable.  
Introduced for the first time by SMG in the ROK, the 
comprehensive public transportation system was 
expanded to its host province – Gyeonggi Province – 
in 2007 as well, providing benefits not only to Seoul 
citizens but to all residents of the metropolitan area. 
Obviously, as the expansion of such benefits leads to 
less profits for buses and metro, the comprehensive 
public transportation system faced opposition 
from transport facilities. In the case of the metro, 
there was less opposition as it is operated by the 
public organizations (Metropolitan Rapid Transit 
and Metropolitan Subway Corporation) under the 
SMG. Nevertheless, raising the minimum charge was 
unavoidable, and the SMG had to partly cover the 
incurred losses. 
On the other hand, there was considerable 
debate on who should cover the losses among bus 
passengers of Seoul and Gyeonggi Province. The 
Gyeonggi Provincial Office proposed that SMG 
should cover a larger share but from the SMG’s 
perspective, it was impossible to subsidize the 
buses that Gyeonggi residents use with the taxes 
collected from Seoul citizens. This problem was left 
unresolved for a prolonged period; during this time, 
Gyeonggi Province passengers were compelled to 
pay multiple minimum charges – once when hopping 
on a bus from Gyeonggi Province to Seoul, and for a 
second time when transiting to a Seoul bus. Under 
the circumstances, residents of Gyeonggi Province 
began to selectively ride Seoul buses that pass 
through parts of Gyeonggi Province to avoid multiple 
charges, leading to a loss of passengers for Gyeonggi 
Province buses. To address the situation, Gyeonggi 
Province eventually conducted active negotiations 
with SMG, and they were able to reach an agreement 
to implement an integrated charging system.
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Amount of 
fares discounted
 from transits 
(in 10 million KRW)
Total 5,392 5,944 6,164 6,184 6,264 7,192
Subway 1,679 1,967 2,137 2,152 2,219 2,581
Bus 3,713 3,977 4,027 4,032 4,045 4,611
Average daily number of persons who 
availed themselves of the discount
(in thousands persons)
1,054 1,105 1,157 1,162 1,180 1,175
Average amount of 
discounts per person
(in 1,000 KRW)
512 537 533 532 530 612
Table 9: Yearly amount of discount from public transportation transits per person 
Source: Seoul Policy Archive, 2015
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Table 10: Operational characteristics of public buses in Seoul
Source: SMG, 2015
Type of Bus Example
Blue Bus: 
Blue buses shorten the distance and time needed for 
transport by crossing the entire Seoul City from East to 
West, and North to South. Blue buses ensure speed and 
punctuality.
Green Bus: 
Green buses form a dense network for districts that Blue 
buses do not cover. Green buses cover transportation 
needs within a confined local district and provide 
accessibility.
Red Bus: 
Red buses directly connect metropolitan areas to 
downtown areas. Red buses are intended to absorb 
commuters that cross the city boundaries using privately 
owned vehicles.
Yellow Bus: 
Yellow buses run short distances in regions with much 
daytime traffic. Yellow buses cover business and shopping 
needs within the region.
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Exclusive Median Bus Lanes
The exclusive median bus lanes facilitate the use 
of public transportation and ease traffic in the 
downtown areas by separating buses from other 
transportation modes. The SMG implemented 
exclusive median bus lanes in three sections in Seoul 
in 2004, and has expanded to the lanes by about 15 
km each year; mainly for roads with multiple bus 
routes and serious traffic jams. As of late 2012, 115 
km of exclusive median bus lanes were constructed 
on 12 main roads, which increased the average speed 
of buses by around 30%, from 15.8 km/h to 19.9 
km/h. In particular, some main streets with intense 
traffic benefited the most from this action, given the 
increase in travel speed of up to 80%. In addition, 
exclusive median bus lanes contributed greatly to 
the timeliness of buses, thereby boosting public 
confidence in buses − as well as the revenues of bus 
companies.
During the initial period of establishing exclusive 
median bus lanes, the pedestrians and passengers 
who were not yet accustomed to the system would 
jaywalk or the buses would surpass speed limits, 
resulting in higher cases of accidents. However, the 
continuous promotion of the system led to improved 
citizen awareness and an orderly culture of following 
traffic rules, thereby reducing the number of 
accidents every year. In implementing the exclusive 
median bus lanes, the SMG exerts significant efforts 
to minimize the inconveniences to passengers, 
pedestrians, and drivers.
Quasi-public Bus Operation System
The private bus companies’ selective operation of 
buses based on the routes of highest profitability 
was a concern for SMG. This operation is not only 
against the public interest on wide geographical 
coverage of bus services but also impedes the overall 
quality of bus services. To address this problem, 
the SMG introduced the quasi-public bus operation 
system in 2004. Basically, the new operation system 
allows SMG to exercise authority in determining 
bus routes, intervals between buses, and number 
of buses in operation. Also, one Bus Operation 
Consulting Body was to manage the revenue of all 
private bus companies. The SMG provides subsidies 
if there is a deficit, and collects the revenue (from 
the Bus Operation Consulting Body), if it is above 
a certain level, to reinvest in infrastructure for 
enhancing bus services.
This quasi-public bus operation system combines 
the benefits of both private and public systems 
in which local governments or public enterprises 
manage their operations. In addition to transferring 
the right to route decisions to citizens (which is 
reflected by SMG), this improves the bus service by 
guaranteeing stable profits for bus companies and 
monthly income for bus drivers. Also, it resolves 
excessive competition among bus companies, 
delivering positive outcomes such as reducing bus 
accidents, enhancing hospitality, and eradicating 
illegal operations.
However, as the revenue from transport remained 
sluggish, while the operation costs for transport 
companies have continuously increased, SMG has 
faced a growing financial burden. For instance, 
during the period 2007 to 2012 when bus fares 
remained flat, the annual financial burden 
shouldered by SMG increased by over 60%, from 
163.6 billion KRW to 265.4 billion KRW. Moreover, 
with the quasi-public bus operation system 
guaranteeing a certain level of profit to transport 
companies, events have demonstrated how bus 
companies have lost the motivation to cut down 
on their operation costs. In order to reform this 
monopolistic operation system with no competition, 
the entry barrier needs to be lowered so that new 
bus operators can enter the market, and operators 
that do not succeed in making profits can be 
liquidated. 
Integrated Transit Fare Card System (T-Money 
Cards)
The T-money system utilizes smart cards with chips 
and GPS installed in buses and metro stations to 
record the date and time of commute and calculate 
the fare, providing a rational charge based on the 
traveled distance. The introduction of T-money 
cards – rechargeable transportation cards – thus 
completed Seoul’s objective of an integrated fare 
system. In other words, through the introduction of 
T-money cards, citizens do not have to use separate 
cards for buses and metro, and can use public 
transportation at a lower cost through the distance-
proportionate charging system and the transit 
discount system. It is a contact-less payment system 
that saves passengers from the inconvenience of 
the process of paying cash to bus drivers, enabling a 
faster and more convenient commuting experience. 
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The development of an integrated transportation 
card system was called for from two different 
aspects. From the operational aspect, the original 
charging system which opened doors to introduce 
various forms of transportation cards (i.e., 
transportation cards that offer certain membership 
benefits) was at the risk of being monopolized by 
a single operator in the market, making it difficult 
for the local government to apply its transportation 
policies, hampering the transparency of revenues 
and profits of transport companies, and discouraging 
the needs for making improvements in service. From 
the systematic aspect, a new system was called 
to address the problems arising from the aging of 
payment infrastructure, such as poor security and 
disorder in service provision. The new T-money card 
system resolved these existing flaws, and at the 
same time led to more convenience in using public 
transport. For example, citizens enjoyed the benefit 
of expanding the recharging of transportation 
cards to new means such as the Internet and mobile 
phones, and the use of a single card for multiple 
purposes such as credit card with transport card 
functions. 
Outcomes and Takeaways
The SMG’s transportation reforms that began in 
2004 have been achieving positive results. Above 
all, the utilization rate of bus services, which had 
been falling steadily ever since the subway began 
expanding routes in the early 1980s, underwent 
a turning point in 2004. Also, with passengers 
exploiting the free-of-charge transfers between 
Figure 12: T-money cards being used in subways, buses, and taxis in Seoul
Source: SMG, 2014
Figure 11: Joint management of revenue pool under the Quasi-public Bus Operation System
Source: SMG, 2015
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subway and buses as well as the distance-
proportionate charging system, Seoul’s public 
transportation service has shown continued annual 
increases in total passenger carriage. 
The usage rate of T-Money Cards by bus passengers, 
amounting to almost 100%, represents the 
importance of effective charging systems and 
payment methods. Reforms in the fee collection 
method sparked a change in commuting patterns, 
from using a single route or single mode of transport 
to reach a certain destination, to making linked trips, 
thereby making the transit system more efficient.  
As the revenue of transport companies increased, 
the quality of services has improved as well, resulting 
in enhanced public confidence in the transportation 
system in Seoul. The reform has cut the operation 
costs of the transport companies while reducing 
boarding and stoppage time, thus leading to higher 
profit. Based on a survey in Seoul in 2012, the 
public satisfaction of using buses and subways has 
drastically improved, as of 2004.
The T-Money transportation card system is gaining 
global attention for benchmarking in countries 
such as New Zealand, Malaysia, and Colombia. For 
instance, in the case of Malaysia, the Korea Smart 
Card Corporation (the company that provides 
T-Money Card services in Korea) and LG-CNS (a 
subsidiary of LG Corporation) have helped establish 
a new transportation card system in Kuala Lumpur, 
which is now operating successfully. The number of 
bus passengers in Kuala Lumpur, which used to be 
around 250,000 per day, has increased by 20,000 
within just a single month after the adoption of the 
new transportation card system. The bus companies’ 
revenue has also increased by 20%, primarily from 
the avoided loss in cash fares that were being lost in 
the pockets of bus drivers. 
3.1.2 Improvement of Vehicle-Emission 
 and Fuel-Economy Standards
Despite the continued improvement in accessibility, 
value-for-money, and quality of service offered by 
public transportation, many people in the ROK still 
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Figure 13: Trends in public transport usage in Seoul
Source: SMG, 2014
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rely on privately owned vehicles, as it is usually 
far more comfortable and convenient. Thus, the 
government has continuously sought to regulate 
the level of emissions and improve fuel efficiencies 
of private vehicles, in addition to stimulating a 
modal shift to public transport. It is important to 
recognize that the government anticipated that such 
measures would not only help cut emissions from the 
transportation sector but also create ripple effects in 
the domestic automobile industry, and specifically in 
improving the competitiveness of local automobiles 
in the global market.
A special characteristic of the ROK’s regulation on 
privately owned vehicles is the “optional regulatory 
scheme,” which provides the choice of either 
following the regulation on average fuel economy 
or GHG emissions. In other words, the scheme 
requires automobile manufacturers to ensure that 
their cars achieve a certain level of fuel economy, 
or GHG emissions performance, whichever the 
manufacturer finds to be more advantageous. Prior 
to the adoption of the optional regulatory scheme in 
2012, the government followed a regulation that was 
based solely on the average fuel economy; vehicles 
with large (above 1,600 cc) or small (1,600 cc and 
below) engine displacements should meet different 
minimum fuel economy standards.
Implementation
The MKE set the standards for average fuel economy 
while the MoE performs the same function for 
GHG emissions. Automobile manufacturers are to 
select one of the two criteria and report to MoE 
no later than March every year. The MoE compiles 
the decisions made by automobile manufacturers 
and shares it with MKE for collective management 
purposes. Consequently, the automobile 
manufacturers are to request designated test 
agencies to evaluate either the average fuel 
economy or GHG emissions performance of their 
vehicles prior to sales. It should be noted that 
numerous test agencies in the public sector – such 
as the Korea Environment Corporation and Korea 
Institute of Energy Research – have been certified 
and designated to support the implementation 
of this policy. The automobile manufacturers are 
required to submit their performance results by 
models and sales accounts, which serve as the basis 
for compliance, to MoE by no later than March of 
the following year. Subject to a justifiable reason, 
automobile manufacturers are allowed to switch 
from one regulatory criterion to the other in the 
following year. 
Figure 14: Degree of satisfaction for the bus and subway service in Seoul
Source: SMG, 2014
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Automobiles subject to the “optional regulatory 
scheme” launched in 2012 are passenger vehicles 
(that are either domestically manufactured, or 
imported) with 10 seats or below, and with gross 
weight of less than 3.5 tons. The targeted average 
fuel economy and GHG emissions are 17 km/L and 
140 g/km, respectively. It should be noted that the 
average fuel economy or GHG emission is evaluated 
for a single car manufacturer (not for each car model) 
considering its product mix in sales; for example, 
the average fuel economy of a car manufacturer 
is equivalent to the sum of fuel efficiencies of 
different car models multiplied by their share (%) 
of sales. In order to allow flexibility for automobile 
manufacturers against the new standards, the 
policy was planned to be phased in; standards are 
to apply to 30%, 60%, 80% and 100% of the total 
automobile sales by each manufacturers by 2012, 
2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively. However, small-
scale automobile manufacturers with domestic sales 
of less than 4,500 vehicles are to be relieved with 
reduced requirements. 
Outcomes and Takeaways
The government’s target for 2015 (100% of vehicles 
to meet one of the criteria set under the optional 
regulatory scheme) was achieved in 2013, which 
was actually earlier than planned. Such outcome 
is a result of not only the government’s strong 
commitment, but stringent efforts made by the 
ROK’s domestic automobile manufacturers that 
export approximately 70% of its total production to 
the global market. Recognizing that the standards 
set by the countries having the world’s biggest 
automobile markets are significantly high, the ROK’s 
domestic automobile industry has made timely and 
constant engagements in R&D to push forward 
the technological progress required in improving 
the environmental performance of their vehicles. 
For example, the average GHG emission targets 
(following the ROK’s method of calculation) set by 
the EU, Japan, China, and the U.S. are 91 g/km (by 
2021), 100 g/km (by 2020), 110 g/km (by 2020), 
and 133 g/km (by 2020), respectively, which are 
significantly lower than the ROK’s 2015 target. 
The government remains compelled to ensure 
that the fuel economy and emissions standards in 
the domestic market would help the nation’s car 
manufacturers to keep pace with the changing 
circumstances of the global market. In 2014, it was 
announced that a new target of 24.3 km/L (average 
fuel economy) or 97 g/km (GHG emission) needs 
to be met under the optional regulatory scheme by 
2020.
Regulating vehicle emissions by setting of fuel 
economy (or GHG emission) standards is a complex 
process that needs to take into account a multiple 
number of variables, such as vehicle mix by size and 
fuel, trends in vehicle sales, and average distance 
travelled. For example, the increase in household 
income during the 1980s-2000s has led to a steep 
rise in the share of mid- or large-sized cars with 
high emission levels in the ROK. The adoption of 
the optional regulatory scheme helped stimulate 
changes in this trend as automobile manufacturers 
are encouraged to develop and sell cleaner and 
more efficient models. In an effort to transform 
consumer preferences, the government changed 
its basis for taxation on car ownership from “engine 
displacement” (i.e., more tax imposed to cars of 
higher engine displacements) to “fuel economy 
and GHG emission” performances in 2010. The 
strengthening of vehicle fuel economy and GHG 
emission standards served as a good starting point 
in increasing public consciousness on climate change 
issues. 
3.1.3 Old Car Replacement Subsidy Program
The old car replacement subsidy program (also 
referred to as the car-scrapping scheme) provide 
subsidies to vehicle owners that trade-in their old 
vehicles for new and more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
The underlying rationale to the program is clear 
and simple – to help decrease emissions from the 
transportation sector by removing energy-inefficient 
vehicles from the roads and revitalizing the domestic 
automobile industry that employs more than one 
million people in the ROK. The program provided 
public subsidies for a limited period to individuals 
who purchased cars before the year 2000, a year 
marked by strengthened requirements for vehicle-
emission levels. 
Implementation
The program was effective for a period of eight 
months, starting from May 2009, the earliest period 
of the nation’s recovery from the global financial 
crisis. Subsidies came in the form of tax cuts in 
the purchase and registration of new vehicles. 
Specifically, the sales tax and registration tax 
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collected by the local government authorities, and 
the special consumption tax imposed by the national 
tax agency were to be reduced by 70%. However, 
ceilings were placed on the maximum amount of tax 
deductions, which increased according to the size 
of the newly purchased automobile; for example, 
a ceiling of 2.5 million KRW (approximately US$ 
2,300) was placed upon purchase of a large-sized 
car. Tax deductions applied once for each old car 
replaced, regardless of the number of old cars to be 
replaced by a single individual. Beneficiaries were 
required to register their aged vehicles on an online 
system by submitting applications to car dealers, 
which would provide them with a certification of 
replacement upon purchase of a new car – the basis 
for tax deductions made by tax authorities. 
Outcomes and Takeaways
Contrary to the concerns that the old car 
replacement subsidies would hamper the 
government’s tax revenues, the program actually 
resulted in an increase in tax revenue, thanks 
to a considerable rise in the number of new car 
purchases. Specifically, the total number of new car 
sales during the first seven months of the program 
reached 885,000, which was a 35.4% increase over 
the same period in the previous year; approximately 
35.4% of these sales were subject to replacement 
subsidies. While the government initially projected 
that 270,000 old car replacements were to benefit 
from the program (i.e., equivalent to 5% of the 5.5 
million old cars on the road eligible for subsidies), 
a total of 380,000 old scrapped cars were found 
to have been provided with subsidies at the end 
of the eight-month period. The volume of new car 
sales in the ROK was revitalized to the levels prior 
to the global financial crisis in 2009. The Bank of 
Korea announced that approximately 35% of the 
nation’s increase in GDP for the second quarter of 
2009 (as compared to second quarter of 2008) was 
attributable to the increase in automobile sales. 
While the program was successful in stimulating 
demand to support the automobile manufacturing 
industry, its contributions in reducing the nation’s 
GHG emissions from the transportation sector 
remains questionable. Most importantly, the 
majority of subsidies supported the purchase of 
large-sized sedans and sports utility vehicles, which 
are not the best-in-class environmental performers. 
Without doubt, the average GHG emission levels 
of new cars that were subsidized were greater than 
those of old cars traded in, but the new cars were 
not hybrids or electric cars; the program failed 
to impose additional conditions based on either 
the fuel efficiency or emission performances. 
Moreover, the program did not help steer people 
toward small and more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
Understanding how a significant share of 
emissions from a vehicle’s cycle are caused during 
production, the program in the ROK was closer 
to being a stimulus package for the automobile 
industry. The experience of the ROK once again 
demonstrates why the old car replacement 
subsidy program is supported by the biggest car-
producing countries around the world. A more 
effective policy alternative may be one of linking 
the program to the electric vehicle rebates, 
which have been gaining momentum globally. 
3.2 Green Cities
In the ROK, GHG emissions in urban areas account 
for approximately 43% of the total national 
emissions. Identifying a wide range of low hanging 
fruits in addressing climate change and GHG 
reductions in the urban context, the government 
decided to implement the “greening of cities” 
across the nation based on the legal mandate of the 
Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth4, 
by mainstreaming green growth into the existing 
Comprehensive National Land Plan and the Basic 
Urban Plans. In an attempt to accelerate this process, 
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
(MOLIT) officially released the Urban Planning 
Guideline for the Low-Carbon and Green City, which 
assists decision-makers of city and district level 
planners in local government offices to incorporate 
various mitigation options. This section aims to delve 
into some of the progress made by the major cities 
across the nation under the Five-Year National Plan 
for Green Growth.
4 | Article 3 (Basic Principles of Promotion of Low Carbon Green Growth) states that: “The Government shall rearrange infrastructure, including 
       national land and cities, buildings and transportation, road, ports and harbors, and waterworks and sewerage systems, to make them suitable for 
       low-carbon green growth while preserving the value of national resources and environment at the same time.”
306
3.2.1 Greening of Cities in the ROK – Case Studies 
of Incheon and Seoul
Given how most Korean cities have reached near 
complete urbanization, the local governments’ 
efforts to green its cities have focused not on 
creating new cities, but rather on renovating 
the existing cities and improving their systems 
for reducing GHG emissions and improving 
environmental sustainability. Each city should 
embody the low-carbon green growth model and 
formulate plans to implement a variety of actions, 
such as: 
(1) spatial planning targeted on reducing GHG 
emissions; 
(2) bridging the trends observed in commuting 
patterns with the city’s transportation planning 
to help reduce energy intensity; and 
(3) expanding the application of green infrastructure 
(e.g., renewable energy generation facilities, 
rainwater harvest, and recycle systems). 
These local government plans also incorporated 
investments to be made by the central government’s 
line ministries, and sought to align them with local 
development directions. Moreover, the city-level 
plans reflect the regional characteristics such as 
geographical, social, and cultural attributes. Seoul’s 
“Green Car Smart City” and Gangneung city’s “Low-
Carbon Green City” provide examples of how the 
concept of green growth was mainstreamed in the 
urban planning process in the ROK. 
Seoul Case Study (Green Car Smart City)
The ROK’s capital city, Seoul, is known for its high 
population density and traffic volume. While the 
SMG focused on the supply of transportation 
infrastructure – new urban freeways and subway 
lines – until the early years of the 1990s, its 
transportation policies started to focus on demand-
side management to resolve the congestion 
problems in 1993. Most importantly, a congestion 
pricing scheme was introduced as a means of 
controlling the use of private vehicles. Despite the 
sizeable reduction in traffic volume and increases in 
average travel speed, the growing concerns over air 
quality in the late 1990s and its health implications 
forced the SMG to take further steps to promote 
better environmental quality. In 2002, the SMG 
announced plans to replace all city buses running on 
diesel fuel with compressed natural gas (CNG) buses.
Against this backdrop, the SMG announced its 
ambition to become a global leader in the roll-out 
of green cars and transportation systems through 
the “Green Car, Smart Seoul” proposal in November 
2010. “Green cars” refers to vehicles (e.g., electric, 
hybrid, and fuel-cell) that minimize air pollution 
and with high fuel efficiencies, as compared to 
conventional petroleum and diesel vehicles. Through 
this proposal, the SMG set an ambitious target 
of rolling out 120,000 electric cars by 2020. To 
accomplish this target, 50% of public buses and 
vehicles owned by state organizations, 10% of 
privately owned vehicles, and 1% of freight vehicles 
were to be replaced with electric equivalents. As a 
means of accelerating the deployment of green cars, 
110,000 electric car recharge stations will be made 
available by 2020. Specific strategies of the proposal 
included:
• Sustained Demand: The SMG provides a reliable 
demand for green cars by placing a mandate 
on green car purchases by public institutions, 
and supports R&D initiatives related to the 
development of green car technologies.
• Accelerating Market Growth: Subsidies are 
offered for green car purchases and operation, and 
the SMG boosts investments to improve the city’s 
infrastructure on vehicle charging.
• Strengthening User-centered Support: The SMG 
prepares and enacts various laws and policies 
specific to green car users to provide preferential 
tax exemptions and benefits, such as exemption 
from paying congestion fees and access to 
reserved parking spaces.
Deployment of CNG Buses (Seoul)
In 2002, the SMG embarked on replacing its diesel-
run public buses – a major source of the city’s air 
pollution – with CNG buses to help clear the city’s 
air and cut down on energy spending. As of 2014, 
all intra-city buses (8,750 units) in Seoul have 
been replaced. Through its CNG bus deployment 
program, the SMG subsidized the purchase of CNG 
buses using budget allocated by the central and 
city governments (50:50 ratio), which significantly 
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reduced the burden on city bus companies. In 
addition, the purchase of approximately 1,600 
additional buses such as community buses and 
tourist buses has also been subsidized. The 
cumulative spending of the government under the 
program has reached 350 billion KRW. The SMG 
made additional investments to establish a total of 
46 new CNG charging stations (as of 2010) across 
the city to enable a smooth transition. 
The CNG buses not only avoid the emission of 
particulate matter, but also help cut down nitrogen 
oxide emissions and improve energy consumption. 
Although CNG buses neither run on renewable 
sources nor are completely harmless to the 
environment, they have contributed significantly 
to reducing the city’s air pollution levels. The SMG 
reported that Seoul’s air quality has continued to 
improve over the years, reaching an annual average 
of 48µ gm3 (particulate matter concentration) in 
2010, which was the lowest in the past 15 years. 
Deployment of Electric Buses (Seoul)
Encouraged by the success of the CNG bus 
deployment, the SMG in 2010 commenced the 
introduction of electric buses that produce even less 
pollutants. The first electric bus to operate in Seoul 
was introduced in Namsan, an area that has become 
the symbol of Seoul, especially to tourists. It is worth 
noting that these electric buses were developed by 
a domestic bus manufacturer that was financially 
supported by the SMG. It directly purchased a total 
of 15 buses to operate on three different routes. 
Not only has Namsan’s electric bus drawn much 
popularity among the citizens, reaching an average 
of 2,000 users per day within the first 100 days of 
its operations; it has also contributed in attracting 
global interest in the ROK’s environmentally friendly 
technology. Electric buses have become a tourism 
icon for visitors to Namsan and a symbol of Seoul’s 
environmental awareness. 
Despite the SMG’s ambitions to introduce a total 
of 337 electric buses by 2014, the momentum 
eventually came to a halt primarily due to budget 
shortage and technical challenges. Understanding 
how purchasing electric buses requires hefty 
government investment, the public criticized the 
operation for its low economic efficiency. Electric 
buses revealed technical limitations in running 
distance such as requiring frequent recharging, and 
vulnerability to extremely hot and cold weather 
conditions, leading to frequent service cancellations. 
Although the SMG has failed to popularize electric 
buses, the initiative played a key role in increasing 
public interest in electric cars and other related 
green technologies. 
Car-Sharing Program (Seoul)
Seoul launched a car-sharing program known as 
the “Nanum Car Service” in February 2013 to ease 
the city’s traffic congestion and to resolve parking 
problems by reducing unnecessary car ownership 
as well as promoting a “sharing culture.” The 
service aims to provide access to shared vehicles 
to individuals in need of a convenient alternative 
to renting a vehicle or using a cab or delivery 
service. The major difference between the Nanum 
Category Total
Years
Up to 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 10,376 6,147 1,757 1,173 590 467 242
City Bus 8,750 5,414 1,396 1,044 396 332 168
Community Bus 1,049 487 214 85 100 100 63
Others 577 246 147 44 94 35 11
Government 
Spending 
(million KRW)
350,996 215,158 49,818 37,636 19,328 16,326 12,716
Table 11: Annual supply of CNG buses in Seoul
Source: Seoul Policy Archive, 2015
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Car Service and regular car rentals is that the 
reservations can be made easily via the Internet, 
mobile phones, or ARS (Automatic Response System) 
service; the cost is also cheap as it is commensurate 
to the actual number of hours used. It should be 
noted that approximately 20% of the cars under the 
Nanum Car Service are electric and hybrid cars.
The service can be used by anyone over 21 years of 
age with at least one year of driving experience. The 
fee is automatically charged through the credit card 
registered during the service member application 
process made via the Internet. Obviously, the costs 
of fuel consumed are additionally charged depending 
on the actual distance traveled. Users can pick 
up the car in pre-selected locations at 30-minute 
intervals after making a reservation, and the service 
automatically ends when the user returns the car 
to the pickup location. An advantage of Nanum Car 
Service is that it operates on an unmanned system 
allowing 24-hour access and is free from the hassle 
of signing of contracts. 
Although the Nanum Car Service is being provided 
by multiple numbers of private entities that have 
been selected through an open bidding process, the 
SMG is the implementating entity responsible for the 
service operations and maintenance. In other words, 
the SMG has the authority to select or replace the 
participating private entities, specify uniform service 
standards, and offer user benefits such as deduction 
of public parking fees for Nanum Cars. This efficient 
governance structure has helped improve the quality 
of service and accelerate the increase in service 
coverage. To ensure that a sufficient number of 
electric cars is available for the service, the central 
government and the SMG have been subsidizing 
the procurement of such cars by the participating 
private entities. 
The SMG reported that a total of 1,922 Nanum 
Cars offered service in 912 locations across 
Seoul as of December 2014. These locations are 
primarily public parking lots, and parking lots of 
public government offices. A steady increase in 
the membership numbers (370,000) has led to an 
increase in usage, reaching a daily average of 3,026 
roll-outs. The average rental time on a single roll-out 
was approximately four hours. Public satisfaction 
with the service was also reported to be high; in a 
survey conducted among 5,950 users, 78.4% were 
positive regarding the quality of service. Users have 
also reported that they have been able to reduce 
36.6% and 36.7% of the number of roll-outs and 
distance travelled, respectively, by taking part in 
the car sharing program. In addition, 62.2% of the 
users replied that they were willing to dispose of 
their private vehicles or give up purchasing one if 
the Nanum service becomes more readily accessible. 
Due to the SMG’s pioneering efforts, similar car-
sharing programs are speading rapidly across 
other regions of the nation, including the Gyeonggi 
Province, Incheon City, and Jeju Island.
Figure 15: Electric bus in Namsan
Source : EBN News, 2015
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After the offical launch of the program, the SMG 
faced several criticisms from the public regarding 
the management and operation of the service. For 
example, there was a discrepancy in the number of 
cars made available for sharing in different locations, 
which led to frequent failure in meeting the demand. 
In addition, there were strong complaints on the 
need for the Nanum car to be returned to the 
location where it was originally picked up. The fact 
that the usage fee can only be paid for by using 
a pre-registered credit card was also cited as an 
inconvenience. The SMG is continuously cooperating 
with the private service providers to close such gaps 
and increase the number and level of incentives 
offered to Nanum cars in service. 
Gangneung Case Study (Low-Carbon Green City)
The city of Gangneung is a major transportation hub 
where highways, railroads, and sea routes meet. 
Located on the east coast of the nation, it has high 
potential in renewable energy generation as well 
as the tourism industry due to its beautiful natural 
environment. Thus, Gangneung has identified the 
potential of green transportation, energy, and 
tourism to boost its local economic growth. In 2009, 
the central government selected Gangneung as the 
nation’s first pilot “Low-Carbon Green City,” leading 
to the development of a new city development 
masterplan. Based on consultations with expert 
groups, private sector entities, and public research 
institutes, as well as the outcomes of the organized 
international conferences on urban development, 
the actions under the masterplan are based on the 
following six key ideas: 
(1) environmentally friendly land-use planning; 
(2) green transportation; 
(3) preservation of natural ecology; 
(4) energy use optimization; 
(5) enabling water and resource cycles; and 
(6) green tourism. 
The action plan is expected to lead to a 49% 
reduction in GHG emissions (against BAU levels), a 
35.9% reduction in energy use (against BAU levels), 
and a 16.5% expansion of green ecological space.
Based on the masterplan, a total of 29 projects are to 
be implemented in three phases during the period of 
2011-2020. 
• The first phase (2011-2012) has nine projects 
that can be readily implemented within a short 
timeframe; these include the creation of bicycle 
paths, establishment of renewable energy facilities 
in Gangneung waste water treatment plant, and 
retrofitting of school facilities with low energy 
variants. 
• The second phase (2011-2016) focuses on building 
the foundations for a Green City, and covers 15 
project-level interventions such as prevention of 
traffic congestion in the city centers and tourism 
Figure 16: A Nanum car stationed in a designated parking space in a public car park in Seoul
Source: Transportation News, 2015
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centers by reorganizing the transportation 
systems, creating an ecological park by restoring 
the Soonpogae Lake to its natural ecological form, 
and building recuperation areas that connect 
mountainous areas with the regional medical 
centers. 
• The third phase (2011-2020) seeks to attract 
private investments in five large-scale projects 
based on a longer timeframe. Its activities include 
the construction of test-bed R&D complexes for 
demonstrating renewable energy technologies 
that suit regional specificities, installing biomass 
power plants capable of converting waste into 
energy, and the introducing smart grid and energy 
management systems. 
It should be noted that most of the project’s 
implementing entities are governmental 
organizations (provincial government and line 
ministries), while a limited number of projects 
with high commercial viabilities – such as the 
establishment of green business complex and zero-
carbon residences – are undertaken by the private 
sector. Approximately 1 trillion KRW was projected 
to be spent on the three phases, indicating the need 
for a strong buy-in from the national and provincial 
governments to translate into actual investments. 
As of 2013, all nine projects of the first phase of 
implementation have been undertaken as planned; 
some of the key examples are provided below. 
However, after the instatement of the new 
government in 2013, there has been a slowdown 
in momentum to pilot-test Gangneung as the 
nation’s first low-carbon green city, but its intended 
outcomes in the long term have put more pressure 
on the city government to actively advance the 
agenda.
Renewable Energy Powered Wastewater 
Treatment Plant (Gangneung)
In the Gangneung wastewater treatment plant, 
the government constructed an 890 kW capacity 
solar power plant and 3 kW capacity wind energy 
facilities during the period of 2010-2012 with a total 
investment worth 5.24 billion KRW, provided by 
the central (50%), provincial (9.2%), and municipal 
government (40.8%). The existing streetlamps of 
the wastewater treatment plant were replaced 
with renewable energy powered lamps in order to 
reduce energy consumption. As a result, a total of 
1,140 MWh of energy is being provided annually 
from renewable energy sources, which accounts 
for approximately 15% of the total annual energy 
consumption. The quantity of GHG emissions that 
have been avoided is expected to reach 525 tons of 
CO
2 
equivalent per year. 
Water Re-use System in Gangneung General Sports 
Stadium (Gangneung)
In 2011, the Gangneung General Sports Stadium 
installed a water re-use system that can provide 
Figure 17: Renewable energy facilities of the Gangneung Wastewater Treatment Plant
Source : Gangwon News, 2015
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100 m3 of water daily to be used in grass sprinkling 
and firefighting. The system collects wastewater 
discharged from a neighboring apartment complex 
and employs a membrane bioreactor (MBR) and 
advanced oxidization process (AOP) technologies 
for treatment. In addition, the stadium installed a 
rainwater harvesting system in its rooftop to provide 
10 m3 of water from simple filtration treatment 
process to be used for urinal flushing purposes. The 
central government and private investors equally 
shared the cost of this investment, which was worth 
2.92 billion KRW in total.
Green Ecological Roads (Gangneung)
During the period 2010-2011, the city of Gangneung 
built green ecologial roads extending 11.5 km 
over the existing hiking trails near Gyeongpo Lake, 
a key tourism site. Green ecological roads are 
environmentally friendly trails that offer walking 
and cycling facilities. Investments totaling 2.2 billion 
KRW were channeled to the planting of roadside 
trees, rehabilitation of ecological forest cover, 
and establishment of bicycle-exclusive roads. The 
budget came from several sources, namely, the 
central (50%), provincial (12.3%), and municipal 
governments (37.7%). As a means of maximizing 
tourist opportunities, the project also built tourist 
recreational areas, an ecology observatory, and 
biotopes (i.e., artificial spaces set up to simulate a 
natural habitat) along with green ecological roads.
3.2.2 Urban Farming
Urban farming refers to the utilization of an urban 
plot of land to cultivate crops for various purposes 
including leisure and education. The practice can 
take place in various locations such as under-utilized 
pieces of land, rooftops, or balconies. In response to 
how urban farming has been successful in gaining 
public-wide interest, the government released the 
Five-Year Plan for Urban Agriculture (2013-2017) 
in 2013. The plan recognizes that urban farming 
has a role to play in improving the quality of life of 
urban residents, and has thus decided to expand the 
size of urban farms to 1,500 ha and the number of 
urban farmers to 2 million people by 2017. In order 
to accomplish this goal, local governments have been 
implementing a diverse number of related programs 
that offer technical, administrative, and financial 
support to stakeholders.
The promotion of urban farming in the ROK was 
made possible through the enactment of the Act on 
the Development and Support of Urban Agriculture 
in 2011. The law categorizes urban farming into five 
types according to their purpose or geographical 
context: 
(1) residential farming within individual homes; 
(2) near-residence farming in common areas of mass 
complexes; 
(3) downtown farming in vacant areas of buildings; 
(4) collective large-scale farming; and 
(5) educational farming. 
Government support for urban farming has 
naturally evolved around these categories to meet 
their customized needs. Local governments – in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, 
and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) – are to legislate local 
ordinances to help promote urban farming practices.
Implementation
The most representative type of support from the 
local governments comes in the form of establishing 
the required infrastructure for urban farming. 
Through public advertising, local governments 
receive grant proposals for the purchase of farming 
equipment and inputs like seeds and fertilizers. For 
example, the Seongbuk district of Seoul periodically 
receives applications from schools, daycare 
centers, silver halls, and residential community 
representatives that plan to transform their unused 
plots of land into cultivated areas. Upon request, the 
district office dispatches “urban farming supporters” 
on a monthly basis to provide the necessary training. 
Securing the space to pursue urban farming is 
perhaps the single most important element toward 
promoting its widespread practice. Accordingly, local 
governments have been active in identifying and 
making available various types of under-utilized or 
unoccupied plots of land, and subsequently opening 
them to the public. The heads of local government 
offices have been establishing “shared urban 
farms” in vacant areas of public ownership, to be 
leased to a multiple number of urban farmers. On 
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the other hand, private entities have also begun to 
acquire lands for establishing “commercial” urban 
farms to be leased to the public. The government 
offices have been supportive of such private sector 
engagement by providing free training programs 
and administrative assistance that can help ease the 
difficulties encountered during the process. 
The MAFRA is responsible for preparing the 
nationwide strategies and setting of targets 
to promote urban farming, primarily through 
the establishment of Five-Year Plans for Urban 
Agriculture. The Urban Agriculture Committee 
– housed under MAFRA’s ministerial office and 
consisting of members drawn from the central 
administrative body, academia and the private sector 
– provides the required expert advisory on national 
government policies. However, the local government 
offices assume the role of translating strategies into 
specific plans and actions on the ground through 
their own budget. Urban farmers can support this 
process by creating “urban farming communities” 
that help raise interest and motivate individuals 
through knowledge-sharing and collaboration. 
Outcomes and Takeways
After the enactment of the Act on Development and 
Support of Urban Agriculture in 2011, the number 
of local government ordinances on the promotion of 
urban farming increased rapidly. In response to such 
support, there was a steep increase in the number 
of urban farming practices; the total area increased 
from 104 ha in 2010, to 558 ha in 2012, while the 
number of urban farmers increased from 153,000 
to 769,000 over the same period. It should be noted 
that this number of urban farmers is equivalent to 
approximately 25% of the nation’s total population 
working in the agricultural sector. In terms of the 
scale of the development by different cities, Seoul 
was found to be in the lead with approximately one 
million m2, which accounts for 0.17% of the city’s 
total area. 
Urban farming is known to have a wide range of 
benefits, not just in the form of leisure or recreation, 
but by providing the opportunities for making food 
as local as possible, adding greenery to the urban 
centers, and offering recreational areas for urban 
residents. The PCGG also recognized how urban 
farming can also help create additional new jobs 
by fostering of experts. The key success factors to 
expanding urban farming practices are the provision 
of required land, establishment of infrastructure, and 
dissemination of knowledge. 
Given the high population densities of cities and 
the potential confict in the use of land between 
stakeholders of varying interests, securing a 
sufficient supply of land is the biggest challenge 
in the promotion of urban farming. It is thus 
important for local governments to take a long-
term perspective in acquiring land to be offered 
to the public; not only does this process require a 
consideration on future urban planning, but urban 
farms must be located in a way that can match 
Table 12: Different forms of government support for urban farming practices
Category Description
Operational Support
- Opening of training programs on urban farming
- Provision of equipment and farm inputs
- Financial grants for operational costs of urban farming communities
R&D
- Fostering of urban farming experts
- Financial grants for R&D projects relevant to urban farming practices
Provision of Land
- Establishment of shared urban farms in vacant areas of public ownership
- Administrative assistance toward the establishment of commercial urban farms
Awareness Raising - Holding of exhibitions and public contests related to urban farming
Policy Intervention - Preparation of standards and regulations for safe urban farming practices
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the characteristics of the local development. 
Government incentives should be made available 
to open privately owned land, while regulatory 
measures may be needed to allow urban farming 
in environmentally protected areas or riverside 
areas. Utilizing rooftops and balconies of high-rise 
buildings is especially important, as urban farming 
can help alleviate the “heat island” effect. Collective 
farms established in areas that are distant from 
urban centers are likely to become “weekend farms” 
that receive less care or even become abandoned 
with the passage of time.
3.3 Green Buildings
The population density of the ROK’s main cities 
is the highest among large cities in the advanced 
nations. For example, the country’s capital, Seoul, 
has a population density that is two to ten times 
greater than the major cities of the OECD. This 
situation has raised the urgency of the need to 
redistribute the population to help achieve balanced 
regional development, but at the same time it also 
opens opportunities to maximize the advantage of 
high population density − specifically, the easing 
of investment burden for basic infrastructure 
and reduction of energy consumption in human 
activities such as commuting (e.g., by reducing daily 
travel distance) and room heating (e.g., by adopting 
grouped heating systems). Daily living in cities with 
sparse population in many advanced countries has 
led to inefficiencies and wastage in energy and 
material consumption. The ROK hopes to avoid this 
problem considering its limited energy sources and 
one solution is the improvement of energy-efficiency 
performance of its buildings. 
In line with the nation’s vision of low-carbon green 
growth, the government has supported various 
incentive programs – most notably tax cuts and 
subsidies for certifications – to promote efficient 
use of energy and adoption of environmentally 
friendly construction technologies. Although many 
of these programs were launched in the early 2000s, 
it was only after the announcement in 2008 of low-
carbon green growth as national strategy that these 
programs became subjected to rigorous government 
oversight. 
3.3.1 Building Design Criteria for Energy Saving
Although energy consumption from buildings 
in the ROK accounts for approximately 25% of 
the nation’s total consumption – which is below 
the global average of 30% – energy consumption 
per unit area is significantly higher than those of 
developed countries such as Japan and those of the 
EU. Benchmarking the practices of the developed 
countries, the ROK issued its first building standard 
in 1977 (on insulation thickness), which was followed 
by various other standards relevant to energy 
consumption by building types. Most importantly, 
the government mandated the submission of Energy 
Saving Worksheets before the launch of construction 
Figure 18: Example of an urban farm development in Seoul
Source: Kim, 2014
Site 
before development
Site 
after development
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activities in 1985 to validate compliance with the 
minimum energy efficiency standards. In order to 
synthesize an increasing number of energy efficiency 
standards by building types, which were being placed 
forward among many other architectural standards, 
the government released the Building Design 
Criteria for Energy Saving (BDCES) as a stand-alone 
document in 2001. The BDCES was a result of an 
extensive amount of desktop study on the building 
energy codes of developed countries; it underwent 
numerous revisions to keep pace with the changing 
technological and environmental landscape.
Implementation 
In issuing the legal permit for new buildings, the 
local government authorities are required to 
execute the building codes developed by MOLIT. 
The property owners are mandated to prepare the 
energy-saving worksheets – signed by the architect, 
mechanical engineer, and electrical engineer – to 
be submitted to government offices. Then, the 
local offices review and approve the worksheets 
through the support of KEMCO, based on blueprints 
and supplemental data provided by the property 
owner. The local authorities are allowed to audit the 
buildings after construction for design compliance, 
in which discrepancies may lead to the revoking of 
building permits. The submission of energy-saving 
worksheets applies to buildings with floor areas 
of 500 m2 and above. However, buildings with no 
cooling and heating systems are exempted. 
The BDCES contains four sections – construction 
design, machinery design, electric facility design, and 
renewable energy facility design – and each section 
is composed of mandatory and recommended items. 
For example, the installation of high-efficiency 
transformers is mandatory, while the adoption 
of energy-efficient lighting such as LED lights is 
recommended. The energy-saving worksheet 
is basically a checklist of such items adopted in 
design. The evaluation of the overall energy-
saving performance is done through the Energy 
Performance Index – a measuring tool that evaluates 
the performance of buildings in terms of energy 
consumption and savings – which gives a score 
between 0-100 points. Only those awarded with 
EPI points above 65 are granted building permits. 
For public buildings such as government offices and 
community centers, the bar is raised to 74 points. 
Buildings exceeding the minimum standards of the 
code are provided with several benefits, such as 
alleviation of restrictions on building area over the 
site area. 
Outcomes and Takeaways
Acknowledging the importance of strengthening the 
design codes to keep pace with the technological 
improvements, MOLIT made a total of 14 revisions 
during 1985-2013. The EPI points system was 
also revised during this process. MOLIT sought to 
ensure that the evaluation criteria is up-to-date in 
supporting measures with the highest energy-saving 
Table 13: Historical development of the building design criteria for energy-saving in the ROK
Year Development
1985 Placement of a mandate on submission of Energy Saving Worksheet
1986 Development of energy-saving criteria for mercantile buildings
1992 Development of energy-saving criteria for office buildings
1995 Adoption of Energy Performance Index (EPI) in evaluating energy saving performance
1996 Formulation of energy-saving criteria for buildings for cultural activities and assembly and education
1999 Formulation of energy-saving criteria for buildings of multi-unit residences
2001 Release of the Building Design Criteria for Energy Saving (BDCES)
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potential and ease of implementation. In alignment 
with the government’s low-carbon green growth 
vision, the revision that took place in 2013 was a big 
leap forward in terms of taking the BDCES a step 
closer to design standards of “passive buildings” – 
buildings that require minimal heating or cooling 
to sustain the weather. In addition, the coverage of 
the energy-saving worksheets was expanded and 
additional points were allocated to encourage the 
adoption of renewable energy.
Following the expanded scope of buildings mandated 
to submit the energy-saving worksheets, the 
number of review requests has increased over 
the years. The success of BDCES lies primarily in 
setting adequate criteria and fostering the technical 
capacities required for the preparation and review 
of energy-saving worksheets. The MOLIT ensured 
that the strengthening of standards takes a phased 
approach to minimize the burden of property 
owners and contractors. In addition, it designated 
two public organizations (expanded to four in 
2013) to build the capacity of local governments 
in reviewing compliance with the given codes. The 
government has also developed detailed procedures 
and built testing facilities to gauge the energy-saving 
performances of building components, which is 
critical to making available options in meeting the 
design code.
Note that the evolving architectural design codes 
apply only to new buildings, which explains why the 
outcomes of the BDCES are limited. Approximately 
half of the nation’s buildings have been constructed 
before 2001, which is the year when the insulation 
standard was strengthened significantly. Thus, the 
buildings before this year have been exempted 
from the energy-saving requirements. This calls 
for the need to revise the policy to also cover old 
buildings that waste energy. The calculation of 
energy efficiency based on a component basis is 
another limitation of the BDCES since this approach 
fails to provide comprehensive information on the 
overall energy-saving performance of buildings. As 
a response, the government introduced a policy that 
seeks to regulate the total energy use per unit area 
in 2013, in which the Energy Demand Worksheets 
ensure that the building’s total energy demand per 
unit area does not exceed a pre-determined value, 
which reflects that of an average building. After 
pilot-testing of office buildings with floor sizes 
greater than 10,000 m2 from 2001, the new policy 
now applies to all buildings with floor sizes greater 
than 3,000 m2. 
3.3.2 Energy-Efficiency Grade Certification Scheme
The voluntary certification scheme boosts the 
demand for buildings with high energy efficiencies 
and sound energy management by assessing the 
credentials of a building’s energy performance 
through a third party. The standards set forth by the 
ten-grade rating system has been designed in such 
a way to engage all parties involved in a building’s 
lifecycle – including the construction company, 
building owner, operations and maintenance 
Table 14: Expansion of the scope of buildings mandated to submit energy-saving sheets  
Prior to 2009 Revision in 2009 Revision in 2013
• Apartment and condominium 
buildings with over 50 households
• Public bathhouses over 500 m2
• Hospitals over 2,000 m2
• Office buildings greater than 3,000 
m2
• Education and research buildings 
with centralized cooling and heating 
systems, and floor area greater than 
10,000 m2
• All apartments and condominiums 
• All education and research buildings 
with floor area greater than 10,000 
m2
[Minimum EPI score for building permit]
• 60 points
• All buildings with floor area greater 
than 500 m2 
[Minimum EPI score for building permit]
• 65 points
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agencies, and building residents. Since the inception 
of the scheme in 2001, the rating standard has 
been constantly revised to expand the coverage of 
eligible buildings and strengthen the certification 
process. Related efforts have accelerated the 
adoption of evolving technological advancements in 
construction, materials, and design, such as adoption 
of underfloor air conditioning systems, graywater 
systems, and ambient light sensors.
Implementation
The certification process follows a two-step 
procedure – the preliminary and main certification 
– during the construction phase of a building. 
For preliminary certification, either the building 
client, building owner, project developer, or the 
construction company will submit an application 
to an accredited certifier, along with the required 
documents such as the final architectural drawing 
and load calculation documents. The review by 
the certifiers – which could be third party public 
agencies designated by the government – leads to a 
recommended provisional rating, which is reported 
to the entity in charge of certification issuance 
(KEMCO).  In the second stage, an additional 
application is submitted to the certifier along with 
the as-built drawings. The certifiers then recommend 
the final performance rating to KEMCO based 
on desktop reviews and field visits. The validity 
period of issued certification is 10 years from 
the date of issuance, during which KEMCO is to 
ensure the consistency in meeting the certification 
requirements.  
The evaluation of the energy-efficiency performance 
is made based on calculations of primary energy 
demand per unit area, which takes into account 
various needs such as room heating and cooling, 
hot water supply, lighting, and ventilation. In cases 
where there are two or more buildings on a single 
plot of land, separate certifications may be issued 
for each building. The certification grades are 
separate for residential buildings and non-residential 
buildings, but both are divided into ten levels, 
with 1+++ being the best and 7 being the worst 
in terms of efficiency performance. It should be 
noted that the coverage of the buildings eligible for 
certification expanded rapidly during the period of 
the Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013). 
Although the policy initially covered only newly 
built communal residences (2001-2009), newly 
constructed commercial buildings were included in 
2010, then it expanded to include all types – both 
newly built and existing buildings – in 2013, with 
minimum floor area (subject to cooling and heating 
systems) of 500 m2. In addition, the rating system 
has been revised multiple times to keep pace with 
the increasingly stringent efficiency standards; 
for example, the standards for Grade 1 or lower in 
non-residential buildings was strengthened from 
below 300 kWh/m2 to below 260 kWh/m2 in 2013.
Efficiency grade certifications are provided based 
on voluntary applications, and the government 
has ensured that the certification offers sufficient 
incentives to stimulate participation. Most 
importantly, buildings are offered reductions in 
acquisition tax and registration tax of 5-15%, 
depending on the grade-level (above Grade 2). 
The benefit was enforced in 2010 to encourage 
developers and investors to prefer energy-efficient 
buildings. In addition, energy-efficient buildings are 
subject to 4-12% leniency in architectural design 
regulations, such as increase in floor area and 
building height. Companies that have participated as 
contractors of high energy-efficiency grade buildings 
are entitled to earning additional points in bidding 
for public sector contracts. 
Table 15: Number of energy saving worksheets reviews by year
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Number of 
Reviews
819 1,544 1,818 2,828 3,406 2,087 1,951 2,742 4,242 4,882 26,319
Source: KEMCO, 2013
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Outcomes and Takeaways
The scheme has helped promote the development 
of energy-efficient buildings across the nation. 
Most importantly, the total number of buildings that 
acquired Grade 1 certification increased 46-fold, 
from 1,119 in 2008 to 51,658 buildings in 2010. 
It should be noted that residences with Grade 1 
certification are reported to consume approximately 
40% less energy than conventional residences. 
Of course, such certification records are neither 
proportional to the actual energy saved, nor do they 
serve as a basis for estimating the improvements in 
energy efficiencies. Rather, the records help redirect 
codes and regulations on architectural design to 
shift the focus on exploiting cost-effective energy 
efficiency potentials. 
Opening ways to maximize the use of the building 
energy-efficiency grades is thus the scheme’s most 
important success factor. For instance, standards 
may be put in place to ensure that asset valuation 
of buildings can be made in connection with the 
issuance of certification or the level of energy-
efficiency grade awarded. Informing the building 
tenants of the efficiency grades to be reflected into 
negotiations for lease contracts provides benefits 
for both the tenant and the building owner, while 
stimulating the property market to make energy-
efficient choices. Recognizing that buildings have 
a lifespan that reach tens of years, the energy 
consulting industry engaged in energy diagnosis 
and retrofits is an important enabler of the scheme’s 
success.
Table 16: Energy efficiency certification grades by building category
Grade
(Lower the Better)
Residential Building Non-residential Building
Annual consumption of primary energy per unit 
area (kWh/m2)
Annual consumption of primary energy per unit 
area (kWh/m2)
1+++ Below 60 Below 80 
1++ 60 or above – below 90 80 or above – below 140 
1+ 90 or above – below 120 140 or above – below 200
1 120 or above – below 150 200 or above – below 260 
2 150 or above – below 190 260 or above – below 320 
3 190 or above – below 230 320 or above – below 380 
4 230 or above – below 270 380 or above – below 450 
5 270 or above – below 320 450 or above – below 520 
6 320 or above – below 370 520 or above – below 610 
7 370 or above – below 420 610 or above – below 700 
Source: MOLIT, 2014
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3.3.3 Green Standard for Energy and Environmental 
Design (G-SEED) Program
The G-SEED program aims to demonstrate the 
“greenness” of buildings based on a wide range of 
information including energy use, GHG emissions, 
and environmental performance. Unlike the energy-
efficiency grade certification scheme, the G-SEED’s 
rigorous third-party commissioning process 
evaluates the energy performance beyond energy 
savings that are closely related to the environmental 
sustainability throughout a building’s lifecycle, such 
as the use of recycled materials in construction, 
friendliness of the design in accordance with the 
surrounding environment, and amount of water 
savings in building operations. The program is 
similar to the LEED (Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design) certification that is being 
globally recognized as the leading sustainability 
standard for buildings. 
In the ROK, rising concerns on environmental 
impacts of building construction and operation led 
to the launch of the Green Building Certification 
(GBC) scheme in 2002. After the Green Building 
Development Support Act was promulgated in 
February 2012, the GBC scheme was rebranded as 
G-SEED, which integrates all government provisions 
related to the promotion of green buildings (the 
policies were originally dispersed under multiple 
laws including the Construction Act and the Housing 
Act). 
Implementation
The G-SEED certification, which is awarded based 
on a similar procedure for energy-efficiency grade 
certification, is also divided into two stages: 
(1) preliminary certification based on desktop review 
on the architectural design; and 
(2) main certification based on review of as-built 
drawings and site inspection. 
The MOLIT and MoE have alternately served as the 
administrative body of the program, supported by 
the Korea Institute of Civil Engineering and Building 
Technology (KICT) as the implementing entity that 
prepares the certification standards and procedures, 
designates third party certifiers, and inspects 
certification records. A total of 11 private and public 
institutions that meet the given requirements (i.e., 
human resources with expertise in design categories 
subject to evaluation) have been designated to 
provide certification services. 
The certification audits cover all new buildings (i.e., 
less than three years from the issuance of building 
use permits) and existing buildings on a voluntary 
basis. However, certification is made enforceable 
to the construction of new buildings or expansion 
of buildings owned by the public sector, with floor 
areas greater than 3,000 m2; this is a strengthened 
mandate from that under the GBC which only 
applied to public buildings with floor areas greater 
than 10,000 m2. In addition, public buildings are 
mandated to acquire grades of two stars and 
above. Certification is valid for five years, with the 
possibility of a five-year extension. 
The G-SEED certification corresponds to points 
earned in seven design categories. Items of 
evaluation and their standards vary according to the 
designed function of the building. Four certification 
grades are offered – 4 stars (Outstanding), 3 stars 
(Excellent), 2 stars (Good), 1 star (Average) – based 
on the total points accrued. Applicants are provided 
Table 17: Outcomes of energy efficiency certification for communal residences (as of March 2013)
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Number of 
households
1,107 695 382 4,039 16,094 22,226 45,337 63,728 68,828 11,417 233,853 143,050 57,719  596,656 
Amount of 
energy reduced 
(TOE)
484 158 104 735 3,743 5,095 10,429 16,146 18,849 3,114 58,858 43,488 14,690  160,471 
Amount of GHG 
emissions avoided 
(tCO
2
)
1,131 370 244 1,719 8,749 11,911 24,381 37,749 44,064 7,276 137,595 101,669 34,341  375,117 
Source: MOTIE, 2009
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with a certification plate to be fitted into building 
entrances. Incentives for certified buildings with 
high G-SEED grades are identical to that under 
the energy-efficiency grade certification, which 
are 5-15% reductions in building acquisition and 
registration tax. The G-SEED certified buildings 
are also subject to 4-12% leniency in architectural 
design regulations. In addition, G-SEED certified 
buildings are offered a 10-15% reduction in property 
tax (for the first five years after certification 
issuance), and a maximum of 50% reduction in 
environmental improvement charges, which is a 
government tax collected from owners of buildings 
and motor vehicles that discharge vast amounts of 
environmental pollutants. To encourage participation 
in the G-SEED program, local governments have also 
been supporting applicants in the form of grants for 
covering their costs in certification. 
Outcomes and Takeaways
The level of participation in the G-SEED (formerly 
the GBC) has shown high dependence on the 
scope of buildings covered by the program and 
the government incentives made available from 
certification. The first annual increase in the annual 
Table 19: G-SEED certification grades by points earned
Grade
Multi-unit Housing
Others (educational buildings, mercantile 
buildings, lodging facilities)
Small Detached 
Housing
New Construction Existing Building New Construction Existing Building
Outstanding 
(4 Stars)
74 points 
and above
69 points 
and above
80 points 
and above
75 points 
and above
74 points 
and above
Excellent
(3 Stars)
66 points 
and above
61 points 
and above
70 points 
and above
65 points 
and above
66 points 
and above
Good
(2 Stars)
58 points 
and above
53 points 
and above
60 points 
and above
55 points 
and above
58 points 
and above
Average
(1 Star)
50 points 
and above
45 points 
and above
50 points 
and above
45 points 
and above
50 points 
and above
Source: MOLIT, 2014
Table 18: Design category for apartment buildings under the G-SEED certification
Category Description
1. Land Use and Transportation Ecological value, impacts on surrounding areas, quality of residence, reduction in transportation load
2. Energy and Environmental   
     Pollution
Energy savings, sustainable (renewable) energy use, GHG emissions avoided
3. Materials and Resources Resource savings, waste reduction, segregation and recycling of waste, sustainable resource use
4. Water Circulation and 
     Management
Water circulation system, water savings
5. Operation and Maintenance
Site management quality, efficiency of building maintenance, efficiency of unit maintenance, ease of 
maintenance
6. Ecological Environment Greenery, ecological function of building areas, biotope plan
7. Indoor Environment Air quality, room-heating, noise, use of daylight
Source: MOLIT, 2014
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number of certifications issued was in 2006, which 
marks the year when the government allowed 
property developers to add 3% to the selling prices 
of residences in G-SEED certified buildings. 
Participation further arose from 2008-2010, 
primarily from the expanded scope of G-SEED 
certifications to newly built educational buildings, 
and provision of tax cuts. With G-SEED certification 
made mandatory for public buildings with floor areas 
greater than 3,000 m2 in 2013, it is expected that the 
trends of annual increase will continue. 
The main challenge faced by building certification 
programs is in establishing the case that attracts 
property owners to participate. Thus the 
competitiveness of G-SEED program can only 
be strengthened if there is sufficient evidence 
documented on the benefits that arise from 
certification – whether in the form of maintenance 
costs saved or rise in property value – which serves 
as the basis for property developers and owners 
to determine whether to make investments on 
improving the “greenness” of their buildings. As 
illustrated in the annual number of certification 
issuance, government policies are critical in building 
the case for support. However, the role of the private 
sector should not be overlooked in improving the 
certification procedures and standards. For example, 
Figure 19: Number of G-SEED certifications issued by year
Source: MOLIT, 2014
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Figure 20: Distribution of G-SEED grades for certified buildings
Source: MOLIT, 2014
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LEED Accredited Professionals – individuals with a 
level of competence and education related to green 
buildings – have been at the forefront of propagating 
the LEED scheme to the public and ensuring that its 
standards continue to reflect the evolving building 
technologies.
4. Assessment
Despite the emissions-reduction efforts made under 
the First Five-Year Plan (2009-2013), the total 
energy consumption and GHG emissions in the ROK 
increased noticeably with GDP growth. Although 
emissions in the urban sector – particularly building 
and transport – followed this trend, government 
policies on green homeland and transport offered 
a broad range of benefits and positive outcomes. 
Some targets set for the urban sector have been met, 
while most actions and programs implemented still 
require additional time to show tangible outcomes. 
Much of the benefits observed to date are by nature 
qualitative and considering the given timeframe of 
the Five-Year Plan, it is still premature to objectively 
measure the results in quantitative terms. 
4.1 Quantitative Assessment 
The gross regional domestic product (GRDP) in most 
urban areas in the ROK continued to experience a 
steady increase. As seen in Figure 20, the national 
GRDP increased by 29.1% from 2008 to 2013, while 
the combined GRDP in seven metropolitan 
cities grew by 23.1%. Despite a rapid growth 
observed across the nation’s mid-sized cities, 
the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA – including 
Incheon and Gyeonggi Province) and the six 
metropolitan cities together produced the bulk 
of GRDP – 66.2% in 2008 and 66% in 2013.
Energy Use and GHG Emissions
The energy consumption by most of the major 
metropolitan cities increased along with GRDP as 
shown in Figure 21. However, a positive trend is 
evident; while the total GRDP increased by 15.2% 
from 2008 to 2013, the rise in energy consumption 
of the seven metropolitan cities was limited at 9.4%. 
In particular, Seoul and Busan – the two largest 
cities in the ROK – have been able to decrease their 
energy consumption by 0.1% and 10.1%, despite the 
increase in GRDP by 21.8% and 15.8%, respectively.
The transport and buildings sectors showed 
substantial increases in energy use between 2008 
and 2013. Table 20 reveals that both sectors have 
had 3.9%-4.5% increases in energy consumption 
during the period 2008-2013. However, it is 
important to recognize that their shares in the 
nation’s total energy use have decreased remarkably, 
as compared to the industry sector over this 
period. The degree of annual increases in energy 
Figure 21: GRDP in metropolitan cities and SMA (2005-2013)
Source: KEMCO, 2013; KEMCO, 2014
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consumption has also become less apparent, 
although this tendency needs to be evaluated strictly 
against the changes in GRDP.
The trends in GHG emissions from the two sectors 
showed different patterns. While the transport 
sector continued to build up its emissions with time, 
the building sector revealed a decrease between 
2008 and 2012. Nevertheless, the transportation 
sector’s share of emissions in the nation’s total 
has been on a decrease since 2005. It is worth 
noting that the building sector’s share of emissions 
dropped dramatically from 15.49% to 8.77% during 
2000-2012, which is  attributed to the increased 
preference for electricity and city gas over oil and 
coal.
Target Accomplishments – Green Cities
Notable achievements have been made in terms 
of green city planning – in line with the targets set 
by the Five-Year Plan – specifically on the pilot 
testing of “green city” concepts and engaging in 
urban regeneration. Although a selected number 
of these initiatives have been completed, many 
are still ongoing. As for urban regeneration 
programs, the MLTM designated Changwon and 
Jeonju as pilot cities for three years (2011-2014). 
Both test-beds now showcase notable green city 
features. The regeneration program in Changwon, 
for example, included greening of parking areas, 
ecological restoration of the city’s main stream, 
and construction of artificial waterways, which has 
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Table 20: Final energy use by sectors during 2000-2013
Unit: thousand toe
Sector 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 149,852 170,854 182,575 182,066 195,587 205,863 208,120 210,247
Transport
(% of total)
30,945
20.7%
35,559
20.8%
35,793
19.6%
35,930
19.7%
36,938
18.9%
36,875
17.9%
37,143
17.8%
37,330
17.8%
Buildings
(% of total)
32,370
21.6%
36,861
21.6%
36,225
19.8%
35,722
19.6%
37,256
19.0%
37,542
18.2%
37,884
18.2%
37,341
17.7%
Industry
(% of total)
83,912
56.0%
94,366
55.2%
106,458
58.3%
106,119
58.3%
116,910
59.8%
126,886
61.6%
128,324
61.7%
130,906
62.3%
Source: KEMCO, 2014; KEEI, 2014
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helped revitalize the city (i.e., increase in the number 
of road shops, pedestrian visits to downtown) and 
enhance environmental quality (i.e., increase in 
the amount of cold wind which can alleviate urban 
heat island phenomenon; Daewuk Kim et.al. 2013). 
Encouraged by results from the two test-bed cities, 
the MLTM initiated a more ambitious program by 
designating 13 cities nationwide to participate in the 
urban regeneration program, which is expected to 
be completed before 2017. Thanks to such efforts, 
the area of urban forests in the nation increased 
significantly, by 10.6% in 2009-2013, which is 
equivalent to a 7.2% increase in terms of green areas 
per urban settler. All in all, the green city initiative 
exceeded the targets set by the Five-Year Plan, 
but their outcomes in terms of GHG and energy 
reduction remain to be evaluated.
Target Accomplishments – Transportation
For the transport sector, the most important target 
set by the Five-Year Plan was to increase the share of 
public transit by 53% and rail transit system by 25% 
in 2012. The actual share of public transit and rail 
system in total domestic passenger trips for 2012 
were estimated at 45.31% and 12.04%, respectively, 
demonstrating that government efforts were short 
of the target. However, the number of passengers 
in major public transit modes showed positive 
trends since the 2000s as depicted in Figure 22. In 
particular, bus passengers increased remarkably 
partly due to the phased introduction of the quasi-
public bus system by metropolitan cities since 2004, 
as well as significant improvements in the quality 
services and facilities. The construction of new and 
expansion of existing rail networks – Korea Train 
eXpress (KTX), Light Rail Transit (LRT), and Metro 
(subway) – have helped sustain the increase in 
passenger carriages.
Another notable achievement in the transport sector 
is the bicycle program. From 2010 to 2012, a total 
of 1,757 km of cycle paths were constructed along 
the nation’s major waterfronts, opening a route 
connecting Seoul and Busan. Bike lanes constructed 
by local governments reached 3,921 km during 
2009-2011, triggering a bicycle boom among the 
general public. However, such efforts were unable 
to meet the targets set under the Five-Year Plan; 
the rate of bicycle use and its share in transport 
modalities only reached 12.9% and 2.16% (MOPAS, 
2012), respectively, well below the respective 
targets of 25 % and 5%. The total length of the 
nation’s bicycle lanes stand at 19,717 km as of 2014.
Other achievements by relevant ministries in 
the transport sector are summarized in Table 
23. Between 2009 and 2013, the national rail 
Table 21: Changes in energy-related GHG level by the transport and building sector (2000-2012)
Sources: KTI, 2013; GIR, 2014
2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Energy-related total 406.6 462 502.5 509.3 561.8 590.2 591.9
Transport
(% of total)
68.6 80.4 82.8 83.7 85.4 85 86.4
16.87% 17.40% 16.48% 16.43% 15.20% 14.40% 14.60%
System
Road 63.2 75.5 78.1 79.2 81.0 80.6 82.1
Rail 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Air 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2
Shipping 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1
Others 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Building
(% of total
63.0 61.6 54.4 51.7 52.3 52.1 51.9
15.49% 13.33% 10.83% 10.15% 9.31% 8.83% 8.77%
 Unit: million CO
2
eq
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infrastructure was constantly expanded, primarily 
from the extension of the high-speed rail system, 
Korea Train eXpress (KTX). The urban rail system 
was also extended to improve the coverage of 
existing lines, while two new LRT lines opened in 
metropolitan cities. To facilitate multi-modal transfer 
system, a total of 10 multi-modal transfer centers 
were designated, of which Dongnae (Busan) and 
Dongdaegu stations were designated as national 
centers. 
Target Accomplishments – Green Buildings
Finally, the building sector also showed positive 
progress in meeting the targets set under the Five-
Year Plan. Upgraded building design codes and 
tightening of criteria set forth by existing building 
certification schemes – which were linked to various 
government incentives and subsidies – were able 
to bring about significant changes in engineering 
practices and investment decision-making; the 
quantitative outcomes of these government efforts 
are well presented in the previous sections of this 
chapter. 
Figure 23: Trends in passenger transport (2001-2012) 
Sources: Korea Transport Database Center, 2013
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Table 22: Some achievements of the Green City Initiative
Initiative Name of Program Targets FYP Achieved (Status) Contents
Green 
City
Low-carbon green city 
adaptive to 
climate change 17
2
(Ongoing)
Gangneung, Gwangwon-Do
Geomdan, Incheon,
EcoRich City
42
(completed)
2009: 11, 2010: 11, 2011: 10
Low-carbon 
green village
6 (completed)
1 (ongoing)
2010: Gwangsan-gu (Gwangju City), Gongju City, 
Wanju-Gun, Bongwha-Gun, 
2011: Pocheon City, HwaCheon-Gun
2013: HongCheon-Gun
Urban regeneration 
projects
No specific 
targets; 
stated only 
in the plan
2011: 
2 cities 
(Completed)
2012: 
selected 13 areas
(ongoing)
Changwon and Jeonju
Busan (Dong-gu), Seoul (Jonro-gu), Daegu (Nam-
gu), Gwanju (Dong-gu), Cheongju, Gunsan, Mokpo, 
Youngju, Changwon, (Taebaek), Gongju, Cheonan, 
Suncheon
Sources: MLTM et al., 2014
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Another pivotal target set under the Five-Year 
Plan was the creation of “a million green homes” by 
2020; green homes refer to homes that either adopt 
environmentally friendly design standards and/or 
self-generate power to meet its needs by exploiting 
new and renewable (NRE) energy sources. Initiated 
by MOTIE, programs that subsidize NRE installations 
have led to an exponential growth in the number 
of green homes, as shown in Table 24. It should be 
noted that the MLTM’s figures pertain to the number 
of new public rental housing constructed with better 
design standards, while green homes subsidized by 
MOTIE are remodeled homes that are partly or fully 
powered by NRE sources. 
4.2 Qualitative Assessment
The agenda of greening the nation’s homeland 
and transportation system involves reforming 
urban communities with complex physical and 
socioeconomic systems and intermingled functions. 
Mitigation efforts at the onset require a package 
of integrated and comprehensive policy directions 
and frameworks at both national and subnational 
levels, engaging both the urban planners and 
the local community. In this sense, the central 
government was successful in making timely 
responses, especially in terms of developing the 
necessary institutional and legal frameworks along 
with policy actions and programs. Immediately 
after the release of the Five-Year Plan, all relevant 
ministries and its affiliates actively coordinated to 
produce a set of coherent policy directions, which 
were to help achieve the target set for green cities, 
transportation, and buildings. In 2009, the MLTM 
developed the Guidelines for Low Carbon Green 
Growth City, a blueprint for all relevant activities 
on city development and urban planning. Table 25 
shows some of the legal and institutional initiatives 
undertaken.
The central government’s low-carbon green growth 
agenda has had a notable impact, especially in terms 
of enhancing public perceptions on climate change 
and environmental sustainability issues. Increased 
public awareness translated into a social movement, 
inciting local government officials to proactively take 
part in the nation’s green growth transformation. 
For example, there was stiff competition among 
local governments in being designated as the 
nation’s pilot green cities. Local authorities rushed to 
conceptualize and brand their cities as green, which 
was followed by local plans and ordinances related 
to green growth. Some cities even changed their 
slogans incorporating messages related to green 
growth, such as “Changwon Environmental Capital,” 
“Green Capital City of Cheongju,” and “Korea Capital 
Ecocity Suncheon.”
Table 23: Major improvements in the rail transport system (2009-2013)
Sector 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Railway extension (km) 3 179 2 13 -
Korea Train eXpress (km) - 164.8 180.4 49.3 -
Subway extension (km) 34 23  29 11 -
Light rail transit (km) - - 22 (Gimhae) 33 (Uijeonbu) -
Multi-modal transfer center - 8 2 -
Transfer center on expressways - - - 2 2
Transit mall
1
(Daegu)
- - -
2 under 
construction
(Busan, Seoul)
Eco-drive trained (persons) - 2,167 3,777 4,610 4,993
Source: KTI, 2013; Korea Transport Database Center, 2014
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Intensified government intervention in the urban 
sector to reduce GHG emissions involved a 
combination of capacity building, development 
planning, and GHG emissions data management, 
engaging urban planners and engineers. 
Multiple urban planning strategies and city 
models such as compact cities, transit-oriented 
development, and integrated urban spatial models 
were researched and validated before applied to 
meet the ROK’s circumstances. In the process, 
expert knowledge in urban planning, including 
the building and transport sector, has been 
substantially upgraded. Since 2008, the Korea 
Transport Database Center has been responsible 
for generating the annual report on the GHG 
inventory by the transport sector in collaboration 
with the Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Research 
Center. Also, the government’s large investments 
in the development of electric cars helped Korean 
manufacturers achieve world-class quality battery 
and motor technologies (PCGG, 2013), even though 
the domestic market for electric cars still remains at 
an early development stage. 
5. Takeaways and 
Recommendations
Developing countries experiencing high urbanization 
and motorization growth rates are expected to 
encounter similar urban challenges that the ROK has 
attempted to resolve to date. Issues related to urban 
development are inherently complex and require 
persistent, long-term efforts. The replicability of 
the nation’s approach and strategies may be limited, 
as different countries have varying demographic, 
social, and geographical conditions. For example, 
ROK’s urban development has been featured and 
supported by early commitments to infrastructure 
investments (e.g., introducing subway systems in the 
1970s) and the presence of a strong construction 
industry, which may not be the case in many 
developing countries. Yet, ROK’s progress made 
under the “green homeland and transportation” 
agenda offers several recommendations for 
countries that intend to pursue green growth. 
Table 25: Legal and institutional framework for the urban sector
Act
• Sustainable Transportation Logistics Development Act
• Special Act on the Support and Activation of Urban Regeneration 
• Act on the Creation and Support of Green Buildings
2009, MLTM
2012, MLTN
2013, MLTM
Guidelines
• Guidelines for Low-Carbon Green City 
• Revised Standard for Sustainable New Town Planning 
• Guideline for Environmentally Friendly Sustainable City
2009, MLTM
2010, MLTM
2013, ME
Plans
• Master Plan for Architectural Policy (2010-2014)
• Master Plan for National Bicycle Road
• Comprehensive Plan for Development of Sustainable Transport Logistics
• Master Plan for Multi-Modal Transfer Center Development (2011-2015)
2010, MLTM
2010, MOPAS
2011, KOTI
2013, KOTI
Table 24: Number of green homes (2005-2013)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
MLTM 0 73,000 81,592 141,798 133,385 429,775 
MOTIE 18,845 29,857 37,684 54,663 30,495 171,544 
Source: KTI, 2013; Korea Transport Database Center, 2014
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Greening the urban sector fundamentally requires 
engaging numerous stakeholders such as ministries, 
public bodies as well as subnational governments 
with varying or even conflicting interests. For 
instance, a variety of green city models were 
conceptualized under different names led by 
different ministries and local government authorities 
in the ROK, which inevitably sparked disagreements 
and conflicts. MoE’s interests in environmental 
protection and ecological rehabilitation were often 
in conflict with MLTM’s upholding of economic 
return of investments. Locally driven initiatives 
for urban greening are no exception from the 
disparities in the level of central government’s 
financial assistance and local government demands 
(Wang, 2009). Therefore, the roles of respective 
stakeholders should be established at the onset 
through centrally coordinated efforts. 
Strategies on mitigation of GHG emissions should 
not consider urban issues as being isolated from 
one another. For example, spatial zoning and 
land use in urban areas may be a direct result of 
transportation planning. On the other hand, land-
use planning with zoning codes that regulate the 
density and size of buildings directly influence 
the choice of residence and mode of transport. 
Thus, greening of urban development must take a 
holistic approach, maximizing synergies in spatial 
planning, transportation, housing, and environment 
management, such as maintaining trip distances 
short and workplaces within reach of public 
transport. Between 2005 and 2012, Seoul was able 
to decrease the share of automobile use from 26.3% 
to 20.4%, which translated into an increased share 
of walking from 4.8% to 23.4%. The regeneration 
of inner city areas to deter urban sprawling and 
investments on pedestrian-friendly spaces were 
critical to achieving such outcomes. 
Furthermore, developing countries should learn 
how Korea has successfully regarded the activity of 
commuting as a public service offering, characterized 
by topnotch service delivery standard and 
promotion of self-discipline. Similar to what Korea 
has done, major cities in developing countries are 
continuously expanding by creating new cities on the 
outskirts of the capital city. This requires seamless 
commuting within and outside the capital, thereby 
requiring an integrated transport infrastructure. One 
of the modes of commuting is the bus, and Korea’s 
current bus system demonstrates a good case of 
utmost respect to time instead of profit, which is 
the opposite case in many developing countries. 
Being a slave to the clock, punctuality is the major 
benchmark of performance. Thus, Korean transport 
system requires buses to arrive and leave on time 
at designated stops, strictly following the fixed 
schedule. Developing countries, on the other hand, 
grapple with unregulated private buses – many of 
which are already old, dilapidated, and heavy smoke 
belchers – and its drivers are treating the road as a 
race track to get the most number of passengers, and 
reach their quota for the day. Thus, congested buses 
would stop whenever and wherever to squeeze 
in as many bodies as possible and rake in more 
profits, which leads to more traffic, pollution, and 
accidents. This unpleasant scene makes commuting 
an everyday struggle for survival.
In an urban jungle, nothing is as powerful as an 
efficient, accessible, and affordable public transport 
service. Although Korea has still a long way to go to 
significantly reduce the number of cars on the road, 
it has achieved great strides in terms of increasing 
public transport ridership. Through its integrated bus 
and subway system – which showcases an impressive 
convergence of IT and transport technologies – as 
well as its aggressive policies designed to curb the 
demand for private car ownership, passengers from 
all walks of life would perceive – in many instances 
– that the use of public transport is much more 
efficient, convenient, and cheaper than driving 
private vehicles. The words of the former mayor 
of Bogota, Enrique Peñalosa resonate well in this 
regard when he emphasized that “a developed 
country is where the rich use public transport.” It is 
worth noting that Korea’s progress in this area was 
not achieved flawlessly as coming up with the proper 
strategy is largely the result of a tedious series 
of trials and errors, the lessons of which could be 
useful for developing countries that are undergoing 
similar transitions and reforms in their transport 
system. Against this backdrop, the major takeaway 
from Korea is its continuous effort to shift its urban 
transport policy from being too focused on technical 
efficiency to a more human-centric approach.  
This entails putting human welfare at the heart 
of transport infrastructure planning such that it 
becomes user-friendly not just for the majority of the 
public but also for children, women, disabled, elderly, 
and even foreigners.
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In terms of the ROK’s experience in the building 
sector, it highlights the importance of this sector in 
making a low-carbon transition. Faced with tough 
climatic conditions – featuring hot and humid 
summers, and long and bitterly cold winters – the 
nation’s buildings have struggled to find ways of 
reducing the high energy demand from the increased 
use of cooling and heating systems. The government 
took the lead in developing the necessary 
technologies, and launching voluntary programs that 
incentivize energy efficient investments. Supported 
by the nation’s globally competitive construction 
and engineering firms, the government took a 
phased approach in introducing design codes that 
help minimize energy loss and improve the quality 
of service. Moreover, the bar was set higher for 
buildings occupied by public entities – such as the 
ministerial and local government offices, schools, 
public hospitals and state-run community centers – 
under the belief that the public sector should set a 
model for the business sector. 
Preference for economic growth over environmental 
sustainability is bound to persist in developing 
countries. One should note that many of the ROK’s 
programs that focus on urban GHG emission cuts 
are in nature mid- to long-term initiatives that 
involve infrastructure restructuring. As opposed 
to management changes, infrastructural measures 
require many years for completion, and are 
difficult and costly to reverse. The lock-in effects of 
infrastructure and technology choices made by the 
ROK during its stage of rapid economic growth are 
the primary reason for sustained increase in GHG 
emissions by the transportation sector. In other 
words, infrastructure decisions made by the ROK 
during the 1970s and 1980s have failed to reflect 
the social costs of environmental degradation and 
GHG emissions resulting from the investments. For 
example, the bold restoration of the Cheonggye 
stream in Seoul – which has become the city’s most 
attractive area to locals and tourists – involved 
demolition of an overpass that had left the stream 
covered for 40 years. Perhaps, the nation’s restricted 
area and steep landscape have played a positive role 
in keeping cities compact and optimized available 
infrastructure. The ROK’s experiences emphasize 
how developing countries have the opportunity 
to take long-planning horizons and make smarter 
decisions in urban infrastructure, as opposed to 
focusing simply on realizing immediate increases in 
urban infrastructural capacity.
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An objective assessment of the ROK’s green grown 
regime is crucial in shaping the overall future of 
green growth, considering the country’s remarkable 
leadership in advancing green growth as a domestic 
and global agenda. Since the ROK was once a 
developing country that has achieved a developed 
status within a single generation, its experience 
could offer useful lessons for both developing and 
developed countries. This concluding chapter applies 
a critical lens to the current status of the ROK’s 
green growth policy. It tackles the key milestones, 
from the perspectives of: 
(1) the advancement of green growth as a national 
agenda; 
(2) its role in building a solid foundation for the 
nation’s climate change mitigation policy; 
(3) the potential of green technology to serve as a 
new growth engine; and
(4) the growing international recognition of the ROK 
as a green power.
Likewise, this chapter also highlights the significant 
setbacks along the way such as: 
(1) the conceptual limitations of low-carbon green 
growth; 
(2) unsatisfactory achievement to date; and
(3) inadequate bottom-up communication. 
It also presents the ROK’s medium-term green 
growth strategy by introducing the Second 
Five-Year Plan for Green Growth (2014-2018). 
This chapter concludes by highlighting key 
takeaways from the ROK’s green growth experience 
and the concomitant challenges going forward. 
1.1 Key Milestones
Green Growth as a national agenda – in words and 
in action
The ROK is the only country by far that adopted 
green growth as a development strategy on a 
CHAPTER 8 
1. Conclusion 
CONCLUSION
Summary
The ROK’s boldness in pursuing green growth, regardless of the outcomes, is already making a significant contribution 
in advancing green growth as a development paradigm. It has been widely recognized as the only country so far to have 
operationalized green growth on a national scale by setting ambitious targets and implementing action plans. It has its fair 
share of criticisms, obviously such as questions regarding the degree of “greenness” of the ROK’s green growth model, 
ambiguity in substance and results, and imbalance between top-down and bottom-up communication. Green growth 
as a policy approach remains embedded in the ROK’s development strategy with the release of the Second Five-Year 
Plan for Green Growth (2014-2018), which will focus on achieving substantial outcomes in integrating green growth 
and the creative economy through the convergence of green technology and ICT. Looking to the future, unlocking the 
short- and long-term economic, social, and environmental benefits of green growth and demonstrating tangible results 
on the ground remain the critical tests for the ROK’s low-carbon green growth model. If this strategy succeeds in reaping 
positive results at home, it could create strong ripple effects beyond the ROK’s borders. 
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national scale – backed up by explicit laws, high-
level institutions, comprehensive goals, and specific 
timeframes (both short-term and long-term). A 
confluence of various factors has made this possible, 
but the most significant is the strong political will 
of the Lee Myung-Bak administration to set low-
carbon green growth as a national vision that would 
hopefully endure leadership changes and enable the 
nation to punch above its weight as a rising “green” 
power in international affairs. The public declaration 
of green growth even took place at the historic 60th 
founding anniversary of the ROK in 2008, when 
former President Lee expressed his utmost optimism 
that green growth would continue or even surpass 
what the ROK has achieved in the past 60 years.
The succeeding developments revealed that the 
nation’s pursuit of green growth does not stop at 
mere talk. Both the ruling and opposition parties 
of the National Assembly agreed to pass the 
Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth in 
2010, which laid the foundation for the legal and 
institutional framework for green growth. The 
key aspects of this landmark legislation are the 
institutionalization of green growth at the national 
level and the formation of consultative bodies to 
stir multi-stakeholder participation. These policy 
innovations provide a good governance structure 
and coordination mechanism for green growth 
planning and implementation. 
Adopting green growth as a national agenda is 
unlikely to succeed without strong public support. 
To gain public approval, the ROK government 
highlighted the economic benefits of green growth 
and the scope for improving the quality of life by 
reducing GHG emissions (Jones and Yoo, 2012).
Moreover, the Framework Act on Low Carbon, 
Green Growth has specific provisions (Articles 58 
and 59) for intensive public awareness campaigns 
and education for the “practice of green life.”1  In 
a survey conducted by Hankook Research (with 
95% confidence level and sampling error of 3.1%), 
majority or 96.7% of 1,000 adult Koreans agreed 
that the next government should continue green 
growth as one of its key policy priorities. In another 
national survey in 2013, up to 97% of Koreans 
agreed that the green growth policy should be 
promoted again by the next government, and 84% 
responded that it has helped in resolving climate 
change and the energy crisis (Kang, 2012). 
The ROK’s shift toward a proactive governance 
that directly tackles climate change has resulted 
in an ideational transition that helps counter the 
criticisms. It also marked a period where green 
growth has become an inviolable political ideology 
and where low-carbon and clean energy schemes 
have become widely accepted as “appropriate policy,” 
even “best practice.” Green growth builds upon 
the alarming public concern over climate change 
impacts that have become evident since the early 
1990s. The urgency of climate change response has 
greatly assisted the ROK government in mobilizing 
widespread support across Korean society for more 
ambitious policies (Lee, 2013b).
Solid foundation created for GHG emissions 
reduction and climate change response
One of the main objectives of the ROK’s green 
growth policy is to mitigate climate change. It 
anticipates a post-Kyoto Protocol order where the 
nation will be classified as a developed country 
bearing mandatory obligations on emissions 
reduction. In 2009, the government announced 
its national target of reducing its GHG emissions 
by 30% below BAU levels by 2020. Although the 
National GHG Inventory Reports noted that the 
country’s recent emission reduction efforts have 
been insufficient in meeting the annual targets, the 
MoE announced the new National Roadmap for 
Reduction of GHG Emissions in early 2014, which 
continues to uphold the ultimate target of a 30% 
cut in emissions by 2020. It maintains the same BAU 
projection and reduction measures for seven priority 
sectors of the economy as strategically set by the 
government in 2011.
To enforce its climate mitigation policy, the ROK 
became the first Asian country to pass a law on 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) effective 2015 
despite strong opposition from the industrial sector 
over the policy’s implications on the international 
competitiveness of the ROK’s industries. The highly 
debated ETS bill passed in May 2012 was able to 
win an almost unanimous approval of the national 
assembly as it was well justified for its intention 
1 | Article 58 (Facilitation of Green Life Campaigns) Section 2 states that the government may provide relevant organizations with financial and administrative 
support to conduct green life campaigns as voluntary action movements driven by the private sector. Article 59 (Education and Public Relations Activities 
for Practice of Green Life) calls for expanding education and public relations activities for low-carbon green growth involving the schools and media organi-
zations.
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of greening the nation’s fossil-fuel dependent 
industries and fostering green technology innovation 
(Yoo, 2012). While some countries veer away from 
setting emissions caps and reduction targets because 
it is politically unpopular and involves painful trade-
offs, the ROK’s ambitious target supported by its 
bold ratification of the ETS bill has been deemed 
impressive for a non-Annex 1 country. Given this 
bold move, the country is better positioned in future 
climate negotiations to set the bar high on emissions 
reduction for other countries and influence them 
to redirect their development efforts along a low-
carbon green pathway.   
Tapping new growth engines through green 
technology
Green growth makes economic sense for the ROK 
through the diffusion of green technology given 
its promising market potential. The nation has 
succeeded in the past in gaining a competitive 
advantage in key industries such as shipbuilding, 
steel, electronics, and ICT following the principle of 
selection and concentration. The new administration 
recognizes the fact that given the small domestic 
market, aging workforce, and increasing competition 
with emerging economies, notably China, the ROK 
has to find its new niche in the global marketplace. 
In this regard, the green industry is deemed to be 
one of the strategic entry points in the context 
of climate change response and tightening 
environmental regulations in international trade. 
Technological innovation is the pivot for turning 
the conflicting relationship between economic 
growth and environmental sustainability into a 
mutually beneficial one. Under the succeeding 
administration’s signature vision (President Park 
Geun-Hye), the “creative economy,” the green 
industry has a key role to play in achieving such 
vision by unleashing potential growth nodes. 
Through intensive R&D efforts, the PCGG reported 
that the ROK has narrowed the technological gap in 
green technology vis-à-vis the global leaders from 
48.7% in 2009 to 22.2% in 2011. Although not all 
technological breakthroughs have fully translated 
into growth in employment, productivity, and export 
activity, there have been positive signals indicating 
potentials for greater success in the future. 
Some of the key examples of the nation’s growing 
industries include secondary cells, LEDs, intelligent 
transportation systems, and renewable energy 
systems. 
Growing international recognition of the ROK as a 
green power
What makes the ROK’s experience an interesting 
case study for green growth is that the country 
not only promotes green growth at home, but also 
banks on its status as a rising middle power to 
disseminate green growth as a new development 
paradigm for developing countries. The continuity 
of green growth policy in the ROK is also attributed 
to the essential role of green growth in uplifting the 
nation’s reputation as a rising middle power on the 
global stage.
The ROK’s “me first” or “first mover” diplomacy and 
leadership in domestic climate policy initiatives 
have been well received internationally, and has 
empowered the nation to play a bridging role to 
help break long-standing stalemates in climate 
negotiations. For instance, the ROK acted as an 
effective mediator in the COP16 in Cancun as it was 
able to converge the interests of both developed and 
developing countries in taking positive action on its 
low-carbon development strategy (Ikenberry and 
Mo, 2013).2 The nation also stands out as a green 
policy entrepreneur in other countries through its 
foreign aid system as it aims to expand the green 
component of its official development assistance 
(ODA) from 11% of the total ODA to 30% by 2020. 
For instance, the ROK mobilized US$ 200 million 
for the East Asia Climate Partnership (EACP) to 
help Asian countries address climate change and 
pursue green growth. Moreover, the nation has 
led discussions on green growth during the G-20 
Summit in 2010 and other high-level meetings. The 
government also pursues a dynamic South-South 
sharing and spreading of green growth strategies 
to the developing world by building the “green-
triangle”3  – the Global Green Growth Institute 
(GGGI), Green Technology Center (GTC), and 
the Green Climate Fund (GCF) − which are key 
organizations (either established and/or hosted by 
the ROK) playing a catalytic role in advancing green 
growth internationally. 
2 | The Cancun Agreement articulated that “a low-carbon development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development” (para 6) and that “addressing 
climate change requires a paradigm shift toward building a low-carbon society that offers substantial opportunities and ensures continued growth and 
sustainable development” (para 10).
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In light of these efforts, the country has indeed 
elevated its international standing by assuming more 
active roles in regional and global affairs through 
“green diplomacy” (Hwang, 2010). The ROK has 
invested so much to gain an international reputation 
of being a trailblazer in green growth, playing a vital 
role in bridging developed and developing countries 
in addressing climate change and providing efficient 
policy directions that could help them achieve green 
growth on a grander scale (Kang et al., 2010). While 
many developing countries look up to the ROK’s 
achievement as a great national accomplishment, 
and even attempt to embrace the nation’s growth 
model to replicate its economic miracle, the 
developed countries also hope to derive useful 
lessons from the ROK if it succeeds in making an 
impact through green growth. 
1.2 Key Limitations
Limits in the concept of low-carbon green growth
From a conceptual standpoint, the degree of 
“greenness” of the ROK’s green growth model 
remains debatable. It has been criticized for focusing 
too much on “growth” while overlooking the “green” 
aspects. In other words, there is a continued 
preference for market-driven growth that prioritizes 
the economy over the environment. 
The “green” aspects of the ROK’s low-carbon green 
growth model have primarily focused on reducing 
GHG emissions, which is intrinsically interlinked 
to the nation’s economic and environmental 
challenges. The mutual benefits in lowering emissions 
are significant; it can help improve economic 
competitiveness, minimize environmental impacts, 
and enhance human well-being. However, emission 
cuts do not spontaneously create such added value. 
As a matter of fact, a low-carbon transition can 
even precipitate environmental degradation and 
entrench unpredicted social inequalities if it is 
not appropriately targeted at specific groups and 
meticulously implemented. It is in this context that 
the ROK’s Five-Year Plan for Green Growth reveals 
gaps in addressing environmental and social needs. 
A large portion of the priority agenda items (and 
their performance indicators) for realizing green 
growth have been anchored on issues concerning 
energy intensity, deploying low-carbon goods and 
services, enhancing the technological levels, and 
boosting export volumes. The target of the Five-
Year Plan to place the nation among the top-30 
countries in the Environmental Performance Index 
(EPI)4 for 2013, was set under the agenda item 
titled “becoming a role model for the international 
community as a green growth leader” (an item 
intentionally omitted for detailed assessment in this 
report) without specifying the concrete action plans 
for meeting this goal. 
Even with the nation’s huge efforts to reorient its 
development toward a greener pathway, improving 
the country’s long-term environmental performance 
remains a long shot as the ROK ranked only 43rd out 
of 178 countries in the EPI 2014. In addition, social 
equity concerns were not fully considered in the 
green growth equation given the definition5 of green 
growth (under the Framework Act on Low Carbon 
Green Growth) that only mentions the economy-
environment nexus. Rendering inadequate attention 
to the social dimension of green growth could be 
attributed to how incredibly fast green growth has 
been elevated as a national agenda to the extent 
of bypassing social equity considerations. Due to 
mounting international pressure to reduce emissions 
and the nation’s urgent need for energy security, the 
development of the enabling systems and policies for 
green growth was done very fast, leaving little room 
for matters related to social welfare, gender equality, 
poverty reduction, and growing income disparity. 
If green growth is deemed as a tool to achieve 
sustainable development, it has to strike a balance 
among the three pillars – economic, environmental, 
and social – to make it more holistic and responsive 
to social problems that are also linked to economic 
and environmental issues.    
3 | The ROK envisioned combining the elements of strategy, finance, and technology in pursuing green growth to form the so-called “green-triangle.” In this 
regard, the government initiated the establishment of GGGI in 2010 (green growth strategy), hosted the secretariat of the GCF in 2012 (green finance), and 
created the GTC in 2012 (green technology). The ROK’s financial contribution to these institutions seeks to create a positive synergy that helps catalyze the 
diffusion of green growth as a new development model for developing countries.
4 | The EPI is an index that “ranks how well countries perform on high-priority environmental issues in two broad policy areas: protection of human health from 
environmental harm and protection of ecosystems.” 
5 | Article 2 defines “green growth” as “growth achieved by saving and using energy and resources efficiently to reduce climate change and damage to the 
environment, securing new growth engines through research and development of green technology, creating new job opportunities, and achieving harmony 
between the economy and environment.”
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Category 2011
Low Carbon Society
Effective reduction 
of GHG emissions
• Setting of national GHG reduction target equivalent to 30% from BAU levels by the year 2020, which is the 
most ambitious target based on levels recommended by the IPCC for developing countries
• Establishment of the Greenhouse Gas Inventory and Research Center (GIR) to operate as the information 
hub of national emissions that supports the setting of national GHG reduction targets and implementation of 
nationwide mitigation programs
• Launch of the Korea Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) in January 2015, which marked a stage of full-fledged 
mitigation actions based on market-driven mechanisms, despite the strong opposition of industries
Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy
Reduction of the use of fossil 
fuels and enhancement of 
energy self-sufficiency
• Introduction of a new overarching national energy masterplan (First National Basic Energy Plan) to help the 
existing policy framework to redirect and coherently align to the targets of reducing GHG emissions, moving 
away from supply-side to demand-side management practices, and supporting development and deployment 
of renewable energy technologies
• Launch of the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) in 2013 to replace the existing Feed-In Tariff (FIT) scheme, 
which places a stringent mandate on national power producers to meet targets for a proportion of their 
energy to come from renewables
Green Technology 
Innovation
Development of green 
technologies for creation 
of new growth engines
• Success in narrowing the technological gap vis-à-vis its global counterparts by adopting the formula of 
“selection and concentration” – identifying 27 key green technology areas of focus based on nationwide 
assessment of innovation potentials – and boosting related public R&D investments
• Secondary cells and LED goods, which have been strongly backed by government incentives for innovation 
and domestic market growth, have become the nation’s leading export items with increasing dominance in 
the global market; other technology items such as energy storage systems, renewable energy systems and 
electric vehicles have made positive progress to become globally competitive
Green Lifestyle
Green life revolution
• Increased public awareness and participation across all sectors of the community in reducing GHG emissions, 
through successful launch of the nationwide movement for low-carbon green growth (the Green Start 
Movement) and establishment of Local Green Growth Committees with the given roles of preparing and 
implementing green growth plans at the grassroots level
• A wide range of government-led initiatives such as green procurement, carbon labeling, green education, 
and pay-as-you-throw waste management programs have entered a stage of maturity, serving a bottom-up 
momentum to pursue green life practices
Green Homeland 
and Transportation 
Creation of green homeland 
and transportation
• A multiple number of “pilot projects” for greening of city operations and urban regeneration carried out by 
ministries and local governments have helped limit growth in urban energy consumption with respect to their 
growth in GRDP during 2009-2013. The total area of urban forest increased by 10.6% from 34,800 to 38,500 
ha between 2009 and 2013
• Share of public transportation system has continued its growth to reach 45.3% by 2012, although such 
achievement is well below the government target of 53% by 2012. The number of bus passenger trips in 
metropolitan cities has increased remarkably after the introduction of quasi-public bus system in 2004 and 
improvements in services and facilities
• Adoption of strengthened building codes and increased participation in energy-efficiency building 
certifications have helped prevent further growth in GHG emissions from the building sector, which made up 
for 8.77% of the nation’s total emissions in 2012 as opposed to 10.83% in 2008
Green Industries
Greening of traditionally 
supported industries and 
nurturing green industries
• The total revenue of green industries – which includes sales of equipment, resources, facilities, and services 
that reduce emissions – have continued to increase to cover 1.44% of the nation’s total industrial turnover by 
2013 from 0.96% in 2009
• Key industries such as steel, petrochemical, oil refining, semiconductor, and display actively pursued 
strategies to cut down on GHG emissions on a company-wide level, through measures such as enhancing 
energy efficiency and production process, and expanding the use of waste resources like waste energy. 
• However, continued rise in energy consumption (and stagnating energy intensities) of the industrial sector 
still remains as the nation’s major obstacle to low-carbon growth; industrial growth propelled the ROK’s 
economic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis but impeded the achievement of energy-efficiency targets
Table 1: Summary of outcomes under the 6 policy directions of the First Five-Year Plan for Green Growth examined in this report
Source: GIR, 2014
338
Lack of actual accomplishment
The real test for green growth’s endurance and 
sustainability as a development policy is whether 
or not it can deliver its promised benefits. However, 
it is still premature to comprehensively assess the 
outcomes of the ROK’s green growth efforts but the 
progress to date has been criticized for its vague 
substance and weak results. In the first place, the 
vision set by the Lee administration for the ROK 
to become the world’s leading “green power” (to 
rank seventh by 2020 and fifth by 2050) remains 
ambiguous as it was not formally defined by concrete 
baseline and measurements. Even the PCGG 
recognized the criticism that the nation’s green 
growth policy has not been guided by appropriate 
metrics and indicators to come up with measureable 
progress (Yang, 2013). 
Moreover, reducing GHG emissions and enhancing 
energy security have not yet produced promising 
results thus far. Imported fossil fuel remains 
the lifeblood of the ROK’s economy and energy 
consumption has increased continuously as more 
industrial facilities were added to weather the global 
financial crisis in 2008. This was exacerbated by 
regular sharp increases in energy consumption due 
to extreme weather events. The government’s plan 
of decoupling the GHG emissions with economic 
growth in 2014 did not materialize. It cannot 
be denied that, in the case of the ROK, energy 
consumption and GHG emissions are still directly 
proportional to economic growth. Considering the 
fact that one of the major objectives of the nation’s 
green growth strategy is to achieve energy efficiency 
and reduce GHG emissions, the recent progress has 
not been impressive.
As long as the nation’s industrial structure remains 
concentrated on manufacturing, bringing about 
fundamental changes in the patterns of energy 
consumption remains a big challenge. The country 
recovered from the financial crunch in 2008 by 
reviving its industrial exports (mainly with China 
providing a huge domestic market for Korean 
products) and taking advantage of favorable 
exchange rates. Accordingly, it is difficult to curb 
energy consumption and improve energy efficiency 
without reforming the energy price structure. 
The ROK’s energy pricing policy tends to focus 
on macroeconomic objectives, specifically price 
stabilization and boosting the manufacturing sector’s 
international competitiveness (Jhung and Park, 
2010). From 2002 to 2010, electricity consumption 
rose by 56% while power utility bills only increased 
by 15%. This sudden surge in energy consumption 
has caused power shortages and could threaten 
national energy security. The subsidy to keep 
electricity prices low is harming the environment as 
it encourages more power consumption and higher 
GHG emissions and also tolerates high energy 
intensity in the industrial sector (Jones and Yoo, 
2012).
Given the persistent rise in energy consumption, 
the only way to reduce GHG emissions is to increase 
the supply of renewable energy and to develop 
innovative technologies to support it. However, in 
the pursuit of doing so, the central government was 
unable to come up with effective incentives for local 
governments to harness renewable energy due to 
lack of social buy-in. Deployment plans for wind and 
tidal power generation were delayed after facing 
opposition from the local residents due to concerns 
over compensation for damage and fishery rights and 
heated debates on ecological depletion. Although the 
nation has succeeded in narrowing the technological 
gap on renewable energy with developed countries, 
it has not yet created a stable market for renewable 
energy facilities and the current pace of market 
penetration is not meeting expectations.
Developing the technology for GHG emission 
reduction requires time and its current level of 
commercialization is in the slow lane such as in the 
case of deploying green cars and carbon capture 
storage (CCS). The ROK’s GHG emissions reduction 
target reveals its lack of practicality as it does not 
only lack accurate evaluation of technical standards 
but also a thorough analysis of the timeframe for 
commercialization. Such experience stressed the 
importance of creating a reduction plan of absolute 
energy use in the first place, before relying on the 
technology per se. The government has shown that 
the nation is eager to be seen as a leader in the 
development of climate policies, so it has taken on 
a strong target to justify its efforts. Nonetheless, 
being unable to produce solid results from such 
efforts reflects the still mediocre performance of the 
government’s green growth policy. 
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Weak bottom-up communication 
The ROK’s traditional top-down planning approach 
has served the country well in the past and has also 
been instrumental in advancing green growth as 
a national agenda. However, since green growth 
requires a fundamental shift of mindset and lifestyle, 
it requires a solid bottom-up communication, 
especially at the grassroots level to effectively 
influence people’s behavior and habits. While the 
overall public sentiment is in favor of green growth, 
as revealed in surveys, many of the promotional 
programs on GHG reduction, energy efficiency, 
green transportation, and the like have struggled 
to induce stakeholder participation on a full scale 
due to weak marketing strategies (largely because 
it is not well tailored for specific target groups), 
inadequate incentive mechanisms, and poor sharing 
of information especially at the early stage of policy 
formulation.
Strengthening bottom-up communication is a 
challenging reform needed in the ROK’s governance 
system given its successful post-war history of 
rapid economic growth built on top-down central 
planning. However, as the nation begins to mature 
as a democratic country, its people will inevitably 
demand more sincerity from government in terms 
of reaching out to the public, conducting bottom-up 
consultation, and achieving a consensus especially 
on policies that will have far-reaching implications on 
the majority.
In most cases, information, education, and 
communication campaigns only take place when the 
policy has already been designed or is in the process 
of being implemented. The ROK government’s 
strategy of seeking quick solutions (based on the 
nation’s ppali ppali6  culture) to the extent that public 
consultation is compromised may have worked 
well during the post-war period, but not for today’s 
modern democratic Korean society. Thus, there is a 
stronger call to build a truly meaningful governance 
system characterized by active exchanges of 
opinions and coordination of policy directions in the 
earlier stages of development planning.
1.3 The New Five-Year Plan for Green Growth 
(2014-2018)
While the grand take-off of green growth in the 
ROK as a new development strategy was indeed 
noteworthy, its endurance as a long-term policy 
remains to be tested under changing political 
leadership. In support of the new administration’s 
launch of “creative economy” as the signature 
advocacy, “green growth” as a policy approach is 
still embedded in the nation’s development strategy 
with the release of the Second Five-Year Plan for 
Green Growth (2014-2018). The deputy minister for 
economic affairs of MOFA noted that the creative 
economy touted by President Park encompasses 
green growth, especially in creating innovative 
business opportunities and jobs as part of global 
efforts for sustainable development and emission 
reduction (Kim, 2013). It should be noted that the 
6 | “Ppali ppali” is a common Korean expression meaning “hurry up.” Doing things fast has become part of the daily culture in Korea as seen in many aspects of 
government and business, particularly in the services sector. 
Source: PCGG, 2014
Figure 1: Comparison of the first and second plans for green growth
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Establishment of an Institutional Basis
1st Plan
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· Covergence Technology / Creation
· Initiated by the Private Sector / Expansion of the market
· Economy, Environment & Society
Achievement of Substantial Outcomes
2nd Plan
2014~ 2018
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First Five-Year Plan (2009-2013) was designed to 
establish the necessary institutional framework 
that would launch and sustain green growth policies 
in the future; it was not intended to complete the 
nation’s transition to green growth considering the 
long-term timeframe required to address the issues 
of climate change and energy security. Drawing 
on the lessons and limitations in the course of 
implementing the first plan, the second plan aims to 
focus on the following areas: 
(1) establishing a low-carbon socioeconomic 
structure; 
(2) achieving a creative economy through the 
convergence of green technology and ICT; and 
(3) building a pleasant living environment safe from 
the harms of climate change. 
The preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan 
involved six expert meetings and two discussion 
meetings with the relevant government agencies 
for the drafting of the strategy. The external experts 
gathered to evaluate the First Five-Year Plan 
followed by the formulation of detailed tasks for 
each government department. After PCGG’s final 
review of the draft, the plan was completed on May 
21, 2014. The second plan is intended to deliver 
more concrete results, particularly in the strategic 
promotion of core areas such as system building for 
the sustainable energy system, capacity building on 
climate change response, and reduction of GHGs. 
1.4 Takeaways and Recommendations
The ROK is a rare example of green growth strategy 
being developed and implemented on a national 
scale as the government’s central agenda. In terms 
of persuasive force, nothing is as powerful and 
inspiring as the first mover who paves the way 
forward. The fact that the nation rose to be a high-
income country from a GDP per capita of US$ 155 in 
1960 further adds to its relevance. In addition to the 
matter of political leadership, developing countries 
could benefit from learning how the ROK has 
approached the green growth agenda, as well as the 
institutional process through which all downstream 
strategies, plans, and projects were developed and 
implemented. The ROK’s green growth strategy 
was a strictly top-down affair and given the reality 
of most developing countries, it could serve as a 
useful model in the planning and execution of their 
respective strategies. 
Source: PCGG, 2014
Figure 2: Basic structure of the second plan
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The nation’s experience offers the following lessons 
for developing countries: 
(1) it shows that green growth can be adopted as 
the government’s central agenda in a democratic 
country; 
(2) its strategy demonstrates the need for a judicious 
balance between national and global interests; 
and 
(3) it underscores the importance of a top-down 
approach and the benefits of a strong political 
momentum. 
Amid the share of praises and criticisms, much of 
the value of the ROK’s experience to the global 
community stems not from its success or failure, 
but in its attempt for a nationwide transition, 
notwithstanding the risk of public backlash. The 
fact that the nation was one of the first to foray 
into such an uncharted territory, while some of the 
world’s major economies were hesitant to act, is in 
itself a significant contribution in the quest for green 
growth.
As the ROK continues to promote green growth 
as a strategic facet of its foreign policy, it has to 
overcome significant challenges. First, governments 
of developing countries are reluctant to commit 
their limited resources to policy experimentation 
on a national scale. History has shown that growth 
alone is hard to realize; hence, green growth is 
perceived as an additional layer of complexity on 
what is already a difficult endeavor. For low-income 
countries lacking in capacity, green growth may also 
imply increased reliance on developed countries 
for technical assistance, financing, and technology 
transfer, with correspondingly diminished control 
over their path toward economic development. 
Second, the lack of government leadership has a 
negative impact on the private sector. Firms require 
a stable business environment to make long-term 
investment decisions. A clear indication from the 
government on its future policies is necessary to 
provide this certainty. Non-existent or halfway 
measures, on the other hand, signal continuance of 
the status quo and result in technological lock-in that 
is costly to rectify. 
Indeed, the challenges at home for the ROK to 
pursue green growth as a development policy are as 
daunting as its challenges abroad. Changing the way 
how countries view economic prosperity through a 
green growth lens is no easy task and making green 
growth responsive to a country’s unique needs is 
likewise a complicated mission considering how 
countries differ in their stages of development, 
natural resource endowment, political structure, 
institutional capacity, and development priorities. 
In working with developing countries, the ROK 
has to conform to the principle that unless green 
growth can contribute to poverty reduction and 
socioeconomic progress in the near to medium term, 
it will be a hard sell in developing countries (OECD, 
2011). Furthermore, diffusing green growth abroad 
will falter if it fails to embrace country ownership. It 
can only be well integrated and mainstreamed in the 
national planning processes if it is demand-driven 
and led by the countries because, green growth, after 
all, should enable – and not dictate – development.
In the bigger picture, green growth has reinvigorated 
the sustainable development agenda and 
contributed to boosting optimism and activism in 
tapping new sources of growth by explicitly stressing 
“growth out of green” (Park, 2013). One of the 
findings of the first Green Growth Best Practice 
(GGBP) report is that “green growth can unlock 
substantial economic, social, and environmental 
benefits, both short-term and long-term” through 
resource efficiency, support for green technology 
and business innovation, and investments on risk 
mitigation to facilitate the transition to green 
development (GGBP, 2014). To consistently trickle 
down such benefits to the grassroots will be the 
critical test for green growth going forward and with 
this challenge in mind, all eyes are on the ROK. 
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